CHAPTER IX

RUSSIA, FRANCE, AND ENGLAND IN THE FAR EAST IN 1895–97

The immediate results of the war—Issue of an important Chinese

loan—Russia becomes guarantee for China, and in return obtains the

right to construct the Manchurian Railway—Ability of Russian

diplomacy in Korea—Faults and abuses of the Japanese in that

country—Revolution in the Korean palace at Seoul—The King of Korea

under the protection of Russia—Preponderance of Muscovite

influences in the Far East at the beginning of 1897—Important

advantages obtained by the Tsar’s allies—Apparent

disinterestedness of Germany—Treaty with France signed on June

20th, 1895—Energy of the French Minister—French protectorate over

the Catholics of the East—Efforts made by England in 1896 to

regain her influence at Peking—Anglo-Chinese Convention, February

4th, 1897—Opening of the West River to European navigation—A few

fresh concessions granted to France in 1897.

In the events which have transpired in the Far East since the War, and

which have led to the present situation, two distinct phases mark the

violent aggression of Kiao-chau. The first extends from the spring of

1895 to the autumn of 1897, and is that in which the Powers, after

having come to China’s assistance, obtained from her concessions in

return for their good offices, whilst pretending moderation in their

demands.

Altogether, the most important consequence of the War was the

establishment of a heavy foreign debt. Hitherto China had only

contracted in Europe insignificant loans of a few millions of francs.

During hostilities her foreign indebtedness rose to £7,000,000, a mere

trifle, and, moreover, the lenders were in possession of excellent

security; but the War Indemnity and other urgent expenses necessary for

the rehabilitation of the country mounted up to £48,000,000, so that now

the interest on this debt, taking the rate at 5 per cent., would absorb

£2,400,000, and, by adding the arrears of already existing loans, this

figure would attain about £2,800,000, equivalent to nearly the whole of

the Customs revenue. The Customs duties are paid in silver, but it would

be absolutely necessary to stipulate, if a considerable loan is to be

floated on the European market, that the interest should be paid in

gold. The question, therefore, very naturally arises whether, in view of

so small a margin, the fluctuations in the value of silver, which have

already caused the _hai-kwan_ taël to fall from 6s. 7d., its value a

quarter of a century ago, to 2s. 10d., the average rate since 1897, will

not sooner or later result in the Customs receipts proving insufficient

to cover the payment of the arrears. Nobody in his senses would dream of

lending money to China on the mere security of her general resources,

and she would, consequently, be obliged to assign to her creditors new

securities, and place in their hands the administration of new branches

of revenue. On the other hand, stripped of about £2,800,000 from the

total revenue, which the most optimistic estimate gives at £24,000,000,

she would have to look for new channels to add to her income, either by

increasing the taxes, or by permitting foreigners to exploit the

resources of the country, conceding to them railway and mining

concessions on the basis of leases or joint profits. The first proposal

ran the risk of unpopularity; the second was more tempting, but it meant

the introduction into the country of that very Western civilization

which the Chinese Government had opposed with all its might for the last

fifty years.

The monetary difficulties of the Celestial Empire brought about a

renewed interference by Europeans in her affairs, if only in the

collecting of the taxes, and, also, a sort of financial embargo, the

dangers of which are sufficiently manifest in countries like Egypt. The

Government of Peking was well aware of this, and, therefore, spared no

effort in obtaining a reduction on the £34,500,000 War Indemnity, and

even attempted to arrive at an understanding with Japan respecting the

retrocession of Liao-tung without supplementary disbursement.

The great importance of this money question was nowhere better

understood than at St. Petersburg, and one cannot help admiring the

boldness and ability of the policy pursued by Russia. That countries

like France and England, literally overflowing with money, should have

ventured to secure a preponderating position in China by means of

financial manœuvrings is not at all to be wondered at; but that Russia,

already heavily indebted with a public foreign debt amounting to over

£240,000,000, should have been shrewd enough to subject China to a sort

of vassalage, through the pecuniary services she rendered her, was

indeed a masterly achievement.

M. de Witte, the Tsar’s Minister of Finance, who devised this remarkable

scheme and conducted it to a triumphant issue over the head of the

Minister for Foreign Affairs, exhibited throughout the rarest political

ability and foresight combined with business acumen. Russia was unable

to lend China money, but she was willing to become her guarantor, and

thus enable the Celestial Empire, backed by the principal banks of

Paris, where Russian funds were at their height, to float a loan of

£16,000,000 at 4 per cent. issued at ninety-four—that is to say, at the

same issue price at which, before this security was granted, the French

and German financial houses had offered to raise a loan at 5 per cent.

The annual interest to be paid by China, thanks to Russian intervention,

was thus reduced by a fifth, whereby the Celestials, although they

obtained a bargain, at the same time committed a grave political error.

In accepting a foreign Power as guarantor, the Chinese Government

rendered itself responsible to that Power only, and placed her financial

and, above all, her political independence in far greater peril than she

could have done had she negotiated directly with individual capitalists

of various nationalities, whose pressure, in case of non-payment, would

have been considerably weakened by the inevitable differences which

would subsist between their Governments. This danger seems to have been

thoroughly understood at Peking, where the necessary documents were not

signed until the expiration of the last day’s delay granted by Russia,

and then only under extreme pressure, because the Chinese Government had

evidently failed to find assistance elsewhere.

The Government of St. Petersburg, well pleased with this success,

proceeded to strengthen its policy in China by further financial

operations, and with the assistance of the Bank of Russia next created

the Russo-Chinese Bank, Parisian financiers supplying the greater part

of the capital, but leaving the direction of affairs almost exclusively

in Russian hands. The Comptoir d’Escompte transferred its agencies in

China to Russia, and the new bank established at the same time branches

at Peking, Tien-tsin, Shanghai, and Hankow. Since then this bank has

continued to be the principal agent of Russian influence in China, and

undoubtedly it was at first almost entirely through its mediation that

Russia negotiated the concession of the East Chinese Railway, which

enabled her to continue her Trans-Siberian Railway southward through

Manchuria, thus shortening the original line by several hundred miles,

and enabling it to pass within 350 miles of the Gulf of Pe-chi-li.

Russia, moreover, obtained the authorization to protect the works by her

own troops, whereby she made herself mistress of Manchuria, whence she

was able to dominate Peking until events allowed her to occupy

Liao-tung.

Whilst she was amply paid for her services by China, Russia made herself

no less active in Korea. The Japanese, who had occupied that country,

perpetrated error on error. They had attempted to impose upon the

Koreans with great abruptness the most varied and radical reforms. Many

of these were possibly useful enough, but they ought to have been

introduced with discretion; others were unnecessary, and greatly

irritated the people by wounding their most cherished customs and

traditions. The Koreans, although not particularly clean in their

habits, are invariably clad in white, are, moreover, addicted to smoking

very long pipes, and to rolling their hair up into a huge chignon, which

they surmount by an enormously broad-brimmed hat, whose crown is so

small that they are obliged to fasten it to their heads by a long

string. The Mikado issued a sumptuary law against long pipes, chignons,

and wide-brimmed hats, and, moreover, ordered that the traditional white

robe should henceforth be replaced by the dark-blue one usually worn by

the Japanese. It is said that this unfortunate incident was the result

of a conviction that Koreans, being obliged to hold their pipe with one

hand, and to balance their enormous hats with the other, could never

become hard workers. Be this as it may, the Japanese sentinels at the

gates of Seoul made life unendurable to the unfortunate Koreans. Armed

with a big pair of scissors, they pounced upon the unfortunate peasants

as they entered the town on their way to market, and cut not only the

strings of their monumental hats, but severed their beloved chignons,

and shortened by at least three-quarters of their length the stems of

their pipes—arbitrary measures well calculated to break their hearts

with mortification and vexation of spirit. It is not to be wondered at

that such impolitic conduct, added to occasional acts of violence, soon

roused the indignation and hatred of the natives, otherwise a very

inoffensive and peaceable people. On October 7, 1895, the Korean Queen

was murdered in her palace by assassins in the pay of the Japanese, and

with the complicity of the Legation. King Li-Hsi, a very poor creature

at the best, whose reign has been one tissue of Court intrigue and

palace revolution, after the assassination of the Queen, fell into a

consternation of abject terror, completely abdicating his regal

authority, and became so degraded that he even consented to sign an

edict insulting the memory of the late Queen, and accusing her of

shameful crimes. Innocent persons were now executed at Seoul as guilty

of the murder, whereas the actual assassins were acquitted by a

self-constituted Japanese tribunal.

In the meantime Russia very ably exploited the general discontent, and

in an underhand manner offered her services to the timid King, who was

not only terribly afraid of the Japanese, but also of his father, the

Tai-wen-kun, a ferocious old gentleman, whose ambition had disturbed

Korea for over twenty years, and who had been raised to power by the

natives. His Majesty seemed disposed to accept the Russian proposal, but

dared not leave his palace, in which he was kept a close prisoner. A

riot ensued, whether spontaneous or provoked has never been divulged,

which, on the night of February 11, 1896, offered him a chance of

escape. The Tai-wen-kun was killed, and Li-Hsi obtained shelter at the

Russian Legation, then guarded by a detachment of sailors fresh landed

at Chemulpo, the port of Seoul, without any attempt on the part of the

Japanese to prevent them. Li-Hsi, once safe in the house of the Russian

Minister, where all the members of the Korean Government had found

shelter, acted like a King in a comic opera, and became the plaything of

Russia, precisely as he had recently been of Japan. He forthwith revoked

all the reforming edicts he had previously signed, and annulled the

decree degrading the memory of the unfortunate Queen, the trial of whose

assassins took place in a High Court presided over by judges selected

from various European nationalities, with the result that the

responsibility for her murder was thrown on the Japanese.

The reactionary movement now became violent, and many useful reforms had

perforce to disappear. A committee, composed of the highest native

functionaries, the British Controller of Customs, and a few Americans,

was appointed to study measures of reform, but they only met two or

three times, and nothing came of it, so that in a few months all the old

abuses reappeared. Nevertheless, by her sagacious conduct, Russia had

the ability to win over the foreign representatives in Korea to her

side, and Japan, in order to preserve the remnant of her influence in a

country whose commerce was mainly in her hands, and where not less than

10,000 of her subjects resided, was now obliged to arrive at an

understanding with Russia. The Convention of Seoul, signed May 14th,

1896, by the representatives of the two Powers, completed by that of

July 29th, concluded at Moscow at the time of the coronation of Nicholas

II., and drawn up by Prince Lobanof and Marshal Yamagata, accorded Japan

merely the right to keep 1,000 troops in Korea for the protection of the

Japanese telegraph wires between Fusan and Seoul and of her subjects

settled in the capital and in the open ports of Fusan and Gensan. Russia

also obtained the same rights, and, moreover, a concession to construct

a telegraphic line from Seoul to the Siberian frontier.

The two Powers further agreed to lend the Korean Government their

support for the reorganization of its finances and a sufficient police

force to maintain order, and to permit, as soon as possible, of the

withdrawal of their garrisons. In appearance it was a sort of

Russo-Japanese _condominium_ that was established in Korea; but Russian

influence, now all-powerful with the King, met with no further obstacle

after the restoration of that Sovereign to his palace in February, 1897.

A decree, ordering that all railways to be constructed in Korea should

have the same gauge as that of the Trans-Siberian Railway, and that the

debt of £300,000 contracted by Korea with Japan should be repaid, and,

moreover, that none but Russian instructors should be engaged in

reorganizing the Korean army, was also issued, which Japan considered a

distinct breach of the Treaty of Moscow.

Russian influence was therefore, at the beginning of the year 1897,

absolutely preponderant in Korea as well as in China. In both countries

the Tsar’s Government had played, with extraordinary ability, the part

of protector of the conquered against the abuses of the conqueror, and

also that of a redresser of wrongs, whereby it won universal approbation

throughout the Far East. The Japanese victories now appeared only to

have been obtained for the benefit of Russia, who substituted herself

everywhere for Japan, in Manchuria as well as in Korea, and thus

profited very considerably by the War without having to pay any of its

expenses. If at its close Russia had the discretion to perceive the

advantages which she might derive from intervention, and if she acted

with energy and decision, she also knew how to curb the impetuosity of

her admirals, who were eager to commit those very faults into which

Japan had fallen, which undoubtedly would have brought about very

serious European complications. She therefore at first abstained from

annexing the peninsula of Liao-tung and the important stations of Port

Arthur and Talien-wan, which she had compelled the Japanese to evacuate,

and officially she made no annexations in Korea; but, possessing the

right to construct a railway through Central Manchuria and to protect

its works by her own troops, and being at one and the same time mistress

of the situation at Seoul, Russia was able at the right moment to annex

either Korea or Liao-tung, and bring the Trans-Siberian to the open sea

through one or the other of these two peninsulas. She hesitated as to

which she should select; the first was nearer Peking, the second brought

her more directly to the Pacific, whence she could menace simultaneously

the mouth of the Yang-tsze and the South-east of Japan. At St

Petersburg, however, it seemed that the Government was waiting for the

completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which was proceeding in hot

haste, and which it was expected would reach the Amur in the first

months of 1900, ere the psychological moment should arrive to strike a

decisive blow.

Side by side with immense advantages acquired by Russia, those obtained

by her allies seemed insignificant. Germany had not shown herself

exacting; all she asked was a few acres of land at Tien-tsin and other

naval ports where she might establish independent concessions intended

to satisfy her sense of dignity. The absence of special concessions had

not hitherto prevented Germany from achieving an extraordinary

commercial success in China, but the future will prove that the German

Empire entertains great designs in the Far East, the realization of

which are merely postponed.

As to France, she got in return for her services the two Conventions

signed at Peking by her Minister, M. Gérard, on June 20th, 1895. The

first of these documents accords divers facilities to the extension of

her commerce on the frontier between China and Indo-China; the second

ratifies, to her advantage, the frontier limits. A new market—Semao, in

the Yunnan—was now added to the towns of Mong-Tze and Lung-Chau, opened

to Franco-Annamite commerce in 1887. The customs on goods entering or

leaving these markets and passing through Tongking, already reduced to

three-quarters of the maritime Custom-house tariff of 1887, were again

lowered to about two-fifths of the general tariff, so far as concerned

products exported from any other Chinese port, or intended to be

re-imported into any one of these said ports. In Article 5 of this

Convention the following passage occurs: ‘It is understood that China,

in the exploitation of mines situated in the provinces of Yunnan,

Kuang-si, and Kuang-Tung, may apply, in the first place, to French

merchants and engineers, the exploitation remaining subject to the rules

laid down by the Imperial Government in all that concerns national

industry. It is agreed that the railways already existing, or to be

constructed in Annam, may, after a mutual understanding, be extended on

Chinese territory.’ Finally, it was further stipulated that the French

and Chinese telegraph lines should be combined. The Convention

respecting the frontier definitely extended the French possessions to

the eastern shore of the upper Mekong, thereby giving France the

territory situated on the border of the Shan State of Xieng-hong.

England in 1894 had admitted the right of suzerainty of China over this

little principality, as well as over one or two others, thereby creating

a sort of neutral zone between her Indian Empire and French Indo-China.

A great deal was made over this Convention in France, and the energetic

manner in which the French Minister at Peking had been able to obtain

these concessions under the very nose of his English colleague, Sir

Nicholas O’Connor. The negotiations closed, M. Gérard proceeded to the

Tsung-li-Yamen on the day arranged for the exchange of signatures, to

find, however, only one of the two Chinese plenipotentiaries present.

This personage offered profuse apologies for the non-appearance of his

colleague. ‘Nothing should have prevented his being here,’ replied the

French diplomatist. ‘I pray you find him at once and tell him so.’ A few

moments afterwards the second Celestial appeared alone, looking very

sheepish. ‘And your colleague, is he coming back?’ asked M. Gérard. ‘No;

I am afraid he is detained, and that he cannot return. Shall I go and

fetch him?’ ‘I beg your pardon,’ M. Gérard shrewdly replied; ‘I will

keep you here, and will go myself in quest of your friend.’ At the end

of an hour or so the two Celestials were finally brought together, and

on being asked to explain their dilatory conduct, stated that the

British Minister was in the next room, threatening, if they ventured to

sign, forthwith to haul down his flag. M. Gérard was soon able to

convince the Celestial plenipotentiaries that they had nothing to fear,

but that they must immediately affix their signatures to the document.

Sir Nicholas O’Connor, he assured them, once he was convinced of the

futility of his intimidation, would soon turn his attention to other

affairs. This anecdote, whilst it reflects great credit on the energy of

the French Minister, and displays his knowledge of the Chinese character

to advantage, emphasizes the declining influence of England in China in

1895 and 1896, as well as the annoyance experienced by this Power at the

ratification of the French frontier and its extension towards Mekong. By

confirming it, China violated, it is true, the engagements she had made

when England recognised her position at Xieng-hong, but this did not

concern France, for the State in question was as much the vassal of

Annam or of Siam as it is of Burmah or of China.

What was the real value of the commercial concessions granted to France

by China, and concerning which her press had made such capital? The

reduction of the duties on all products passing by Tongking would have

been of great value if the neighbouring Chinese province had been a rich

one, but it is, unfortunately, quite the reverse. It is now time to

glance over the region that can be provisioned and exploited through

Tongking. It includes the greater part of Yunnan and Kwang-si, the

southern half of Kwei-chau, and a small part of Kwang-tung, that long

and narrow band of territory which this province projects over the

Tongking frontier between the sea and Kuang-si. The Yunnan, the

Kwang-si, and the Kwei-chau are the three poorest provinces of China,

and cover a fifth of her territory, whilst possessing barely the

fifteenth of her population, or, in other words, about 24,000,000 out of

380,000,000. They have been unfortunately devastated by the great

insurrection of the Taipings and the Mohammedan revolts, especially

Yunnan; the country is really only a conglomeration of mountains and

plateaux, some of them 6,500 feet in height, and, moreover, the

communications are very scanty, and it would cost an enormous sum to

improve them. The report of the Lyons Mission, which explored this part

of China in 1895–97, frequently mentions the great difficulties of

transport and the steepness of the ascents, such, for instance, as the

famous Imperial road of Ten Thousand Steps, which you ascend from the

bank of the Red River to the Yunnan plateau, between Manhao and

Mong-tze, and which in a distance of only 30 miles rises from 485 to

more than 6,500 feet. It also mentions the paucity of population, as

contrasted with its superabundance, in the basin of the Yang-tsze-Kiang

and the coast provinces. In the Far East the mountains are almost

invariably barren, even when there is very little cultivable soil in the

plain below. It is said that the Yunnan is extremely rich in mineral

ore, but, as once remarked an acute observer, who has recently visited

nearly the whole of China, when explorers find nothing worth noticing on

the surface of a country, they generally arrive at the conclusion that

there must be something worth looking for underneath. Undoubtedly both

copper and tin have been exploited for years past in Yunnan, but thus

far the actual wealth of these mines is unknown, and it would be mere

matter of conjecture to affirm whether they are worth working or not, or

whether it would pay to construct a railway 300 miles in length to

transport the ore, as these Chinese provinces on the frontier

neighbouring Tongking produce neither silk, tea, nor any other valuable

Chinese export product, and do not offer a particularly brilliant

prospect at present. As to Article 5, relating to mines, if taken in the

literal sense, it is simply a truism, but if one wishes to discover in

it a disguised engagement, and read ‘ought’ instead of ‘may,’ it is a

violation of the clause granted to the most favoured nation inserted in

all Chinese treaties with European Powers. France had soon to recognise

its futility on January 15th, 1896, at the time of the signing of the

Anglo-French treaty relating to the affairs of Siam, by which, it is

true, she profited little by the difficult circumstances in which Great

Britain then found herself, and the two Governments of Paris and London

agreed that all the rights and privileges acquired, or to be acquired,

either in the Yunnan or more to the north at Sze-chuan, were to be

equally shared.

The profit which France might have obtained from the convention of June

20th, 1895, was thus reduced to little or nothing. During the following

year the negotiations which were being persistently pursued at Peking

brought about other results. The right to reconstruct the arsenal at

Foochow established by the French in 1866, and which they destroyed in

1884 under Admiral Courbet, was again restored to them. Several naval

engineers are working there at present, and French foundries are

supplying material. Such has been the share derived by France in the

concessions made by China, to obtain which the nations made such

flattering advances to Li Hung-chang when that astute old gentleman made

his recent famous tour through Europe and America. It certainly

compensated after a fashion for the loss of the custom of Japan, who at

one time gave frequent orders to French factories, but who now deals

exclusively with England and America for the ships and cannon necessary

for her greatly augmented fleet.

Meanwhile, the French Minister at Peking has exerted himself in a

creditable manner for the benefit of the Catholic missionaries. He has

obtained the abrogation of those regulations which prohibited

missionaries from purchasing estates in the interior of China, and

exacted a promise that the next edition of the _Ta-tsing-lu-lieh_, a

collection of laws issued by the Tsing Dynasty, should appear without

the list of punishments against missionaries contained in the edition of

1892. Finally, he obtained authorization for the Lazarists to rebuild on

the same spot the cathedral at Tien-tsin, burnt at the time of the

massacre of the missionaries and nuns during the insurrection of June,

1870.

It is assuredly as the protectress of Catholicism that France has of

late years most worthily played her part in the Far East. Possibly she

has not known how to convert to her material advantage the influence

which ought to be derived in China from her religious position, and

doubtless French policy in the Celestial Empire has been lacking in

enterprise. She certainly did not derive from the intervention in favour

of China a profit proportionate to the risks incurred, and has obtained

from China not only less than her ally, Russia, but even than England,

and by uselessly opposing the demands of this latter Power she has run

the risk of irritating without any benefit that ill-feeling which

divides these two great Western nations.

After a period of inaction during the year which followed the War, the

British Government, if it has not positively reconquered its former

influence, has at least gained a renewed hearing at Peking. Although

China trembled before Russia, the presence in her waters of the British

fleet did not fail to inspire her with a feeling of profound respect;

but, once the first moment of alarm was over, she again bethought

herself as much as possible to begin afresh her old game of pendulum

between the various Powers. The slow work of British diplomacy

throughout the year 1896 fructified in the signing of the Anglo-Chinese

Convention of February 4th, 1897, by which China conceded to Great

Britain certain important modifications on the Burmese frontier; granted

her back a part of the Shan States; recognised her right to establish a

Consul somewhere in Western Yunnan, Manwyne, or Chunning-fu; engaged to

open the roads leading to these places as well as to others; and finally

allowed the railways to be constructed in Yunnan to be united with those

of Burmah. Lastly—and this is the most important point of all—a separate

article prescribed that the Si-Kiang, or West River, which flows through

Canton, should be open to European navigation as far as Woochow, on the

Kwang-si and Kwang-tung frontier, 125 miles from Canton. The two river

ports Samshui and Wuchow became treaty ports, and European concessions

were established there.

This was for England some return for the mortification she had

experienced twenty months earlier at the time of the Gérard Convention.

If, therefore, in Yunnan, in spite of the equality of rights existing

between Great Britain and France, the advantage was with the latter, by

reason of the natural conditions rendering access less difficult from

Tongking than from Burmah, the opening of the West River was a check for

French policy, which had vigorously opposed it. By this waterway

European vessels—that is to say, almost exclusively British steamers

coming from Hong-Kong—would, in the first place, be able to trade with

the rich valley of the lower Si-kiang, which crosses Kwang-tung, and

reascends to the frontier of Kwang-tung, where they would meet the junks

which bring to this point at a small cost the varied products of this

province, and, moreover, distribute merchandise from Hong-Kong to the

extreme navigable points of the West River and its affluents. These

points are situated at a great distance in the interior, almost on the

frontiers of Yunnan and Tongking, and at Lung-chau, thirty miles from

Lang-son, one can see at high tide junks from Canton. Therefore all the

commerce of Kwang-si which France had so coveted was to be drained by

this new channel.

French diplomacy endeavoured to repair the unfavourable impression

produced by this Anglo-Chinese treaty, which effaced the greater part of

the advantages conceded to her on the frontier of Tongking, and in June,

1897, it was stated in Paris that China had ceded to France the right to

construct a railway from Lao-kai, on the Red River, between Tongking and

Yunnan-hsien, the capital of Yunnan, and to prolong it to Nanning-fu and

even northward beyond the line projected to Lang-son and Lung-chau. This

last concession should reserve for France all the traffic of the western

Kwang-si, provided that it is really worth while constructing a railway

to obtain it; for unquestionably navigable rivers have a distinct

advantage over railways in so mountainous and poor a country. As soon as

the former are opened they can be navigated, whereas it will require

time to construct the railways, which, moreover, are very costly. In

February, 1898, I was able to see for myself that the Si-kiang was

already traversed by steamers, whereas the railway from Lang-son to

Lung-chau, the concession for which was given in 1896, was not even

commenced, on account of the many difficulties that had arisen with the

local authorities. The opening in 1899 of Nanning to foreign commerce is

well calculated to deprive France even of this little traffic, which

will revert to Canton.

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