In the _Romane Questions_[97] Plutarch has preserved for us various
marriage customs, which raise the whole question, not perhaps of human
marriage, but certainly of Aryan marriage. Has monandry always been the
prevailing form among the Aryan-speaking peoples? Among those peoples has
the family, as far as we can see or guess, from the beginning been
patriarchal and agnatic?
As a starting-point for the discussion of this question, two propositions
may be laid down as broadly true. The first is, that at some period or
other, all Aryans have been in the habit of obtaining their wives (or some
of their wives) by capture and by purchase. This fact may ultimately imply
scarcity of native women, female infanticide, polyandry, and kinship
through the female line; or it may prove to be perfectly compatible with a
patriarchal and agnatic system. But it is a fact, and a fact of the first
importance for this discussion. The second proposition that may safely be
made is, that in historical times at least, the patriarchal form of family
has always been the prevailing form amongst Aryan nations. The exceptions
may be real, or they may be due to faulty observation; they may be of the
highest importance, as being the sole indications of a prior and very
different form of family life, or they may be merely local, transient
departures from the normal patriarchal form, and so be insignificant or
deceptive; but in any case, they are relatively so few as to leave it a
practically true statement to say that the patriarchal family has been
normal among the Aryans in historic times.
The evidence of the existence of marriage by capture is furnished by
folk-lore. It is not necessary, nor is this the place to review that
evidence; but the survivals of this form of marriage which are recorded in
the _Romane Questions_ must be mentioned. The Romans, Plutarch says (_R.
Q._, 29), "_would not permit the new wedded bride to passe of herself over
the door-sill or threshold, when she is brought home to her husband's
house, but they that accompanie her must lift her up between them from the
ground, and so convey her in_."[98] That the Romans themselves were dimly
conscious of the real origin of this custom is implied in the first
solution suggested by Plutarch, viz., that the ceremony was "in remembrance
of those first wives whom they ravished perforce from the Sabines;" and
Rossbach, in his great work on Roman marriage,[99] sees in the custom a
survival from times when the bride, captured by force, was conveyed against
her will into the house (or den) of her captor. Parallels to the Roman
custom are to be found elsewhere. Among the modern Greeks the bride is
lifted over the threshold, as it would be most unlucky if she touched it in
crossing.[100] It is the most important wedding-guest among the
Servians,[101] the bride's nearest relation in Lorraine,[102] who carries
her in his arms from the waggon into her new home. Among the North Frisians
the "bride-lifter" (_bridlefstr_) is a regular wedding-official.[103] The
ceremony seems to have been known to the ancient Hindoos also.[104] The
Finnish-Ugrians, whether they borrowed or lent, or independently developed
the custom, uniformly practise it.[105] It is further noteworthy that the
Finnish-Ugrians agree with the Romans, the Hindoos, and the Russians in
this, viz., that the bride is not only carried over the threshold by some
of the bridal party (not by the bridegroom) but is then caused by them "to
sit upon a fliece of wooll."[106] The meaning and object of this strange
proceeding were quite unknown to the Romans, who practised it in Plutarch's
time, as they are to the Finnish-Ugrians and Russians who still observe the
custom. Rossbach rightly compares the ancient Roman custom of making the
_flamen_ and _flaminica_, when married _per farreationem_, sit upon the
fleece of the sheep that was slaughtered during the wedding
ceremonies;[107] he then refers to the Roman practice of sitting for a
short time after prayer in silent meditation, and this he thinks explains
the custom in question. But surely it leaves unexplained just that which
requires explanation. Granted, that the Romans showed more reverence than,
say the Scots whom Dr. Boyd can remember; still, are we to imagine them so
rapt into "the mind's internal heaven" that they could sit down in the
grease and the gore of a freshly-slaughtered sheep's fell, "nor heed nor
see what things these be"? Why did they not sit down somewhere else?
A possible answer to this question may be found in the following
considerations. Many savages consider themselves peculiarly liable on their
wedding-day to the attacks of evil spirits. The Hindoos and the
Finnish-Ugrians unanimously regard the seating of the bride on the fleece
as the right time for exorcising evil spirits and purifying the bride: the
Hindoos recite an incantation, the Esthonians clash daggers over her head,
for iron is generally dreaded by spirits. It is, therefore, an easy
inference that the fleece itself had purificatory powers; and, as a matter
of fact, we find that the Greeks, at any rate, regarded a sheepskin in this
light, for in the preliminary ceremonies of the Eleusinia was a
purificatory rite which was known as the Zeus-fleece.[108] In the
collection of the Hôtel Lambert[109] is a red-figured vase bearing a
representation of this rite, in which the person purified is represented as
crouching on the fleece.
In days when marriage by capture was real, and not merely symbolical, it
was highly important that a strange woman should, immediately on entering
the house, be, so to speak, spiritually disinfected, lest she should
introduce unwelcome spirits into her new home; or, in the intimate
relations which were to subsist between her and her captor,[110] should
bring him into the power of strange and hostile gods. Hence the close
adhesion of the ceremony of the fleece, long after its meaning was
forgotten, to that of lifting the bride over the threshold.
But it was necessary not merely to detach the strange woman from her own
gods, she must also be introduced to the gods of her new home. This
introduction survived in the Roman custom, whereby _new wedded wives are
bidden to touch fire and water_ (_R. Q._ 1).[111] That this custom goes
back to the time when wives were captured is indicated by the words "are
bidden:" the force which was at first necessarily used survives in this
gentle compulsion. Parallels to this custom are forthcoming: the Hindoo
bride, according to the Kâuçikasûtra (77. 16), was led thrice round the
hearth in the bridegroom's house. Exactly the same ceremony not only was
practised by the ancient Teutons, but is still observed in some places in
North Germany and in Westphalia.[112] The Esthonians and Wotjaks still
honour the custom.[113] The first thing a Servian bride has to do on
entering her new home is to mend the fire,[114] and in ancient Greece she
was taken at once to the hearth. It need hardly be said that the hearth is
the abode of the house-spirit and the centre of the family worship. At
Rome, we find from Festus,[115] the bride was also sprinkled with water. In
Sardinia,[116] her mother-in-law empties a glass of water over her. Amongst
the ancient Hindoos[117] this was the bridegroom's duty; with the Servians
it is the function of the _Djewer_.[118] That this sprinkling was
originally an introduction of the strange woman to the local water-spirit
seems indicated by the fact that amongst the Servians the sprinkling is
performed at the well, in the Unterkrain at the burn,[119] in Albania[120]
at the village-spring, while in modern Greece the bride casts offerings
into the spring.[121]
The conventionally extravagant lamentation which was required of the Roman
bride[122] is regarded by Rossbach (p. 329) as a survival of marriage by
capture, and may be paralleled amongst many Aryan nations: with the Hindoos
it was part of the officially prescribed programme;[123] in the Oberpfalz
it is obligatory; in Bohemia and in Russia it is required by public
opinion.[124]
The evidence of folk-lore (so far as it is called for by the _Romane
Questions_) that the Aryans obtained wives by capturing the women of other
households or family groups than their own, has now been stated. It does
not suffice to show that an Aryan was forbidden to marry a woman of his own
household; but a wider survey of early Aryan wedding-customs would bring
out this important fact, that however other parts of the ceremony vary,
there is one which is always present, and which may be regarded as
essential—that is the _domum deductio_, the bringing-home of the bride; and
from this fact we may fairly draw the conclusion that normally, and—so
strong is custom—probably uniformly, the bride and the bridegroom belonged
to different households, and that the bride came to live in the home of the
bridegroom.
Marriage by purchase does not happen to be mentioned in the _Romane
Questions_, nor is it necessary to prove what is universally admitted. All
that need be remarked here is that purchase was not necessarily preceded by
a state of things in which capture prevailed; frequently it may have been a
peaceable remedy for the grievances caused by capture, but quite as often
it may have been practised side by side with capture from the beginning.
Further, the purchase, like the capture, of wives implies that husband and
wife belonged to different households; and purchase indicates that the wife
thus bought was the property of the husband, or at least that she was
subject to him.
Let us now turn to the evidence showing that the family was patriarchal and
agnatic. The evidence is furnished by the comparative study of law,
especially the law regulating the order in which the relatives of a dead
man shall succeed to his property. The order of succession prescribed by
the earliest legal codes is strikingly similar among all the Aryan peoples;
first, the deceased's male descendants to the third generation (his sons,
grandsons, and great-grandsons); next, the male descendants of the
deceased's father to the third generation (_i.e._, the deceased's brothers,
nephews, and grand-nephews); then the male descendants of the deceased's
grandfather to the third generation (_i.e._, his uncles, cousins, and their
children); and finally, the male descendants of his great-grandfather to
the third generation (_i.e._, his great-uncles, his first cousins once
removed, and his second cousins once removed). Beyond these degrees, kin
was not counted; and if no heir were forthcoming within them, the property
went, amongst the Hindoos, to those of the same name as the deceased;
amongst the Romans, to the members of his _gens_; in Crete, to the village
community. What is the origin of this unanimous and well-marked distinction
between the Near and the Remote Kin? Why were the _anchisteis_, "the
nearest relations," as the Greeks technically named them, so sharply
distinguished from the others?
To begin with, it is clear that the distinction, being common to all the
Aryans, was not developed subsequently to their dispersion, but is
pre-historic—indeed, pro-ethnic. Hence it follows that the distinction was
not the work of any legislator or of any individual; it could not have been
a law enacted by a lawgiver and enforced by the State under pains and
penalties, for the simple reason that the Aryans, previous to their
dispersion, were not organised into a State, and had no government to issue
or execute laws. But before Law, Custom was, and "Kin and Custom go
together and imply each other, as do Law and State. Law is the enactment of
the State—Custom is the habit of the Kin. And as Custom precedes Law, so
the State is preceded by kin or sib associations. The earliest form of the
State is modelled on that of the sib associations out of which it is
developed, and the first laws promulgated by the State are but the old
customs committed to writing."[125]
In what pro-ethnic Aryan custom, then, are we to seek the origin of the
clear and deep-cut line between the Near and the Remote Kin? The answer is
furnished by what is known among the Slavonians as the house community, and
to Anglo-Indian lawyers as "the joint undivided family." As it exists now
in India, the joint undivided family consists, or may consist, of the sons,
grandsons, and great-grandsons of a man (deceased), who, on the death of
their common ancestor, do not separate, but continue to live on the
undivided estate and worship their deceased ancestor as their house-spirit.
The family, as defined by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,[126]
is "joint in food, worship, and estate."
Now, the relatives whom the earliest Aryan codes, the laws of the Twelve
Tables, the laws of Solon, of Menu, the Gortyn Code, &c., specify as a
man's heirs-at-law are in every case precisely those relatives who
belonged, or might at some time have belonged, to the same joint undivided
family as the deceased. It is worth while to note that at different times a
man might belong to four different joint undivided families: he might be
born into a family which still united in worshipping the spirit of his
great-grandfather: and thus his cousins, his first cousins once removed,
and his second cousins once removed, would dwell in the same household with
him. His grandfather might then die and become a house-spirit: in that
event, his grand-uncle (and descendants) would have to set up a family of
his own, for they only can belong to a joint undivided family who are
descended from a common house-father. Now, my grand-uncle, being the
brother of my grandfather, is not descended from my grandfather, therefore
cannot worship his spirit, therefore cannot belong to the joint undivided
family which worships my grandfather's spirit. On the other hand, the
family, of which my (deceased) grandfather is the house-spirit, includes my
grandfather's descendants to the third generation, _i.e._, includes not
only my cousins, but also their sons. This (cousins' sons) is the limit of
the second joint undivided family to which it is possible for a man to
belong. Thirdly, when my father becomes a house-spirit, and is worshipped
by his children's children, I dwell in the same household as my nephews and
grand-nephews. Finally, when I am gathered to my fathers, I dwell, in the
spirit, with my sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons.
Here we obviously have the key to the order of succession prescribed by the
earliest Aryan codes: my own descendants (if any) are called first, because
they constitute the joint undivided family, with which, at the time of
dying, I am presumably dwelling. My father's descendants come next, because
that was the family I had previously belonged to; and on the same principle
my grandfather's descendants, and then those of my great-grandfather were
called.
So long as the joint undivided family was a living institution, so long
there was no need (as there was no thought) of specifying who a man's heirs
were, and so long a man could be in no doubt as to who his Near Kin
were—they were those who had been brought up in the same family as himself.
It was only when this unwieldy form of family came to be disintegrated by
the advance of civilisation that it became necessary to specify the order
of succession, and to determine who were a man's Near Kin; and, as we have
seen, the earliest laws on this subject are but the old customs reduced to
writing.
Two facts of importance in the history of Aryan marriage have now been
shown. The first, inferred from the _domum deductio_ and from the existence
of marriage by capture and by purchase, is that amongst the undispersed
Aryans a man customarily abstained from marrying a woman belonging to his
own family group. The second is that the family groups in which the Aryans
lived, if not originally, certainly for some time before their dispersion,
were joint undivided families. The Aryan was averse to marrying women of
his Near Kin; the difficult question now arises, whether he was equally
averse to marrying into his Remote Kin? The "prohibited degrees" of
historic times do not help us much in answering this question. The
Athenians had lost the Aryan aversion to marriages within the near kin:
they married their cousins, and even half-sisters. There is no evidence to
show that the Romans ever abstained from marrying their Remote Kin.
Rossbach maintains that the prohibition extended only to first cousins;
Klenze, Walter, Burchardy, Göttling, and Gerlach make it go as far as the
extreme limit of the Near Kin, _i.e._, to second cousins once removed—no
writer on Roman law or marriage supports a wider prohibition; and the _jus
osculi_[127] (which, by the way, was accorded by men to men as well as by
women to men) extended only to the near kin. The Hindoos, again, were
averse to marriage between any persons of the same name.
Does the Hindoo system come down from pro-ethnic times, or is it a
development peculiar among Aryan nations to the Hindoos? Many savages have
a much wider circle of prohibited degrees than civilised peoples possess,
and amongst civilised peoples themselves the number of prohibited degrees
has even in historic times diminished. We thus seem to get a sort of law of
diminishing degrees, which would point to the Hindoo system as that which
was known to the pro-ethnic Aryans. But though some savages have more
prohibited degrees than civilised men have, other savages have few or none.
The downward movement, therefore, from the maximum to the minimum number of
prohibited degrees which is observable in historic times must have been
preceded in pre-historic ages by an upward movement from the minimum to the
maximum; and, as far as the evidence at present goes, though the upward
movement may, in pro-ethnic times, have proceeded as far as the Remote Kin,
it may equally well only have reached to the limits of the Near Kin; while,
after the Aryan dispersion, the movement may have continued upwards amongst
the Hindoos, downwards amongst the Athenians, and, for a long time, have
ceased to move in any direction amongst the conservative Romans.
A more important point to notice is that, if we believe the Hindoo system
to date from pro-ethnic times, we must also assume that the Hindoo system
of naming is pro-ethnic, _i.e._, we must assume that each Aryan had two
names, one distinguishing him personally from other people, the other
indicating what kin he belonged to; and in this event, the Near and the
Remote Kin must, in pro-ethnic times, have had a common name. There is,
however, very little evidence to show that this was the case: gentile names
are found among the Hindoos and the Romans alone of Aryan peoples. It is,
of course, possible that, before the dispersion, the Aryans had gentile
names, and that, after the dispersion, all the Aryans, with the exception
of the Romans and the Hindoos, lost them entirely. On the other hand, if
there was a time when gentile names had not yet been invented, if they have
had a history and growth, we must consider it as at least possible that
gentile names had not been evolved at the time of the dispersion, and were
only developed subsequently by the Romans and Hindoos.
Whether the undispersed Aryans had gentile names, and at the same time an
aversion to marriages between persons of the same name, is a question on
which it were vain to pronounce confidently. We may more safely consider
both these equally possible alternatives, together with the consequences
which flow from each. Let us assume that marriage was, amongst the Aryans
as amongst the Hindoos, prohibited between persons of the same gentile
name: is there anything in the social organisation presupposed by this
prohibition incompatible with the patriarchal system? According to Mr. D.
M‘Lennan there is: not only are there "numerous societies of which the
patriarchal theory does not even attempt to give any account," but "in the
societies upon contemplation of which it was formed, a most serious
difficulty for it is presented by the tribes, which consist of several
clans, each clan considered separate in blood from all the others. The
patriarchal theory, of course, involves that the clans are all of the same
blood."[128] Mr. M‘Lennan's difficulty seems to be this: where inheritance
(of family name, property, sacra, &c.) is confined to the male line, the
descendants of a common ancestor must all have the same family or gentile
name; persons having different names cannot be descended from the same
ancestor—that is to say, different _gentes_ or clans cannot have a common
origin. A tribe, therefore, which consists of several clans cannot consist
of descendants of a common ancestor. Yet, these clans believe they have an
ancestor, however remote, in common. If their belief is incorrect (if the
_gentes_ have not a common origin), how did the error arise? If, on the
other hand, the different _gentes_ of the same tribe have a common origin,
how came they to have different names?
The source of this difficulty plainly is the assumption that the original
ancestor of the tribe had a family name, which was inherited by all his
descendants. It is impossible to disprove or to prove this assumption. We
may, however, note that the Teutons (according to Dr. Taylor[129]) rejoiced
in only one name a-piece. An Athenian added to his own name his father's.
And—to set assumption against assumption—we may conjecture that as
patronymics are formed from personal names, so gentile names were developed
out of patronymics. At first, a man's sons bore nothing in their names to
indicate from what father they were sprung. In course of time the sons of
Anchises were known as Anchisiadæ; and as long as the family group
consisted only of parents and children, this system of nomenclature would
suffice. It might even continue into times when the family group included
three generations: Iulus, as well as his father, Æneas, might be an
Anchisiades. And here we may note that if all the members of a joint
undivided family bore the surname Anchisiades, an aversion to marriage in
the near kin would forbid the marriage of any two Anchisiadæ. When,
however, owing to natural growth, the joint undivided family of Anchises
becomes so large that it is necessary for his younger (married) sons to go
out into the world and start joint undivided families of their own, leaving
Æneas and his children in possession of the old home, it is obvious that
persons who once had belonged to the same joint undivided family, and
therefore had possessed the same family name, and had been prohibited to
intermarry, would now belong to different families, and (being named after
the respective house-fathers of the newly formed families) would have
different patronymics, and would be allowed to marry persons whom
previously they were forbidden to wed. In these circumstances an extension
both of prohibited degrees and of the family name might very naturally be
the ultimate result. Iulus, who for years had worshipped Anchises as
house-spirit, and had consequently been an Anchisiades, might, when Æneas
became his house-spirit, come to be known as an Ænæades, but on the other
hand the old patronymic might stick to him and to his children for ever. In
the same way, the aversion to marrying women who belonged to the same joint
undivided family might cease when they ceased to belong to the same family,
but it might continue. Hence a continual tendency to extend the family
name, and to enlarge the number of prohibited degrees.
The transition from the system of naming by patronymics to that of gentile
names would not be made in a day or in a generation, and during the
transition the usage would fluctuate: the descendants of Æneas might choose
to be known as Ænæadæ rather than as the sons of Anchises, while the
children of Æneas' brothers might retain the name of Anchisiadæ, because
their fathers were less distinguished than their grandfather. The period of
this fluctuation in usage may be assumed to have been long enough to allow
of the requisite diversity of gentile names, while the fact that the number
of _gentes_ is always fixed, however far back they can be historically
traced, shows that the fluctuation at last hardened into unyielding custom.
It was pointed out in the last paragraph but one that second cousins once
removed (the great-grandchildren of a common house-father) might at one
time belong to the same joint undivided family, and subsequently to
different families, and that they might wish to continue, after their
separation, to consider each other as relatives. Language afforded them no
means of indicating their relationship, for there was no word in the
original Aryan language for "cousin," much less for "second cousin." And
before patronymics had been stereotyped into gentile names, it might seem
that the Aryan system of naming at that time afforded no means of binding
these relatives together either. But a certain Athenian custom may perhaps
be taken, both as evidence of the existence of the desire in question, and
as an indication of the means taken for gratifying it. At Athens it was the
custom to name a child after its grandfather; and if we assume this
practice to have obtained in Aryan times, we have here a ready means for
indicating the fact that second cousins are related without the aid of a
gentile name; for if I and my first cousin are both named after our common
grandfather, then our children (who are second cousins once removed) will
have the same patronymic, and therefore will be related, and thence again
prohibited to marry. This may be illustrated by an imaginary pedigree,
which will also serve to show how—when once patronymics, such as "John's
son," became stereotyped into true family or gentile names, such as
"Johnson"—all the _gentes_ of a tribe might be descended from a common
ancestor. Thus:—
John.
|
Will,
John's son.
|
+—————————-+————————-+
| |
John, Tom,
Will's son. Will's son.
| |
+————-+————+ +————-+———-+
| | | |
Will, Harry, Will, Jack,
John's son. John's son. Tom's son. Tom's son.
| | | |
+——+——+ +——+——-+ +—-+—-+ +——-+——+
| | | | | | | |
John Frank John Bill Tom Dick Tom Richard
Wilson. Wilson. Harrison. Harrison. Wilson. Wilson. Jackson. Jackson.
We may now sum up. The oldest form of family organisation historically
traceable amongst the Aryans is that of the joint undivided family. The
pro-ethnic Aryans were probably averse to marriages between members of the
same joint undivided family. They may also have been averse to marriages
between second cousins once removed, even when those second cousins had
ceased to dwell in the same joint household. If so, then, as language
afforded no term even for "cousins," the memory of the relationship may
have been kept up in one of three ways. As the members of a _genos_ at
Athens had no common family name, and as they were notoriously related, not
by blood, but merely by the possession of a joint-worship, so amongst the
Aryans a joint-worship may have served as the mark of kinship (as it does
among the Hindoos still). Or the remote kin may have been enabled to claim
kindred by means of a patronymic system, which survived at Athens. Or,
third, gentile names may have been developed out of patronymics even in
pro-ethnic times, in which case marriage would be prohibited, as amongst
the Hindoos, between all persons of the same family name.
But there is nothing in this patriarchal organisation of the family and of
the tribe which compels us to assume that it was evolved out of some
earlier non-patriarchal form of family. The warrant for such an assumption,
if to be found, must be sought elsewhere. Let us seek. Analogy will not
help us. The patriarchal system may, elsewhere in the world, have been
evolved out of the matriarchate; but, as the late Mr. M‘Lennan warned us,
we may not assume that marriage has everywhere had the same history. The
widest survey of the various forms of human marriage (Westermarck's) that
has yet been made warrants no presumption in favour of the priority of the
matriarchate. If the matriarchate was a pro-ethnic Aryan institution, it is
on Aryan ground that traces of it must be discovered. Such traces are said
to be discernible.
There are traces amongst some Aryan peoples of the levirate. The levirate
is said to indicate polyandry, and polyandry to presuppose the
matriarchate. This is a perfectly legitimate line of argument, but before
resorting to polyandry for an explanation of the Aryan levirate, it is
worth while to inquire whether there is anything in known Aryan customs
capable of supplying an explanation. According to Aryan custom, the estate
of a man who leaves no son passes to the next of kin, _i.e._, his brother,
or it may be a more distant relative. If the deceased leaves no son, but a
daughter, then according to Athenian law, according to the Gortyn Code, and
probably also according to Aryan custom, the next of kin (whether brother
or not) must not only take the estate, but also marry the heiress, if any
(whether wife or daughter of the deceased). According to the Gortyn Code,
if the next of kin is married, he must put away his wife; if the heiress is
already married, she must leave her husband. Now, if the obligation to
raise up seed to the deceased extended only to his brothers, the Tibetan
form of polyandry would afford an explanation which, whether correct or
not, would, at any rate, account for all the facts. But inasmuch as the
obligation is binding on all the near kin, and extends to the daughter as
well as the wife of the deceased, it cannot be explained by the hypothesis
of the Tibetan form of polyandry or any other form short of incest in every
degree possible, not only amongst the members of the same joint undivided
family, but also with the women who have married out of that family into
some other. In truth, so far from _mutterrecht_ being the source of the
Aryan custom, that custom bears on its face the marks of the rudest and
most savage application of the agnatic theory. The provisions of the Gortyn
Code which require that the next of kin shall marry the heiress, even if
the marriage necessitate divorce on both sides, show that the mother was
held absolutely incapable of transmitting rights—only a kinsman could do
that. A devotion to the principle of agnation so strong as to over-ride the
innate Aryan aversion to endogamous marriages, so strong even in the days
of civilised Athens as to afford the Orestes of Æschylus with the defence
that the mother whom he had killed was not of his blood, cannot be
explained as a survival from times when kinship was counted exclusively
through the female line. The savage practice must have its roots in some
equally crude and savage theory. What the Aryan theory was we can hardly
hope to discover, but we may conjecture that it was at least as barbarous
as that which leads savages to eat their dead kinsmen, and European
peasants to eat corpse-cakes, in the belief that thereby "the virtues and
advantages of the departed ... and the living strength of the deceased
passed over ... into the kinsman who consumed them, and so were retained
within the kindred" (Mr. E. S. Hartland in _Folk Lore_, III. ii. 149). The
_Leichen-nudeln_ of the Bavarian peasant, or the beans of the primitive
Italian funeral feasts, would, when eaten, qualify the next of kin to wed
the heiress and to raise up seed to the dead kinsman.
Before leaving the subject of the levirate we may note that the joint
undivided family survived in historic times at Athens and in Sparta, and
that in both places brothers lived on the joint-estate as well after the
death as during the life of their father. In Sparta, if one only of the
brothers had a son, that son was naturally heir to the joint-estate, and
was considered the son of all. Amongst the Hindoos, too, Vasishtha says
(xvii. 10), "If amongst many brothers who are begotten by one father, one
have a son, they all have offspring through that son" (_cf._ Vishnu, xv.
42).[130] Now, a casual observer, ignorant of the nature and constitution
of the joint undivided family, might thus easily draw the mistaken
inference that the wife of one brother was common to them all; and this may
be the origin of Cæsar's statement with regard to the polyandry of the
ancient Britons, and of Polybius' with regard to the Spartans. Or, again,
it is possible that the joint undivided family may in these instances have
given rise to this form of polyandry. It is thus not safe to infer that
where polyandry is, the matriarchate must previously have been.
There remains the argument from totems. Unfortunately their very existence
in Europe is questioned, and this is not the place to discuss the question.
It is safer not to meddle in European totems at present. Their appearance
in Greek mythology, however, may fittingly here be made the subject of a
brief allusion. The value, to the anthropologist, of ancient Roman customs
and beliefs is that they show us the Italians at a much lower stage of
civilisation than that in which the Vedas show us the Hindoos or the
Homeric poems the Greeks. They show us an Aryan people having no mythology,
and they warrant the inference that myths were unknown to the pro-ethnic
Aryans. The Greek myths about the amours of Zeus in animal form cannot go
back, therefore, to Aryan times. They may be the peculiar invention of the
early Greeks, or it may be that the families which claimed to be descended
from animals were pre-Hellenic, and that, when they joined the immigrating
Greeks, they learnt the worship of Zeus, and were aided in their conversion
by identifying Zeus with their animal ancestor.
Against the instances of polyandry and the survivals of totemism, which may
or may not show that the matriarchate was known to Aryan peoples, we may
fairly set the evidence of comparative philology. The original Aryan
language possessed terms for grandfather, father, son, and grandson; and
these are just the direct ascendants and descendants who could compose a
joint undivided family. There was a word for the paternal uncle, whom the
children brought up in such a family would know; there is none for the
maternal uncle, with whom they would not dwell. There were special
designations for husband's father, husband's mother, husband's brother,
husband's sister, and even for husband's brothers' wives—just the words
which would be required if the wife left her own family to dwell in that of
her husband. There were none for wife's father, mother, &c., which would be
required if the husband became a member of his wife's family. And
this—which is inconsistent with the matriarchal system—is in accord with
the evidence afforded by wedding customs, viz., that the wife left father
and mother, and was brought, by the _domum deductio_, to her husband's
home.
Still, it would be as unjustifiable to say that the matriarchate could
never have established itself on Aryan ground, as it is to say that the
agnatic family must have been developed out of the system of "maternal
rights" and "female descent." The list of prohibited degrees varies among
early Aryan peoples from the minimum possible for a civilised people (as at
Athens) to the maximum possible even for savages (as amongst the Hindoos).
There may have been a similar variation in the organisation of the family.
Nor can we say with confidence that the pro-ethnic Aryans were more uniform
than their descendants. The different languages evolved out of the common
Aryan tongue existed as dialects from the beginning, and in the beginning
there may have been differences in social organisation. But whereas we can
certainly trace the joint undivided family and the principle of agnation as
far back as modern science enables us to trace the Aryans at all, the
evidence for the existence of the matriarchate at any time amongst any
Aryan people is inferior both in amount and in value.