CHAPTER II.

The two Battalions, then stationed at Hythe, were ordered to be

completed to a strength of a thousand men each; and active steps were

taken to supply the losses occasioned by the retreat by obtaining

volunteers from the Militia. The Regiment had already become so

famous and so popular, that not only were the deficiencies filled up

in a very short time, but more than a thousand volunteers presented

themselves beyond the numbers required.[65] It was therefore resolved

by the authorities to add a 3rd Battalion to the Regiment. Colonel

M’Leod was promoted to the Lieutenant-Colonelcy of it, and soon

afterwards exchanged with Colonel Andrew Barnard, of the 1st Royals,

afterwards Sir Andrew Barnard: a name indelibly connected with the

subsequent achievements of the Regiment. Only two or three other of

the steps consequent on the formation of an additional Battalion were

given in the Regiment, the services of those by whose valour and

sufferings the Regiment had obtained the fame which attracted these

volunteers and to whose exertions in recruiting their great number

was due, being, with the usual injustice of the British Government

to its military defenders, ignored. General Sir David Dundas, then

Commander-in-Chief, became Colonel-in-Chief on August 31, 1809, in

place of Manningham; and the Colonelcies of the three Battalions were

bestowed on Major-Generals Forbes Champagné, Sir Brent Spencer, and

the Honourable William Stewart, thus restoring to the roll of the

Regiment the honoured name of its first Lieutenant-Colonel.

I now resume the history of the services of the 1st Battalion, which

having been completed to 1,010 rank and file, marched from Hythe,

under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Beckwith, at two o’clock in

the morning of May 25, 1809, and arriving at Dover about six, soon

after embarked in three transports, the ‘Fortune,’ the ‘Malabar,’

and the ‘Laurel,’ and sailed immediately for the Downs. Here they

were joined by a battalion of the 43rd and by the 52nd, which were

to form the Light Brigade under Major-General Robert Craufurd, who

embarked in the ‘Nymph’ frigate. Contrary winds kept them in the

Downs till June 3, when they made sail; and arriving in the Tagus on

the 28th anchored off Lisbon. Here they remained until July 2, when

about midnight they were put into flat-bottomed boats, and towed up

the river. The men and officers were very crowded, and experienced

great inconvenience for twenty-four hours, until they were landed at

Vallada on the right bank of the river, at or near which place they

bivouacked on that night. On landing they were definitively formed,

with the 43rd and 52nd Light Infantry Regiments, their constant

companions in arms, into the Light Brigade, whose deeds of arms in

Portugal, Spain and France, can never be forgotten while England has

an army.

The Battalion marched on the 4th to Santarem, where they halted

till the 7th, to allow the baggage animals, the ammunition, and the

Commissariat to come up. On that day they marched to Golegão, and on

the 8th to Punhete and Tancos, still on the Tagus; on the 9th they

passed through Abrantes, but, not halting there, crossed by a pontoon

bridge to the left bank of the river, and bivouacked in extensive

woods. All these marches were, in consequence of the extreme heat of

the weather, performed in the night; the Battalion generally falling

in about midnight, and arriving at their bivouack about eight or nine

in the morning.

It was about this time that Craufurd issued standing orders to his

Brigade of extreme strictness, not to say severity. This Draconic

code made him at first very unpopular; but as time went on, its

usefulness in maintaining discipline and repressing offences became

manifest. It produced a perfection in the Brigade which the officers

and the men themselves could not but recognise; and this, added to

his own personal valour and reckless daring, eventually endeared him

to the soldiers who followed him.[66]

At midnight on the 10th the Battalion moved to Gavião, a march of

thirteen hours, the greater part under a blazing sun. On the 12th

they reached, through a bleak and high country, Niza. On the next

day they marched through the pass of Villa Velha, and crossing the

Tagus by a bridge of boats, bivouacked on the opposite bank. On the

14th they advanced by mountainous and difficult roads to Sernadas,

and on the 15th reached Castello Branco. Here they halted on the 16th

and 17th to enable the 43rd and 52nd to join them. On the 18th the

Brigade thus complete marched soon after midnight and bivouacked in

the woods near Ladouira; on the 19th they moved through a desolate

country to Zebreira; and on the 20th, crossing the Elgas, passed into

Spain and encamped near Zarza Major. On the next day, after a long

and oppressive march, they reached Moralegua, and on the 22nd arrived

at Coria, where they halted during the 23rd.

On the 24th the Battalion marched to Galisteo, on the river Alagon;

on the 25th over a burning plain, with the Sierra de Gata, topped

with snow, in view, to Malpartida, a village on the Calzones. On the

next day, the 26th, crossing the river Tietar by a flying bridge,

they had a most fatiguing march to Venta de Bazagona, and on the 27th

arrived at Navalmoral, the heat being oppressive.

On the 28th they marched at daylight to the town of Calzada, where

tidings reached Craufurd that an action was imminent between Sir

Arthur Wellesley’s army, with General Cuesta’s Spanish troops,

and Marshal Victor’s army, then in close proximity. He determined,

therefore, if possible, to unite his Brigade to Sir Arthur Wellesley

before it should take place; and undertook the forced march which

has rendered the name of the Light Division famous. Accordingly,

after a short rest at Calzada, he pushed on to Oropesa, two leagues,

which he reached about noon. A distant cannonade began to be heard,

which, increasing as they approached it, acted as an incentive

to speed and endurance. They marched on under a scorching sun to

Oropesa, where they halted for four hours to cook. Here Craufurd

desired the commanding officers to pick out of the ranks such men as

they considered unable to continue a further march. Very few men of

the Battalion fell out; these were left at Oropesa in charge of a

subaltern. After this was done the bugles sounded the ‘_fall in_,’

and the Riflemen moved onward till about ten at night; when, passing

a cattle-pond, Craufurd halted to allow the men to drink. The parched

soldiers eagerly drank the water, filthy and nauseous though it was.

As soon as they had satisfied their thirst, the march was resumed

and continued through the night, without check, through deep, sandy

roads. Early on the morning of the 29th the Light Division marched

across the field of Talavera, giving three hearty cheers for the

victory of the day before.

They had thus, in heavy marching order, under a burning sun, and with

a most insufficient supply of food, marched upwards of fifty miles,

with only two short halts, in twenty-five hours. They thus arrived

the morning after the fight at Talavera; but though the Battalion

itself was not present, a detachment of the Regiment left in the

Peninsula in 1808 took part in the action, and was mentioned in Sir

Arthur Wellesley’s despatches as having particularly distinguished

themselves.[67]

As soon as it arrived at Talavera the Battalion was immediately

ordered to occupy some woods in advance of the British position and

to furnish the picquets, the sentinels of which were facing the

position of the French army. Here the Battalion remained till August

3. During that time it suffered much from want of provision, not more

than one ration of bread, and but little of other food, having been

issued.

On the 3rd the British army began to fall back in consequence of

information that Soult with a large force was moving towards the

rear of the English with a view of cutting off their communications

with Portugal. Before daybreak they marched and arrived at Oropesa,

the 95th forming the rear-guard with the cavalry. On the 4th they

crossed the Tagus by the bridge of Arzobispo. It was during this

march that Craufurd, knowing that his Division were famishing,

allowed them to kill any animals which might be in the woods in which

they halted that evening. A large herd of pigs being discovered was

instantly set upon by the hungry soldiers, killed, cut up and eaten

in an incredibly short time. About midnight they started again, thus

refreshed, and pushed forward to secure the bridge of Almaraz, the

rest of the army moving on Truxillo. It was of vast importance to

secure this bridge, as it was feared Soult might occupy it. The Light

Division, therefore, was pushed on with great rapidity. The Riflemen

marched for fourteen hours through a hilly and barren country, still

without food, except a kind of pea parched by the sun, and wheat

found in such fields as remained ungleaned; suffering also from want

of water, the streams being almost all dried up; and on the evening

of the 5th the Battalion bivouacked in some woods in advance of the

rest of the Division. Before dawn on the 6th they resumed their march

under a burning sun, and with the same scanty provision, and after

fifteen hours’ march, during which there were many stragglers, faint

from heat and want, they reached the bridge of Almaraz. Two companies

of the Battalion were immediately sent on picquet at a ford a little

below the bridge; and the remainder bivouacked near, in order to

support the picquets in case of an attack. Here they remained till

August 20, the Battalion being always in advance, and bivouacking

in an olive wood near Rio Gardo, and furnishing the picquets at

the ford. Every evening at sunset they moved out of the olive wood,

and lay down with their arms on the bank of the river, and returned

to the camp at sunrise. The remainder of the Light Division were

encamped near the village of Las Casas del Puerto.

During this whole fortnight the scarcity, or rather the absolute

want, of provision continued. Scanty rations of goat-flesh were

issued during this time; and a coarse kind of pea-flour, with

bran and chopped straw, provided by the Commissariat, which the

officers and men made into a kind of cake with water, and cooked

on a camp-kettle lid or on a stone, was the only provision. Unless

when the men found some ears of corn in a field, and by rubbing them

in their hands and grinding the grains between stones, in this way

supplemented the Commissariat allowance.

On the 12th the French picquets appeared on the heights opposite the

bridge and the ford, but no shots were exchanged between them and

the two companies of Riflemen always posted at the ford. And indeed

then, as throughout the war in the Peninsula, the best understanding

existed between the Riflemen on outpost duty and the advanced posts

of the French; the officers frequently saluting each other. And so

far did this go that the Riflemen, when ordered to advance to drive

in the French picquets, used to hold up their rifles and tap the

brass bullet-box in the stock of the Baker rifle then in use, to show

their opponents that they were in earnest, and that their adversaries

were to stand on their defence.

The insufficient food and the unwholesome position of their camp near

the Bridge of Almaraz, in a damp situation, with poisonous vapours

arising from vegetable matter decaying, and swamps half-dried under

a burning sun, soon began to tell on the men of the Battalion; and

fever and dysentery became prevalent among them.

At midnight on August 20 the Light Division marched from Almaraz

and arrived at Deletosa on the following day, where a large portion

of Sir Arthur Wellesley’s force was encamped. This and the whole

British army (except the Light Division) marched on the 21st for

Truxillo. On that evening the Battalion marched; and about midnight

lay down with their arms until daybreak, when they started again for

Caceres, where they arrived on the 23rd. And on the three following

days they continued their march towards the Portuguese frontier,

starting in the night and proceeding during many hours of the day.

During this march the men suffered much both from the heat of the

sun in a barren, treeless country, and the constant insufficiency of

provisions. And it was not until they reached Valencia de Alcantara

on the 26th, where they halted during the 27th, that they were

able to procure bread, and the luxury of fruit and vegetables from

the neighbouring gardens. Late on the 28th they started again, and

marching during most of the night crossed the rivulet which here

divides Spain from Portugal on the 29th, and proceeding by Maravão,

after a march of many miles encamped at Castello de Vide, where

the Battalion halted for a week. On September 7 they marched to

Portalegre, where they halted two days, after which, resuming their

march, they arrived at Arronches on the 10th, whence one more march

on the next day brought them to Campo Major, their winter quarter,

where they remained three months. During these, sickness and death

ravaged the Battalion; fever, ague and dysentery, the fruits of

exposure, of want, and of the proverbially unhealthy climate of

Alemtejo, in which Campo Major is situated, sent numbers into

hospital; and it is said[68] that nearly three hundred men of the 1st

Battalion died during their stay there.

I now return to the narrative of the services of the 2nd Battalion,

which we left at Hythe barracks; whence, after a rest of five

months after the fatigues of Moore’s retreat, their losses being

replaced by volunteers from the Militia, and their clothing and

accoutrements renewed, they marched, about July 20, 1809,[69] about

a thousand strong, under Colonel Wade, to Deal, and there embarked

in the ‘Superb,’ 74, to join the expedition destined for Holland,

under the Earl of Chatham. Subsequently they were shifted into

the ‘Namur,’ on the 22nd, and formed part of the brigade of their

former Lieutenant-Colonel, the Honourable William Stewart, with

the 2nd Battalions of their constant companions in arms, the 43rd

and 52nd. They sailed on July 30, and arrived off Flushing on the

following day. Two companies were immediately detached to act with

the force under Major-General Baron de Rottenberg; and on that night

Lieutenant William Humbley, being in charge of an advanced picquet,

while going his rounds, was informed by a peasant that a party of

French soldiers were at that moment plundering his house. Humbley,

with great promptness, suspecting that while intent on plunder the

look-out would not be very good, at once took with him a corporal and

eight men of his picquet; and, under the guidance of the peasant, the

night being very dark, made his way to the house, about 200 yards

from his post. They moved in perfect silence, and arrived at the

place without a ‘_qui vive_’ from the only sentry there posted. Him a

Rifleman knocked down at once with the butt of his rifle; the others

instantly surrounded the house, and made prisoners the whole picquet,

consisting of 2 sergeants, 2 corporals, and 20 privates. The officer

in command of it alone escaping, by getting out of a back window,

and in the darkness of the night getting away. The Riflemen broke

the whole of the muskets of the French picquet, and conveyed their

twenty-four prisoners into the British lines and forwarded them to

head-quarters.[70]

The two companies to which Humbley’s picquet belonged, on the next

day repulsed a sortie made from the place; and in this affair

Humbley received a severe wound in the head from a musket ball, and

1 sergeant and 9 rank and file were also wounded.

During the subsequent siege, a Rifleman named Jackman got close up

to the walls of Flushing, and scooping out a pit with his sword,

entrenched himself in it, and began to fire deliberately at the

French gunners. He is said to have picked off eleven artillerymen,

as they showed themselves at the embrasures; and having done so,

he sprang out of his pit, ran across the open, and rejoined his

Battalion unhurt.[71]

Five companies, with the rest of Stewart’s brigade, were not landed

till the 9th, when they disembarked on the Island of South Beveland.

The other companies, on the Island of Walcheren, took an active part

in the siege operations until the capitulation on the 15th. During

these operations the Battalion lost 11 rank and file killed, and

Lieutenants Manners and Clarke, and 21 rank and file wounded. But

the casualties from engines of war were trifling compared to the

devastating effects of the climate of Walcheren and South Beveland.

The officers and men were struck down by fevers; and on the 27th

Stewart writes that the increase of the sickness in the 95th was

at the rate of twenty cases daily. On September 8 the Battalion

re-embarked, and this useless, abortive and mismanaged expedition

came to an end. They landed at Dover on the 14th, and on the 18th the

Battalion which had left Hythe barracks less than six weeks before,

a thousand stalwart and hale men, staggered into them a gaunt and

fever-stricken band of about seven hundred: many to be carried at

once to hospital, and not a few to their grave. Thus in the space

of nine months had the Battalion been twice more than decimated by

fatigue, want and pestilence.[72]

The 1st Battalion having remained at Campo Major three months

marched on December 12, forming the advance of the Light Division,

to Arronches; and thence by Portalegre, Crato, Ponte de Sor,

Abrantes and Punhete, to Thomar, which they reached on the 23rd.

They continued their march through Leiria, Pombal, Condeixa, and

arrived at Coimbra on the 29th, and halted there during the next

day. Resuming their march on the 31st, they passed through Ponte

da Murcella, to Venda and Gallizes, in which villages they were

quartered on January 1, 1810, arrived at Celorico on the 3rd, and at

Pinhel on the next day; and crossing the Coa on the 6th, occupied the

villages of Villar Torpim, Regada and Cinco Villas. In this position,

with occasional shifting of quarters with the other regiments of the

Division, they continued during the remainder of January, February

and the early part of March. The Riflemen, with a few German hussars,

were the only troops pushed across the Coa to observe the French

outposts at St. Felices, immediately opposite the bridge and pass of

Barba del Puerco; the remainder of the army being quartered on the

left bank of the Coa.

On February 27 Captain Creagh’s company was ordered to reconnoitre

the village of Barba del Puerco, which he found occupied by a strong

detachment of French cavalry; and after a skirmish with them fell

back, according to his orders, to Escarigo, where he was joined

by Captain Leach’s company, while a third was moved in support

from Villar Torpim to Vermiosa. On the 28th Leach[73] made a fresh

reconnaissance; and finding that the enemy had left Barba del Puerco,

occupied it, sending a party to the bridge which spanned the Agueda

at the foot of the pass. It was ascertained that the French occupied

St. Felices with about 3,000 men of all arms, under General Ferey,

having a picquet of cavalry and infantry at their side of the bridge.

Thus it continued, three companies being posted in the village, and

one on picquet at the bridge, on which were double sentries. At the

same time the whole of the Battalion was pushed up to the Agueda,

the whole line of which they (with the German hussars) occupied,

with four companies at Villa de Ciervo on the left, one company at

Almofela, and another at Escalhao on the right of the position of

Barba del Puerco.

On March 19 the French General Ferey attempted to surprise the

post of Barba del Puerco. About midnight, leaving a strong force

in support, at the head of six hundred grenadiers, chosen for this

service, he approached the bridge, as the moon, rising behind him,

threw a shadow from the high ground and made his approach invisible.

The roaring torrent of the Agueda, swollen by recent rains and

melting snow, overpowered the tread of the advancing column. Thus

he came, unperceived, on the double sentries on the bridge. They

had just time to fire their rifles, when they were both wounded and

made prisoners. Ferey at once dashed across the bridge with his

grenadiers, sweeping before him a sergeant’s party at the bridge,

and made for the pass. Here he was met and checked by O’Hare,[74]

whose company happened to be on picquet, who defended the face of

the hill, step by step and muzzle to muzzle, as overpowering numbers

forced him up it. Meanwhile the three companies in the village sprung

from their sleep, seized their arms, and without waiting for regular

formation, fought hand to hand with their enemies as they met them.

One company, Colonel Sidney Beckwith, who was in command of the post,

immediately sent away to the right, thinking that the enemy might

attempt to climb the hill by a pathway there and turn his flank; with

the other two he reinforced O’Hare’s picquet; and so they fought for

half an hour, with such daring and such fury that the French turned

and fled across the bridge, leaving 2 officers and 7 men killed, 6

prisoners and 30 muskets in the hands of their opponents.

In this affair great deeds of valour were done. Beckwith, while

lowering a piece of rock to hurl down on the advancing Frenchmen,

received a musket-ball through his shako, without its wounding him.

And James Stewart, then the Adjutant, was engaged in a hand-to-hand

fight with two of the grenadiers, when a Rifleman named Ballard shot

one, on which the other was overpowered by, and surrendered to,

Stewart, who was specially mentioned by Sir Arthur Wellesley in his

Despatches, and recommended by Beckwith for promotion; but it never

came, and he was killed a year after in the advance from Santarem.

Lieutenant Mercer and 3 Riflemen were killed, and 10 were wounded.

In repelling this night attack the Riflemen stood against more than

double their numbers. Six hundred grenadiers crossed the bridge, and

only three companies repulsed them, O’Hare’s picquet and two under

Beckwith; the fourth company occupying the post being detached to

defend the path on the right, which was not attempted, never having

been engaged.

This fight opened the campaign of 1810. The stern Craufurd, ever

sparing of praise, issued the following divisional order:

Villa de Ciervo: _March 25, 1810_.

D. O.

Brigadier-General Craufurd has it in command from the

Commander-in-Chief to assure Lieutenant-Colonel Beckwith and

the officers of the 95th Regiment who were engaged at Barba

del Puerco that their conduct in this affair has augmented the

confidence he has in the troops when opposed to the enemy in any

situation.

Brigadier-General Craufurd feels peculiar satisfaction in

noticing the first affair in which any part of the Light Brigade

were engaged during the present campaign. That British troops

should defeat a superior number of the enemy is nothing new; but

the action reflects honour on Lieutenant-Colonel Beckwith and

the Regiment, inasmuch as it was of a sort which the riflemen of

other armies would shun. In other armies the rifle is considered

ill-calculated for close action with an enemy armed with a musket

and bayonet; but the 95th Regiment has proved that the rifle in

the hands of a British soldier is a fully sufficient weapon to

enable him to defeat the French in the closest fight, in whatever

manner they may be armed.

(Signed) V. GRAHAM, D. A. G.

Sir Arthur Wellesley also repeatedly mentions this gallant fight

in his Despatches and letters. Besides the message thus conveyed

by Craufurd, he tells Admiral the Honourable G. Berkeley that the

French were ‘repulsed in fine style’ by the 95th; and in his Despatch

reporting it to the Earl of Liverpool, he adds that ‘this affair was

highly creditable to Colonel Beckwith, and displayed the gallantry

and discipline of the officers and troops under his command.’

But this discipline, which thus elicited the approval of the great

commander, was not enforced by Beckwith with sternness or severity.

It is recorded how, during their halts at Campo Major and near the

Coa, during the preceding winter, he had let his Battalion repose

from the fatigues of their long marches, and their sufferings

from famine and disease; not worrying the soldiers with drills or

barrack-yard parades; but rather encouraging amusements and sports

which refreshed and reanimated them. This it was, added to their

knowledge of his valour and experience when leading them in the

field, that made him loved by the Officers and Riflemen of his

Battalion, made them ready to ‘follow him through fire and water when

the day of trial came; for they well knew that he was the last man

on earth who would give them unnecessary trouble, or, on the other

hand, would spare either man or officer when the good of the service

demanded their utmost exertions.’[75]

About this time the 1st and 3rd Caçadores of the Portuguese

army were added to Craufurd’s Division; the latter commanded by

Lieutenant-Colonel Elder, one of the original officers of the Rifle

Corps.[76] At the same time Ross’[77] troop of Horse Artillery and

the 14th and 16th Light Dragoons were attached to the Light Division.

Soon after the attack on Barba del Puerco the troops (which had been

reinforced with some of the 43rd and 52nd) were withdrawn to Villa de

Ciervo.

Early in April, in compliance with orders from home, the ten

companies of which the Battalion on service had hitherto consisted

were reduced to eight, two captains with subalterns, non-commissioned

officers, and a few men returning to England to form a Depôt. These

eight companies were of about a hundred men each, as the Battalion

which embarked a thousand and ten rank and file, had been reduced in

about nine months, principally by disease, to about eight hundred men

in all.

Craufurd now maintained a long line of posts on the right bank of the

Agueda, from Fuentes Guinaldo on the right to the junction of the

Agueda and the Douro, near Escalhao, on the left. In May the French

began the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, distant a few miles from Gallegos,

then the head-quarters of the Light Division. The 1st Battalion had

picquets at Carpio, Molina das Flores, and Marialva. The Battalion

itself was every evening under arms, and took up a position in a

wood situated on some high ground behind Gallegos, and towards Duas

Casas; here they remained during the night, returning for the day

to their quarters. It seems that Massena observed this movement,

and supposed that these troops were reinforcements to Craufurd’s

Division. He therefore ordered Junot with a considerable force to

cross the Azarva at the bridge of Marialva. This he did at daybreak

on July 4, driving in the picquet at Marialva; the passage of his

cavalry was gallantly disputed and checked by the German hussars; but

Junot advancing in force, Craufurd resolved to fall back behind the

Duas Casas. The Battalion, with some cavalry, covered this movement,

and skirmishing with the French advanced troops, held them back until

Craufurd had established himself behind the river. Junot, probably

thinking Craufurd’s force to be much larger than it was, did not

follow up this advance; and the Battalion took up a position at Val

de la Mula, behind the River Turon, here the boundary between Spain

and Portugal, detaching two companies to Fort Concepcion in front

of the position. On July 10 Craufurd resolved by a night march to

surprise the French posts at Gallegos and Barquillo. Accordingly,

seven companies of the 95th with two of the 52nd got under arms late

on that night, together with the 14th Light Dragoons and some German

hussars. The Riflemen were ordered to load, to march in silence, and

not to light their pipes. The wheels of two of Ross’ guns, which

formed part of the column, were muffled. Thus they marched through

a good part of the night, Craufurd himself accompanying them. On

reaching some high ground, the Riflemen were ordered to lie down

in some high standing corn. Here they waited for dawn; when it

appeared, the orders to fall in and to advance to the edge of the

height were given, and the French appeared in the plain below. They

consisted of about two companies of infantry and a troop of cavalry.

Craufurd ordered Colonel Talbot to charge them with the 14th; this

he did gallantly, sabreing or making prisoners the cavalry; but

the infantry formed square, and receiving the charge, brought down

Talbot himself and several of his troopers, and then made good their

retreat. Why Craufurd did not use his guns, or let loose the Riflemen

at the French infantry, seems inexplicable. But so it was: and after

remaining on the hill inactive spectators of the combat, they marched

back to their position at Val de la Mula. But Ciudad Rodrigo having

surrendered, Craufurd fell back on July 16 to Junça, about a mile and

a half from Almeida, in Portugal, and on the right bank of the Coa.

At daybreak on the 21st the Battalion, with Ross’ battery, advanced

towards the Turon to support the cavalry who were driven from Val

de la Mula and across the Turon by an advance of the enemy in great

force. On this advance the mines which our engineers had formed under

Fort Concepcion were fired. The two companies of Riflemen posted

there, under Captain O’Hare, proceeded to rejoin the Battalion, and

had not long left their position when the work fell with a tremendous

explosion. On the 22nd Craufurd fell back to near Almeida, his left

protected by the guns of that place, and his right resting on the Coa.

During the night of the 23rd the Division was exposed to a violent

storm of thunder, lightning and torrents of rain. Day had just

begun to dawn on the morning of the 24th, and the troops, which had

assembled at their alarm posts, were expecting an order to retire, as

all seemed quiet, when the crack of the rifle of one of the advanced

sentries announced the approach of the enemy. Marshal Ney, with an

overwhelming force, was advancing by the road from Val de la Mula,

and attacked and drove in the outlying picquet under Captain the

Honourable Keith Stewart, which occupied that road. In resisting

this attack, and falling back on the supports, Lieutenant M’Cullock,

who was on this picquet, was sabred, and, with several men, taken

prisoner.[78]

O’Hare’s company were at once ordered in support, and he disposed

them behind some walls. Here they waited till Stewart’s picquet,

slowly retreating and disputing their ground, came in upon them,

followed by a swarm of French tirailleurs. A wing of the 43rd were

about a hundred yards in the rear of these Riflemen; and at this

moment a shell from Almeida, thrown of course at the French, burst

close by, and killed and wounded several Riflemen.

O’Hare’s company was now ordered to retire. Half the company did so;

the remainder, under Lieutenant Johnston, were still engaged with

the French advanced troops, when a troop or squadron of the enemy’s

hussars, whom our men, on account of the similarity of the uniform to

that of the German hussars, had not noticed, swept round their left

flank, and galloping between the Riflemen and their support the 43rd,

sabred and rode down many, and caused great confusion.

[Illustration:

ACTION ON THE COA

24^{TH} JULY 1810.

_Drawn by Lieut. G. Goodall, R.E._

_E. Weller, lith., London._

_London: Chatto & Windus._

]

It was but for a moment: for the 43rd, recovering from their

surprise, fired a volley which emptied many saddles. The action now

became general along the whole line. The French advance was for a

time checked in the broken ground; but Ney’s overwhelming force bore

back the English towards the rocky defile which led to the one narrow

bridge over the Coa. The ground was disputed inch by inch by the

Battalion, the 43rd and the 52nd, while the cavalry, the guns,

the baggage, and the two Portuguese regiments attached to Craufurd’s

Division, descended the steep defile and crossed the bridge, about a

mile to the rear.

Thus the unequal contest had long and arduously to be maintained.

As they fell back to the hill which overlooked the Coa, it was

perceived that some of the cavalry and artillery had not yet got

across the bridge. Craufurd unhappily ordered a number of Riflemen,

who occupied a position which prevented the enemy from cutting off

the passage to the bridge, to evacuate it, before the 52nd, who

were far on the right of the position, had made good their retreat.

Beckwith at once saw the mistake, and ordered the Riflemen to retake

the hill and the wall. This they did in fine style; but not without

many officers and men falling. And about this time some skirmishers

of the Battalion and a wing of the 43rd, led on by Major McCleod of

that regiment, the senior officer on the spot, not only held their

ground, but, mixed together and gallantly headed, rushed against the

French advanced troops, and checked them until the bridge was clear

and the 52nd over; then, rushing down at speed, they got across the

bridge. As soon as the regiment got over they formed along the bank

of the river, among rocks, walls, and any ground that could afford

cover. The Coa, swollen by the rain of the preceding night, and by

that which had been incessantly pouring since noon, was not fordable,

so that the only point to be defended was the narrow bridge. Twice it

was attempted by a valiant assault of French grenadiers; twice they

were sent reeling back under our fire, almost all killed or wounded;

the few who got across falling on the other side. Still a constant

fire was kept up till about five o’clock; when the French ceased,

apparently giving up all hope of forcing the bridge; and our men

ceasing fire from exhaustion after about twelve hours’ hard fighting.

The loss of the Battalion in this engagement was very severe.

Lieutenant Donald M’Leod and 11 rank and file were killed; Captains

Creagh, Samuel Mitchell, Lieutenants Matthew Pratt, Peter Reilly,

Alexander Coane, Thomas Smith, and Second Lieutenant George Simmons

were severely, and Lieutenant Harry Smith slightly, wounded; and 1

sergeant and 54 rank and file were wounded; and Lieutenant M’Cullock

wounded and prisoner, 1 sergeant and 52 rank and file missing.

Of these, Captain Creagh died the night of the fight; Reilly died the

following day at Celorico; Pratt,[79] shot in the neck, died from the

bursting of the carotid artery on August 1, on the Mondego river,

near Fordaso; and many of the wounded men also died on their way to

Lisbon.

In O’Hare’s company alone, which, as we have seen, bore the brunt

of the hussar charge, Lieutenant Alexander Coane was dangerously

wounded, 11 men were killed and wounded, and 45 prisoners. Indeed,

it is said that O’Hare’s company only mustered 11 men on parade next

morning.

A Rifleman, named Charity, in the cavalry charge received a sabre cut

in the head, another in the body, and a musket shot through the arm;

yet recovered and died a Chelsea pensioner many years afterwards.

In the Despatch reporting this action to the Earl of Liverpool,

Lord Wellington states: ‘I am informed that throughout this trying

day the Commanding Officers of the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th Regiments,

Lieutenant-Colonel Beckwith, Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay, and

Lieutenant-Colonel Hall, and all the officers and soldiers of these

excellent regiments, distinguished themselves.’[80]

As soon as night had fallen Craufurd withdrew his Division from the

Coa, and the Battalion bivouacked late on that night in some rocky

ground near Valverde, the men suffering from the heavy rains of the

preceding night and day.

Late in the night of the 25th they marched from Valverde, the rain

still continuing to fall in torrents, and bivouacked near Freixadas.

Here they were met by Lord Wellington, who came up from head-quarters

at Alverca early in the morning, on hearing of the affair at the Coa.

By him the Battalion were ordered into the village of Freixadas,

where they were housed until the 28th.

On that day they arrived at Celorico, and hutted themselves by

cutting down branches of the trees in a wood. Here, on August 4,

Craufurd’s Division was divided into two brigades; one under Colonel

Sidney Beckwith, consisting of the right wing of the 95th, the 43rd

and the 3rd Portuguese Caçadores; the other, under Colonel Barclay

of the 52nd, consisting of his own regiment, the left wing of the

95th and the 1st Caçadores. The Battalion remained at Celorico until

August 5, when it was ordered to the front to support cavalry; and

for about a fortnight or three weeks it was constantly on the move,

the latter part of the time in heavy and continuous rain for three

or four days. Early in September the army began its retreat, being

covered by the Battalion and the other regiments of Craufurd’s

Division as a rear-guard. On the 20th they marched before daylight

from Celorico, and crossing the Mondego by a ford, fell back by the

road from Viseu to Coimbra. On the 23rd, the enemy’s advanced guard

pressing the cavalry of the rear-guard, Lord Wellington, who was

present, ordered Craufurd to retire by the road leading to Busaco.

This was effected during the two following days; on both of which

the French pressed the rear-guard, composed of some companies of

Riflemen and the 52nd and of some cavalry, with cavalry and infantry

skirmishers intermixed, and some light guns; but the retreat was

effected in good order and with little loss. The Battalion on both

those nights threw forward picquets to support the cavalry.

On the 25th, when about a league and a half from Busaco, the enemy

pressed the British cavalry so hard that the rear company of the

Battalion had to face about and check them; and soon after the

left wing of the Battalion was halted in a fir-wood, behind the

village of Mora Morta, and effectually stopped them until the Light

Division drew into the Sierra of Busaco, where the rest of the army

were at this time assembled in position. This was an important and

well-performed service; for Craufurd had kept his Division too long

in an advanced position; and it was not without some difficulty that,

protected by these four companies of Riflemen, he moved the Division

into its position on the heights.

The right wing of the Battalion under Beckwith was halted in the

village of Sula, at the foot of the hill of Busaco, where they were

smartly cannonaded from the opposite heights, but without loss; and

at night they were withdrawn from Sula, leaving a picquet in that

village, and stationed among the rocks on the face of the hill, right

and left of the road leading to Coimbra.

On the 26th Massena was engaged in bringing up his forces. Some

infantry was pushed into a wood close to Sula, and skirmishing took

place between them and the picquet of the Battalion there; and the

companies attached to Barclay’s brigade, in an adjacent village,

were also attacked. This continued all the day; and as this constant

interchange of fire was very harassing, the companies on picquet

were relieved about every two hours. At last, at nightfall this

skirmishing and fire ceased, and nothing indicated the presence of

the vast hosts but the numerous watch-fires, which illuminated the

sides of the mountains, divided only by a narrow valley.

[Illustration:

BATTLE OF BUSACO.

27^{TH} SEP^R 1810.

_E. Weller, Litho._

_London, Chatto & Windus._

]

It is not for me to describe the position of Busaco, or the

particulars of the fight. It is enough for this record to note that

in the centre of the side of the Sierra projects a hill forming a

sort of natural bastion, and connected with the mountain itself by

a neck, depressed below the level of the projecting hill. Among the

rocks and broken ground on the sides of this hill were disposed the

Riflemen of this Battalion; while in the hollow behind it Craufurd

had concealed the 43rd and 52nd. Scarcely had day dawned on the 27th,

when the enemy made his advance. Loison’s division climbed the road

leading up the face of the projecting hill, though galled by the

fire of the Riflemen and Ross’ guns. Yet they came on, the Riflemen,

as the French pressed up the hill, running in on their supports and

forming in the hollow between the spur and the mountain. At last

the leading section topped the hill, and then, and not till then,

Craufurd gave the signal; the bugles sounded, and eighteen hundred

men sprang as from the earth. Instantaneously they gave a volley;

the head of the column after one destructive fire from the leading

section reeled; Craufurd ordered a charge; and soldiers, arms,

knapsacks and caps rolled in a confused mass down the precipitous

hill. The French column was wedged in the road, the leading sections

were driven back on the still advancing rear, and all turned back

in utter confusion. Then they came under the fire of the whole

Division which far overlapped their flanks; and through the narrow

street of Sula they fled, trampling the living and the dead. The

Battalion and some Caçadores were ordered to pursue them; and General

Simon, who commanded the attacking brigade, and many others were made

prisoners by the Light Division.

No further attack was made on this position; but the enemy’s

skirmishers swarmed in the valley, and kept the Battalion employed

till the afternoon, when Craufurd received a flag of truce with

General Simon’s baggage, and granted a temporary cessation of arms.

Leach mentions that, during that time, he went down into Sula, and

met officers and men of Loison’s division, who acknowledged their

loss to be very heavy; one of them asserting that his company, which

mounted the hill 120 strong, could only muster 27 men after their

repulse.

The time limited for the truce having expired, the French seemed

disposed to keep possession of the village of Sula; but Lord

Wellington, who happened to be at hand, ordered a company of the

Battalion to go down and drive them out: which they did in a very

short time, and established a picquet there.

On the 28th no movement took place; but on the morning of the 29th,

owing to an attempt on Massena’s part to turn Lord Wellington’s

position by getting round by Coimbra, the English army broke up and

fell back at a very early hour. About nine the Battalion followed,

forming, as usual, part of the rear-guard, with some cavalry; and

at night halted in a wood some miles from Busaco. On October 3 they

reached Pombal; on the 5th Batalha; and on the succeeding days, in

incessant rains, proceeded to Alemquer, where they arrived on the

9th. On the 10th they were pressed by the French advanced guard, and

after a little skirmishing fell back to Arruda in a tempest of rain.

Thus they reached the Lines of Torres-Vedras, of which no description

is needed here. The portion of the lines this Battalion occupied was

on the right centre of the position, and on the fortified heights

immediately behind Arruda, having advanced posts in front of the

town. In very wet weather the Battalion were allowed to shelter

themselves in Arruda during the day, but always returned to their

bivouack on the heights during the night.

While the Battalion remained in these lines the enemy made several

reconnaissances, which occasionally brought on affairs of picquets.

On one of these occasions, on October 14, a sharp affair took place

near Sobral between the advanced guard of the 8th _Corps d’Armée_ and

the light troops of Sir Brent Spencer’s division. In this skirmish a

company of the 3rd Battalion, which had lately arrived from England

and had been detained on its way to Cadiz by Sir Brent Spencer, as

the Regiment was his,[81] was engaged, and Captain Percival and

Lieutenant Eeles were severely wounded, and several men killed and

wounded. These young soldiers (as George Simmons observes) ‘behaved

_like Riflemen_, and were complimented.’

On the 23rd, Simmons and Hopwood, being on picquet with Mitchell’s

company near Villa Matos, observed two French soldiers entering a

house in their front in search of provisions. Taking three men of the

picquet with them, they crawled to an avenue which screened them from

a vedette who was stationed on a rising ground to give the foragers

notice of any danger. Entering the house they seized the men, who

were armed, and one of whom snapped his musket at his assailants,

but it missed fire. The Riflemen found a large barrel of wine in

the house; and the officers sending back one of the men for all the

canteens he could find at the picquet while the others kept a good

look-out, filled sixty, destroyed the rest of the barrel, and led off

their two prisoners to the picquet.

The army remained in the lines of Torres-Vedras till November 15.

Leach’s company, which furnished the picquet in front of Arruda on

the night of the 14th, discovered at daybreak on the next morning

that the French army had fallen back during the night; leaving

dummies of straw topped with a shako, and with a pole to look like

a musket, to represent their advanced sentries. Soon after this was

known at head-quarters the Battalion was ordered in pursuit; but

did not come up with the French rear-guard, and halted that night

near Alemquer. On the 16th the Battalion continued the pursuit

through Villa Nova and Azambuja; and though they never got sight of

the rear-guard, they took many stragglers prisoners. They first got

sight of the French near Cartaxo, where they found them posted on

some rising ground, having a heathy plain in their front. Craufurd,

believing that a rear-guard only was opposed to him, was on the point

of attacking; but Lord Wellington, who came up at the moment, forbade

this attack, a whole _Corps d’Armée_ being, in fact, concealed

behind the heights on which the small force visible was posted. The

Battalion halted that night in Cartaxo, and before dawn on the 18th

again started in pursuit, and came up with the enemy’s rear-guard,

which retired before them across a plain to the Rio Mayor, which they

crossed by a narrow bridge at the end of a long causeway. A company

of the Regiment was pushed on as a picquet near the bridge. The enemy

were occasionally exchanging shots with some dismounted dragoons whom

the Riflemen relieved; and Simmons, who was on the picquet, taking

three men with him, crept on the bridge; and lying down behind a

dead mule, which gave them a good rest for their rifles, they took

deliberate aim and evidently hit some of their adversaries, who

became very chary of showing themselves. As the Riflemen had had a

long march and a hard day’s work, they were relieved at night by a

company of the 52nd; and retreating to a grove of olive-trees near at

hand, for they were to remain as a reserve, they kindled their fires

and made themselves as comfortable as a rainy night allowed. But they

were not long undisturbed. For Craufurd, fancying or hoping that the

enemy were moving off, and ever anxious to be the first in pursuit,

took two or three soldiers with him, and walked cautiously along the

causeway so far that the French sentry challenged and fired; Craufurd

ordered his escort to return it. And this alarmed the enemy; who,

fancying probably that the English were crossing the bridge in force,

opened a heavy fire, the balls of which rattled among the olive trees

where the weary Riflemen were bivouacked, and rudely disturbed their

rest. However, at last the uproar ceased; and when day broke on the

19th it was found that during the remainder of the night the French

had formidably increased the strength of their position by placing

_abattis_ on the causeway and breastworks at the end of it. They had

also placed guns on the high ground which rose behind, and which they

had also fortified with _abattis_. The position, in fact, was a very

strong one: in front the Rio Mayor, and swampy ground crossed only by

the bridge and causeway; on the left the Tagus, with ground rising

in bold and hilly eminences; and the considerable town of Santarem

about a league in the rear. After bivouacking in a pine-wood near

Valle, where, as in the previous night, they suffered from torrents

of rain, they were ordered on the 20th to cross by a bridge near

Valle to the left of the enemy’s position and to attack his picquets.

The Battalion was employed to drive in the enemy’s advanced party,

which they effected in fine style, and with but slight loss, though

under sharp fire from the French light troops for about two hours.

The object of this reconnaissance was to ascertain whether Massena’s

whole force occupied the position or only a rear-guard; though, as

Beckwith observed in his north-country phrase to a staff officer who

asserted his certainty that it was but the latter, ‘It was a _gay_

rear-guard that built that _abattis_ in a night.’

However, it being evident that the whole of Massena’s army held this

strong position, the Battalion was withdrawn and placed in houses,

cottages and sheds, near the bridge. On it they had double sentries;

close to it an outlying picquet of three hundred men; a large inlying

picquet close by; and the rest of the Battalion, sleeping always

by their arms, were ready, in case of an alarm, to turn out at a

minute’s notice.

As the Battalion remained thus posted at Valle, near the bridge to

Santarem, during the winter, and there is nothing to record of them

for four months, I shall return to trace the services of the 2nd and

3rd Battalions; observing only that General Craufurd at this time

went on leave of absence to England, and that Sir William Erskine

succeeded to the command of the Light Division during his absence.

We left the 2nd Battalion at Hythe on its return from Walcheren. Its

sufferings and casualties there prevented its taking part in any

operations of the war for some time. But its losses were supplied

with energy; and within a space of five months after its return

from Flanders, two companies (Captain Cadoux’s and Captain Jenkins’)

embarked on February 12, 1810, and formed part of the force assembled

at Tarifa on February 25, under Lieutenant-General Graham, being then

attached to Brigadier-General Dilkes’ brigade. They served at Cadiz,

and under the command of Colonel Norcott distinguished themselves at

the Battle of Barrosa, as I shall more particularly mention when I

come to detail the part taken by the 3rd Battalion in that action.

Meanwhile, to trace the services of these companies.

One of these (Captain Jenkins’) was detached to act with Ballesteros’

Spanish force, and disembarked at Algeçiras early in September, and

marched to Ximena; whence on the 18th they advanced to Alcalá de

Gazules, and after some smart skirmishing with a French detachment

from Chiclana, retired to Ximena. It remained in the neighbourhood of

Algeçiras for two months; and after being constantly engaged with the

enemy, it retreated (with Ballesteros’ army) to Gibraltar.[82]

This company subsequently formed part of the garrison of Tarifa.

On December 20 it was engaged in Colonel Skerrett’s attempt to

resist the investment of the place, and both companies took part in

successfully repelling the assault on the breach which was made on

the 31st, when their distinguished gallantry was very conspicuous. On

the former of these occasions they lost 2 men killed, and had 10 men

wounded. In the fight at the breach 1 man was killed and 1 wounded.

After taking their share in this ‘great and splendid exploit,’[83]

this company rejoined the other at Cadiz.

In July 1810, another company (Charles Beckwith’s) embarked at

Portsmouth, and, having landed at Lisbon, marched to join the army,

then on its retreat from Busaco to Torres-Vedras. It joined at

Coimbra, and was attached to the 1st Battalion in the Light Division.

This company thenceforward took part in the movements and actions of

the 1st Battalion during the remainder of this and the first half of

the following year.

On July 5, 1811, another company (Captain Hart’s) embarked at

Portsmouth and joined the Light Division on the frontiers of Portugal

in September. These two companies then, as we shall see, acted

with the 1st Battalion and the Light Division, and distinguished

themselves at the two great sieges (Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos) of

the next year.

A further reinforcement of two companies (Captains Duncan’s and

Ferguson’s) left England in May 1812, and landed at Lisbon at the

latter end of that month. They joined the army in July, shortly

before the battle of Salamanca, and were attached to the Light

Division. At Salamanca and during the advance to Madrid the four

companies of this Battalion were commanded by Major Wilkins; but soon

after they reached Madrid, Colonel Wade arrived from England with

the Staff of the Battalion, and took command. And on the retreat

from Madrid, the other two companies (Cadoux and Jenkins’), which

had been in Andalusia with Skerrett, having, as we have seen, joined

Lord Wellington’s army early in November, the strength of the 2nd

Battalion in the Peninsula consisted (as did the 1st Battalion) of

six companies until the close of the war.

I have thus brought down the details of the movements of this

Battalion to this period, because being enfeebled by the results of

the disastrous Walcheren campaign, they were enabled only to join

the army in the field by single, or at most by two, companies at a

time, as their numbers were recruited and their health was restored.

Its marches, its actions and its glories will henceforward form part

of the general history of the Regiment, as will that of the 3rd

Battalion, which, until its junction with the other Battalions, I

will now proceed to particularise. But I will in as far as record or

other information enables me to do so, distinguish the feats of arms

and the losses of each Battalion.

The 3rd Battalion on its formation in 1809 was stationed at Brabourn

Lees; and the drill and discipline of this new levy were carried

on so vigorously and effectively that it was able early in 1810

to send three companies to Cadiz. And on July 11 in that year two

more companies and the head-quarters, under the command of Colonel

Barnard, embarked at Portsmouth on board the ‘Mercury’ frigate,

and landed at Cadiz on the 29th. Cadiz was at this time besieged

by the army under command of Marshal Victor; who occupied all the

surrounding towns and villages except Cadiz itself and the Isla de

Leon, their advanced posts being pushed forward to near the river

Santi-Petri, except near the bridge of Zuazo, the only communication

with the mainland. Here the English picquets were thrown forward

beyond the bridge and on the road to Seville, which forms a causeway

across the marshy plain intersected with saltpans. And so well was it

defended by our picquets, that, as Ford observes, this bridge was the

_pons asinorum_ of the French; for they never could get over it.

Here the 3rd Battalion, and the two companies of the 2nd under

Norcott, remained until February 1811, when they embarked under the

command of General Graham on the 18th, and landed at Algeçiras on

the 24th. Having bivouacked on a height near Algeçiras, they moved

the next day to Tarifa, where they halted until the 26th. The two

companies of the 2nd Battalion were attached to the brigade of Guards

commanded by Brigadier-General Dilkes, and the four companies of the

3rd Battalion,[84] with two companies of the 47th, were brigaded

under Colonel Barnard.[85]

On March 1 they marched about twelve miles and bivouacked on some

high ground; and the following day reached Casas Viejas, where they

bivouacked on a hill, and suffered much from the bitterly cold

weather. On the 3rd, having started before daylight, they reached

about mid-day a lagoon through which was a ford. The Spaniards,

who led the column, hesitated so long in attempting to cross, that

General Graham, out of all patience, proposed to General La Peña to

let the British troops advance. The 3rd Battalion was the leading

regiment, and at once entered the ford in column of sections, and

marched straight through it, the water reaching about to their

waist. The rest of the English force followed; and the Spaniards,

shamed into imitation, followed their example. The troops marched

forward, and halted that night in an olive-wood on very high ground,

near Vejer; the soldiers suffering from the extreme cold, which

was severely felt in consequence of their wetting in crossing the

lagoon, and the scarcity of wood for firing. They halted here until

the evening of the 4th, when a little after dark they marched to the

village of Conil, and on the morning of the 5th reached the plain of

Chiclana, and halted on the eastern slope of the knoll of Barrosa.

This is a ridge running in from the sea-coast about a mile and a

half, and overlooking the plain, which is bounded on one side by the

shore, and on the other by the forest of Chiclana. In our front was

a pine-wood. About twelve o’clock General Graham put his troops in

motion, and the 3rd Battalion were ordered down the hill and into

the wood in order to take possession of the height of Bermeja. But

they had not long moved, when Graham was informed that the enemy had

debouched from the forest, and having forced the troops left on the

height, were ascending the hill of Barrosa. The 3rd Battalion were

instantly countermarched, and ordered to get to the plain and engage

the enemy as soon as possible. On emerging from the pine-wood they

found themselves in front of two battalions of the 8th Regiment, one

of grenadiers, the other of voltigeurs. Two companies under Barnard

were left to cover and protect the guns; while the other Riflemen of

this Battalion, inclining to the left, and extending as they came

up the hill, soon became engaged with their opponents. In the same

way Norcott, in command of the two 2nd Battalion companies forming

the rear-guard, as soon as he heard from a sergeant of the German

hussars of the appearance of the enemy, put his column to the right

about, and extending his two companies, made his way out of the wood;

and on getting out of it and seeing the enemy advancing, he put his

right to the cliffs to cover the British regiments then filing out of

the wood, and was soon engaged with the enemy’s voltigeurs; and the

Guards and 67th having advanced, he placed his Riflemen on the flanks

of the brigade, and with them advanced against the enemy’s line.[86]

[Illustration:

BATTLE of BARROSA.

March 5, 1811.

_E. Weller, Litho._

_London, Chatto & Windus._

]

About this time the grenadiers of the 8th French Regiment advanced,

with drums beating, and the 54th (French) entered the pine-wood

to endeavour to turn our left. Notwithstanding the fire of the 3rd

Battalion on them in column, and at a short range, the grenadiers of

the 8th pushed on and drove in our skirmishers; when the 87th, with

some companies of the Guards, charging them with the bayonet, they

gave way, and in a short time fled routed and in disorder; pursued by

the Riflemen, who were engaged with the light troops which attempted

to cover their retreat. However, as is well known, the Spaniards

giving no help, but looking on as unconcerned spectators, Graham was

unable to follow up his victory, and the Riflemen were recalled.

‘In all my fighting,’ says Surtees, ‘I never saw an action in which

the chances of death were so numerous as in this.’[87] And so the

Duke calls it ‘the hardest action that has been fought yet.’[88]

In the hour and a half during which it lasted, the two 2nd Battalion

companies lost 6 rank and file killed, and Lieutenants Hope[89] and

Thomas Cochrane (severely) and 1 sergeant, 1 bugler, and 26 rank

and file wounded; and the four 3rd Battalion companies had Captain

Knipe and 13 rank and file killed, and Lieutenant-Colonel Barnard,

Lieutenants William Campbell (severely) and Hovenden, 3 sergeants,

and 45 rank and file wounded. Barnard was severely wounded about the

middle of the action, and was carried to the rear; and while the

wound was being dressed, another shot struck him, and inflicted a

wound more severe than the first. Surtees, who went to the rear to

bring up fresh ammunition, says that the ground there was ploughed up

by the enemy’s round shot and musketry. The 3rd Battalion had four

mounted officers in the field: the horses of two were killed; of

another wounded.

In his despatch reporting this action General Graham says:

‘Lieutenant-Colonel Barnard and the officers of his Battalion

executed the duty of skirmishing in advance with the enemy in a

masterly manner.’ And he specially mentions Lieutenant-Colonel

Norcott, whom he recommends for promotion.[90]

Soon after the action the British forces moved off, and crossed to

the Isla, except the 3rd Battalion, which was left on the field to

protect the wounded, and to give notice of any return of the enemy.

But none appeared; and after dark Major Ross, who had succeeded to

the command on Barnard’s being wounded, moved the Battalion across

the field, thickly strewn with dead and wounded of both armies,

and formed it into square on a sand-hill on the beach, where they

rested on their arms during the remainder of the night. It was severe

service which fell to the lot of this young battalion; a march of

sixteen hours in the preceding night; three hours’ manœuvring, and

half of it hard fighting; and all this without food; remaining under

arms on the field till dark; and now only resting on their arms.

General Rousseau, who had been made prisoner, badly wounded, died

in the course of the night, and was buried on the beach by the 3rd

Battalion. In his pocket they found a leave of absence to return

to France on account of ill-health, which his appearance clearly

indicated, but of which this brave soldier had not availed himself.

Towards morning Ross moved off his weary and famished Battalion; and

passing by the beach and over the Santi-Petri river, they returned to

their former quarters in the Isla de Leon.

Here they remained till June 30, when, embarking at Cadiz, they

reached Lisbon (after an unusually slow passage) on July 19, and

marched up the country to join Lord Wellington’s army. They arrived

on August 21, and were attached to the Light Division, then cantoned

in villages near the Agueda. At the same time the company of this

Battalion which had been attached to Sir Brent Spencer’s division was

withdrawn from it, and joined the Battalion.[91]

[Illustration:

Plate II.

THE 95^{TH}]

FOOTNOTES:

[65] This return will show the actual numbers:

_Return of 95th, May 10, 1809._

+-------------+------------+-------------+---------+------+-----+------+

| | Effective | | | | | |

| | April 1, | Volunteers | | | | |

| | previous |from Militia |Remaining| |Left | Grand|

| | to Militia +-------+-----+ in | Total| in | total|

| |volunteering|English|Irish|Portugal | |Spain| |

| +------------+-------+-----+---------+------+-----+------+

|1st Battalion| 799 | 641 | None| 8 | 1448 | 88 | 1536 |

|2nd Battalion| 863 | 641 | None| 37 | 1541 | 38 | 1579 |

+-------------+------------+-------+-----+---------+------+-----+------+

Thus leaving an excess of more than eleven hundred men, after

completing the two Battalions to a thousand men each. This excess

formed the 3rd Battalion.

[66] For twenty years and upwards after the end of the war, every

officer of the Regiment was required to learn and to know these

standing orders.

[67] 1st Battalion Record. I do not find this in the ‘Wellington

Despatches’ or in the ‘Supplementary Despatches.’ It was probably

noticed in Divisional Orders. The detachments under Colonel Bunbury

are, however, mentioned with praise in the despatch of Talavera

(‘Wellington Despatches,’ iv. 537). It may have formed part of these,

for it appears by the return (p. 42, note) that 88 men of the 1st

Battalion and 38 of the 2nd Battalion had been ‘left in Spain;’ and

8 men of the 1st Battalion and 37 of the 2nd Battalion ‘left in

Portugal.’

[68] Costello, 24. He was himself in hospital and dangerously ill.

[69] The 2nd Battalion Record says that they embarked on the 23rd,

but as Stewart (‘Cumloden Papers,’ 56) notes that they changed to the

‘Namur’ on the 22nd, this must be an error.

[70] Humbley’s Letter, January 31, 1838, in Adjutant-General’s Office.

[71] Harris, 131.

[72] There died between the date of their return, and January 10,

1810, 5 sergeants and 128 rank and file. On February 10, 1810, the

Battalion had 161 sick; on February 25, 140 sick. The strength on

embarkation was 70 sergeants, 988 rank and file.

[73] Lieutenant-Colonel Leach retired from the army 1821.

[74] Captain O’Hare was very ill and in bed; but at the first alarm

placed himself at the head of his company, which was previously in

the charge of Lieutenant Mercer.

[75] Leach, 121.

[76] Major-General Sir George Elder, K.C.B., died December 3, 1836.

[77] Afterwards Field-Marshal Sir Hew Dalrymple Ross, G.C.B.

[78] M’Cullock refused to give his parole, and was marched towards

the French frontier; and at Valladolid, being confined in a private

house, his handsome person and his wounds excited the pity, or that

which is akin to pity, of a young lady of the family. The old story:

she laid plans for his escape; she procured him a disguise; she gave

him a supply of money; and he succeeded in rejoining the Battalion.

[79] ‘As noble a fellow and as worthy a man as I ever met

with.’--George Simmons’ MS.

[80] ‘Wellington Despatches,’ vi. 293.

[81] ‘Wellington Despatches,’ viii. 218. He was Colonel-Commandant of

a Battalion.

[82] 2nd Battalion Record.

[83] ‘Napier,’ Book xv. chap. v.

[84] The other company of this Battalion had joined the army under

Lord Wellington (‘Wellington Supplementary Despatches,’ vi. 569,

575), and was no doubt the company with Sir Brent Spencer’s Division.

See p. 62.

[85] ‘Napier,’ vol. ii. appendix ix. 2.

[86] Norcott’s Report: ‘Wellington Supplementary Despatches,’ vii.

128.

[87] P. 127.

[88] ‘Wellington Despatches,’ vii. 400.

[89] Lieutenant-Colonel John Charles Hope, K. H., died October 12,

1842.

[90] ‘Wellington Despatches,’ vii. 396.

[91] ‘Wellington Despatches,’ viii. 218; and see p. 62.

The History of the Rifle Brigade (the Prince Consort's Own) Formerly the 95th · 第 2 / 16 章