CAN SUICIDE BE PREVENTED BY LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS?—INFLUENCE OF MORAL
INSTRUCTION.—CONCLUSION.
The legitimate object of punishment—The argument of
Beccaria—A legal solecism—A suicide not amenable to human
tribunals—Evidence at coroners’ courts, _ex-parte_—The old
law of no advantage—No penal law will restrain a man from
the commission of suicide—Verdict of _felo-de-se_ punishes
the innocent, and therefore unjust—Are suicides insane, and
therefore not responsible agents?—The man who reasons himself
into suicide not of sound mind—Rational mode of preventing
suicide by promoting religious education.
The only legitimate object for which punishment can be inflicted is
the prevention of crime. “Am I to be hanged for stealing a sheep?”
said a criminal at the Old Bailey, addressing the bench. “No,” replied
the judge; “you are not to be hanged for stealing a sheep, but _that
sheep may not be stolen_.” Every punishment, argues Beccaria, which
does not arise from absolute necessity is unjust. There should be a
fixed proportion between crimes and punishments. Crimes are only to be
estimated by the injury done to society; and the end of punishment is,
to prevent the criminal from doing further injury, as well as to induce
others from committing similar offences.
The act of suicide ought not to be considered as a crime in the
legal definition of the term. It is not an offence that can be
deemed cognizable by the civil magistrate. It is to be considered a
sinful and vicious action. To punish suicide as a crime is to commit
a solecism in legislation. The unfortunate individual, by the very
act of suicide, places himself beyond the vengeance of the law; he
has anticipated its operation; he has rendered himself amenable to
the highest tribunal—viz., that of his Creator; no penal enactments,
however stringent, can affect him. What is the operation of the law
under these circumstances? A verdict of _felo-de-se_ is returned, and
the innocent relations of the suicide are disgraced and branded with
infamy, and that too on evidence of an _ex-parte_ nature. It is unjust,
inhuman, unnatural, and unchristian, that the law should punish the
innocent family of the man who, in a moment of frenzy, terminates his
own miserable existence. It was clearly established, that before the
alteration in the law respecting suicide, the fear of being buried
in a cross-road, and having a stake driven through the body, had
no beneficial effect in decreasing the number of suicides; and the
verdict of _felo-de-se_, now occasionally returned, is productive of no
advantage whatever, and only injures the surviving relatives.
When a man contemplates an outrage of the law, the fear of the
punishment awarded for the offence may deter him from its commission;
but the unhappy person whose desperate circumstances impel him to
sacrifice his own life can be influenced by no such fear. His whole
mind is absorbed in the consideration of his own miseries, and he even
cuts asunder those ties that ought to bind him closely and tenderly to
the world he is about to leave. If an affectionate wife and endearing
family have no influence in deterring a man from suicide, is it
reasonable to suppose that he will be influenced by penal laws?
If the view which has been taken in this work of the cause of
suicide be a correct one, no stronger argument can be urged for the
impropriety of bringing the strong arm of the law to bear upon those
who court a voluntary death. In the majority of cases, it will be
found that some heavy calamity has fastened itself upon the mind,
and the spirits have been extremely depressed. The individual loses
all pleasure in society; hope vanishes, and despair renders life
intolerable, and death an apparent relief. The evidence which is
generally submitted to a coroner’s jury is of necessity imperfect;
and although the suicide may, to all appearance, be in possession of
his right reason, and have exhibited at the moment of killing himself
the greatest calmness, coolness, and self-possession, this would not
justify the coroner or jury in concluding that derangement of mind was
not present.
If the mind be overpowered by “grief, sickness, infirmity, or other
accident,” as Sir Mathew Hale expresses it, the law presumes the
existence of lunacy. Any passion that powerfully exercises the mind,
and prevents the reasoning faculty from performing its duty, causes
temporary derangement. It is not necessary in order to establish the
presence of insanity to prove the person to be labouring under a
delusion of intellect—a false creation of the mind. A man may allow
his imagination to dwell upon an idea until it acquires an unhealthy
ascendency over the intellect, and in this way a person may commit
suicide from an habitual belief in the justifiableness of the act.[87]
If a man, by a distorted process of reasoning, argues himself into a
conviction of the propriety of adopting a particular course of conduct,
without any reference to the necessary result of that train of thought,
it is certainly no evidence of his being in possession of a sound mind.
A person may reason himself into a belief that murder, under certain
circumstances not authorized by the law, is perfectly just and proper.
The circumstance of his allowing his mind to reason on the subject
is a _prima facie_ case against his sanity; at least it demonstrates
a great weakness of the moral constitution. A man’s _morale_ must be
in an imperfect state of development who reasons himself into the
conviction that self-murder is under any circumstances justifiable.
We dwell at some length on this subject, because we feel assured that
juries do not pay sufficient attention to the influence of passion in
overclouding the understanding. If the notion that in every case of
suicide the intellectual or moral faculties are perverted, be generally
received, it will at once do away with the verdict of _felo-de-se_.
Should the jury entertain a doubt as to the presence of derangement,
(and such cases may present themselves,) it is their duty, in
accordance with the well-known principle of British jurisprudence, to
give the person the benefit of that doubt; and thus a verdict of lunacy
may be conscientiously returned in every case of this description.
Having, we think, clearly established that no penal law can act
beneficially in preventing self-destruction,—first, because it would
punish the _innocent_ for the crimes of the _guilty_; and, secondly,
that, owing to insanity being present in every instance, the person
determined on suicide is indifferent as to the consequences of his
action,—it becomes our province to consider what are the legitimate
means of staying the progress of an offence that undermines the
foundation of society and social happiness.
In the prevention of suicide, too much stress cannot be laid on the
importance of adopting a well-regulated, enlarged, and philosophic
system of education, by which all the _moral_ as well as the
intellectual faculties will be expanded and disciplined. The education
of the intellect without any reference to the moral feelings is a
species of instruction calculated to do an immense amount of injury.
The tuition that addresses itself exclusively to the perceptive and
reflective faculties is not the kind of education that will elevate
the moral character of a people. Religion must be made the basis of
all secular knowledge. We must be led to believe that the education
which fits the possessor for another world is vastly superior to
that which has relation only to the concerns of this life. We are no
opponents to the diffusion of knowledge; but we are to that description
of information which has only reference “to the life that is, and not
to that which is to be.” Such a system of instruction is of necessity
defective, because it is partial in its operation. Teach a man his
duty to God, as well as his obligations to his fellow-men; lead him to
believe that his life is not his own; that disappointment and misery
is the penalty of Adam’s transgression, and one from which there is
no hope of escaping; and, above all, inculcate a resignation to the
decrees of Divine Providence. When life becomes a burden, when the
mind is sinking under the weight of accumulated misfortunes, and no
gleam of hope penetrates through the vista of futurity to gladden the
heart, the intellect says, “Commit suicide, and escape from a world of
wretchedness and woe;” the moral principle says, “Live; it is your duty
to bear with resignation the afflictions that overwhelm you; let the
moral influence of your example be reflected in the characters of those
by whom you are surrounded.”
If we are justified in maintaining that the majority of the cases
of suicide result from a vitiated condition of the moral principle,
then it is certainly a legitimate mode of preventing the commission
of the offence to elevate the character of man as a moral being. It
is no legitimate argument against this position to maintain that
insanity in all its phases marches side by side with civilization and
refinement; but it must not be forgotten that a people may be refined
and civilized, using these terms in their ordinary signification, who
have not a just conception of their duties as members of a Christian
community. Let the education of the _heart_ go side by side with the
education of the _head_; inculcate the ennobling thought, that we
live not for ourselves, but for others; that it is an evidence of
true Christian courage to face bravely the ills of life, to bear with
impunity “the whips and scorns of time, the oppressor’s wrong, and the
proud man’s contumely;” and we disseminate principles which will give
expansion to those faculties that alone can fortify the mind against
the commission of a crime alike repugnant to all human and Divine laws.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Cæsar’s reply on being told of Cato’s death was reported
to be—“Cato, I envy thee thy death, for thou hast envied me the
preservation of thy life;” on which Plutarch remarks, “Had Cato
suffered himself to be preserved by Cæsar, it is likely he would not so
much have impaired his own honour, as augmented the other’s clemency
and glory.” But Cato’s own idea was, that it was an insupportable
instance of Cæsar’s tyranny and usurpation that he should “pretend” to
shew clemency in saving lives over whom he had no legal authority.
[2] The affection and resolution of an obscure private soldier was
very remarkable, who, standing before Otho with his drawn sword, spoke
thus—“Behold in my action an instance of the unshaken fidelity of all
your soldiery. There is not one of us but would strive thus to preserve
thee,” and immediately he stabbed himself to the heart. Many private
soldiers, after Otho’s death, gave the same proof of fidelity to their
deceased lord.—_Plutarch’s Life of Otho._
[3] It is said that the night before the battle the same spectre
appeared to Brutus, but vanished without saying anything.
[4] Tac. An. xvi.
[5] At Anchiale, there was a monument erected to the memory of
Sardanapalus. It consisted of an image carved in stone work, and having
the thumb and the finger of the right hand joined, as if making some
sound or noise with them. On the monument was inscribed these words in
Assyrian characters: “Sardanapalus, the son of Anacyndarax, founded
Anchiale and Tyre in one day. Eat, drink, and be merry. As for the
rest, it is not worth the snap of the finger.”
[6] Varro _de Ling. Lat._, lib. iv.
[7] 1 Samuel, xxxi.
[8] This is the only case of suicide recorded in the New Testament.
Judas’s conduct is condemned in the strongest language; he is called in
the Gospel of St. John (vi. 70,) “a devil, and the son of perdition;”
and in the first chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, at the 25th
verse, after the account given of his violent death, he is said to have
gone _to his own peculiar place_. (Εἰς τὸν τόπον τὸν ἴδιον.)
Virgil thus alludes to the “place of punishment” allotted to those who
sacrifice wantonly their own lives:—
“Proxima deinde tenent mæsti loca, qui sibi letum
Insontes peperêre manu, lucemque perosi
Projecêre animas. Quàm vellent æthere in alto
Nunc et pauperiem et duros perferre labores!
Fas obstat. Tristique palus inamabilis undâ
Alligat, et novies Styx interfusa coërcet.”
(ÆNEIS, lib. vi. ver. 434 et seq.)
“The next in place and punishment are they
Who prodigally throw their souls away:
Fools, who, repining at their wretched state,
And loathing anxious life, suborn their fate:
With late repentance now they would retrieve
The bodies they forsook, and wish to live;
Their pains and poverty desire to bear,
To view the light of heaven and breathe the vital air.
But fate forbids, the Stygian floods oppose,
And with nine circling streams the captive souls inclose.”
(DRYDEN.)
[9] Macc. i. 6.
[10] There is something sublime in the stern copiousness with which the
stoics dwelt particularly on the facility with which suicide may be
committed. “Ante omnia cavi, ne quis vos teneret invitos: PATET EXITUS.
Si pugnare non vultis, licet fugere. Ideoque ex omnibus rebus, quas
esse vobis necessarias volui, nihil feci facilius, quam mori. Attendite
modo et videbitis quam brevis ad libertatem et quam expedita ducat
via. Non tam longas in exitu vobis quam intrantibus, moras posui,”
&c.—_Seneca de Providentia_, in fine. Vide epistle lxx.
[11] Epistles xii. and lxx.; and De Irâ, lib. iii.
[12] Corpus Juris Civilis, lib. xlviii. tit. xxi. parag. 3.
[13] Vide Potter’s Antiquities.
[14] Universal Geography, vol. iii. p. 155.
[15] It is generally believed that Rousseau killed himself by taking
arsenic; but this has been denied. Judging from the character and
disposition of the man, we should feel disposed to credit the statement
respecting his voluntary death. Rousseau always maintained that
the following stanza of Tasso had a direct application to him, and
accurately described his feelings and position in the world—
“Still, still ’tis mine with grief and shame to rove,
A dire example of disastrous love;
While keen remorse for ever breaks my rest,
And raging furies haunt my conscious breast,
The lonely shades with terror must I view,
The shades shall every dreadful thought renew:
The rising sun shall equal horrors yield,
The sun that first the dire event revealed;
Still must I view myself with hateful eye,
And seek, though vainly, from myself to fly.”
[16] _Duverger de Haurane_, abbot of St. Cyran, regarded as the founder
of Port Royal, wrote, in the year 1608, a treatise on suicide, which
has, says Voltaire, become one of the scarcest books in Europe.
He says the decalogue forbids us to kill. In this precept, self-murder
seems no less to be comprised than murder of our neighbour. But if
there are cases in which it is allowable to kill our neighbour, there
likewise are cases in which it is allowable to kill ourselves. We must
not make an attempt upon our lives until we have consulted reason. The
public authority, which holds the place of God, may dispose of our
lives. The reason of man may likewise hold the place of the reason of
God,—it is a ray of the eternal light.
Voltaire, disposed as he was to advocate the right of committing
suicide whenever a man considered death preferable to a dishonourable
life, had sufficient sagacity to see through the glaring sophistry of
St. Cyran’s reasoning on this point. The same author says, “A man may
kill himself for the good of his prince, for that of his country, or
for that of his relations.”
[17] It is evident that the great dramatist considered that suicide was
opposed to the divine will.
“Against self-slaughter
There is a prohibition so divine,
That cravens my weak hand.”
Again, he says—
“Or that the Everlasting had not fixed
His canon ’gainst self-slaughter!”
[18] Warder’s “Letters from the Northumberland.”
[19] London Medical and Surgical Journal, vol. v. p. 51.
[20] In a table given by Professor Caspar, of Berlin, one hundred and
three cases of suicide are attributed to mental affections; thirty of
these may be classed under this head, and thirty-two under that of fear
and despondency combined.
[21] The massacre of St. Bartholomew lasted seven days, during which
more than 5000 persons were slain in Paris, and from 40 to 50,000 in
the country. During the execution, the king betrayed neither pity nor
remorse, but fired with his long gun at the poor fugitives across the
river; and on viewing the body of Coligni on a gibbet, he exulted with
a fiendish malignity. In early life, this monster had been noted for
his cruelty: nothing gave him greater pleasure than cutting off the
heads of asses or pigs with a single blow from his _couteau de chasse_.
After the massacre, he is said to have contracted a singularly wild
expression of feature, and to have slept little and waked in agonies.
He attributed his thirst for human blood to the circumstance of his
mother having at an early period of his life familiarized his mind with
the brutal sport of hunting bullocks, and with all kinds of cruelty. It
is recorded that, when dying, he actually sweated blood.
[22] Hist. Eccles. edit. Duaci, 1622, pp. 643-4.
[23] Meaning the Duke of Gloucester.
[24] King Henry, Act 3.
[25] Dr. Johnson’s Rasselas.
[26] Goëthe, in allusion to one of his own early attachments.
[27] Love, it is said, often turns the brains of the Italians, even the
men. M. Esquirol says, “Frenchmen seldom go mad from love. A Frenchman
often kills himself in a sally of passion and feeling, but is seldom in
love long enough to go mad about it.”
[28] “Love.”
[29] O’Meara’s “Voice from St. Helena,” vol. i. p. 57.
[30] “Life of Napoleon,” vol. viii. p. 244.
[31] It is worthy of remark that the judge who condemned, as well as
the disciple who betrayed, our Saviour, were both driven by despair to
suicide. The fate of Judas is recorded in the Gospel; the concluding
scenes in the life of Pontius Pilate are related by two learned
historians (_Josephus_ and _Eusebius_). The former says that “Pontius
Pilate, after having exercised great cruelties in his government of
Judæa, was, before the Roman Emperor (Caligula), stripped of all his
dignities and fortunes, and banished to Gaul, where it is said he
suffered such extreme hardships of body and despair of mind, that,
after lingering for two years, he became his own executioner.”
[32] Lessing.
[33] On Lunatic Asylums.
[34] Vide Mathews’ Life, by his widow, vol. ii. p. 158.
[35] Dr. Haslam.
[36] “Revue Médicale,” Dec. 1821.
[37] Under the heathen mythology, it was believed that the struggles of
death continued till Proserpine had cropped the hair on the crown of
the head, as victims were treated at the altar. Virgil has preserved
this opinion in the fourth book of the Æneid, where he gives so fine a
picture of the dying agonies of Dido.
[38] It is only by reasoning physiologically that we can conclude that
the act of dying is not a painful process. In proportion as death
seizes its victim, so must consciousness be suspended. What can be more
painful to the beholder than to witness the convulsive struggles, and
the foaming at the mouth, of a person in an epileptic fit, who, when
restored to consciousness, has no recollection of what has occurred? He
remembers the premonitory indications, and that is all. Death is but
an epileptic struggle. A phenomenon attends the dying moment which we
do not recollect to have seen noticed. A man who fell into the water,
and who rose several times to the surface, had a consciousness of the
hopelessness and awfulness of his situation; he felt that death was
inevitable. With this conviction on his mind, he saw presented to him
a picture of his past life; the minutest action in which he had been
engaged was brought in a kind of tableau before him. Circumstances that
had long been forgotten were conjured from his brain, and he had a
bird’s-eye view of his past career. Possibly, this may occur to every
person at the moment of dying. The expressions of those placed under
such circumstances would indicate as much.
[39] Foreign Quarterly Review, vol. xvi.
[40] Vol. xxi. for 1837.
[41] It is related by Lord Bacon, in his “Historia Vitæ et Mortis,”
that a friend of his, who was particularly anxious to ascertain
whether criminals suffered much pain in undergoing the sentence of
the law, on one occasion suspended himself by the neck, having for
that purpose thrown himself off a stool, on which he supposed he could
readily remount, when he had carried his experiment sufficiently far
to satisfy his curiosity. The report goes on to state, that the loss
of consciousness which followed would have led to a fatal termination
of the experiment, had not a friend accidentally entered the apartment
in time to save the life of the adventurous experimentalist. Foderé
relates a similar incident of one of his fellow-students. This young
man, after an argument respecting the cause of death in hanging,
resolved personally to gratify his curiosity, by passing a ligature
round his neck, and attaching it to a hook behind the door. To
accomplish this, he had raised himself on tip-toe, and now gradually
brought his heels to the ground. He soon lost all consciousness,
but was cut down by a companion, who discovered him, in a state of
insensibility, very soon after the commencement of the experiment,
and by the prompt application of remedial measures he was finally
recovered. From cases of this description we learn that the first
effect experienced in hanging is the appearance of a dazzling light
before the eyes, accompanied by tingling in the ears. These sensations
are, however, momentary, for insensibility and death rapidly close the
scene.
[42] Gazette Litteraire.
[43] Foreign Literary Gazette.
[44] In 1806, upwards of sixty voluntary deaths took place at Rouen,
during June and July, the air being at that time remarkably humid and
warm; and in July and August of the same year, more than three hundred
were committed at Copenhagen, the constitution of the atmosphere
presenting the same characteristics as it did at Rouen. The year 1793,
presented in the town of Versailles alone the horrible spectacle of
thirteen hundred suicides.
[45] This was Philip Mordaunt, cousin-german to the celebrated Earl of
Peterborough, so well known to all European courts, and who boasted of
having seen more postillions and kings than any other man. Mordaunt
was young, handsome, of noble blood, highly educated, and beloved by
those who knew him. He resolved to die. Preparatory to his doing so,
he wrote to his friends, paid his debts, and even made some verses on
the occasion. He said his soul was tired of his body, and when we are
dissatisfied with our abode, it is our duty to quit it. He put a pistol
to his head and blew out his brains. An uninterrupted course of good
fortune was the only motive that could be assigned for this suicide.
[46] M. Falret.
[47] Dict. des Sciences Med., vol. liii.
[48] Previous to Cowper’s attempt at suicide, he had fallen into the
company of two sophists, who both advanced claims to the right of
self-destruction, and whose fallacious arguments won him to their
pernicious views, which were, besides, aided by his recollection of
a certain book containing similar reasoning, which, however weak in
itself, now seemed to his disordered mind irrefragable.
[49] Dr. J. Johnson.
[50] Vide Dr. Conolly.
[51] Wordsworth.
[52] The _possunt quia posse videuntur_ feeling is not sufficiently
encouraged by medical philosophers in treating mental affections.
[53] History of Music.
[54] Edinburgh Medical Trans.
[55] Lib. xii. cap. 51.
[56] When Pope was on his death-bed, Bolingbroke observed to the
weeping attendants, “I have known Pope these thirty years; he was the
kindest-hearted man in the world.”
[57] Prior to the more urgent symptoms developing themselves, he
appeared to be endeavouring to recollect Dr. B., and addressed him as
Dr. Death.
[58] A medical student, twenty years of age, was seized with mania,
arising from the presence of worms in the intestines. He felt the most
acute pains in the different regions of his body, appearing to him
as if persons were driving arrows into him, more particularly in the
palms of his hands and soles of his feet. This caused him to utter most
distressing cries, to seek to be alone, and prevented him from walking.
The intolerable pains and madness left him as soon as the worms were
expelled.
[59] “When powerful feelings or passions are in active operation, in
the insane or in the sane, they draw the muscles of the face into
particular forms; and, if they continue for a length of time to be
greatly predominant, they impress upon the countenance an appearance
indicative of the character. This is felt and acted upon unconsciously
in the common intercourse of life. A good countenance is a letter of
recommendation; and we have, in spite of ourselves, an unfavourable
feeling towards a stranger where this is absent. Now in the generality
of suicidal cases, the desponding feelings are in constant and active
operation; hence there is usually a melancholy and gloomy expression of
countenance. This arises from no mysterious cause peculiar to insanity,
but is perfectly intelligible on common physiognomical principles; but
there are numerous instances where the most experienced physician would
be unable to detect, by inspection only, the slightest mark of either a
disposition to suicide or insanity. The absence of this expression must
not, therefore, induce us to suppose that this disposition does not
exist.”—SIR W. ELLIS.
[60] Ellis on Insanity.
[61] Indications of Insanity.
[62] Journ. Gen. de Médecine, Juillet, 1822.
[63] “Pain is an evil; death, the deprivation of every hope or comfort
in this life. No man in his senses will burn, drown, or stab himself;
for these all produce what are called evils; neither can any of these
actions be executed without the probability of pain in the convulsive
action or struggles of death. As no rational being will voluntarily
give himself pain, or deprive himself of life, which certainly, while
human beings preserve their senses, must be acknowledged evils, it
follows that every one who commits suicide is indubitably _non compos
mentis_, not able to reason justly, but is under the influence of false
images of the mind; and therefore suicide _should ever be considered an
act of insanity_.”—DR. ROWLEY.
[64] Lowness of spirits ought to be regarded and treated as insanity,
says Ellis, and not dreaded as its forerunner. For it is at this stage
that suicide is resorted to. Should this not be the case, specific
hallucinations may speedily appear, and the agony of mind will be
endured as a consequence of bankruptcy, the unfaithfulness of a friend,
the persecutions of enemies, or the ravages of an incurable disease.
No demonstration of the untenableness of such grounds, no picture of
brighter and happier circumstances, will avail to refute or encourage.
The sufferer clings to his hoarded misery. There is generally great
loss of physical strength in cases of this kind, and the pale emaciated
countenance, dull and sunken eye, and listless dejected form, tell as
plainly as the querulous complaint, or the long intricate description
of sorrows and anticipated evils, to what class the patient belongs.
[65] Vide Lord Dover’s Life of Frederick, and Ray on Med. Juris.
[66] Dr. J. Johnson.
[67] Hill on Insanity.
[68] This was no doubt an hallucination of the senses. On another
occasion, when in the House of Commons, Lord Castlereagh fancied
he saw the same “Radiant Boy.” Does not this fact establish that
his lordship’s senses were not always in a healthy condition? It is
possible that when impelled to suicide he laboured under some mental
delusion.
[69] Notes to Metzger.
[70] Annales de Hyg. pub. et de Méd. Lég. tom. v. p. 156.
[71] We have availed ourselves of Dr. Taylor’s translation of the
particulars of the prince’s death, which are recorded with much
minuteness in the “Annales d’Hygiène Publique, et de Médecine Légale.”
[72] Foderé, vol. iii. p. 167; from the Causes Célèbres. See also
Grimm’s Historical and Literary Memoirs, (from 1753 to 1769,) vol. ii.
pp. 41, 117, and 166.
[73] Travels in Asia, Africa, &c.
[74] To which may be added, anticipation of punishment, or disgrace
from misconduct.
[75] Méd. Légale, iv. § 948; and Smith on Med. Jurisprudence.
[76] The committee made no report. Lord Delamere undertook to draw it
up, but before he did so, parliament was prorogued. Bishop Burnet, who
has given the particulars of the case with great minuteness, says, he
had no doubt that the Earl of Essex committed suicide. He was subject
to fits of deep melancholy, and maintained the lawfulness of suicide.
This is also Hume’s opinion.
[77] This is confirmed by the fact that within the jurisdiction of the
metropolitan police, the two districts in which the greatest number of
suicides were committed or attempted, in 1836 or 1837, were those of
the Regent’s Park and Stepney, through both of which the Regent’s Canal
runs. This circumstance tends to shew that drowning is the mode of
suicide most frequently resorted to in London, and that a canal offers
greater facilities for that purpose than the river.
[78] The disposition to suicide may be manifested very early in life.
M. Falret knew a boy, twelve years old, who hanged himself because
he was only twelfth in his class. A similar case occurred at the
Westminster school about seventeen years ago. Harriet Cooper, of Huden
Hill, Rowly-Regis, aged ten years and two months, upon being reproved
for a trifling fault, went upstairs, after exhibiting symptoms of grief
by sighing and sobbing, and hung herself with a pair of cotton braces
from the rail of a tent bed. A girl named Green, eleven years old,
drowned herself in the New River, from the fear of correction for a
trifling fault. Dr. Schlegel states, on the authority of Casper, that
in Berlin, between the years 1812 and 1821, no less than thirty-one
children, of twelve years of age and under, committed suicide, either
because they were tired of existence or had suffered some trifling
chastisement.
[79] “Oh, supreme God, who inhabitest the highest heavens, heal my
afflictions; as with the wretched in hell, the joyful in heaven, shew
mercy to the guilty.”
[80] Dr. Moore’s Travels through France, vol. i. let. 32.
[81] Hufeland’s Journal.
[82] Hist. de l’Acad. Roy., 1769.
[83] Paris and the Parisians, by Mrs. Trollope.
[84] Voltaire observes, that if Creech had been translating Ovid, he
would not have committed suicide.
[85] We refer our readers, for a minute and deeply interesting account
of this unfortunate woman’s career, to a work from which we have
gleaned the above facts; the particulars of her life will be perused
with great interest.—Vide “Memoirs of Mirabeau, by himself,” vol.
iii. chap. xi.
[86] Vide Frontispiece.
[87] A singular case of this kind was brought under the notice of the
Westminster Medical Society by Dr. Stone, as an argument in favour of
the possibility of a person committing suicide when in possession of a
sane mind.
T. C. Savill, Printer, 107, St. Martin’s Lane, Charing Cross.