CHAPTER V.

The Regiment remained now encamped for more than a month on the slope

of l’Arrhune. Extremely inclement weather set in; rain, wind, and

sometimes snow. Occasionally tents were blown away, or falling on

their sleeping occupants buried them under the wet canvass. The men

on picquet also suffered severely. But notwithstanding the altitude

and exposure of their camp and the severity of the weather, the

health of the Regiment was uncommonly good; not one man, in the 1st

Battalion at least, being sick. But this immunity from illness did

not extend to all the officers; for Colonel Ross was obliged to leave

the camp and the command of the 3rd Battalion, and to take up his

residence in the village of Renteria.

During this time the French were busily employed in fortifying and

throwing up entrenchments on La Petite Arrhune. The officers with

these working parties frequently interchanged civilities with our

officers, saying: ‘You will not be able to remain on these bleak

mountains. You will have to retire into Spain.’ To which the reply

was: ‘We will do so, if we are ordered.’ At last La Petite Arrhune

exhibited a truly formidable appearance. Stone walls were built with

loop-holes to fire through; the ground was escarped where it appeared

accessible; and redoubts were built at intervals.

[Illustration:

BATTLE OF THE NIVELLE

10^{TH} NOV.^R 1813

_E. Weller, lith., London._

_London: Chatto & Windus._

]

Pamplona surrendered at the end of October; and Lord Wellington

being thus relieved from any enemy in his rear, immediate measures

were adopted to advance into France. Heavy rains and the consequent

impracticability of the roads postponed this movement, which was

resolved upon in the first days of November, until the night of the

9th. On that day the commanding officers of the three Battalions had

been taken up to the top of l’Arrhune, and from that commanding

position the task laid out for each of the Battalions, and the

ground over which they were to move, had been pointed out to them.

After nightfall on that evening the Regiment moved to its ground,

and about midnight took up its position, crouching behind the rocks

within half-musket shot of the enemy’s picquet. All this was done in

profound silence. No horse, nor even a dog, was allowed to go with

the Regiment, lest their neighing or their barking should reveal the

movement.

The signal for attack was a gun on the left. A little before daylight

the Riflemen assumed their arms, and watched with anxiety the first

tinge of sunlight on the peaks of the mountains. At last that streak

appeared, the gun pealed forth among the hills, and the Riflemen

sprang up from their lair. The enemy, though surprised (for their

picquet was found seated round the fire), were not unprepared; but

flew to arms and to man their works. The 1st and 3rd Battalions

crossed the valley separating the two Arrhunes, and ascended and

forced the steep sides of La Petite Arrhune. The 2nd Battalion, with

the mountain guns, was stationed near the hermitage at the top of

the greater Arrhune; but when the other two Battalions had advanced,

they also moved forward and took their part in the fray. The French

fought here with great determination, and clung to the works they

had constructed with resolute tenacity. The officers were observed

by the Riflemen to stand on the walls, and urge their men by their

gesture and example to remain. One young man in particular excited

their admiration by prodigies of valour; and refusing to the last

to retire, fell forward pierced by a bullet. Later in the morning,

when La Petite Arrhune had been carried and cleared of its defenders,

General Alten led his Division across and attacked the enemy’s

entrenchments on the opposite range. These were carried with less

difficulty than those they had fought for in the morning. But towards

the close of the day the 1st Battalion charged the right flank of the

French, near a redoubt called the Signal redoubt; and the enemy being

taken in flank at the same time by other troops, turned and fled,

closely pursued by the Riflemen.

At this moment Barnard, who led them, fell from his horse, wounded

through the right breast by a musket-ball. George Simmons, who was

close to him, was at once at his side, and placed his head on his

breast. It was evident that the lung was penetrated; for blood and

air issued from the wound, and blood came from the mouth also. His

first words were: ‘Do you think I’m dying? Did you ever see a man

so wounded recover?’ Simmons assured him that though his wound was

dangerous, yet that there were many instances of recovery from such

wounds; and that his pulse indicated no appearance of sinking.[131]

‘Then,’ said the gallant chief, ‘you give me hopes. If any man can

recover, I know that I shall.’ While he lay here, as at Barrosa, the

enemy seeing they had brought down an officer of rank plied their

fire on him and those who surrounded him. He was at once carried by

four soldiers into a farm-house, whence three days after he was borne

by his band of the 1st Battalion through the pass to the town of

Vera, where he slowly recovered.

The loss of the Regiment in this action, known as the Battle of the

Nivelle, was very severe. Of the 1st Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel

Barnard, Captain Charles Smyth, Lieutenants Haggup and Fensham were

severely wounded; 2 sergeants, 1 bugler, and 3 Riflemen were killed;

and 42 wounded.

Of the 2nd Battalion, Captain William Cox was slightly, and

Lieutenants Charles Eaton, Henry Scott, and Doyle were severely

wounded. Doyle died of his wounds. Five Riflemen were killed; 3

sergeants and 23 Riflemen wounded; and 3 missing.

Of the 3rd Battalion, there were Lieutenants Kirkman slightly, Loftus

Jones severely, and 8 Riflemen wounded.

The Regiment bivouacked that night on the ground it had taken in

front of Sarre. It rained hard all the following day, and for some

days subsequently, and the troops suffered severely from the state

of their camp. On the 15th the Regiment moved to Arbonne, where the

men were quartered in houses, and on the 17th proceeded to Arcangues.

Here the 1st Battalion occupied the château and some houses near it;

while the 3rd Battalion were placed in some houses near the church,

about a quarter of a mile to the rear. The village of Arcangues is

built on high ground, from which three tongues or spurs run out like

a trident. The enemy’s picquets were at the village of Bassussari,

about 400 yards from our picquets posted on these tongues of land;

and in fact the sentries of the opposing armies were so close that

the reliefs passed each other. There were some houses in this line of

posts in the possession of the enemy which it was important to take

from them, and so to connect our picquets on the tongues by a line of

sentries extending across the valleys between them.

Accordingly, on November 23 the Light Division was ordered to attack

the houses. This task was given to the 43rd. They at once attacked

and carried these houses; but unfortunately the officer commanding

the company engaged went beyond, and attacked a fortified house

which the French occupied in strength on their reinforcing their

post there, and the 43rd became seriously engaged. The 1st Battalion

were then ordered to move forward and cover this officer’s retreat.

But he was made prisoner with many of his men, and his Lieutenant

was killed. The 1st Battalion then held the houses which it was the

object of this movement to secure.

While this was happening on the left projection, there were some

houses also on the right in the possession of the enemy, which it was

essential to take in order to secure access to a causeway, which ran

along a marsh, and to some high ground near the Nive, occupied by

another Division of the army; and on which stood a château, called,

from the owner of it, ‘Garrat’s House.’

This task was also assigned to a company of the 43rd, supported by

some other companies of that regiment, and by the 3rd Battalion.

The houses were at once taken; but an order immediately arrived to

evacuate them, and the 43rd retired. But ere long a counter-order

was issued that they were to be held; when a company of the 3rd

Battalion took possession of them. They had not, however, been long

in them when a third order was given that they were to retire.

Scarcely had they begun to obey it when they were charged by some

cavalry, supported by a column of infantry. The officer in command

of the company, anxious perhaps to fulfil the last orders, and not

unnecessarily to engage himself with a superior force, ordered his

company to run to the rear. He thus brought them off safely, with

the exception of one man wounded; but rather to the offence of his

brother Riflemen, who felt that he might have resisted, and punished

the cavalry, and then have slowly withdrawn before a superior force

of infantry.

One man of this company I have said was wounded. He was shot in the

head; and came to the surgeon who was with the other 3rd Battalion

companies in reserve, to have his wound dressed. As the surgeon was

sponging it with water from a mess-tin held by the hospital orderly,

a ball struck the tin, knocking it out of the hands of the orderly;

but without injuring any of the party. There were also wounded of the

1st Battalion, Lieutenant Stilwell, 1 sergeant and 3 Riflemen, and of

the 3rd Battalion, 1 sergeant and 1 other man.

The houses so often taken and evacuated were retaken next day by

another company of the 3rd Battalion, who held them in spite of all

attempts of the enemy to dispossess them. In taking them a young

officer, George Cary, then a Second Lieutenant, advanced with his men

on the enemy, who withdrew for some distance without much resistance;

but on reaching a hedge some way in front of the principal house,

they called to him to come no further, or they would fire. Cary,

having placed his men under cover, called out to them (for he spoke

excellent French) that they might begin their fire when they liked;

but that he must have the house. They made no more resistance; but

walking off planted their sentries within about forty yards of it.

This is but one of many instances of the good and chivalrous feeling

that existed between the Riflemen and the French troops on outpost

duty. On another occasion soon after, some French officers made

signs of peace to those of our 3rd Battalion on picquet. These being

courteously returned, the French officers advanced, and informed our

officers that some of the inhabitants who had fled from their homes

within our lines were desirous to return to them; and requested our

officers to pass them through our outposts unmolested. This was of

course readily agreed to, and promptly executed; and the officers on

both sides parted with mutual expressions of esteem. ‘But the most

remarkable instance’--(though it occurred a little later than the

period of which I am writing, I will give it here, in the words of

Sir William Napier)--‘happened on the occasion of Lord Wellington’s

being desirous of getting to the top of a hill occupied by the enemy

near Bayonne. He ordered the Riflemen who escorted him to drive the

French away, and seeing the former stealing up, as he thought too

close, called out to commence firing. With a loud voice one of those

old soldiers replied “No firing!” and then holding up the butt of

his rifle towards the French, tapped it in a peculiar way. At the

well-understood signal, which meant “We must have the hill for a

short time,” the French, who though they could not maintain would

not have relinquished the post without a fight if they had been

fired upon, quietly retired. And this signal would never have been

made, if the post had been one capable of a permanent defence. So

well,’ concludes the historian, ‘do veterans understand war and its

proprieties.’[132]

The well-known signal was holding up the butt, and tapping the brass

tool-box which was in the stock of the Baker, as it was also in that

of the Brunswick rifle. It signified ‘We are in earnest;’ and was

used by the Riflemen when they approached the French outposts to

drive in picquets or with other hostile intent. Without this signal

made they were unmolested.

On December 9 the Light Division was ordered to advance with a view

to the troops under General Hill passing the Nive. The 1st and 3rd

Battalions drove in the enemy’s outposts, the latter advancing along

a ridge in their front. The 2nd Battalion was also actively engaged.

A heavy fire was kept up by the French, to which the Regiment was

more or less exposed all day. In the evening the Regiment fell back

to the cantonments at and near Arcangues which they had before

occupied. On the morning of the 10th no immediate fighting was

anticipated; so little indeed that the Light Division had orders to

fall back to Arbonne about four miles to the rear, and part of the

second brigade had already marched; but General Kempt, not being

satisfied with the look of things in his front, delayed his movement.

The morning dawned with a thick drizzling rain; and the troops,

having been as usual under arms at daylight, had turned in, when

a sudden order was received to fall in and support the picquets,

for the enemy were advancing. The position of Arcangues has been

already described: the church, the château, the adjacent houses, the

three tongues of hilly land; and there was a table-land, a sort of

open common, at the top. The left tongue was occupied by picquets

of the 52nd; the centre by those of the 43rd; the right by those

of the 1st Battalion; and that near Garrat’s House by those of the

3rd Battalion. As soon as these Battalions turned out, they found

the picquets vigorously attacked. The numbers of the assailants

were overwhelming, and they had to retire. But though this had to

be effected at the double--for there was much ground to get over to

reach the plateau in front of Arcangues--and though they moved over

bad ground, yet the moment they reached the flat ground at top, these

apparently flying skirmishers resumed their formation, and presented

a steady and impenetrable front to the advancing enemy. But some of

the 1st Battalion retiring from the right-hand tongue were unable to

head the enemy, who moving by the ravine, arrived at the plain before

them. Some men[133] and one officer, Second Lieutenant James Church,

were then made prisoners.

Two companies of the 3rd Battalion were pushed forward to cover the

retreat of the picquets; and having done so, they retired gradually

as the enemy advanced. This Battalion then lined a coppice at

the foot of the high ground on which the church is situated and

connecting the church with the château, whence the 1st Battalion,

having loop-holed it and strengthened it with _abattis_ and a

kind of rude rampart, kept up a galling fire upon the enemy. This

_tiraillade_ continued till dark.

In this affair Lieutenant Hopwood of the 1st Battalion, Sergeant

Brotherton and Private Patrick Mahon were killed by one ball, which

passed through the heads of all three as they were standing one

behind the other. They fell near a hedge which the Battalion had

defended as they fell gradually back from one defensible point to

another. During the day several French soldiers came through the

hedge and approached their bodies; but as our men supposed that it

was with the intention to plunder them, they shot every man who

passed the hedge. For they were unable from the violence of the

fire to go out themselves to remove their bodies. At last towards

evening a French officer approached through the hedge waving a white

handkerchief; and when our firing ceased, he brought out some of his

men with spades, who buried Hopwood and the sergeant in one grave.

On this day the losses of the Regiment were: 1st Battalion: 4

Riflemen killed; 2 Sergeants, 1 Bugler and 21 Riflemen wounded; 2nd

Battalion: 4 Riflemen killed, 3 Sergeants, 1 Bugler and 24 Riflemen

wounded; 3rd Battalion: 1 Rifleman killed, 1 Bugler and 22 Riflemen

wounded.

On that night the 1st Battalion continued of course in its occupation

of the château d’Arcangues, while the 3rd Battalion bivouacked on the

ridge extending from it to the church.

On the 11th the Regiment was not engaged. And on that day some French

officers, continuing the good feeling which I have mentioned, and

doubtless anxious to show their confidence, brought out some chairs

and a table from a house occupied by their picquet; and having

carried them into the middle of the adjoining field, within 100 yards

of our sentries, placed some wine and glasses on the table, and

sitting down saluted the officers of our picquet; bowing and holding

up their glasses, as if drinking to their healths.

Yet this security of the outposts was sometimes broken through. For

on this night a Sergeant of the 3rd Battalion surprised the French

picquet. Taking a few men with him he stole past the sentries and got

up to the picquet house undiscovered; and seizing their arms, which

he found piled outside, broke them. And while the picquet, utterly

surprised, were turning out, he and his companions ran back to their

lines. I do not know the name of this daring soldier. He lost an arm

at the battle of Toulouse, and was consequently discharged.

On the other hand: some of the 1st Battalion were, in one of the

affairs of outposts about this time, ordered to drive in the French

picquets in front of them. Lieutenant Gardiner, who commanded the

party, observed that he would not shoot the French sentries. So,

calling to them to begone, he told them that he was going to attack

the post. I have already noted that he spoke French fluently. They

retired; but had hardly done so, when the French officer ordered his

picquet to fire on Gardiner, who was making his men fall in for the

attack. The discharge was ineffectual; and the Riflemen were glad to

hear afterwards that the officer in charge of the French picquet was

not a real soldier, but one of the national guard.

On the 12th the enemy made a show of strengthening his position;

constructing a six-gun battery on the height in front of Arcangues,

which however his gunners never could have served; as the Riflemen

would have shot them before they could have fired a second round.

While therefore our people were strengthening the château of

Arcangues by _abattis_ and throwing up a breastwork, the older

heads declared that it was all a sham. And so indeed it proved. For

though some fighting was anticipated on the 12th, and though in

the afternoon the 1st and 3rd Battalions fell in with the supposed

intention of driving the enemy’s outposts further back from the ridge

in front of Arcangues, yet nothing was done. And in the night between

the 12th and 13th, the sentries of the picquets having reported that

the enemy’s fires were burning more brightly than usual, the _ruse_

was suspected. And an officer with a patrol, having crept up to

their lines, found them almost abandoned. The truth is that Soult

had withdrawn his force in front of the Riflemen, to attack General

Hill’s force on their right.

In the morning the Riflemen moved forward to the ridge of Bassussari,

and had some little firing with the rear-guard, which had not yet

cleared off; but one of the known signals being made (an officer

holding up his cap on the top of his sword), the firing ceased; and

the Riflemen were suffered without any opposition to advance their

outposts to the ground they had occupied before the attack on them on

the 9th.

On this night an untoward event occurred, which gave the officers of

the Regiment some annoyance. After dark, a French officer accompanied

by two men, approached our position; when the Corporal in charge

of the advanced post of the picquet at the _abattis_ took up his

rifle and shot the French officer, whom the two soldiers carried

into their picquet. It was feared that this would endanger the good

understanding of the French outposts with the Riflemen. For it was

not known whether they came on a friendly visit, as they sometimes

did; or whether it was a patrol sent forward to ascertain if we had

withdrawn the picquets pushed forward in the afternoon. If the latter

(and the presence of the two soldiers makes it probable that it was),

of course those composing the patrol, risked the chances of war.

However, no retaliation was attempted, and the outposts continued as

friendly as before.

Here the Regiment remained without any other matter of moment

worth recording for some weeks, during which they were hospitably

entertained by the owners of the château of Arcangues, an aged lady

and her grandson.

On January 3, 1814, they were moved to the right; and crossing the

Nive advanced a league or two, in order to support some operations

of the army on the Adour. These being effected they fell back to the

Nive; and were cantoned in the villages of Ustaritz and Aurantz; the

3rd Battalion occupying the latter.

The weather now became very severe; rain, sleet and snow fell; and

the roads were knee-deep for foot-passengers, and up to a horse’s

girths.

On January 24 the 1st Battalion was transferred to the second brigade

of the Light Division, and the 2nd Battalion was placed in the first

brigade. This was in consequence of Barnard, commanding the 1st

Battalion, being given the command of the second brigade.

On February 16 the Regiment moved from its cantonments, and may be

said to have commenced the campaign of 1814. Crossing the Nive at

Ustaritz, they moved to within a league and a half of La Bastide de

Clarence and encamped on a wild heathy plain. Next day they marched

to La Bastide itself, and encamped on a hill beyond it.

On the 18th they were moved into houses in consequence of the

weather; which beginning with rain, changed through sleet into snow.

On the 19th the 1st Battalion marched for St. Jean-de-Luz to get

their new clothing, for they were almost in rags; and the means

of transport were not forthcoming, nor the roads easy for its

conveyance. Therefore the Regiment went down to St. Jean-de-Luz, one

Battalion at a time, to obtain it. Having received it on the 23rd

the Battalion started on the 24th to rejoin the army, and passing

though Ustaritz, La Bastide and Garris, arrived at St. Palais on the

28th. Here they were very much disappointed to find that the regiment

which occupied it had orders to move to the front, leaving the 1st

Battalion at St. Palais till a fresh regiment relieved them. For

they had heard firing on the 27th, and now the tidings of the hard

fight at Orthez had reached them. Here they remained some days, in a

state of great anxiety and excitement, until, as they were trying to

persuade some detachments which came up that they were a relieving

battalion, an order reached them to move forward. And marching as

rapidly as possible, they reached Sauveterre on the 7th March, Orthez

on the 8th, and rejoined the other two Battalions at Barcelonne on

the 11th.

But while the 1st Battalion was absent for re-equipment in clothing,

the two other Battalions had moved from La Bastide to Esturi on

February 21st, and to St. Palais on the 22nd, and on the 23rd they

encamped near La Chere and Charite. And it was found that the enemy

had blown up a bridge over the Bidouze. It was necessary therefore

on the 24th to cross two branches of that river by fords. The first,

the Gave de Mauleon, they passed at Nabes; and then moving forward

to Gave d’Oleron, they found some French cavalry drawn up on the

opposite bank to dispute the passage. A small cottage was on the

bank; and George Simmons,[134] taking a few Riflemen into it, kept

up a smart fire from the windows to cover the passage of the two

Battalions through the ford. As it was very deep, they were halted,

and made to take off their pouches and strap them on the top of their

knapsacks, and then plunge in, Captains Miller and Duncan of the 2nd

Battalion leading the way. The water was above the men’s waists, and

they were obliged to link themselves together to avoid being swept

away; while some of the men clung to the stirrup-leathers and tails

of the horses of the mounted officers. On arrival at the opposite

bank they found that the enemy had endeavoured to obstruct their

mounting it, by drawing harrows with the point upwards to the slope.

The cavalry however did not molest them. One man indeed galloped

towards the bank, but he was instantly shot down by one of the 2nd

Battalion men in the cottage. Under their fire, and that of a couple

of guns, brought up to the left bank, they gave way and retired. This

ford was near Villeneuve; and having passed through that village the

Riflemen halted till the rest of the Division had crossed and formed

up. While here George Simmons, being wet to the shoulders and very

cold, entered a respectable house, and sitting down by the fire,

asked the people to get him some wine and something to eat. Some ran

to execute his orders, while the rest watched him with terror and

aversion. A little child being present, he took it up on his knee and

fondled it, and (as the people refused to be paid for the refreshment

he had asked for) he put some money into its hand. On his setting it

down a general feeling of relief seemed to pervade the bystanders,

who then told him that Soult and his emissaries had informed the

peasantry that the English were barbarians, who would carry off and

murder their children.

On their march after crossing the Gave d’Oleron, they came in sight

of a body of the enemy’s infantry moving parallel to them, and

apparently making the utmost haste to escape from them. It was at

first proposed to fall on them; but some wiser man having observed

that their supports were probably not far off, they were allowed to

depart in peace. The two Battalions bivouacked on a bleak exposed

common not far from Orion.

The next day they passed through Orion; and on arrival there learned

that it had been occupied as Soult’s head-quarters the night before.

The wisdom of not attacking the retreating column the day before was

now apparent; for the French being in force at Orion, would have

moved out to their succour; and possibly might have overpowered, and

certainly would have harassed, the soldiers weary with a long march

and the passage of two fords.

Pursuing their march they arrived near Orthez and soon heard a loud

explosion, which proved to be the destruction by the enemy of the

stone bridge over the Gave de Pau. The two Battalions advanced to

some high ground looking over the town of Orthez. Some troops of the

enemy were observed filing through the town; and some guns being

brought up opened on them, which induced them to quicken their pace,

and their officers were seen riding up and down and urging them on.

They also brought forward some guns which returned the cannonade

without, however, doing much harm. The Riflemen bivouacked on this

height.

On the 26th Lord Wellington after reconnoitring the enemy’s position

ordered them about twelve o’clock to fall in. And they were soon

after directed to move to the right, and cross a ford a little above

the destroyed bridge. This promised to be a most deadly business as

the French infantry were massed, with heavy guns, directly in front

of the ford. However the Riflemen marched off, the 3rd Battalion

leading. On the way a staff officer overtook them, and ordered them

to conceal themselves as much as possible behind any irregularities

of the ground. This they did and crept on; and just as they got to

open ground leading down to the ford, and expected the artillery to

open upon them, they were suddenly countermanded, countermarched,

and moved far to the left. The truth is that this was a double

feint. First, to make the enemy believe that our people were going

to attempt the ford; and then, lest they should have suspected that

any open demonstration to do so was a feint, to make them fancy, by

our stealth and getting under cover, that it was hoped to conceal

the movement from them. By occupying the enemy’s attention with this

skilful manœuvre, three divisions of the army were enabled to cross

the river by a pontoon bridge at a point near Salles, below Orthez.

By this bridge the Riflemen were also to pass; and marching all day

they bivouacked near the village of Salles and close to the pontoon

bridge at night.

On the 27th they early crossed the Gave de Pau; and moved by the

great road which leads from Peyrehorade towards the town of Orthez;

and when within about two miles of it, turning to the left, they

ascended the ridge which runs parallel with the river and in front

of which the French were posted in a very strong position. Whether

it was that the Light Division was weak, two of its regiments being

absent, or that they were not needed, the two Battalions were not

actively engaged. Lord Wellington was in front of them during the

afternoon, and ordered that advance of the 52nd which, as is well

known, broke through Soult’s centre and decided the fate of the day.

Then the enemy fled, and then the Riflemen were ordered in pursuit,

but did not come up with the retreating columns. Their march

continued for about two leagues, in the course of which they passed

the river Lys de Béarn and bivouacked near the village of Bonne

Garde. They were entirely without covering and suffered much; for it

froze hard. The Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion (whether Ross

or Balvaird, I am not sure) did indeed contrive to get into a hut;

but there being no bed unoccupied, he lay down in a kneading-trough

or flour-bin, and appeared in the morning more like a miller than a

Rifleman.

On the 28th the two Battalions started early, and after crossing the

Lys de France, arrived at Duerse, where they halted for the night.

On March 1, they passed the Adour, and after a long march entered

Mont-de-Marsan, which the enemy evacuated just before they reached

it. Here they were quartered in good houses, and had comfortable

beds: a change very refreshing to them after their long marches,

often in very bad weather, and after their exposed bivouacks.

On the next day the 2nd Battalion marched to Bertam, and the 3rd

Battalion to St. Maurice; the march was through the pine forests and

by the sandy roads of the Landes; and being made in a snow storm was

very painful to the soldiers.

On the next day the 3rd Battalion moved on to St. Sever, where Lord

Wellington had fixed his head-quarters. Here they continued till the

8th, furnishing the guards and duties of head-quarters. On the 4th

the 2nd Battalion had marched to Bascom, where they remained till

the 9th, when both Battalions re-united near Aire, whither the 3rd

Battalion had marched, crossing the Adour on the 8th and moving to

Grenade; and next day to Barcelonne opposite Aire on the right bank

of that river.

On the 10th both Battalions marched at daylight to some poor cottages

near Arblade, and on the 11th entered Tarsac, where they halted for

the night. The 1st Battalion now rejoined the Light Division, and the

Regiment was re-united.

On the 14th, as Soult assembled a considerable force and threatened

General Hill’s corps, the Regiment was moved back through Tarsac and

formed on the high road near a wood, where they remained the whole

day expecting to be engaged; but the enemy retiring after making a

demonstration only, they marched back to Tarsac and re-occupied their

quarters there.

The enemy had left a rear-guard of cavalry, and as they remained

during the next two days, it was determined on the 16th to attack

them. The 15th Hussars were with the Riflemen at Tarsac; and

accordingly on that morning this regiment moved out to attack the

French cavalry. This consisted of the 13th French Hussars, and they

sent one squadron in advance, the rest of the regiment being formed

in support. The English cavalry adopted the same formation, and

a squadron under Captain Hancox, supported by the 2nd Battalion,

advanced to meet their opponents. The French were rapidly charged and

upset; many of them sabred; and about twenty-five made prisoners,

among whom was the French Captain. He was badly wounded, and died of

his wounds in his father’s house, to which he was taken. For he was

a native of the place, which it was said he had not visited for many

years. The rest of the French cavalry rapidly retired and escaped.

On the 18th the Regiment advanced by the road by which the French had

retreated, and crossing the Adour by a bridge at Arros (or La Rose)

proceeded to St. Germain; whence, after a short halt, to Plaisance,

where they remained for the night, three companies of the 1st

Battalion being pushed across the river.

On the next day the Regiment marched to Obregon, where they halted

for some hours; and in the evening halted at Aget.

The French were now falling back on Tarbes, and on this day the

Riflemen heard much firing on their right, which was caused by the

attack of Picton’s light troops on the retreating enemy near Vic en

Bigorre.

On the 20th the Regiment marched early, and moving along the ridge

on which they had last night encamped, arrived at Rabastens. Here

learning that the enemy had taken up a position near Tarbes, they

moved to the right, by the road leading from Auch to Tarbes. On

approaching this town the French were found posted in a formidable

position on a hill, or rather a succession of heights intersected

with ditches and hedges, which gave it almost the form of

entrenchments. It being at first supposed that no considerable force

was engaged, for on marching along the road only a small party were

observed, a company of the 2nd Battalion was sent to dislodge them.

But when it was ascertained that the position was occupied by a

considerable part of General Harispe’s division, the whole Regiment

advanced to the attack. The 3rd Battalion were on the right, the 2nd

in the centre, and the 1st Battalion on the left. The front of the

enemy was covered by clouds of light troops, whom it was not easy to

dislodge, for they had the protection of hedges and banks; and the

Riflemen had to force their way in skirmishing through some covert of

considerable growth. Then they emerged at the foot of the hill, and

the enemy’s ranks rose ‘tier above tier’ as one eye-witness describes

it, on the side of the mountain. But the Riflemen rushed forward;

and though their opponents fought desperately, and their fire was

delivered from one rank above another like the guns on the decks of

a three-decker, yet the Riflemen drove them from the hill, over it

and into the plain below. ‘The French,’ Napier relates, ‘charged

with great hardiness, and being encountered by men not accustomed to

yield, they fought muzzle to muzzle; and it was difficult to judge

at first who would win.’ It was not long to decide; for within an

hour this hill was taken; its face cleared of all but the dead or

dying, and the French in disordered flight over the plain beyond.

Napier supposes that the French mistook the Riflemen, on account of

their green dress, for Portuguese, and therefore fought with more

perseverance than was usual against English troops. Yet one would

suppose that the veterans of the Peninsula had too often fought

with the green-jackets to be ignorant of their nationality or their

endurance in fight. Be that as it may, all agree that this was an

unusually hard-fought field. Surtees says ‘the firing was the hottest

I had ever seen, except perhaps Barossa.’ And Costello observes ‘I

never remember to have been so warmly engaged as on this occasion,

except at Badajos.’

The odds too were very great. I am not able to say how many French

crowded that hill-side; but sixteen companies of Riflemen only drove

them from it. For though the other regiments of the Division were in

reserve, and would doubtless have supported the Riflemen, had they

been repulsed; yet not a shot was fired on that hill except from a

95th rifle. Lord Wellington in his despatch notes the loss of the

enemy as being considerable; that of the Regiment was 11 officers and

80 men.

Of the 1st Battalion, Captain Loftus Gray and Lieutenant John Cox

were severely, and George Simmons slightly, wounded; 2 Riflemen

were killed, and 5 sergeants and 21 Riflemen wounded. Of the 2nd

Battalion, Captain Duncan was killed, Lieutenant-Colonel Norcott,

Captain Miller, and Lieutenant Dixon were severely, and Lieutenant

Humbley slightly, wounded; 1 sergeant and 2 Riflemen were killed;

and 14 wounded. And of the 3rd Battalion, Captain William Cox and

Lieutenant Farmer were severely, and Lieutenant Sir John Ribton and

Quartermaster Surtees slightly, wounded. 1 Rifleman was killed, and

3 sergeants and 32 Riflemen were wounded.

Colonel Norcott was conspicuous, riding about on a tall black mare:

he was early in the day wounded in the shoulder. George Simmons

late in the day was wounded in the knee. When he was down the

French continuing to fire at him, his servant, Henry Short, a brave

Rifleman, ran up and deliberately placing himself in the line of

fire, said ‘You shall not hit him again except through my body.’

Amongst this carnage some curious, some almost ludicrous,

circumstances occurred. A captain of the Regiment was struck by a

ball on a flask or drinking-horn which he carried at his side. The

force of the ball knocked him down and for the moment stunned him.

The men thinking he was killed, or desperately wounded, were carrying

him to the rear, when he revived and called out ‘Stop, let me feel;’

when finding he was unhurt except by the blow, he leaped out of their

arms, and again headed his company. His return was heralded by shouts

of laughter, so ludicrous was the whole episode, though the fight was

at the thickest, and the men falling fast.

When the Riflemen were occupying their camp on the Pyrenees, an owl

had taken up its quarters with them, and always pitched on the tent

of Lieutenant Doyle, who was killed at the Nivelle. Its accustomed

haunt being gone, it transferred its perch to Captain Duncan’s tent.

The joke ran, in the rough mirth of the camp, that he must be next on

the roster; a joke of which he neither liked the point, nor saw the

wit. Yet so it was that he fell in this day of Tarbes.

This fight was a strictly regimental one; for (as I have said) the

Rifle Battalions only were engaged. It excited the admiration of

their companions in arms. One of them, an eye-witness, thus speaks

of this action: ‘Our Rifles were immediately sent to dislodge the

French from the hills on our left, and our battalion was ordered

to support them. Nothing could exceed the manner in which the

ninety-fifth set about this business. Certainly I never saw such

skirmishers as the ninety-fifth, now the Rifle Brigade. They could

do the work much better and with infinitely less loss than any other

of our best light troops. They possessed an individual boldness, a

mutual understanding, and a quickness of eye in taking advantage of

the ground, which, taken altogether, I never saw equalled. They were

in fact as much superior to the French Voltigeurs as the latter were

to our skirmishers in general. As our regiment was often employed

in supporting them, I think I am fairly qualified to speak of their

merits.’[135]

The enemy having been driven from the hill retreated across the

plain, which was covered with the pursued and the pursuers. As

they were crossing it, the Riflemen came upon a considerable body

of the French who were retreating from the town of Tarbes, whence

they had been driven by the 3rd Division; and it was proposed that

the Riflemen, quickening their pace, should fall upon their flank

and intercept them. But the French were too quick for them. For

perceiving their intention, they inclined to the right and got away.

The enemy having crossed the plain took up a strong position on

some heights at the extremity of it; but while Lord Wellington

was making dispositions to attack them, darkness came on; and the

Riflemen bivouacked that night on the plain. The French cannonaded

the bivouack from the height, but the fire was almost harmless;

and as the troops did not move from the ground on which they had

bivouacked, it gradually ceased. And in the night the enemy abandoned

the position and continued their retreat; pursued in the morning by

the Riflemen, who halted that night at Lannemazen. The next day they

proceeded, still in pursuit, to Castelnau. And starting early in

the morning of the 24th, halted that night at L’Isle-en-Dodon. And

on the next day (moving on Toulouse) reached Mont Ferrand. On the

27th they advanced to the village of Tournefeuille, a little beyond

which the enemy still held some ground, occupying some hedges and

enclosures, in front of a bridge about half a mile from the village.

The 3rd Battalion and a Portuguese regiment were ordered to dislodge

them. And the Riflemen extending to the left while the Portuguese

moved on the road, the French gradually fell back towards the bridge

and crossed it, taking the road to Toulouse; and the Riflemen did

not pursue. The loss was trifling. But a most curious circumstance

occurred during this skirmish. A Rifleman of the name of Powell was

shot in the mouth, the ball knocking several of his teeth out. One

of these struck a Portuguese and wounded him in the arm. The surgeon

of the 43rd who happened to be at hand, dressing the wound of the

Portuguese, found in it not a bullet but a tooth. On this the cry

went among the Riflemen that ‘The French were firing bones and not

bullets.’

On enquiry being made and the relative positions of the Portuguese

soldier and Powell being ascertained, no doubt remained that

his tooth had caused the wound. Powell was afterwards killed

by a cannon-ball near New Orleans. I relate this extraordinary

circumstance on the authority of Surtees, who was near Powell at the

time he was wounded, and who minutely examined into the circumstances

at the time. I ought to add that I have invariably found Surtees’

statements corroborated in every particular by the relations

or journals of others; and as he was a man of strong religious

impressions his veracity cannot I think be questioned.

On the 29th the Regiment moved forward to near Toulouse, and occupied

some villages and châteaux in the neighbourhood. On the 31st the

engineers attempted to throw a bridge over the Garonne above its

junction with the Ariège above the town, and the Regiment was

assembled to pass it; but the number of pontoons being insufficient,

and it not being possible to construct a bridge on trestles, they

returned to their cantonments. But it would seem that the 3rd

Battalion did cross (ferried over probably)[136] and were left as a

picquet in one of the villages on the bank.[137]

On April 2 all had recrossed the Garonne, and again occupied

cantonments, on this occasion the houses occupied being lower down

the river than those in which they were formerly cantoned; the 3rd

Battalion were quartered in a wine-store, amongst the casks of which

the men slept. During the time they occupied it no depredation

whatever was committed, nor was any man of the Battalion found to be

drunk. On the 6th the Regiment moved down the river towards Grenade,

and encamped near the village of Seilh. A bridge of pontoons had been

thrown across the Garonne here, and some divisions had crossed; but

the river having risen, and fallen trees having been floated down the

river, the pontoons broke away from the right bank, and were swung

round with the stream, being still fast to the left bank. Though

exertions were made to re-establish it, it was not practicable till

the 9th. And early in the morning of the 10th the Regiment with the

other troops of the Light Division crossed it, and moved up into

position in front of Toulouse. The roads were excellent, and they

quickly attained the position they were to occupy. Their right,

the 3rd Battalion, was to touch Picton’s left, and the left was to

communicate with the Spanish force under General Freyre. In front of

the Riflemen the enemy occupied some houses, and they had constructed

a battery near the bridge over the canal of Languedoc; and at the end

of the bridge stood a Convent which they had loop-holed and fortified

in a very effective manner. The Riflemen commenced by driving the

enemy from the houses, and keeping up their attention during the day.

But some of the 3rd Battalion (and of Picton’s division on their

right) pushed on too far, and getting under the fire of the defenders

of the Convent, they suffered severely. To cover themselves they

had to leap into an open sewer; and detestable as was this position,

they had to remain in it for some time, so severe was the fire of

their opponents. But on the left of the Riflemen a different scene

was taking place. The Spaniards had claimed, as a place of honour, to

lead the attack on the Calvinet. Their rout and their flight under

the fire of its defenders are well known. The Riflemen, and the

other regiments of the Light Division, were mainly occupied during

the day in covering the retreat of the Spaniards, who re-formed more

than once and advanced to the attack; but always to be repulsed by

the French fire, and to fly from it. As often as the English troops

interposed, the French retired; as often as they left the fight to the

Spaniards, the French pursued them.

When the left of the Division was thus occupied in shielding the

flying Spaniards the French rushed out again with loud cries,

in front of the 3rd Battalion, and only with hard fighting were

again driven in. So the battle raged till about four o’clock, when

Beresford having carried the heights on the left of the Riflemen, the

French withdrew within the place, and the battle ended.

Captain Michael Hewan of the 2nd Battalion was severely wounded.

14 Riflemen of that Battalion were killed; and 3 Sergeants and 23

Riflemen wounded.[138]

The Regiment bivouacked on the ground they had occupied, being

saluted from time to time by shot or shell from the place.

On the 11th the Regiment remained perfectly quiet, and on the

12th entered Toulouse, Marshal Soult having in the previous night

retreated from the place in the direction of Carcassonne. On the

same day Colonel Cooke and Colonel St. Simon, as English and

French commissioners, arrived with intelligence of the abdication

of Napoleon. This was at once communicated to Marshal Soult; but

as he refused to acknowledge the authority of those making the

communication, the Regiment with other troops was started in pursuit,

and marched on the 16th towards Villefranche. On the second day’s

march, as they were halted on the roadside, loud huzzas were heard in

front, and a carriage approached containing Count Gazan, the bearer

of intelligence that Soult recognised the abdication of the Emperor,

and acceded to a suspension of arms. The Regiment, therefore, at once

returned to Toulouse and occupied their former quarters.

Towards the end of April the Regiment moved out of Toulouse, and

descending the Garonne were quartered in Castel Sarazin and the

neighbouring villages, the 1st Battalion occupying Castel Sarazin,

and the 3rd Grisolles. The 2nd appear to have been at Castelnau

d’Estrettefons.

Here they remained until the 1st June, when they forded the Garonne

and halted at Grenade. On the next day they reached Cadours near

Cologne, at which the 2nd Battalion halted. On the 5th they marched

to Leitoure; and passing next day through Condom and Nerac halted at

Castel Jaloux. On the 11th they reached Bazas and on the 12th arrived

at Langon. The next day they proceeded to Barsac. On the 14th they

halted at Castres, and the next day entered Bourdeaux. They were not

however quartered there, but merely passed through it, and marched

on to Blanquefort. On the road the Riflemen were reviewed by Lord

Wellington, and the men and officers as they passed saluted with loud

cheers the chief who had for six years led them to victory.

They remained at Blanquefort till the 13th July, when the 1st and 2nd

Battalions embarked at Paulliac on board H.M. ship ‘Ville de Paris’

and disembarked at Portsmouth on the 22nd.

The 3rd Battalion embarked on the 8th July on board H.M. ship

‘Dublin,’ and sailing on the 9th arrived at Plymouth on the 18th, and

disembarking there occupied the barracks.

I have been unwilling to interrupt the narrative of events in which

the Regiment was engaged in the North of Spain and the South of

France; but I have now to turn to operations in Holland in which

detachments of the three Battalions were engaged.

An expedition to that country having been decided on, under the

command of General Sir Thomas Graham[139] (afterwards Lord Lynedoch),

some companies of the Regiment, from the depôts of each Battalion at

Shorncliffe, were selected to form part of it.

Of the 1st Battalion, Captain Glasse’s company; of the 2nd, Captain

M’Cullock’s; and of the 3rd, two companies, Captains Fullerton’s

and William Eeles’, formed the detachment to accompany this

expedition.[140]

They marched from Shorncliffe on November 28; but in consequence of

the continuance of easterly winds, did not embark from Deal until

December 9. In this embarkation the Deal boat which was conveying

Captain Glasse’s company on board H.M. ship ‘Grampus’ was swamped;

but the men, after being in considerable danger, were all saved.

Yet their dangers were not over; for on that or the next night the

‘Grampus,’ in which the Rifle companies were embarked, came into

collision with the ‘Monarch.’ These dangers being overcome, the

Riflemen disembarked at St. Martin’s dyck in the Island of Tholen

on December 17; and made a night march to Wosmaer. On the next day

they proceeded to Halteren, and thence to near Bergen-op-Zoom, near

which they halted. At this time Bergen was partially invested, and

the Riflemen were moved up on the 23rd close to the walls. But on the

24th they made a night march to Steenberghen; and on the next day

proceeded to Oudenbosch. Here they halted some days; and on the 29th

an attack was anticipated, but none took place.

Early in January 1814 a combined movement was arranged between Sir

Thomas Graham and General Bülow, who commanded the Prussian force

with which Graham’s was to co-operate, by which the French were to

be dislodged from Hoogstraten, and a reconnaissance was to be made

on Antwerp. Accordingly the Riflemen moved to Roosendael on January

9, and thence to Calmthout, where they arrived at daybreak on the

11th. The combined movement of the English and Prussians was to have

taken place on the 12th; and on that day the enemy threatened an

attack; but learning from their patrols that the Prussians were also

approaching, they fell back, and being reinforced from the garrison,

took up a position in front of Antwerp, their left resting on the

village of Merxem, their right on Bergerhout. The Riflemen on the

enemy retiring had advanced in pursuit to Capellen.

On the 13th they advanced towards Antwerp, and soon came up with

the enemy’s rear, as they were retiring into the place. There was a

smart skirmish; and the enemy were driven into Antwerp. The Riflemen

distinguished themselves in this affair; and Sir Thomas Graham in

his despatch particularly mentions ‘the rapid but orderly advance of

the detachment of the 3rd Battalion of the Rifle Corps under Captain

Fullerton’s command,’ with great praise.[141]

In this affair one Rifleman of the 3rd Battalion was killed, and one

wounded.

On the 14th they fell back to Calmthout, and on the 15th marched to

Eckeren, where they remained for some days. The Riflemen had suffered

much from the extreme cold; and on January 26 it reached its maximum,

the thermometer marking 13° of frost.

During the month of January the army under Sir Thomas Graham,

which originally amounted to hardly 6,000 men, was increased by

reinforcements of about 3,000 men. And at this time Major and Brevet

Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron of the 1st Battalion arrived in Holland

and took command of the detachments from the three Battalions.

As the French had 12,000 men in Antwerp under Carnot’s command,

no regular siege could be attempted with this force and with the

means at Graham’s disposal; it was resolved therefore to attempt

to set fire to the enemy’s ships at Antwerp. With this object the

troops were moved forward. And the Riflemen returned on January 30

from Eckeren to Calmthout; on the 31st marched to Braeschaet; and

on February 1 advanced to Donk. On that evening the picquets had

some fighting with those of the enemy. On the 2nd the enemy advanced

to Merxem, which had been strengthened with field works, and the

Riflemen had some hard fighting in and about that village, and at

Schooten. Merxem was carried in gallant style; and Graham specially

notes the conduct of ‘the detachments of the three Battalions of the

Rifle Corps,’ under Colonel Cameron’s command, ‘for the distinguished

manner in which they attacked the left and centre of the village,

forcing the enemy from every stronghold.’[142]

On this day Lieutenant Wright of the 1st Battalion was returned as

wounded;[143] as were Captain William Eeles, Lieutenants Ferguson and

Fitzgerald of the 3rd Battalion. One bugler and 2 Riflemen of the 2nd

Battalion were killed, and 6 wounded.[144]

The attempt to burn the ships in the Scheldt and in the docks was

unsuccessful; for our mortars numbering only seventeen, two-thirds of

which were Dutch or French ones found on the ramparts of Willemstadt

(where part of the force had disembarked), were unserviceable, and

unable to throw shells a sufficient distance. The enemy too nightly

flooded the decks with water, which the intense frost converted into

a thick coating of ice, which, at that range, helped to resist the

shells thrown by the imperfect mortars. And the enemy were able at

once to extinguish any fire among the shipping which might take place.

On the 3rd the Riflemen occupied the château of Merxem, where they

remained until the 6th, when the partial investment of Antwerp and

the attempt on the ships having been found a failure, they moved to

Braeschaet. On the next day they were again moved forward to Donk to

repel a sortie of the garrison, which having effected they returned

to Braeschaet; and on the 9th fell back to Klein Zundert, and on the

15th to Loënhout.

About this time the Prussians, having received orders to proceed to

the south, separated from the British force; and Graham’s position

on the frontier of Holland was far from secure. He fell back,

as we have seen, from Antwerp, and occupied ground between that

place and Breda. He eventually resolved to attempt the capture of

Bergen-op-Zoom. The Riflemen moved on February 28 to West Wesel. In

the storm of Bergen and its failure they had no part; for on March 8

(the day on which the attempt was made) they marched in the evening

towards Antwerp, it being understood that their destination was to

attack Fort Lillo. They marched all night, and towards morning were

countermanded and halted; and some hours afterwards heard of the

failure at Bergen-op-Zoom. However a picquet of the 3rd Battalion was

left near Bergen; and on the failure of the attack on it, they were

ordered late in the night of the 8th to retire, and to make the best

of their way to their companies. This they effected; but with barely

sufficient time to call in their advanced sentries.[145]

On the 9th the Riflemen halted at Stabroek, and on the 11th moved to

Capellen.

Another sortie was made by the enemy from Antwerp on March 26, and

the Riflemen were under arms expecting an attack; but none took

place on them, the enemy having retired. Such alarms and affairs

occasionally occurred; for on the 30th the Riflemen pursued a

foraging party of the enemy, but unsuccessfully, for they made good

their return into Antwerp before the Riflemen could intercept them.

But all really active operations of this expedition terminated

with the failure at Bergen-op-Zoom. Some further operations were

contemplated; but as Graham was on the point of executing them, news

reached the Riflemen on April 4 of the entrance of the Allies into

Paris on March 31.

However by the Treaty of Paris the Kingdom of the Netherlands was

to be established; and pending the details of that measure being

arranged by the Congress of Vienna, an Anglo-Hanoverian force was to

remain in the country. The Rifle detachments formed part of it.

Early in April a detachment of one company was sent to occupy Fort

Batz, and on April 15 the Riflemen moved from Capellen to Braeschaet

and Schooten; on the 29th they marched to Contich, and on the

30th to Mechlin, where they remained about a fortnight. On May 14

they arrived at Brussels; where on the 30th they were reviewed by

the Prince Sovereign of the Netherlands, as he was then styled,

afterwards the King of the Netherlands.

On Sir Thomas Graham, then Lord Lynedoch, returning to England, the

Anglo-Hanoverian force was placed under the command of General the

Prince of Orange. The Riflemen remained at Brussels until August

29, when they moved to Ypres, and on the 31st arrived at Courtrai.

On September 5, they marched to Menin; but returned to Ypres on

October 12. Remaining there till November 22, they moved on that day

to Dixmude, and to Furnes on December 9. About this time the Rifle

detachments received some reinforcements. Captain Logan, Lieutenant

Robert Cochrane and 45 men of the 2nd Battalion embarked at Deal on

November 7 to join them. On March 8, 1815, they were at Nieuport,

with a detachment of two companies at Furnes; their strength being

then 4 captains, 14 subalterns, 2 staff, 21 sergeants, 9 buglers and

388 rank and file, under the command of Captain Glasse of the 1st

Battalion. But on March 24 they were re-united at Menin.[146]

On the renewal of hostilities in 1815 the companies of the 1st and

2nd Battalions joined those Battalions on their arrival in Flanders.

The 2nd Battalion company joined at Leuze on April 18; and the two

companies of the 3rd Battalion were (with the 2nd Battalion) in Sir

Frederick Adam’s brigade at Waterloo.[147]

I have said that the five companies of the 3rd Battalion, on their

return from the Peninsula disembarked at Plymouth, and moved into

barracks there. On September 18, 1814, exactly two months after their

arrival in England, they re-embarked for service; the commanding

officer, Major Mitchell, and three companies on board the ‘Fox,’

and the other two companies on board the ‘Dover’ frigates. Their

destination and the nature of their service were kept a profound

secret, but they were, in fact, intended to effect a descent on

the American coast near New Orleans. They reached Madeira on the

8th October, where they remained till the 11th, and having touched

at Barbadoes early in November, anchored in Negril Bay, Jamaica,

on the 25th. Here they were joined by four line regiments, and two

West India regiments; and setting sail on the 29th, arrived off the

American coast near Mobile on December 10, and on the 11th anchored

near the Chandeleur Islands near the entrance to Lake Borgne.

New Orleans is situated on the left bank of the Mississippi, here

about 800 or 1,000 yards across; below the town are great marshes,

covered with reeds six or seven feet high. While on the river bank

runs a strip of firm ground, varying from one to three miles across,

and mostly under sugar plantations. From this the marsh extends

six or seven miles to the shores of Lake Pontchartrain, which

communicates by Lake Borgne with the sea.

It was deemed impossible to approach New Orleans by the Mississippi,

as well because very strong works existed at its mouth, and on the

way up to the city, as because the course of the river is so tortuous

that no wind would have carried the ships up, without considerable

delay. It was therefore resolved to disembark the troops on the shore

of one of the lakes. But it was ascertained that the Americans,

already cognisant of the intended invasion, had placed gun-boats on

these lakes to prevent the landing. The previous destruction of these

was therefore necessary; and this was effected in very fine style

and in a very short time by the boats of the fleet under Captain

Lockyer.

On the 15th the Riflemen were moved from the ships of war into brigs,

which drew less water, but in which they were so crowded as to be

unable to lie down or almost to turn. But even these were too deep

for the shoal waters of the lake, and they were transferred into long

boats, from which they were landed on the 19th on the Île au Poix (or

as our men called it Pearl Island), formed by the branches of the

Pearl river. The weather in moving from the ships to the island was

very bad; and on arrival at it, it was found to be a perfect desert.

Nothing but reeds grew on it, except a few scrubby pine-trees at one

end. To add to their discomfort, a severe frost came on at night; the

men were without shelter of any kind, and they suffered severely. And

as all their supplies had to be furnished from the fleet, want of

provisions was added to their other hardships.

On the 22nd the Battalion (which formed part of the advance under

Colonel Thornton) embarked in boats, and about two o’clock pushed

off to land on the mainland. The place decided on for their

disembarkation was at the head of a creek called Bayou Catalan in

Lake Borgne. The distance was between thirty and forty miles, and the

men were so crowded in the boats that they could not move. They did

not reach the entrance to the creek till after dark. As a picquet of

the enemy was posted about half a mile up the creek, Captain James

Travers, with his company, were placed in small boats and pushed

forward. The picquet was stationed at some huts; near these Travers

landed, and having moved his men to both ends of the huts, prevented

the escape of the picquet, which was secured without a shot being

fired. This was admirably effected; and was a most important service.

For had this picquet escaped or raised an alarm, the landing would

have been opposed. And this would have been a serious check; for on

the morning of the 23rd, when the leading boat reached the narrow

part of the Bayou it was found impracticable to ascend higher, and

the boats being drawn up one after another the men passed over them

as a bridge. This of course was a very slow operation, and one

which, if opposed, would have been very difficult. The Battalion

disembarked about an hour after daylight, having been upwards of

sixteen hours cramped in the boats.

As soon as the whole advance were on shore, they marched, Travers’

company leading; and to give their force as imposing an appearance

as possible, and to scour the country, they advanced with extended

files. They moved in this order through a wood which skirted the

swamp on this side, and as soon as they had cleared it, came upon a

house, surrounded with out-buildings and huts for slaves, belonging

to a M. Villeroy. The Battalion advancing at the double, took

possession of it; and in this and some neighbouring houses took

about thirty prisoners, and a good many stand of arms, belonging, as

was supposed, to the local militia. Unhappily M. Villeroy escaped,

and probably gave information to the enemy; this, before the night

was over, entailed very disastrous consequences. The Battalion then

advanced, and turning to the right, marched for about a mile on the

road to New Orleans, and then bivouacked in a green field in quarter

distance column.

The road ran near the river’s bank which was on the left; and an

embankment about three or four feet high was thrown up to keep

the overflow of the river from the cultivated ground, here about

three-quarters of a mile or a mile broad; beyond this was a strip of

wood, the way through which was, in fact, impracticable, the ground

under the trees being wet and swampy. The cultivated land was much

intersected with wet ditches, and divided by strong wooden palings

five feet high.

On arriving at the bivouack Travers’ company, which had formed the

advanced guard on the march, was pushed forward about a mile to the

front, on the main road, as a picquet.

The troops halted somewhat after mid-day; and as the men had been

without provisions since the morning before, they began as soon as

dismissed to cook. While doing so, between three and four o’clock,

firing was heard in the front from the picquet; it turned out to

be in consequence of an American officer, attended by some mounted

men, riding up to the picquet to reconnoitre. However, the Riflemen

saluted him with a few shots, one of which wounded him, and another

killed the horse of one of the party, on which they retired, getting

off the wounded officer with them.

At nightfall, Captain Hallen’s company relieved Travers at the

advanced picquet; and the men of the rest of the Battalion, being

much fatigued by their uncomfortable night in the boats, their

tedious landing, and their march, lay down in bivouack. They had torn

down some of the palings dividing the fields, and had made good fires

which then burned brightly. While they were thus, as they fancied,

secure, a schooner dropped down the Mississippi, and guided by the

light of their fires, opened a heavy cannonade upon them with great

effect. The men of course were aroused and dispersed; but no shelter

could be found, in this dead flat, except by crouching under the

embankment by the riverside. Hallen had seen the schooner pass his

post and had sent a man off to alarm the Battalion; but the schooner

having the current of the river in her favour reached the bivouack

before the Rifleman could get there.

While in this state of alarm from the sudden cannonade from the

schooner, heavy and continued firing was heard in the front. A body

of 5,000 Americans had attacked Hallen’s picquet, detaching 1,500 men

through the wood to turn the right of the troops. Nobly Hallen kept

them at bay; but being himself wounded, and his picquet threatened by

such overpowering odds, reinforcements advanced from the Battalion.

Meanwhile the enemy made way through the garden of a house on the

right, where a picquet of the 85th had been placed; and the night

being very dark, a hand to hand fight took place. Every deception

was practised by the enemy; and having discovered (from prisoners

probably made in the _mêlée_) the regiments opposed to them, they

would call out, ‘Come on my brave ninety-fifth (or eighty-fifth),’

and then make those who advanced prisoners.

But this _ruse_ was not always successful; more than once they found

that instead of making Riflemen prisoners, they had themselves

‘caught a Tartar.’ On one such occasion an officer and some men

of the Battalion made a body of the Yankees prisoners, and when

they were desired to lay down their arms, the cowardly officer who

commanded them made a stab at the 95th officer with a knife. He was

summarily disposed of; for a Rifleman instantly shot him through the

body.

Meanwhile the fight continued at Hallen’s post. Two battalions came

up and fired volleys by word of command as at a drill. Not much to

their advantage, for the Riflemen, warned by the words, ‘Ready!

Present!’ took care to lie pretty close before the word ‘Fire!’

which, having been pronounced and obeyed, they sprang up, and gave

them a severe return before they could reload. This continued for

some time; but at last, the picquet was obliged to give way before

superior numbers. Yet they only retired a little way to get under

cover and re-form. Eventually the Riflemen advanced again, attacked

their assailants, repulsed them, and regained the post. Hallen, as I

have said, was wounded, so was Lieutenant Forbes, who held a separate

post, and about forty men were killed or wounded. This defence by

Hallen has truly been characterised as ‘an affair of posts but rarely

equalled, and never surpassed in devoted bravery.’[148]

‘Had the expedition terminated more favourably,’ he who makes the

foregoing remark goes on to observe, ‘it is to be presumed that the

brave commander of the company would not have gone unrewarded.’ It

may be so: this is the presumption; the fact is, that Hallen retired

from the Service in 1824 with the rank of Captain, which he had

obtained fifteen years before. Thus England rewarded acts of valour

performed by all but her superior officers.

When the fire was first heard at Hallen’s picquet, Major Mitchell,

taking with him twenty or thirty Riflemen, had hurried to the front

to reinforce it. On the way, however, he fell in with a body of the

enemy, whom, in consequence of the darkness of the night, he could

not distinguish, and he and the men with him were made prisoners.

Altogether the loss of the Battalion on that night was 6 Sergeants

and 17 Riflemen killed; Captain Hallen, Lieutenants Daniel Forbes,

(severely), and W. S. C. Farmer (slightly), 5 Sergeants and 54

Riflemen wounded; and Major Samuel Mitchell, 2 Sergeants, and

39 Riflemen missing. A total (exclusive of officers) of 123, or

one-fifth of their whole number.

The loss of the Americans, who were finally driven off about

midnight, must have been very great, for the field was strewn with

their dead.

Yet still the schooner, and a ship which had joined her, inflicted

amazing annoyance on our people. With a brutality happily unknown

among European nations, they fired into the houses to which the

wounded had been carried. One shot struck a house in which a wounded

Rifleman was lying, and knocked away his knapsack, which he was using

as a pillow, without doing him any actual injury.

However, this savage warfare was to end. On the night of the 25th

a battery was constructed close to the river’s edge, and furnaces

erected for heating red-hot shot. At daybreak on the 26th the battery

commenced its fire on the schooner. Its crew, whose courage did

not equal their cruelty, at once took to their boats and fled; the

fourth shot set her on fire, and she soon afterwards blew up. While

the ship, warned by her fate, and esteeming discretion as the better

part of valour, had herself towed, as rapidly as possible, out of the

range of the little English battery.

In this bivouack the Riflemen continued till the 28th. But it was

toilsome work. The picquets were continually fired at; the reliefs

waylaid; the officers going round their sentries exposed to chance

shots from a concealed marksman. How different this from the

courtesies and chivalry of their European enemies, which I have so

often had occasion to narrate!

[Illustration:

Operations near NEW ORLEANS

in 1814-15.

_Compiled & Drawn by Capt^n H. M. Moorsom, Rifle Brigade._

E. Weller, _Litho._

_London, Chatto & Windus._

]

Early on the 28th the army advanced towards New Orleans, the Riflemen

leading, by the high road along the river’s bank. They drove in the

enemy’s picquets, and proceeded along the road here called ‘_Le

détour des Anglais_,’ till, on turning round some houses on the left,

they suddenly found themselves in front of a strong work the enemy

had thrown up, and from which they opened a cannonade from four guns;

while their old enemy the ship, now moored a little in advance of the

work, brought a flank fire to bear on them. The Riflemen, leading and

extended, did not suffer so much;[149] but the 85th which followed

in close formation were mown down by this fire. Some houses were on

the right, which might have afforded some temporary cover; but the

enemy, by their shells, set them on fire, and the flames added to the

confusion. To escape in some measure from the effects of the fire the

regiments were deployed to the right, while the Riflemen advancing

about a hundred yards got into a ditch, which in a great degree

sheltered them. In the afternoon the regiments moved off by wings, so

as to present as small a body as possible to the enemy’s fire. The

Riflemen, however, did not move off till after dark, nor till some

of the Yankees had ventured out of their works ‘in a very triumphant

manner.’ But a few shots from the Riflemen immediately produced the

conviction among them that it was more advisable to return to the

protection of their rampart. This work was a stout parapet, in front

of which was a wet ditch or canal. Its extent was about 1,000 yards,

and its left touched the river, while its right was defended by the

wood.

The army now took up a position about a mile and a half or two

miles from this work. The Battalion was placed in a house rather in

advance, and on the left of the line. This was exposed, not only to

the fire from the work, but also, as it was near the bank, from a

redoubt which the enemy had constructed on the opposite side of the

river. The men were placed in a sugar-house belonging to this farm,

the floor of which being sunk below the level of the natural ground

afforded some protection. Yet on one occasion at least their cooking

utensils were knocked off the fire by shot passing through this house.

So matters continued until the 31st. It was resolved to bring up some

of the ships’ guns and to place them in battery against the enemy’s

work. Accordingly on the night of the 31st strong working parties

were employed in constructing two batteries near it; one with the

object of keeping down the flank fire from the ship; the other with

the view of breaching the centre of the rampart. The night was dark;

the men worked in silence; and before daylight the batteries were

completed, and the guns in position.

Early in the morning of January 1, 1815, the troops were moved up,

with the object of attacking the enemy’s work. A thick fog favoured

their advance, and concealed their movements from the Americans.

About nine o’clock the fog rose, and our batteries at once began

their fire. This threw the Yankees, who were seen on parade, into

utter confusion; and had a charge on the works been made at that

moment, no doubt it would have been successful. But unhappily the

orders were that the attack was not to be made till the enemy’s

fire had been silenced, and his works breached. When, therefore,

the Americans saw that nothing took place but a cannonade, their

courage returned, and after about twenty minutes they began to return

our fire; and gradually increased to a vigorous cannonade, which

effectually overpowered our guns, and dismounted some of them. The

flank fire too from the battery on the opposite bank of the river, in

which they had placed their ship’s guns, was very galling.

After being kept under this fire inactive till between two and three

o’clock in the afternoon, the troops were withdrawn and bivouacked

on the ground, and some occupied the houses they had held during

the last few days. At night the troops were turned out and employed

in withdrawing the guns from the batteries in which they had been

placed. This was hard work; and some of the guns had to be buried, it

being found impossible to remove them before daylight. Thus the men

had been up, and at hard work, two nights; and in the intervening day

had been for many hours under the enemy’s fire, without the chance of

fighting them. The loss of the Battalion was, 1 Rifleman killed, and

2 missing.

Things continued in this state till the 7th, the picquets being as

before constantly harassed by the enemy.

No other course remained but to carry the enemy’s work by an attack

_de vive force_, and it was decided that this should take place on

the 8th. Three companies of the Battalion were to precede the advance

of the right column under General Gibbs, consisting of the 4th,

21st and 44th regiments; while the other two companies were in like

manner to act with the left column. The Riflemen were to extend along

the edge of the canal or ditch in front of the enemy’s rampart, and

both parties so extended were to occupy the whole of the bank, or

as it might be called, the crest of the glacis. At four o’clock in

the morning the troops paraded; and by daylight the Riflemen were

in their place. But the 44th Regiment, which had been appointed to

carry ladders and fascines to enable the attacking force to cross

the ditch, had come without them. Their commanding officer, the Hon.

Colonel Mullens, had said loudly the night before when the regiment

was detailed for this duty in orders, that ‘his regiment was sent on

a forlorn hope’ and ‘was doomed.’ And on the regiment returning to

fetch the ladders and fascines, he prudently did not come back to

the front with them. The enemy meanwhile opened a furious fire on

the troops, specially destructive to the Riflemen who were extended

within 100 or 150 yards of the work. One regiment of the right

attack, finding itself exposed to this fire, and without the fascines

and ladders they had been led to expect, wavered, broke up, and fled

to the rear, throwing the regiment which was following in support

into confusion. Sir Edward Pakenham, who commanded, in trying to

rally this column was killed; General Gibbs, who commanded it, was

mortally wounded; and General Keane, who commanded the left attack,

was wounded. This attack succeeded better; and for a time the troops

composing it held a redoubt which the enemy had constructed in front

of the ditch, and which they had stormed. But in the end they were

obliged also to give way. Thus the Riflemen, extended in skirmishing

order along the edge of the ditch, were left unsupported, and were

obliged to retire as best they could. As their files were extended

they presented a less prominent object for the enemy’s guns, and

they eventually got away with comparatively small loss. Some of them

had got quite to the edge of the ditch, and reported that they could

have passed it, but the attacking columns which they expected never

came up; and to have entered the enemy’s work without them would, of

course, have been certain destruction.

A gallant and successful diversion was made on the right bank of the

Mississippi by a column under Colonel Thornton; but as the Battalion

did not form part of it, it is not my province, as historian of the

Regiment only, farther to notice it.

It was regretted by the Riflemen, that Pakenham, himself a Peninsular

soldier, did not employ troops who had seen fighting more prominently

in so arduous an operation as storming this work. The 7th and 43rd

had arrived just before; beside both these regiments the Riflemen

had fought in Spain and Portugal; the latter were especially

companions in arms, and they had hailed their advent with delight.

Yet these he held in reserve, while he advanced comparatively

unseasoned troops to the fire of the Americans.

The Battalion retired at last, sorrowful and weary, to its bivouack.

It lost 1 Sergeant and 10 Riflemen killed; and Captains James

Travers (severely) and Nicholas Travers (slightly), Lieutenants John

Reynolds, Sir John Ribton, John Gossett, William Backhouse, and

Robert Barker (severely), 5 Sergeants and 89 Riflemen wounded.[150]

During the night the wounded were removed, and a truce for two

days, to enable the dead to be buried and the wounded cared for,

was made between General Lambert (who succeeded to the command) and

General Jackson who commanded the American force. This truce was

effected, not without difficulty, by Major Harry Smith, Assistant

Adjutant-General, who passed and repassed frequently between the

opposing armies.

During this truce every attempt was made by the Yankees to induce

our men to desert. The non-commissioned officers were promised

commissions, the men land, if they would enter the American service.

On one such occasion two Sergeants and a private of the 95th were

accosted by an officer of American Artillery, who with such large

promises invited them to enter the American service. The Riflemen

heard the tempter out; and then, in language perhaps rather forcible

than complimentary, assured him that they would rather be privates

in their own Corps, than officers with such ‘a set of ragamuffins’

as they saw before them; assuring him that if he did not move off,

he should have a taste of their rifles. On that hint, he fled; but

getting into the work turned a gun on them and fired, knocking over

the private, whom however he only wounded.

A Rifleman on sentry was exposed to the solicitations of another

of these gentry. He heard all his generous offers of money, land,

and promotion; but pretending he did not, he begged him to come a

little nearer and ‘tell him all about it.’ The Yankee elated at his

success walked up to the post, and when he was well within range, the

Rifleman levelled and shot him in the arm. Then walking forward, he

led him prisoner to the guard-room; on the way informing him what a

real soldier thought of such sneaking attempts on his fidelity.[151]

These attempts were not always unsuccessful, and much desertion took

place; but Surtees records with natural pride, that as far as he

knew not a single instance took place among the Riflemen of the 3rd

Battalion.

During this truce an officer of the American army was observed

plundering a wounded soldier. This excited the ire of Corporal Scott

of the 3rd Battalion, who (with the permission of his officer) took a

shot at the marauder, and tumbled him over the man he was plundering.

The last duties having been paid to the dead, and all the wounded

that were capable of being moved having been withdrawn, a retreat

was effected on the night of the 18th. The fires were trimmed, and

the men fell in and marched in silence. The weather had latterly

broken up; heavy rains by day, and sometimes thunderstorms, were

often followed by frost at night. As it was impossible, owing to

the narrowness and shallow water of the Bayou Catalan, to embark

the troops where they had landed, a road, or an attempt at a road,

had been constructed across the marsh, from the great road to New

Orleans, along the river’s bank to the shore of Lake Borgne. This

extended some miles, and was made of reeds, which it was thought

would support the men across the morass; and where it crossed open

ditches, as it frequently did, the reeds were laid on boughs of trees

brought with great labour from the wood. This road, a bad one at the

best, was much injured by the rains, and sunk in with the tramp of

the head of the column; so that this night march was very fatiguing,

the men often sinking in to the knees, and sometimes in the dark

slipping off into the marsh, from whence they were with difficulty

rescued.

However at last on the 19th they reached the shore of the lake about

one mile from its entrance. Here they were ordered to hut themselves;

but this was no easy task, the place being a desert, and almost the

only material the reeds which grew on the marsh.

Here they remained till the 25th, when the Battalion embarked on

board the ‘Dover,’ which had brought out two of its companies. The

Battalion was reduced by its losses in the field to almost half its

strength on landing. On the 27th they set sail; and it was resolved

to attempt the capture of Mobile. This place, lying about 100 miles

to the eastward of New Orleans, is situated in a bay, the entrance to

which is defended by a work called Fort Boyer, which therefore had

first to be reduced. In order to effect this the 4th, 21st, and 44th

Regiments were landed, and commenced the investment of and approach

to the place. While on the 8th February the Riflemen and the rest of

the troops were disembarked on Île Dauphine at the other side of the

bay, till the reduction of Fort Boyer should enable them to move up

to Mobile. Here the men hutted themselves; for the island, though

otherwise almost a desert, is well covered with pine wood; while the

officers, or some of them, had tents.

During the time that they were here, General Lambert inspected the

troops by regiments. On making his inspection of the 3rd Battalion,

James Travers (in Mitchell’s absence, who had been taken prisoner)

was in command. ‘Well, Travers,’ said the General, ‘I hear your

Sergeant-Major ran away on the night of the 23rd December.’ ‘Nay,

General,’ answered Travers, ‘that he did not. He fought as well

as any man could, and was towards the end of the affair severely

wounded. But,’ added he, ‘I think I know what may have given rise

to that report. A sergeant of ours was in or near one of the houses

where the wounded were taken, and the surgeon made him remain there

as Hospital Sergeant. I did all I could to get him back to the

Battalion; but I could not succeed.’ ‘Well,’ said the General, ‘since

I had done the Sergeant-Major some wrong, I must see what I can do

to make him amends.’ He did procure him an ensigncy in a West India

Regiment, to which he was gazetted soon after.

While the Battalion was on Île Dauphine, a gallant act was performed

by Sergeant Thomas Fukes. He, with four or five Riflemen, was sent

over to the mainland to shoot bullocks. Fukes with a couple of

Riflemen went inland, leaving the other men in charge of the boat.

Here one Shiel of the American navy (who had captured a boat in bad

weather with some of the 14th Light Dragoons, when embarking at Lake

Borgne, and who in consequence fancied himself a hero) came upon them

round a jutting point, and having captured them, put them in charge

of some of his own crew into their own boat, and dispatched them to

an American ship or post. Then waiting for the sergeant, the other

two Riflemen, and the Commissary, he of course made them prisoners,

since their boat and the rest of their party had disappeared. The

Commissary was placed aft with Mr. Shiel; Sergeant Fukes and his two

men forward; and they were being rowed off. When well off the shore

the Commissary seizing Shiel by the thighs chucked him overboard,

while Sergeant Fukes at the same instant sent one of the boat’s

crew to follow him, and the Riflemen disposed of the rest. They now

recovered their rifles, and having taken security of Mr. Shiel for

his good behaviour, admitted him at his urgent importunity into the

boat, from whence they landed him, a moist and dispirited prisoner of

war, on Île Dauphine.

The approaches to Fort Boyer being completed, Harry Smith was

sent in with a summons to surrender. The poor Yankee commandant,

sadly puzzled, asked Major Smith what he would advise him to do.

He strongly recommended him to surrender immediately, as the place

must be taken by assault. Acting on such good advice, which fell

in probably with his own sinking courage, he surrendered with his

garrison, and signed a capitulation on the 11th February.

This important work having fallen, immediate preparations were made

for re-embarking the troops, and attacking Mobile. But on the 14th

news arrived of the preliminaries of peace between England and the

United States having been settled at Ghent on December 24. All

warlike operations of course terminated; and the troops only awaited

on Île Dauphine the ratification of the treaty by President Madison.

Intelligence of this reached them on the 5th March, and on the 15th

the officers and Riflemen who had been made prisoners re-joined the

Battalion, having been released under the terms of the treaty. Major

Mitchell had been roughly treated by General Jackson, because he

refused to furnish him with information of our strength or movements.

On the 31st March the Battalion embarked on board the ‘Dover,’ some

few men being placed on board the ‘Norfolk’ transport. On the 4th

April they set sail, and, having called at the Havannah, arrived

at Plymouth, whence they were ordered round to Dover, where they

disembarked on the 2nd June and moved to Shorncliffe, where they

found three companies of the Battalion, the remaining two being in

Flanders, as is now to be narrated.

FOOTNOTES:

[131] George Simmons had been brought up to the medical profession.

[132] ‘Napier,’ Book xxiii. chap. 3.

[133] Nineteen men of the 1st Battalion, and 1 bugler and 12 men of

the 2nd Battalion, were returned as ‘missing.’

[134] He was, while the 1st Battalion were absent, temporarily

attached to the 2nd Battalion; being employed on the telegraph of the

Light Division.

[135] ‘Twelve Years’ Military Adventure.’

[136] See Napier, Book xxiv. chap. 5.

[137] Surtees, 296, 297. The context is very confused, the editor not

having been able to decipher or to arrange Surtees’ MS.

[138] Record, 2nd Battalion. As the return in the ‘London Gazette’

does not distinguish the regiments of the non-commissioned officers

and privates, I am unable to give the casualties of the other

Battalions.

[139] It is evident from Sir Thomas Graham’s letters to Lord Bathurst

and Lord Wellington (‘Supplementary Despatches,’ viii. 376-7) that

he undertook this command very unwillingly and only from a sense

of duty. To Lord Wellington he says ‘I cannot look forward to it

otherwise than an irksome service, with scarce a chance of any

material success.’

[140] It would appear from a private letter from Lord Bathurst to

Lord Wellington, that the strength of the detachment of the 3rd

Battalion was 250 men. ‘Supplementary Despatches,’ viii. 390. This is

a clerical or typographical error for ‘of the three Battalions.’ The

depôt companies were at this time very weak, and the strength of the

whole detachment was about 250 men.

[141] Graham’s Despatch, ‘Annual Register,’ lvi., 154.

[142] Despatch, ‘Annual Register,’ 157.

[143] I am informed by Mr. Wright that he was _not_ wounded on this

occasion. This is a curious illustration of Byron’s remark about

‘Gazette fame’ (‘Don Juan,’ canto viii., stanza 18 and note). The

officer of the 1st Battalion who was wounded at Merxem on February

2 was Lieutenant Church. He had been taken prisoner in one of the

fights at Arcangues on December 10, 1813 (see p. 160); but had made

his escape, had found his way across France without being discovered,

and had joined Glasse’s company in Holland. Like M’Cullock after the

Coa (p. 56) he had trusted himself to the fair sex, who had assisted

his disguise, and favoured his escape.

[144] ‘London Gazette,’and 2nd Battalion Record. As the ‘Gazette’

does not distinguish the regiments of the non-commissioned officers

and lower ranks, I am unable to state the losses of the detachments

of the other two Battalions.

[145] I derive this information from Michael Mappin, a pensioner

in the Royal Hospital at Chelsea, who served in the 3rd Battalion

from April 1813 till it was disbanded, and afterwards in the 2nd

Battalion, and who was himself on this picquet. He was wounded before

Antwerp.

[146] ‘Wellington Supplementary Despatches,’ x. 704-5-6, and 718.

[147] I owe almost all the particulars of this expedition to the

kindness of Lieutenant Wright, on half-pay of the Regiment, who

served in it, and who survives in good health and perfect memory,

whose acquaintance I had the pleasure of making while these sheets

were passing through the press. The information and papers he

communicated to me enable me to supply many details of this campaign,

which, squeezed out between the Peninsular and Waterloo campaigns,

and eclipsed by the latter, has never had its history sufficiently

written. Yet it was arduous service, albeit unsuccessful.

[148] Leach, ‘Sketch of Field Services,’ 27.

[149] Their loss between December 25 and 31 was 1 Rifleman killed; 1

Sergeant and 3 Riflemen wounded; and 1 Rifleman missing.

[150] Major James Travers, K.H., died February 5, 1841. The ball

received at New Orleans had never been extracted, and is said

eventually to have caused his death. Lieutenant Backhouse died of his

wounds.

[151] Gleig, ‘Campaigns of the British Army at Washington and New

Orleans’ p. 186. He regrets that he has forgotten, or did not know,

the name of this soldier; a regret in which all Riflemen will join.

The History of the Rifle Brigade (the Prince Consort's Own) Formerly the 95th · 第 5 / 16 章