THE ORIGIN OF THE IDEAS OF JUSTICE AND MERCY, AND THEIR TRANSFER TO
THE CHARACTER OF JEHOVAH.
Although holiness and justice convey to the mind ideas somewhat
distinct from each other, yet the import of the one is shaded into
that of the other. Holiness signifies the purity of the Divine nature
from moral defilement; while justice signifies the relation which
holiness causes God to sustain to men, as the subjects of the Divine
government. In relation to God, one is subjective, declaring his
freedom from sin; the other objective, declaring his opposition to
sin, as the transgression of the Divine law. The Israelites might know
that God was holy, and that he required of them clean hands and a
clean heart in worship, and yet not understand the full demerit of
transgressing the will of God, or the intensity of the Divine
opposition to sin. God had given them the moral law, and they knew
that he required them to obey it; but what, in the mind of God, was
the proper desert of disobeying it, they did not know. They had been
accustomed, like all idolaters, to consider the desert of moral
transgression uncertain and unequal. Now they had to learn the
immutable justice of the Supreme Being--that his holiness was not a
passive quality, but an active attribute of his nature, and not only
the opposite, but the antagonist principle to sin.
_In what manner, then, could a knowledge of the Divine justice, or of
the demerit of sin in the sight of God, be conveyed to the minds of
the Jews?_
There is but one way in which any being can manifest to other minds
the opposition of his nature to sin. A lawgiver can manifest his views
of the demerit of transgression in no other way than by the _penalty_
which he inflicts upon the transgressor. In all beings who have
authority to make law for the obedience of others, the conscience is
the standard which regulates the amount of punishment that should be
inflicted upon the disobedient; and the measure of punishment which
conscience dictates, is just in proportion to the opposition which the
lawgiver feels to the transgression of his law; that is, the amount of
regard which he has for his own law, will graduate the amount of
opposition which he will feel to its transgression. The amount of
opposition which any being feels to sin is in proportion to the
holiness of that being, and conscience will sanction penalty up to the
amount of opposition which he feels to crime.
If the father of a family felt no regard for the law of the sabbath,
his conscience would not allow him to punish his children for
violating, by folly or labour, a law which he did not himself respect.
But a father who felt a sacred regard for the Divine law, would be
required by his conscience to cause his children to respect the
sabbath, and to punish them if they disobeyed. The penalty which one
felt to be wrong, the other would feel to be right, because the
disposition of the one towards the law was different from that of the
other.
The principle, then, is manifest, that the more holy and just any
being is, the more opposed he is to sin, and the higher penalty will
his conscience sanction as the desert of transgressing the Divine law.
Now God being infinitely holy, he is, therefore, infinitely opposed to
sin; and the Divine conscience will enforce penalty accordingly.
This is the foundation of penalty in the Divine mind. The particular
point of inquiry is, _How could the desert of sin, as it existed in
the mind of God, be revealed to the Israelites?_
If the penalty inflicted is sanctioned by the conscience of the
lawgiver, it follows, as has been shown, that the opposition of his
nature to the crime is in exact proportion to the penalty which he
inflicts upon the criminal. Penalty, therefore, inflicted upon the
transgressor, is the only way by which the standard of justice, as it
exists in the mind of God, could be revealed to men.
The truth of this principle may be made apparent by illustration.
Suppose a father were to express his will in relation to the
government of his family, and the regulations were no sooner made than
some of his children should resist his authority and disobey his
commands. Now, suppose the father should not punish the offenders, but
treat them as he did his obedient children. By so doing he would
encourage the disobedient, discourage the obedient, destroy his own
authority, and make the impression upon the minds of all his children
that he had no regard for the regulations which he had himself made.
And further, if these regulations were for the general good of the
family, by not maintaining them he would convince the obedient that he
did not regard their best interests, but was the friend of the
rebellious. And if he were to punish for the transgression but
lightly, they would suppose that he estimated but lightly a breach of
his commands, and they could not, from the constitution of their
minds, suppose otherwise. But if the father, when one of the children
transgressed, should punish him and exclude him from favour till he
submitted to his authority, and acknowledged with a penitent spirit
his offence, then the household would be convinced that the father's
will was imperative, and that the only alternative presented to them
was affectionate submission, or exclusion from the society of their
father and his obedient children. Thus the amount of the father's
regard for the law, his interest in the well-being of his obedient
children, and the opposition of his nature to disobedience, would be
graduated in every child's mind by the penalty which he inflicted for
the transgression of his commands.
So in the case of an absolute lawgiver: his hostility to crime could
be known only by the penalty which he inflicted upon the criminal. If,
for the crime of theft, he were to punish the offender only by the
imposition of a trifling fine, the impression would be made upon every
mind that he did not, at heart, feel much hostility to the crime of
larceny. If he had the power, and did not punish crime at all, he
would thus reveal to the whole nation that he was in league with
criminals, and himself a criminal at heart.
So in relation to murder, if he were to let the culprit go free, or
inflict upon him but a slight penalty, he would thus show that his
heart was tainted with guilt, and that there was no safety for good
men under his government. But should he fix a penalty to
transgression, declare it to all his subjects, and visit every
criminal with punishment in proportion to his guilt, he would show to
the world that he regarded the law, and was opposed directly and for
ever to its transgression.
In like manner, and in no other way, could God manifest to men his
infinite justice and his regard for the laws of his kingdom. Did he
punish for sin with but a slight penalty, the whole universe of mind
would have good reason to believe that the God of heaven was but
little opposed to sin. Did he punish it with the highest degree of
penalty, it would be evidence to the universe that his nature was in
the highest degree opposed to sin and attached to holiness.
Now, whatever may be said in relation to the application of these
principles to future rewards and punishments, one thing will be
apparent to all, which is all that the present argument requires to be
admitted, that is--the mind of man would receive an idea of the amount
of God's opposition to sin, only by the amount of penalty which he
inflicted upon the sinner.
Having ascertained these premises, we return to the inquiry, _How
could the demerit of sin in the sight of God, or the idea of God's
attribute of justice, be conveyed to the minds of the Jews?_
The people had now, in a good degree, a knowledge of what sin is. In
addition to the light of natural conscience, which might guide them to
some extent in relation to their duties to each other, they had the
moral law, with the commentary of Moses, defining its precepts, and
applying them to the conduct of life. Their minds were thus
enlightened in relation to sin in the following particulars. First,
those acts which were a transgression of the positive precepts of the
law; Second, omissions of duties enjoined in the law; and, Third, many
acts which the spirit of the law would condemn, but which might not
be defined in any particular precept, would now be noticed by
enlightened conscience, as sin against Jehovah, their holy benefactor,
and the giver of the law.
Having thus been taught what was sin of commission and omission, one
obvious design of the institution of sacrifices,[19] and one which has
been perceived and understood, both by the Jews and Gentiles, was to
convey to the mind the just demerit and proper penalty of sin.
[19] The question whether the sacrifices, and the particular
regulations concerning them, were of Divine origin, does not
affect the argument. Whether they were originally instituted by
Divine command, or whether Moses, acting under Divine guidance,
modified an existing institution and adapted it to the Divine
purposes, both the design, and the end accomplished, would be the
same. There are good reasons, however, for the opinion, that
sacrifices for sin were of Divine appointment.
There were three classes of sacrifices in the old dispensation in
which death was inflicted. The first, which Gentiles as well as Jews
were permitted to offer, was the holocaust, or whole burnt-offering,
which was entirely consumed by fire. Sacrifices of this description
seem to have been offered from the earliest ages. They were offered,
as the best informed think, as an acknowledgment of, and atonement
for, general sinfulness of life. They seem to have had reference to
the fact that men constantly violate known duty, and do many things
which the light of nature and conscience teaches them not to do.
After the whole burnt-offering, was the sin-offering, sacrificed for
an atonement, when the individual had transgressed any specific
precept of the moral law.
The trespass-offering differed only from the sin-offering, as the
learned suppose, in this, that it was a sacrifice for sins of
omission, or for the non-performance of duty, while the sin-offering
was made for a violation of the specific precepts of the moral law.
Whether the design of the different classes of sacrifices was as above
specified or not, is not material, further than it shows how nicely
the forms of the Levitical economy were adjusted to meet that varied
consciousness of sin which the precepts of the law and an enlightened
conscience would produce in the human soul. The material point to
which attention is necessary, with reference to the present
discussion, is that by which the death and destruction of the animal
offered in sacrifice were made to represent the desert of the sinner.
When an individual brought a sacrifice, he delivered it to the priest
to be slain. He then laid his hands upon its head, thereby, in a form
well understood among the Jews, transferring to it his sins; and then
the life of the sacrifice was taken as a substitute for his own life.
He was thus taught that the transgression of the law, or any act of
sin against God, was worthy of death; and that the sacrifice suffered
that penalty in his stead.
Further: the Jews had been taught that the blood of the sacrifice was
its life; or rather the principle upon which the life of the body
depended. Upon this subject they had the following express
instruction--'For the life of the flesh is the blood: and I have given
it to you upon the altar to make an atonement for your souls; for it
is the blood that maketh an atonement for the soul.'[20] Now, this
blood, which the Jews were thus taught to believe was the life of the
sacrifice, was repeatedly sprinkled by the priest upon the mercy-seat
and towards the holy place; thus presenting the life of the sacrifice
immediately in the presence of God (the ineffable light, or symbol of
God's presence, rested over the mercy-seat between the cherubim);
signifying--as plainly as forms, and shadows, and external types could
signify, that life had been rendered up to God to make atonement for
their souls.
[20] Lev. xvii. 11.
Thus the idea was conveyed to their minds through the senses, that the
desert of sin in the sight of God was the death of the soul. And while
they stood praying in the outer court of the tabernacle, and beheld
the dark volume of smoke ascending from the fire that consumed the
sacrifice which was _burning in their stead_, how awful must have been
the impression of the desert of sin, made by that dark volume of
ascending smoke! The idea was distinct and deeply impressed, that
God's justice was a consuming fire to sinners, and that their souls
escaped only through a vicarious atonement.
As a picture in a child's primer will convey an idea to the infant
mind, long before it can be taught by abstract signs, so the Jews, in
the infancy of their knowledge of God, and before there were any
abstract signs to convey that knowledge, had thrown into their minds,
through the senses, the two essential ideas of God's justice and
mercy: His justice, in that the wages of sin is the death of the soul;
and His mercy, in that God would pardon the sinner, if he confessed
his sin, acknowledged the life of his soul forfeited, and offered the
life of the sacrifice as his substitute.
In this manner an idea of the desert of sin was conveyed to the minds
of the Jews; God's law honoured, and the utter hostility of the
Lawgiver to sin clearly manifested; and God's mercy was likewise
revealed as stated in the preceding paragraph. Thus, in a manner
accordant with the circumstances of the Jews, and by means adapted in
their operation to the constitution of nature, was the knowledge of
God's attribute of justice, and the relation which mercy sustains to
that attribute, fully revealed in the world; and in view of the nature
of things, it could have been revealed in no other way.[21]
[21] Inquiring readers of the Old Testament often find many things
announced in the name of God, which must seem to them inconsistent
with the majesty of the Divine nature, unless they view those
requirements in the light of the inquiry, 'What impressions were
they adapted to make upon the Jewish mind?' There are but few
readers of the Old Testament who read on this subject
intelligently. In this remark we do not refer to the historical or
preceptive portions of these writings, but to the elements of the
Mosaic institution. In order to see the design of many items of
the system, we must consider those items as exhibitions to the
senses, designed chiefly, perhaps only, to produce right ideas, or
to correct erroneous ones then existing, in the minds of the Jews.
The inquiry ought not to be, What impressions are they adapted to
produce upon our minds concerning God? but, What impression would
the particular revelation make upon _their_ minds? An instance or
two will illustrate these remarks.
The adaptation to accomplish a necessary end is apparent in the
scene at Sinai. The Israelites had been accustomed to an idolatry
where the most common familiarities were practised with the idol
gods. The idea of reverence and majesty which belongs to the
character of God had been lost, by attaching the idea of divinity
to the objects of sense. It was necessary, therefore, that the
idea of God should now be clothed, in their minds, with that
reverence and majesty which properly belong to it. The scene at
Sinai was adapted to produce, and did produce for the time being,
the right impression. The mountain was made to tremble to its
base. A cloud of darkness covered its summit, from which the
lightnings leaped out and thunders uttered their voices. In the
words of a New Testament writer, there was 'blackness, and
darkness, and tempest.' It was ordered that neither man nor beast
should touch the mountain, lest they should be visited with death.
The exhibition in all its forms was adapted to produce that sense
of majesty and awe in view of the Divine character which the
Israelites needed to feel. To minds subjected to the influence of
other circumstances than those which affected the character of the
Israelites in Egypt, such manifestations might not be necessary;
but in the case of the Jews, accustomed as they had been to
witness a besotting familiarity with idols, these manifestations
were directly adapted to counteract low views of the Divine
character, and to inspire the soul with suitable reverence in view
of the infinite majesty and eternal power of the Being with whom
they had to do.
The testimony of the Bible in relation to the design of the
exhibition at Sinai corroborates the views that have been given.
'When the people saw it, they removed and stood afar off. And they
said unto Moses, Speak thou with us, and we will hear: but let not
God speak with us, lest we die. And Moses said unto the people,
Fear not: for God is come to prove you, and that his fear may be
before your faces, that ye sin not.'--Ex. xx. 18-20.
The scene which occurred afterwards, evinced the necessity of this
exhibition, and developed the result of the proof [trial] that was
made of their character. In the absence of Moses, they required an
image of Jehovah to be made, and they feasted and 'played' (this
last word having a licentious import) in its presence. Thus, after
trial of the strongest exhibitions upon their mind, some of them
proved themselves so incorrigibly attached to licentious idolatry,
that they desired to worship Jehovah under the character of the
Egyptian calf. They thus proved themselves unfit material, too
corrupt for the end in view; and they were, in accordance with the
reason of the case, destroyed.
Another conviction necessary to be lodged in the minds of the
Israelites, and impressed deeply and frequently upon their hearts,
was faith in the present and overruling God. This was the more
necessary, as no visible image of Jehovah was allowed in the camp.
There were but two methods possible by which their minds could be
convinced of the immediate presence and power of God controlling
all the events of their history. Either such exhibitions must be
made that they would see certain ends accomplished without human
instrumentality; or they must see human instrumentality clothed
with a power which it is not possible in the nature of things it
should in itself possess. The circumstances connected with the
fall of Jericho will illustrate the case. The people were required
to surround the city, by a silent procession during seven days,
bearing the sacred ark, and blowing with rude instruments which
they used for trumpets. On the seventh day, the people were to
shout after they had compassed the city seven times; and when they
shouted, according to a Divine promise, the walls of the city fell
to the ground. Now, here was a process of means in which there was
no adaptation to produce the external effect, in order that the
INTERNAL effect, the great end of all revelation, might be
produced--that they might be taught to recognise Jehovah as the
present God of nature and providence, and rest their faith on him.
If the Israelites had, in this case, used the common
instrumentalities to secure success--if they had destroyed the
wall with instruments of war, or scaled its height with ladders,
and thus overcome by the strength of their own arm, or the aid of
their own devices, instead of being led to humble reliance upon
God, and to recognise his agency in their behalf, they would have
seen in the means which they had used a cause adequate to produce
the effect, and they would have forgotten the First Cause, upon
whose power they were dependent. Second causes were avoided in
order that they might see the connection between the First Cause
and the effect produced--human instrumentality stood in abeyance,
in order that the Divine agency might be recognised. Thus they
were taught to have faith in God, and to rely upon the presence
and the power of the Invisible Jehovah.