In the history of philosophy we see before us the consecutive forms of
the thoughts of the ruling classes of society on life and on the world
at large. This class thought appears after the primitive communism has
given way to a society with class antagonisms, at a stage when the
wealth of the members of the ruling class gave them leisure time and
thus stimulated them to turn their attention to the productions of the
mind. The beginning of this thought is found in classic Greece. But it
assumed its clearest and best developed form when the modern bourgeoisie
had become the ruling class in capitalistic Europe and the thinkers gave
expression to the ideas of this class. The characteristic mark of these
ideas is dualism, that is to say the misunderstood contrast between
thinking and being, between nature and spirit, the result of the mental
unclearness of this class and of its incapacity to see the things of the
world in their true interconnection. This mental state is but the
expression of the division of mankind into classes and of the
uncomprehended nature of social production ever since it became a
production of goods for exchange.
In times of primitive communism, the conditions of production were clear
and easily understood. Things were produced jointly for use and consumed
in common. Man was master of his mode of production and thus master of
his own fate as far as the superior forces of nature admitted it. Under
such conditions, social ideas could not help being simple and clear.
There being no clash between personal and social interests, men had no
conception of a deep chasm between good and bad. Only the uncontrolled
forces of nature stood like unintelligible and mysterious powers, that
appeared to them either as well meaning or as evil spirits, above these
primitive little societies.
But with the advent of the production of commodities the picture
changes. Civilized humanity begins to feel itself somewhat relieved from
the hard and ungovernable pressure of fickle natural forces. But now new
demons arise out of social conditions. "No sooner did the producers give
their products away in exchange instead of consuming them as heretofore,
than they lost control of them. They no longer knew what became of their
products, and there was a possibility that these products might some day
be used for the exploitation and oppression of the producers--The
products rule the producers." (Engels) In the production of commodities,
it is not the purpose of the individual producer which is accomplished,
but rather that which the productive forces back of him are aiming at.
Man proposes, but a social power, stronger than himself, disposes; he is
no longer master of his fate. The inter-relations of production become
complicated and difficult to grasp. While it is true that the individual
is the producing unit, yet his individual labor is only a subordinate
part of the whole process of social production, of which he remains a
tool. The fruits of the labor of many are enjoyed by a few individuals.
The social co-operation is concealed behind a violent competitive
struggle of the producers against one another. The interests of the
individuals are at war with those of society. Good, that is to say the
consideration of the common welfare, is opposed to bad, that is to say
the sacrifice of everything to private interests. The passions of men as
well as their mental gifts, after they have been aroused, developed,
trained, strengthened, and refined in this struggle, henceforth become
so many weapons which a superior power turns against their helpless
possessors.
Such were the impressions out of which thinking men were obliged to
fashion their world-philosophy, while, at the same time, they were
members of the possessing classes and had thus an opportunity to employ
their leisure for a certain self-study, without, however, being in touch
with the source of their impressions, viz., the process of social labor
which alone could have enabled them to see through the social origin of
their ideas. Men of this class, therefore, were led to the assumption
that their ideas emanated from some supernatural and spiritual power or
that they were themselves independent supernatural powers. This dualist
metaphysical mode of thought has gone through various transformations in
the course of time, adapting itself to the evolution of production
beginning with ancient slavery, on through the serfdom of the Middle
Ages and of mediaeval commodity production, to modern capitalism. These
successive changes of form are embodied in Grecian philosophy, in the
various phases of the Christian religion, and in the modern systems of
philosophy.
But we must not regard these systems and religions for what they
generally pass, that is to say, we must not think them to be only
repeated unsuccessful attempts to formulate absolute truth. They are
merely the incarnations of progressive stages of better knowledge
acquired by the human mind about itself and about the universe. It was
the aim of philosophical thought to find satisfaction in understanding.
And as long as understanding could not wholly be gotten by natural
means, there remained always a field for the supernatural and
incomprehensible. But by the painstaking mental work of the deepest
thinkers, the material of science was ceaselessly increased, and the
field of the supernatural and incomprehensible was ever more narrowed.
And this is especially the case since the progress of capitalist
production has promoted the persistent study of nature. For through this
study the human mind was enabled to test its powers by simple, quiet,
persistent and fruitful labor in the search for successive parts of
truth; and thus to rid itself from the overirritation of hopeless quest
after absolute truth. The desire to ascertain the value of these new
truths gave rise to the problems of the theory of understanding. The
attempts to solve these problems form a permanent part of modern systems
of philosophy, which represent a graduated evolution of the theory of
understanding. But the supernatural element in these systems prevented
their perfection.
Under the impulse of the technical requirements of capitalism, the
evolution of natural sciences became a triumphal march of the human
mind. Nature was subjugated first through the discovery of its laws by
the human mind, and then by the material subordination of the known
forces of nature to the human will in the service of our main object,
the production of the necessaries of life with a minimum expenditure of
energy. But this bright shining light rendered, by contrast, the gloom
which surrounded the phenomena of human society only the darker, and
capitalism in its development still accentuates this contrast, as it
accentuates and thus renders more easily visible and intelligible all
contrasts. While the natural sciences dispensed with all mysterious
secrecy within their narrower domain, the darkness shrouding the origin
of ideas still offered a welcome refuge to the belief in miracles on the
spiritual field.
Capitalism is now approaching its decline. Socialism is near. And the
vital importance of this transition in human history cannot be stated
more strongly than in the words of Marx and Engels: "This concludes the
primary history of man. He thereby passes definitely out of the animal
kingdom." The social regulation of production makes man fully the master
of his own fate. No longer does any mysterious social power then thwart
his plans or jeopardise his success. Nor does any mysterious natural
force control him henceforth. He is no longer the slave, but the master
of nature. He has investigated its effects, understands them, and
presses them into his service. For the first time in his history he will
then be the ruler of the earth.
We now see that the many centuries that filled the history of
civilization were a necessary preparation for socialism, a slow struggle
to escape from nature's slavery, a gradual increase of the productivity
of labor, up to the point where the necessaries of life for all may be
obtained almost without exertion. This is the prime merit of capitalism
and its justification, that after so many centuries of hardly
perceptible progress it taught man to conquer nature by a rapid assault.
At the same time it set loose the forces of production and finally
transformed and bared the springs of the productive process to such a
degree that they easily could be perceived and grasped by the human
mind; this was the indispensable condition for the control of this
process.
As never since the first advent of production of commodities there has
been such a fundamental revolution, it must necessarily be accompanied
by an equally fundamental spiritual revolution. This economic revolution
is the conclusion of the long period of class antagonisms and of
production of commodities; it carries with it the end of the dualist and
supernatural thoughts arising from this source. The mystery of social
processes passes away with this period, and the spiritual expression of
these mysteries must necessarily disappear with it. The slow development
of human thought from ignorance to an ever increased understanding
thereby ends its first chapter. This signifies the completion and
conclusion of philosophy, which is equivalent to saying that philosophy
as such passes out of existence, while its place is taken by the science
of the human mind, a part of natural science.
A new system of production sheds its light into the minds of men already
before it has fully materialized. The same science which teaches us to
understand and thereby to control the social forces, also unfetters the
mind from the bewitching effects of those forces. It enables him even
now already to emancipate himself from traditional superstitions and
ideas which were formerly the expression of things unknown. We may
anticipate with our mind the coming time. And thus the ideas which will
then dominate are already even now growing within us in a rudimentary
form corresponding to the present actual economic development. By this
means we are even now enabled to overcome the capitalist philosophy in
thought and to soberly and clearly grasp the matter-dependent nature of
our spirit.
The completion and the end of philosophy need not wait for the
realization of socialist production. The new understanding does not fall
from heaven like a meteor. It develops with the social-economic
development, first imperfectly and imperceptibly, in a few thinkers who
most strongly feel the breath of the approaching time. With the growth
of the science of sociology and with that of its practical application,
the socialist labor movement, the new understanding simultaneously
spreads and gains ground step by step, waging a relentless battle
against the traditional ideas to which the ruling classes are clinging.
This struggle is the mental companion of the social class struggle.
************
The methods of the new natural science had already been practiced for a
few centuries before the new theory was formulated. It first found vent
in the expression of surprise at the great confidence with which men
assumed to predict certain phenomena and to point out their connections.
Our experience is limited to a few successive observations of the
regularity or coincidence of events. But we attribute to natural laws,
in which are expressed causal relations of phenomena, a general and
necessary applicability which far exceeds our experience. The English
thinker Hume was the first who clearly expressed and formulated the
question--since called the problem of causality--why men always act in
this manner. But as he believed the reason for such action should be
sought in the nature of experience alone, experience being the only
source of knowledge, and as he did not further investigate the special
and distinct part played by the nature of the human mind in this
experiential connection, he could not find any satisfactory answer.
Kant, who made the first important step toward the solution of this
question, had been trained in the school of rationalism which then
dominated in Germany and which represented an adaptation of mediaeval
scholasticism to the requirements of increased knowledge. Starting from
the thesis that things which are logical in the mind must be real in
nature, the rationalists formulated by mere deduction general truths
about god, infinity and immortality. Under the influence of Hume, Kant
became the critic of rationalism and thus the reformer of philosophy.
The question, how it is that we have knowledge of generally applicable
laws in which we have implicit confidence--such as mathematical theses,
or the maxim that every change has a cause--was answered by Kant in this
way: Experience and science are as much conditioned on properties
inherent in the organization of our mind as on the impressions of the
outer world. The former properties must necessarily be contained in all
experience and science. Therefore everything dependent on this common
mental part of science must be perfectly certain and independent of
special sense impressions. Common to all experience, and inseparable
from it, are the pure sense-conceptions (reine Anschauungsformen), such
as space and time, while the many experiences, in order to succeed in
forming understanding and science, must be connected by the pure
mind-conceptions (reine Verstandesbegriffe), the so-called categories;
among the latter also belongs causality.
Now Kant explains the necessity and general applicability of the pure
sense and mind conceptions by the fact that they arise from the
organization of our mind. Accordingly, the world appears to the senses
as a succession of phenomena in time and space. Our reason transforms
these phenomena into things which are welded into one aggregate nature
by laws of cause and effect. On the things as they really are in
themselves, in the opinion of Kant, these pure conceptions cannot be
applied. We know nothing of them and can neither perceive nor
reconstruct them by reason, because "in themselves" they are wholly
beyond reason and knowledge.
The result of this investigation, which was the first valuable
contribution to a scientific theory of understanding and forms, from our
standpoint, the most important part of Kant's philosophy, served him
mainly as a means of answering the following questions: What is the
value of knowledge which exceeds experience? Can we, by mere deduction
through concepts which go beyond experience, arrive at truths? His
answer was: No, and it was a crushing blow to rationalism. We cannot
exceed the boundaries of experience. By experience alone can we arrive
at science. All supposed knowledge about the unlimited and infinite,
about concepts of pure reason, called Ideas by Kant, (as the soul, the
world, and God) is nothing but illusions. The contradictions in which
the human mind becomes involved whenever it applies the categories
outside of experience to such subjects, are manifested in the fruitless
strife between the philosophical systems. Metaphysics as a science is
impossible.
This did not give the deathblow to rationalism alone, but also to
bourgeois materialism which reigned among the French radical thinkers.
Kant's researches refuted the negative as well as the positive
assertions anent the supernatural and infinite. This cleared the field
for faith, for intuitive conviction. God, freedom and immortality are
concepts the truth of which cannot be proved by reason, like the natural
truths derived from experience. But nevertheless their reality is no
less certain, only it is of a different nature, being subjective and,
therefore, necessarily a matter of personal conviction. The freedom of
the will, for instance, is not a knowledge gained by experience, because
experience never teaches us anything but lack of freedom and dependence
on the laws of nature. But nevertheless freedom of will is a necessary
conviction of every one who feels it in the categorical imperative: Thou
shalt! of every one possessed by a sense of duty and of the knowledge
that he can act accordingly: therefore freedom of will is
unconditionally certain and requires no proof by experience. And from
this premise there follows in same way the assurance of the immortality
of the soul and of the existence of God. It gives the same kind of
certainty to all ideas which were left in a state of uncertainty by the
critique of pure reason. At the same time freedom of will determines the
form of the theory of understanding. In the entire world of phenomena
there was no room for freedom, for these phenomena follow strict rules
of causality, as demanded by the organization of our mind. Therefore it
was necessary to make room for freedom of will somewhere else, and so
"things in themselves," hitherto a phrase without value and meaning,
assumed a higher importance. They were not bound to space, time or
categories, they were free: they formed so to say a second world, the
world of noumena, which stood behind the world of phenomena and which
solved the contradiction between the lawful dependence of things in
nature and between the personal conviction of freedom of will.
These opinions and reasonings were fully in accord with the conditions
of science and the economic development of Kant's time. The field of
nature was left entirely to the inductive method of science which based
itself on strictly materialist experience and observation, classifying
things systematically in their causal order and excluding all
supernatural interference. But while faith was banished from the natural
sciences forever, it could not be dispensed with. The ignorance as to
the origin of the human will left room for a supernatural ethic. The
attempts of the materialists to exclude the supernatural also from this
field failed. The time had not come as yet for a materialist and natural
ethics, for science was not yet able to demonstrate as an indisputable
truth, founded on experience, in what manner ethical codes and moral
ideas in general had a material origin.
This state of things shows that the Kantian philosophy is the purest
expression of bourgeois thought, and this is still more emphasized by
the fact that freedom is the center of his system and controls it.
Rising capitalism required freedom for the producers of commodities in
order to expand its productive forces, it required freedom of
competition and freedom of unlimited exploitation. The producers of
commodities should be free from all fetters and restrictions, and
unhampered by any coercion, in order that they could go, under the sole
direction of their own intelligence, into free competition with their
fellow citizens. For this reason, freedom became the slogan of the young
bourgeoisie aspiring to political power, and Kant's doctrine of the free
will, the basis of his ethics, was the echo of the approaching French
Revolution. But freedom was not absolute; it was to be dependent on the
moral law. It was not to be used in the quest for happiness, but in
accord with the moral law, in the service of duty. If the bourgeois
society was to exist, the private interest of the individual must not
be paramount, the welfare of the entire class had to be superior to that
of the individual, and the commandments of this class had to be
recognized as moral laws taking precedence over the quest for happiness.
But for this very reason, these moral laws could never be fully obeyed,
and every one found himself compelled to violate them in his own
interest. Hence the moral law existed only as a code which could never
be fulfilled. And so it stood outside of experience.
In Kant's ethics the internal antagonism of bourgeois society is
reflected, that antagonism which is the compelling force of the ever
increasing economic development. The foundation of this antagonism is
the antagonism, already mentioned, between the individual and social
character of production that gives rise to omnipotent, but unconceived
social forces ruling the destiny of man. In capitalistic production it
is still intensified by the antithesis of the wealthy ruling class and
the poor producing class that is continuously augmented by those who are
expropriated by competition. This antagonism gives rise to the
contradiction between the aims of men and the results achieved, between
the desire of happiness and the misery of the great mass. It is the
basis of the contradiction between virtue and vice, between freedom and
dependence, between faith and science, between phenomenon and "thing
itself." It is at the bottom of all contradictions and of the entire
pronounced dualism of the Kantian philosophy. These contradictions are
to blame for the downfall of the system, and the work of disintegration
was unavoidable from the moment that the contradictions of the bourgeois
production became apparent, that is to say immediately after the
political victory of the bourgeoisie. The system of Kant could, however,
not be overcome, unless the material origin of morality could be
uncovered. Then these contradictions could be understood and solved by
showing that they were relative and not absolute as they appeared. And
not until then could a materialist ethics, a science of morality, drive
faith from its last retreat. This was at last accomplished by the
discovery of social class struggles and of the nature of capitalist
production, by the pioneer work of Karl Marx.
The practice of developed capitalism about the middle of the 19th
century directly challenged proletarian thinkers to criticise Kant's
doctrine of practical reason. Bourgeois ethics and freedom manifested
themselves in the form of freedom of exploitation in the interest of the
bourgeoisie, as slavery for the working class. The maintenance of human
dignity appeared in reality as the brutalization and degradation of the
proletarians, and the state founded on justice proved to be nothing but
the class state of the bourgeoisie. And so it was seen that Kant's
sublime ethics, instead of being the basis in all eternity of human
activity in general, was merely the expression of the narrow class
interests of the bourgeoisie. This proletarian criticism was the first
material for a general theory, and once it had been stated, its
correctness was demonstrated more and more by the study of previous
historical events, and these events were thereby shown in their proper
light. It was then understood by this theory that the social classes,
distinguished by their position in the process of production, had
different and antagonistic economic interests, and that each class did
necessarily regard its own interest as good and sacred. These general
class interests were not recognized in their true character but appeared
to men in the guise of superior moral motives; in this form they crowded
the special individual interests into the background, and since the
class interests were generally felt, all the members of the same class
recognized them. Moreover, a ruling class could temporarily compel a
defeated or suppressed class to recognize the class interests of the
rulers as a moral law, so long as the inevitability of the mode of
production in which that class ruled was acknowledged. Owing to the fact
that the nature and significance of the productive process was not
understood, the origin of human motives could not be discovered. They
were not traced back to experience, but simply felt directly and
intuitively. And consequently they were thought to be of a supernatural
origin and eternal duration.
Not only the moral codes, but also other products of the human mind,
such as religion, science, arts, philosophy, were then understood to be
intimately connected with the actual material conditions of society. The
human mind is influenced in all its products by the entire world outside
of it. And thus the mind is seen to be a part of nature, and the science
of the mind becomes a natural science. The impressions of the outer
world determine the experience of man, his wants determine his will, and
his general wants his moral will. The world around him determines man's
wants and impressions, but these, on the other hand, determine his will
and activity by which he changes the world; this will-directed activity
appears in the process of social production. In this manner man by his
work is a part, a link in the great chain of natural and social
development.
This conception overturns the foundations of philosophy. Since the human
mind is seen now to be a part of nature and interacts with the rest of
the world according to laws which are more or less known, it is classed
among Kant's phenomena. There is no longer any need of talking about
noumena. Thus they do not longer exist for us. Philosophy then reduces
itself to the theory of experience, to the science of the human mind. It
is at this point that the beginning made by Kant had to be farther
developed. Kant had always separated mind and nature very sharply. But
the understanding that this separation should only be made temporarily
for the purpose of better investigation, and that there is no absolute
difference between matter and mind made it possible to advance the
science of thought processes. However, this could be accomplished only
by a thinker who had fully digested the teachings of socialism. This
problem was solved by Joseph Dietzgen in his work on "THE NATURE OF
HUMAN BRAIN WORK," the first edition of which appeared in 1869, and by
this work he won for himself the name of philosopher of the proletariat.
This problem could be solved only by the help of the dialectic method.
Therefore, the idealist philosophical systems from Kant to Hegel which
consist chiefly in the development of the dialectic method, must be
regarded as the indispensable pioneers and precursors of Dietzgen's
proletarian philosophy.
************
The philosophy of Kant necessarily broke down on account of its dualism.
It had shown that there is safety only in finite and material
experience, and that the mind becomes involved in contradictions
whenever it ventures beyond that line. The mind's reason calls for
absolute truth which cannot be gotten. Hence the mind is groping in the
dark and critique may perhaps explain why it is in the dark, but it
cannot show the way out. What is called with Kant dialectics is in
reality resignation. True, the mind finds knowledge about things outside
of experience by some other way, viz., by means of its moral
consciousness, but this intuitive knowledge in the form of faith remains
sharply separated from scientific understanding. It was the task of the
philosophical development immediately after Kant, to do away with this
sharp separation, this unreconciled contradiction. This development
ended with Hegel; its result was the understanding that contradiction is
the true nature of everything. But this contradiction cannot be left to
stand undisturbed, it must be solved and still retained in a higher
form, and thus be reconciled. Therefore the world of phenomena cannot be
understood as being at rest. It can be understood only as a thing in
motion, as activity, as a continuous change. Action is always the
reconciliation of contradiction in some higher form, and contradiction
appears in this way as the lever of progressive development. That which
accomplishes this dialectic self-development does not appear in the
idealistic systems as the material world itself, but as the spiritual,
the idea. In Hegel's philosophy, this conception assumes the form of a
comprehensive system outlining the self-development of the Absolute
which is spiritual and is identical with God. The development of this
Absolute takes place in three stages; in its primitive pure spiritual
form it develops out of its undifferentiated being the conceptions of
logic; then it expresses itself in another, an external form, opposite
to itself, as Nature. In nature all forms develop by way of
contradictions which are eliminated by the development of some higher
form. Finally the Absolute awakens to consciousness in nature in the
form of the human mind and reaches thus its third stage, at which the
opposite elements, matter and spirit, are reconciled into a unity. The
human mind evolves in the same way to ever higher stages, until it
arrives, at the end of its development by understanding itself, that is
to say, by knowing intuitively the Absolute. This is what happens
unconsciously in religion. Religion, which in the form of faith must be
satisfied with a modest corner in the system of Kant, appears in the
system of Hegel very proudly as a higher sort of understanding superior
to all other knowledge, as an intuitive knowledge of absolute truth
(God). In philosophy this is done consciously. And the historical
development which finds its conclusion and climax in the Hegelian
philosophy corresponds to the logical development of the human mind.
Thus Hegel unites all sciences and all parts of the world into one
masterly system in which the revolutionary dialectics, the theory of
evolution, that considers all finite things as perishable and
transitory, is given a conservative conclusion by putting an end to all
further development when the absolute truth is reached. All the
knowledge of that period was assigned to its place somewhere in this
system, on one of the steps of the dialectic development. Many of the
conceptions of the natural sciences of that day, which later on were
found to be erroneous, are there presented as necessary truths resting
on deduction, not on experience. This could give the impression that the
Hegelian philosophy made empirical research superfluous as a source of
concrete truths. This appearance is to blame for the slight recognition
of Hegel among naturalists; in natural sciences, this philosophy
therefore has won much less importance than it deserved and than it
might have won, if its actual significance, which consists in the
harmonious connection between widely separated events and sciences, had
been better understood under its deceptive guise.
On the abstract sciences the influence of Hegel was greater, and here he
held an exceptionally prominent position in the scientific world of that
time. On one hand, his conception of history as a progressive evolution
in which every imperfect previous condition is regarded as a necessary
phase and preparation for subsequent conditions and thus appears natural
and reasonable, was a great gain for science. On the other hand, his
statements on the philosophy of law and religion met the requirements
and conceptions of his time. In his philosophy of law, the human mind is
taken in that stage in which it steps into reality, having as its
principal characteristic a free will. It is first considered as a single
individual which finds its freedom incorporated in its property. This
personality enters into relations with others like it. Its freedom of
will is thereby expressed in moral laws. By combining all individuals
into one aggregate whole, their contradictory relations are merged into
the social units, viz., the family, the bourgeois society (buergerliche
Gesellschaft) and the state. There the moral rules are carried from the
inner to the outer reality. As the expressions of a superior, common and
more general will, they stand forth in the generally accepted moral
codes, in the natural laws of bourgeois society and in the authoritative
laws of the state. In the state, the highest form of which is the
monarchy, the mind finds itself at its highest stage of objective
realization as the idea of the state.
The reactionary character of Hegelian philosophy is not merely a
superficial appearance that rests on the glorification of state and
royalty, thanks to which this philosophy was raised to the position of
Prussian state philosophy after the restauration. It was in its very
essence a product of reaction which in those days represented the only
possible advance after the revolution. This reaction was the first
practical critique of bourgeois society. After this society had been
firmly established, the relative amenities of the old time appeared in a
better light, because the shortcomings of the new society made
themselves soon felt. The bourgeoisie had recoiled before the
consequences of its revolution, when it recognized that the proletariat
was its barrier. It arrested the revolution as soon as its bourgeois
aims had been accomplished, and it was willing to acknowledge again the
mastery of the feudal state and monarchy, provided they would protect it
and serve its interests. The feudal powers that previously had been
overcome by the weight of their own sins and by the unconditional
superiority of the new social order, again lifted their heads when the
new order in its turn gave cause for well founded criticisms. But they
could not keep the revolution in check, unless they recognized it in a
limited degree. They could once more rule over the bourgeoisie, provided
they compromised with it so far as it was inevitable. They could no
longer prevail against capitalism, but they could govern for it. Thus,
by their rule, the imperfectness of capitalism was revealed.
The theory of restauration, therefore, had to consist first of all of a
thorough critique of the revolutionary bourgeois philosophy. But this
philosophy could not be thrown aside entirely. So far as a critique of
the old order was concerned, the truth of bourgeois philosophy had to be
admitted. On the other hand, the sharp distinction it made between the
falsity of the old and the truth of the new order was found to be beside
the mark. So the correctness of the bourgeois philosophy itself proved
to be relative and limited, like that of a herald of some higher truth
which in its turn would acknowledge that which was temporarily and
partially true in its vanquished precursor. In this way the
contradictions became moments in the evolution of absolute truth, in
this way, furthermore, the dialectics became the main feature and method
of post-Kantian philosophy; and in this way, finally, the theorists of
the reaction were the men who steered philosophy over new courses and
who thereby became the harbingers of socialism. Scepticism and a
critique of all traditional things, yet a careful protection of
endangered faith, had characterized the tendencies of bourgeois thought
during its revolutionary period. In the reactionary stage, the bourgeois
implicitly accepted the belief in absolute truth and cultivated a
self-righteous faith. The practice of Metternich and of the Holy
Alliance corresponded to the theory of Hegelian philosophy.
The practice of the Prussian police state, which embodied the
shortcomings of capitalism without its advantages and thus represented a
higher degree of reaction, destroyed the Hegelian philosophy, as soon as
the practices of maturing capitalism began to rebel against the fetters
by which reaction endeavored to bind it. Feuerbach returned in his
critique of religion from the fantastical heights of abstraction to
physical man. Marx demonstrated that the reality of bourgeois society
expresses itself in its class antagonisms which herald its imperfectness
and approaching downfall, and he discovered that the actual historical
development rested on the development of the process of material
production. The absolute spirit that was supposed to be embodied in the
constitution of the despotic state before the March revolution now
revealed itself as the narrow bourgeois spirit which regards bourgeois
society as the final aim of all historical development. The Hegelian
statement that all finite things carry within themselves the germ of
their own dissolution came home to his own philosophy, as soon as its
finiteness and limitations had been grasped. Its conservative form was
abandoned, but its revolutionary content, the dialectics, was preserved.
The Hegelian philosophy was finally superseded by dialectic materialism
which declares that absolute truth is realized only in the infinite
progress of society and of scientific understanding.
This does not imply a wholesale rejection of Hegelian philosophy. It
merely means that the relative validity of that philosophy has been
recognized. The vicissitudes of the absolute spirit in the course of its
self-development are but a fantastical description of the process which
the real human mind experiences in its acquaintance with the world and
its active participation in life. Instead of the evolution of the
absolute idea, the dialectics henceforth becomes the sole correct method
of thought to be employed by the real human mind in the study of the
actual world and for the purpose of understanding social development.
The great and lasting importance of Hegel's philosophy, even for our own
time, is that it is an excellent theory of the human mind and of its
working methods, provided we strip off its transcendental character, and
that it far excels the first laborious contributions of Kant to the
theory of understanding.
But this quality of the Hegelian philosophy could not be appreciated,
until Dietzgen had created the basis for a dialectic and materialistic
theory of understanding. The indispensable character of dialectic
thought, which is illustrated by the monumental works of Marx and
Engels, has been first demonstrated in a perfectly convincing manner by
Dietzgen's critical analysis of the human force of thinking. It was only
by means of this method of thought--of which he was according to Engels'
testimony an independent discoverer--that he could succeed in completing
the theory of understanding and bringing it to a close for the time
being.
************
If we refer to the ideas laid down by Dietzgen in this work as "his
philosophy," we say too much, because it does not assume to be a new
system of philosophy. Yet, on the other hand, we should not say enough,
because it would mean that his work is as passing as the systems before
it. It is the merit of Dietzgen to have raised philosophy to the
position of a natural science, the same as Marx did with history. The
human faculty of thought is thereby stripped of its fantastic garb. It
is regarded as a part of nature, and by means of experience a
progressive understanding of its concrete and ever changing historical
nature must be gained. Dietzgen's work refers to itself as a finite and
temporary realization of this aim, just as every new theory in natural
science is a finite and temporary realization of its aims. This
realization must be further improved and perfected by successive
investigations. This is the method of natural science; philosophical
systems, on the contrary, pretended to give absolute truth, that could
not be improved upon. Dietzgen's work is fundamentally different from
these former philosophies, and more than they, because it wishes to be
less. It presents itself as the positive outcome of philosophy toward
which all great thinkers have contributed, seen by the sober eyes of a
socialist and analyzed, recounted and further developed by him. At the
same time, it attributes to previous systems the same character of
partial truths and shows that they were not entirely useless
speculations, but ascending stages of understanding naturally related,
which contain ever more truth and ever less error. Hegel had likewise
entertained this broader view, but with him this development came to a
self-contradictory end in his own system. Dietzgen also calls his own
conception the highest then existing, and its distinctive step in the
evolution is that it for the first time adopts and professes this
natural and scientific view, instead of the supernatural point of view
of the former systems. The new understanding that the human mind is a
common and natural thing is a decisive step in the progressive
investigation of the mind, and this step places Dietzgen at the head of
this evolution. And it is a step which cannot be retraced, because it
signifies a sober awakening after centuries of vain imaginings. Since
this system does not pretend to be absolute truth, but rather a finite
and temporal one, it cannot fall as its predecessors did. It represents
a scientific continuation of former philosophies, just as astronomy is
the continuation of astrology and of the Pythagorean fantasies, and
chemistry the continuation of alchemy. It takes the place that formerly
was held by its unscientific predecessors and has this in common with
them, apart from its essential theory of understanding, that it is the
basis of a new world-philosophy, of a methodical conception of the
universe.
This modern world-philosophy (Weltanschauung), being a socialist or
proletarian one, takes issue with the bourgeois conceptions; it was
first conceived as a new view of the world, entirely opposite to the
ruling bourgeois conceptions, by Marx and Engels, who developed its
sociological and historical contents; its philosophical basis is here
developed by Dietzgen; its real character is indicated by the terms
dialectic and materialist. By its core, historical materialism, it gains
a wholly new theory of social evolution that forms its chief content.
This theory was for the first time sketched in its main outlines in the
Communist Manifesto, and later on fully developed in a number of other
works and thoroughly vindicated by innumerable facts. It gives us the
scientific assurance that the misery and imperfectness of present
society, which bourgeois philosophy regards as inevitable and natural,
is but a transitory condition, and that man will within measurable time
emancipate himself from the slavery of his material wants by the
regulation of social production. By this certainty socialism is put on
an eminence so far above all bourgeois conceptions that these appear
barbarous in comparison with it. And what is more significant, our
world-philosophy may justly claim to have for the first time thrown the
light of an indisputable science on society and man; combined with the
maturest products of natural sciences it forms a complete science of the
world, making all superstitions superfluous, and thus involving the
theoretical emancipation, that is to say the emancipation of the mind.
The science treating of the human mind forms the essence and foundation
of this theory of society and man, not only because it gives us the
same as the natural sciences a scientific or experience-proven theory of
the function of human thinking, but also, because this theory of
cognition can alone assure us that such sciences are able to furnish us
an adequate picture of the world, and that anything outside of them is
mere fantasy. For this reason we owe to Dietzgen's theory of cognition
the firm foundation of our world-philosophy.
Its character is primarily materialistic. In contradistinction to the
idealist systems of the most flourishing time of German philosophy which
considered the Mind as the basis of all existence, it starts from
concrete materialist being. Not that it regards mere physical matter as
its basis; it is rather opposed to the crude bourgeois materialism, and
matter to it means everything which exists and furnishes material for
thought, including thoughts and imaginations. Its foundation is the
unity of all concrete being. Thus it assigns to the human mind an equal
place among the other parts of the universe; it shows that the mind is
as closely connected with all the other parts of the universe as those
parts are among themselves; that is to say, the mind exists only as a
part of the entire universe so that its content is only the effect of
the other parts. Thus our philosophy forms the theoretical basis of
historical materialism. While the statement that "the consciousness of
man is determined by his social life" could hitherto at best be regarded
as a generalization of many historical facts and thus seemed imperfect
and open to criticism, capable of improvement by later discoveries, the
same as all other scientific theories, henceforth the complete
dependence of the mind on the rest of the world becomes as impregnable
and immutable a requirement of thought as causality. This signifies the
thorough refutation of the belief in miracles. After having been
banished long ago from the field of natural science, miracles were now
banished from the domain of thought.
The enlightening effect of this proletarian philosophy consists
furthermore in its opposition to all superstition and its demonstration
of the senselessness of all idol worship. Socialist understanding
accomplished something which the bourgeois reformers could not do,
because they were limited to natural science in a narrow sense and could
not solve the mystery of the mind; for in explaining all the mental,
spiritual phenomena as natural phenomena our proletarian philosophy
furnishes the means for a trenchant critique of Christian faith which
consists in the belief in a supernatural spiritual being. In his
dialectic discussions of mind and matter, finiteness and infinity, god
and the world, Dietzgen has thoroughly clarified the confused mystery
which surrounded these conceptions and has definitely refuted all
transcendental beliefs. And this critique is no less destructive for the
bourgeois idols: Freedom, Right, Spirit, Force, which are shown to be
but fantastic images of abstract conceptions with a limited validity.
This could be accomplished in no other way than by simultaneously
determining, in its capacity as a theory of understanding, the relation
of the world around us to the image which our mind forms of it. In this
respect Dietzgen completed the work begun by Hume and Kant. As a theory
of understanding, his conceptions are not only the philosophical basis
of historical materialism, but also of all other sciences as well. The
thorough critique directed by Dietzgen against the works of prominent
natural scientists, shows that he was well aware of the importance of
his own work. But, as might be expected, the voice of a socialist
artisan did not penetrate to the lecture hall of the academies. It was
not until much later that similar views appeared among the natural
scientists. And now at last the most prominent theorists of natural
science have adopted the view that explaining signifies nothing else but
simply and completely describing the processes of nature.
By this theory of understanding Dietzgen has made it plainly perceptible
why the dialectic method is an indispensable auxiliary in the quest for
an explanation of the nature of understanding. The mind is the faculty
of generalization. It forms out of concrete realities, which are a
continuous and unbounded stream in perpetual motion, abstract
conceptions that are essentially rigid, bounded, stable, and
unchangeable. This gives rise to the contradiction that our conceptions
must always adapt themselves to new realities without ever fully
succeeding; the contradiction that they represent the living by what is
dead, the infinite by what is finite, and that they are themselves
finite though partaking of the nature of the infinite. This
contradiction is understood and reconciled by the insight into the
nature of the faculty of understanding, which is simultaneously a
faculty of combination and of distinction, which forms a limited part of
the universe and yet encompasses everything, and it is furthermore
solved by the resulting penetration of the nature of the world. The
world is a unity of the infinitely numerous multitude of phenomena and
comprises within itself all contradictions, makes them relative and
equalizes them. Within its circle there are no absolute opposites. The
mind merely constructs them, because it has not only the faculty of
generalization but also of distinguishing. The practical solution of all
contradictions is the revolutionary practice of infinitely progressing
science which moulds old conceptions into new ones, rejects some,
substitutes others in their place, improves, connects and dissects,
still striving for an always greater unity and an always wider
differentiation.
By means of this theory of understanding, dialectic materialism also
furnishes the means for the solution of the riddles of the world
(Weltraetsel). Not that it solves all these riddles; on the contrary, it
says explicitly that this solution can be but the work of an ever
advancing scientific research. But it solves them in so far as it
deprives them of the character of a mysterious enigma and transforms
them into a practical problem, the solution of which we are approaching
by an infinite progression. Bourgeois thought cannot solve the riddles
of the world. A few years after the first publication of Dietzgen's
work, natural science in the person of Du Bois-Reymond acknowledged its
incapacity by his "Ignorabimus:" "We shall never know." Proletarian
philosophy, in solving the riddle of the human mind, gives us the
assurance that there are no insoluble riddles before us.
In conclusion, Dietzgen in this work indicates the principles of a new
ethics. Starting with the understanding that the origin of the ideas of
good and bad is found in the needs of man, and designating as really
moral that which is generally useful, he logically discovers that the
essence of modern morality rests in its class interests. At the same
time, a relative justification is accorded to these temporary ethics,
since they are the necessary products of definite social requirements.
The link between man and nature is formed by the process of social
production carried on for the satisfaction of man's material wants. So
long as this link was a fetter, it bound man by a misapprehended
supernatural ethics. But once the process of social labor is understood,
regulated and controlled, then this fetter is dropped and the place of
ethics is taken by a reasonable understanding of the general wants.
************
The philosophical works of Dietzgen do not seem to have, until now,
exerted any perceptible influence on the socialist movement. While they
may have found many a silent admirer and contributed much toward a
clearing up of their thoughts, yet the importance of his writings for
the theory of our movement has not been realized. But this is not a
matter for great surprise. In the first decade after their publication,
even the economic works of Marx, the value of which was much more
apparent, were little appreciated. The movement developed spontaneously,
and the Marxian theory could exert a useful and determining influence
only by means of the clear foresight of a few leaders. Hence it is no
wonder that the philosophy of the proletariat, which is less easily and
directly applicable than our economics, did not receive much attention.
The political maturity of the German working class, which was farthest
advanced in the theories of the international movement, did not develop
to the point of adopting Marxian theses as party principles, until after
the abolition of the anti-socialist laws. But even then they were for
most of the spokesmen of the party rather concise formulations of a few
practical convictions than the outcome of a thorough scientific training
and understanding. It was no doubt the great expansion of the party and
of its activity which demanded all their powers for its organization and
management, that led the younger intellectuals of the party to devote
themselves to practical work and to neglect the theoretical studies.
This neglect has bitterly avenged itself in the theoretical schisms of
the subsequent years.
The decrepit condition of capitalism is now evidenced very plainly by
the decay of the bourgeois parties, so that the practical work of the
socialist party is in itself sufficient to attract every one who has an
independent turn of mind and a capacity for deep feeling. But under the
present circumstances, such a transition was not accompanied by a
proletarian world-philosophy acquired by painstaking study. Instead of
such a philosophy, we are confronted by a critique of socialist science
from the bourgeois standpoint. Marxism is measured by the standard of
the immature bourgeois theory of understanding, and the Neokantians,
unconscious of the positive outcome of philosophy of the past century,
are trying to connect socialism with Kantian ethics. Some even speak of
a reconciliation with Christianity and a renunciation of materialism.
This bourgeois method of thought, which, being anti-dialectic and
anti-materialistic, is opposed to Marxism, has acquired some practical
importance in the socialistic movement of countries where by lack of
economical development the class-consciousness of the workers is
hindered by relics of the narrow-minded views of the class of little
producers--as in France and Italy under the name of reformism. In
Germany where it could not obtain much practical importance it
presented itself mostly as a theoretical struggle against Marxism under
the name of revisionism. It combines bourgeois philosophy and
anti-capitalist disposition and takes the place formerly occupied by
anarchism, and, like anarchism, it again represents in many respects the
little bourgeois tendencies in the fight against capitalism. Under these
circumstances, a closer study of Dietzgen's philosophical works becomes
a necessity.
Marx has disclosed the nature of the social process of production, and
its fundamental significance as a lever of social development. But he
has not fully explained, by what means the nature of the human mind is
involved in this material process. Owing to the great traditional
influence exerted by bourgeois thought, this weak spot in Marxism is one
of the main reasons for the incomplete and erroneous understanding of
Marxian theories. This shortcoming of Marxism is cured by Dietzgen, who
made the nature of the mind the special object of his investigations.
For this reason, a thorough study of Dietzgen's philosophical writings
is an important and indispensable auxiliary for the understanding of the
fundamental works of Marx and Engels. Dietzgen's work demonstrates that
the proletariat has a mighty weapon not only in proletarian economics,
but also in proletarian philosophy. Let us learn to wield these weapons!