four o’clock, however, the news arrived that the railway at Burke’s
Station, within twelve miles of Alexandria, had been cut, and that the
enemy was in force between that point and Centreville. On Centreville,
therefore, the whole army was now directed; Hooker, Kearney, and Reno,
forming the right wing, marched by Blackburn’s Ford, and were to be
followed by Porter and Banks; Sigel and Reynolds, forming the centre,
took the road by New Market and the Stone Bridge; McDowell (King’s and
Ricketts’ divisions), forming the left, was to pass through Gainesville
and Groveton. But when the right wing reached Centreville, Pope was
still at fault. There were traces of a marching column, but some small
patrols of cavalry, who retreated leisurely before the Federal advance,
were the sole evidence of the enemy’s existence. Night was at hand, and
as the divisions he accompanied were directed to their bivouacs, Pope
sought in vain for the enemy he had believed so easy a prey.
Before his troops halted the knowledge came to him. Far away to the
south-west, where the great Groveton valley, backed by the wooded
mountains, lay green and beautiful, rose the dull booming of cannon,
swelling to a continuous roar; and as the weary soldiers, climbing the
slopes near Centreville, looked eagerly in the direction of the sound,
the rolling smoke of a fierce battle was distinctly visible above the
woods which bordered the Warrenton-Alexandria highway.
Across Bull Run, in the neighbourhood of Groveton, and still further
westward, where the cleft in the blue hills marked Thoroughfare Gap,
was seen the flash of distant guns. McDowell, marching northwards
through Gainesville, had evidently come into collision with the enemy.
Jackson was run to earth at last; and it was now clear that while Pope
had been moving northwards on Centreville, the Confederates had been
moving westward, and that they were once more within reach of Lee. But
by what means, Pope might well have asked, had a whole army corps, with
its batteries and waggons, passed through the cordon which he had
planned to throw around it, and passed through as if gifted with the
secret of invisibility?
The explanation was simple. While his enemies were watching the
midnight glare above Manassas, Jackson was moving north by three roads;
and before morning broke A. P. Hill was near Centreville, Ewell had
crossed Bull Run by Blackburn’s Ford, and Taliaferro was north of Bald
Hill, with a brigade at Groveton, while Stuart’s squadrons formed a
screen to front and flank. Then, as the Federals slowly converged on
Manassas, Hill and Ewell, marching unobserved along the north bank of
Bull Run, crossed the Stone Bridge; Taliaferro joined them, and before
Pope had found that his enemy had left the Junction, the Confederates
were in bivouac north of Groveton, hidden in the woods, and recovering
from the fatigue of their long night march.[19]
Jackson’s arrangements for deceiving his enemy, for concealing his line
of retreat, and for drawing Pope northward on Centreville, had been
carefully thought out. The march from Manassas was no hasty movement to
the rear. Taliaferro, as soon as darkness fell, had moved by New Market
on Bald Hill. At 1 a.m. Ewell followed Hill to Blackburn’s Ford; but
instead of continuing the march on Centrevile, had crossed Bull Run,
and moving up stream, had joined Taliaferro by way of the Stone Bridge.
Hill, leaving Centreville at 10 a.m.,
marched to the same rendezvous. Thus, while the attention of the enemy
was attracted to Centreville, Jackson’s divisions were concentrated in
the woods beyond Bull Bun, some five or six miles west. The position in
which his troops were resting had been skilfully selected. South of
Sudley Springs, and north of the Warrenton turnpike, it was within
twelve miles of Thoroughfare Gap, and a line of retreat, in case of
emergency, as well as a line by which Lee could join him, should
Thoroughfare Gap be blocked, ran to Aldie Gap, the northern pass of the
Bull Run Mountains. Established on his enemy’s flank, he could avoid
the full shock of his force should Lee be delayed, or he could strike
effectively himself; and it was to retain the power of striking that he
had not moved further northward, and secured his front by camping
beyond Catharpen Run. It was essential that he should be prepared for
offensive action. The object with which he had marched upon Manassas
had only been half accomplished. Pope had been compelled to abandon the
strong line of the Rappahannock, but he had not yet been defeated; and
if he were not defeated, he would combine with McClellan, and advance
in a few days in overwhelming force. Lee looked for a battle with Pope
before he could be reinforced, and to achieve this end it was necessary
that the Federal commander should be prevented from retreating further;
that Jackson should hold him by the throat until Lee should come up to
administer the _coup de grâce._
It was with this purpose in his mind that Jackson had taken post near
Groveton, and he was now awaiting the information that should tell him
the time had come to strike. But, as already related, the march of the
Federals on Manassas was slow and toilsome. It was not till the morning
was well on that the brigade of Taliaferro’s division near Groveton,
commanded by Colonel Bradley Johnson, was warned by the cavalry that
the enemy was moving through Gainesville in great strength. A skirmish
took place a mile or two north of that village, and Johnson, finding
himself menaced by far superior numbers, fell back
to the wood near the Douglass House. He was not followed. The Union
generals, Sigel and Reynolds, who had been ordered to Manassas to “bag”
Jackson, had received no word of his departure from the Junction; and
believing that Johnson’s small force was composed only of cavalry, they
resumed the march which had been temporarily interrupted.
The situation, however, was no clearer to the Confederates. The enemy
had disappeared in the great woods south-west of Groveton, and heavy
columns were still reported coming up from Gainesville. During the
afternoon, however, the cavalry captured a Federal courier, carrying
McDowell’s orders for the movement of the left and centre, which had
been placed under his command, to Manassas Junction,[20] and this
important document was immediately forwarded to Jackson.
“Johnson’s messenger,” says General Taliaferro, “found the Confederate
headquarters established on the shady side of an old-fashioned
worm-fence, in the corner of which General Jackson and his division
commanders were profoundly sleeping after the fatigues of the preceding
night, notwithstanding the intense heat of the August day. There was
not so much as an ambulance at headquarters. The headquarters’ train
was back beyond the Rappahannock, at Jefferson, with remounts, camp
equipage, and all the arrangements for cooking and serving food. All
the property of the general, the staff, and the headquarters’ bureau
was strapped to the pommels and cantels of the saddles, and these
formed the pillows of their weary owners. The captured dispatch roused
Jackson like an electric shock. He was essentially a man of action. He
rarely, if ever, hesitated. He never asked advice. He called no council
to discuss the situation disclosed by this
communication, although his ranking officers were almost at his side.
He asked no conference of opinion. He made no suggestion, but simply,
without a word, except to repeat the language of the message, turned to
me and said: ‘Move your division and attack the enemy;’ and to Ewell,
‘Support the attack.’ The slumbering soldiers sprang from the earth at
the first murmur. They were sleeping almost in ranks; and by the time
the horses of their officers were saddled, the long lines of infantry
were moving to the anticipated battle-field.
“The two divisions, after marching some distance to the north of the
turnpike, were halted and rested, and the prospect of an engagement on
that afternoon seemed to disappear with the lengthening shadows. The
enemy did not come. The Warrenton turnpike, along which it was supposed
he would march, was in view, but it was as free from Federal soldiery
as it had been two days before, when Jackson’s men had streamed along
its highway.”[21]
[Illustration: Situation Sunset, August 28th, 1862.]
Jackson, however, was better informed than his subordinate. Troops were
still moving through Gainesville, and, instead of turning off to
Manassas, were marching up the turnpike on which so many eyes were
turned from the neighbouring woods. King’s division, while on the march
to Manassas, had been instructed to countermarch and make for
Centrevile, by Groveton and the Stone Bridge. Ricketts, who had been
ordered by McDowell to hold Thoroughfare Gap, was already engaged with
Longstreet’s advanced guard, and of this Jackson was aware; for Stuart,
in position at Haymarket, three miles north of Gainesville, had been
skirmishing all day with the enemy’s cavalry, and had been in full view
of the conflict at the Gap.[22]
Jackson, however, knew not that one division was all that was before
him. The Federal movements had covered
so wide an extent of country, and had been so well concealed by the
forests, that it was hardly possible for Stuart’s patrols, enterprising
as they were, to obtain accurate information. Unaccustomed to such
disjointed marches as were now in progress across his front, Jackson
believed that King’s column was the flank-guard of McDowell’s army
corps. But, although he had been compelled to leave Hill near the Stone
Bridge, in order to protect his line of retreat on Aldie, he had still
determined to attack. The main idea which absorbed his thoughts is
clear enough. The Federal army, instead of moving direct from Warrenton
on Alexandria, as he had anticipated, had apparently taken the more
circuitous route by Manassas, and if Pope was to be fought in the open
field before he could be reinforced by McClellan, he must be induced to
retrace his steps. To do this, the surest means was a resolute attack
on King’s division, despite the probability that it might be strongly
reinforced; and it is by no means unlikely that Jackson deferred his
attack until near sunset in order that, if confronted by superior
numbers, he might still be able to hold on till nightfall, and obtain
time for Longstreet to come up.
Within the wood due north of the Dogan House, through which ran an
unfinished railroad, Ewell’s and Taliaferro’s divisions, awaiting the
propitious moment for attack, were drawn up in order of battle. Eight
brigades, and three small batteries, which had been brought across
country with great difficulty, were present, and the remainder of the
artillery was not far distant.[23] Taliaferro, on the right, had two
brigades (A. G. Taliaferro’s and the Stonewall) in first line; Starke
was in second line, and Bradley Johnson near Groveton village. Ewell,
on the left, had placed Lawton and Trimble in front, while Early and
Forno formed a general reserve. This force numbered in all about 8,000
men, and even the skirmishers, thrown out well to the front, were
concealed by the undulations of the ground.
The Federal division commanded by General King, although unprovided
with cavalry and quite unsupported, was no unworthy enemy. It was
composed of four brigades of infantry, led by excellent officers, and
accompanied by four batteries. The total strength was 10,000 men. The
absence of horsemen, however, placed the Northerners at a disadvantage
from the outset.
The leading brigade was within a mile of Groveton, a hamlet of a few
houses at the foot of a long descent, and the advanced guard, deployed
as skirmishers, was searching the woods in front. On the road in rear,
with the batteries between the columns, came the three remaining
brigades—Gibbon’s, Doubleday’s, and Patrick’s—in the order named.
The wood in which the Confederates were drawn up was near a mile from
the highway, on a commanding ridge, overlooking a broad expanse of open
ground, which fell gently in successive undulations to the road. The
Federals were marching in absolute unconsciousness that the enemy, whom
the last reports had placed at Manassas, far away to the right, was
close at hand. No flank-guards had been thrown out. General King was at
Gainesville, sick, and a regimental band had just struck up a merry
quickstep. On the open fields to the left, bathed in sunshine, there
was not a sign of life. The whitewashed cottages, surrounded by green
orchards, which stood upon the slopes, were lonely and untenanted, and
on the edge of the distant wood, still and drooping in the heat, was
neither stir nor motion. The troops trudged steadily forward through
the dust; regiment after regiment disappeared in the deep copse which
stands west of Groveton, and far to the rear the road was still crowded
with men and guns. Jackson’s time had come.
Two Confederate batteries, trotting forward from the wood, deployed
upon the ridge. The range was soon found, and the effect was
instantaneous. But the confusion in the Northern ranks was soon
checked; the troops found cover inside the bank which lined the road,
and two batteries, one with the advanced guard and one from the centre
of the column, wheeling into the fields to the
left, came quickly into action. About the same moment Bradley Johnson
became engaged with the skirmishers near Groveton.
The Confederate infantry, still hidden by the rolling ground, was
forming for attack, when a Federal brigade, led by General Gibbon,
rapidly deploying on the slopes, moved forward against the guns. It was
Stuart’s horse-artillery, so the Northerners believed, which had fired
on the column, and a bold attack would soon drive back the cavalry. But
as Gibbon’s regiments came forward the Southern skirmishers, lying in
front of the batteries, sprang to their feet and opened with rapid
volleys; and then the grey line of battle, rising suddenly into view,
bore down upon the astonished foe. Taliaferro, on the right, seized a
small farmhouse near Gainesville, and occupied the orchard; the
Stonewall Brigade advanced upon his left, and Lawton and Trimble
prolonged the front towards the Douglass House. But the Western farmers
of Gibbon’s brigade were made of stubborn stuff. The Wisconsin
regiments held their ground with unflinching courage. Both flanks were
protected by artillery, and strong reinforcements were coming up. The
advanced guard was gradually falling back from Groveton; the rear
brigades were hurrying forward up the road. The two Confederate
batteries, overpowered by superior metal, had been compelled to shift
position; only a section of Stuart’s horse-artillery under Captain
Pelham had come to their assistance, and the battle was confined to a
frontal attack at the closest range. In many places the lines
approached within a hundred yards, the men standing in the open and
blazing fiercely in each other’s faces. Here and there, as fresh
regiments came up on either side, the grey or the blue gave way for a
few short paces; but the gaps were quickly filled, and the wave once
more surged forward over the piles of dead. Men fell like leaves in
autumn. Ewell was struck down and Taliaferro, and many of their field
officers, and still the Federals held their ground. Night was settling
on the field, and although the gallant Pelham, the boy soldier, brought
a gun into action within seventy paces of Gibbon’s line, yet
the front of fire, flashing redly through the gloom, neither receded
nor advanced. A flank attack on either side would have turned the
scale, but the fight was destined to end as it had begun. The Federal
commander, ignorant of the enemy’s strength, and reaching the field
when the fight was hottest, was reluctant to engage his last reserves.
Jackson had ordered Early and Forno, moving through the wood west of
the Douglass House, to turn the enemy’s right; but within the thickets
ran the deep cuttings and high embankments of the unfinished railroad;
and the regiments, bewildered in the darkness, were unable to advance.
Meanwhile the fight to the front had gradually died away. The Federals,
outflanked upon the left, and far outnumbered, had slowly retreated to
the road. The Confederates had been too roughly handled to pursue.
The reports of the engagement at Groveton are singularly meagre.
Preceded and followed by events of still greater moment, it never
attracted the attention it deserved. On the side of the Union 2,800 men
were engaged, on the side of the Southerners 4,500, and for more than
an hour and a half the lines of infantry were engaged at the very
closest quarters. The rifled guns of the Federals undoubtedly gave them
a marked advantage. But the men who faced each other that August
evening fought with a gallantry that has seldom been surpassed. The
Federals, surprised and unsupported, bore away the honours. The Western
brigade, commanded by General Gibbon, displayed a coolness and a
steadfastness worthy of the soldiers of Albuera. Out of 2,000 men the
four Wisconsin and Indiana regiments lost 750, and were still
unconquered. The three regiments which supported them, although it was
their first battle, lost nearly half their number, and the casualties
must have reached a total of 1,100. The Confederate losses were even
greater. Ewell, who was shot down in the first line, and lay long on
the field, lost 725 out of 3,000. The Stonewall Brigade, which had by
this time dwindled to 600 muskets, lost over 200, including five field
officers; the 21st Georgia, of Trimble’s brigade, 178 men out of 242;
and it is probable that the Valley army on
this day was diminished by more than 1,200 stout soldiers. The fall of
Ewell was a terrible disaster. Zealous and indefatigable, a stern
fighter and beloved by his men, he was the most able and the most loyal
of Jackson’s generals. Taliaferro, peculiarly acceptable to his
Virginia regiments as a Virginian himself, had risen from the rank of
colonel to the command of a division, and his spurs had been well won.
The battle of Groveton left gaps in Jackson’s ranks which it was hard
to fill, and although the men might well feel proud of their stubborn
fight, they could hardly boast of a brilliant victory.
Strategically, however, the engagement was decisive. Jackson had
brought on the fight with the view of drawing the whole Federal army on
himself, and he was completely successful. The centre, marching on the
Stone Bridge from Manassas Junction, heard the thunder of the cannon
and turned westward; and before nightfall A. P. Hill’s artillery became
engaged with Sigel’s advanced guard. Pope himself, who received the
intelligence of the engagement at 9.20 p.m., immediately issued orders
for an attack on Jackson the next morning, in which the troops who had
already reached Centreville were to take part. “McDowell,” ran the
order, “has intercepted the retreat of the enemy, Sigel is immediately
in his front, and I see no possibility of his escape.”
But Pope, full of the idea that Jackson had been stopped in attempting
to retreat through Thoroughfare Gap, altogether misunderstood the
situation. He was badly informed. He did not know even the position of
his own troops. His divisions, scattered over a wide extent of country,
harassed by Stuart’s cavalry, and ignorant of the topography, had lost
all touch with the Commander-in-Chief. Important dispatches had been
captured. Messages and orders were slow in arriving, if they arrived at
all. Even the generals were at a loss to find either the
Commander-in-Chief or the right road. McDowell had ridden from
Gainesville to Manassas in order to consult with Pope, but Pope had
gone to Centreville. McDowell thereupon set out to rejoin his troops,
but lost his way in the forest and went
back to Manassas. From Ricketts Pope received no information
whatever.[24] He was not aware that after a long skirmish at
Thoroughfare Gap, Longstreet had opened the pass by sending his
brigades over the mountains on either hand, threatening both flanks of
the Federals, and compelling them to retire. He was not aware that
King’s division, so far from intercepting Jackson’s retreat, had
abandoned the field of Groveton at 1 a.m., and, finding its position
untenable in face of superior numbers, had fallen back on Manassas; or
that Ricketts, who had by this time reached Gainesville, had in
consequence continued his retreat in the same direction.
Seldom have the baneful effects of dispersion been more strikingly
illustrated, and the difficulty, under such circumstances, of keeping
the troops in the hand of the Commander-in-Chief. On the morning of the
28th Pope had ordered his army to march in three columns on Manassas,
one column starting from Warrenton Junction, one from Greenwich, and
one from Buckland Mills, the roads which they were to follow being at
their furthest point no more than seven miles apart. And yet at dawn on
the 29th he was absolutely ignorant of the whereabouts of McDowell’s
army corps; he was but vaguely informed of what had happened during the
day; and while part of his army was at Bald Hill, another part was at
Centreville, seven miles north-east, and a third at Manassas and at
Bristoe, from seven to twelve miles south-east. Nor could the staff be
held to blame for the absence of communication between the columns. In
peace it is an easy matter to assume that a message sent to a
destination seven miles distant by a highroad or even country lanes
arrives in good time. Seven miles in peace are very short. In war, in
the neighbourhood of the enemy, they are very long. In peace, roads are
easy to find. In war, it is the exception that they are found, even
when messengers are provided with good maps
and the country is thickly populated; and it is from war that the
soldier’s trade is to be learned.
Jackson’s army corps bivouacked in the position they had held when the
fierce musketry of Groveton died away. It was not till long after
daybreak on the 29th that his cavalry patrols discovered that King’s
troops had disappeared, and that Longstreet’s advanced guard was
already through Thoroughfare Gap. Nor was it till the sun was high that
Lee learned the events of the previous evening, and these threw only a
faint light on the general situation. But had either the
Commander-in-Chief or his lieutenant, on the night of the 28th, known
the true state of affairs, they would have had reason to congratulate
themselves on the success of the plan which had been hatched on the
Rappahannock. They had anticipated that should Jackson’s movement on
Manassas prove successful, Pope would not only fall back, but that he
would fall back in all the confusion which arises from a hastily
conceived plan and hastily executed manœuvres. They had expected that
in his hurried retreat his army corps would lose touch and cohesion;
that divisions would become isolated; that the care of his impedimenta,
suddenly turned in a new direction, would embarrass every movement; and
that the general himself would become demoralised.
The orders and counter-orders, the marches and counter-marches of
August 28, and the consequent dispersion of the Federal army, are
sufficient in themselves to prove the deep insight into war possessed
by the Confederate leaders.
Nevertheless, the risk bred of separation which, in order to achieve
great results, they had deliberately accepted had not yet passed away.
Longstreet had indeed cleared the pass, and the Federals who guarded it
had retreated; but the main body of the Confederate army had still
twelve miles to march before it could reach Jackson, and Jackson was
confronted by superior numbers. On the plateau of Bull Run, little more
than two miles from the field of Groveton, were encamped over 20,000
Federals, with the main number at Manassas. At Centreville, a seven
miles’ march, were 18,000; and at Bristoe Station, about the same
distance, 11,000.
It was thus possible for Pope to hurl a superior force against Jackson
before Lee could intervene; and although it would have been sounder
strategy, on the part of the Federal commander, to have concentrated
towards Centreville, and have there awaited reinforcements, now fast
coming up, he had some reason for believing that he might still,
unaided, deal with the enemy in detail. The high virtue of patience was
not his. Ambition, anxiety to retrieve his reputation, already
blemished by his enforced retreat, the thought that he might be
superseded by McClellan, whose operations in the Peninsula he had
contemptuously criticised, all urged him forward. An unsuccessful
general who feels instinctively that his command is slipping from him,
and who sees in victory the only hope of retaining it, seldom listens
to the voice of prudence.
August 29 So on the morning of the 29th Jackson had to do with an enemy
who had resolved to overwhelm him by weight of numbers. Nor could he
expect immediate help. The Federal cavalry still stood between Stuart
and Thoroughfare Gap, and not only was Jackson unaware that Longstreet
had broken through, but he was unaware whether he could break through.
In any case, it would be several hours before he could receive support,
and for that space of time his three divisions, worn with long marching
and the fierce fight of the previous evening, would have to hold their
own unaided. The outlook, to all appearance, was anything but bright.
But on the opposite hills, where the Federals were now forming in line
of battle, the Valley soldiers had already given proof of their
stubborn qualities on the defensive. The sight of their baptismal
battle-field and the memories of Bull Run must have gone far to nerve
the hearts of the Stonewall regiments, and in preparing once more to
justify their proud title the troops were aided by their leader’s quick
eye for a position. While it was still dark the divisions which had
been engaged at Groveton took ground to their left, and passing north
of the hamlet, deployed on the right of A. P. Hill. The long,
flat-topped ridge, covered with scattered copses and rough undergrowth,
which stands north of the
Warrenton–Centreville road, commands the approaches from the south and
east, and some five hundred yards below the crest ran the unfinished
railroad.
Behind the deep cuttings and high embankments the Confederate
fighting-line was strongly placed. The left, lightly thrown back,
rested on a rocky spur near Bull Run, commanding Sudley Springs Ford
and the road to Aldie Gap. The front extended for a mile and
three-quarters south-west. Early, with two brigades and a battery,
occupied a wooded knoll where the unfinished railroad crosses the
highroad, protecting the right rear, and stretching a hand to
Longstreet.
The infantry and artillery were thus disposed:—
_Infantry_
Left.—A. P. Hill’s Division. First and Second line: Three brigades.
(Field, Thomas, Gregg.) Third line: Three brigades. (Branch,
Pender, Archer.)
Centre.—Two brigades of Ewell’s Division (now commanded by
Lawton). (Trimble’s and Lawton’s.)
Right.—Taliaferro’s Division (now commanded by Stark). First
and Second line: Two brigades. Third line: Two brigades.
Force detached on the right: Two brigades of Ewell’s Division
(Early and Forno), and one battery.
_Artillery_
16 guns behind the left, 24 guns behind the right centre: On the
ridge, five hundred yards in rear of the fighting-line.
The flanks were secured by Stuart. A portion of the cavalry was placed
at Haymarket to communicate as soon as possible with Longstreet. A
regiment was pushed out towards Manassas, and on the left bank of Bull
Run Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade watched the approaches from Centreville and
the north. Jackson’s strength, deducting the losses of the previous
day, and the numerous stragglers left behind during his forced marches,
can hardly have exceeded 18,000 muskets, supported by 40 guns, all that
there was room for, and some 2,500 cavalry. These numbers, however,
were ample for the defence of the position which had been selected.
Excluding the detached force on the extreme
right, the line occupied was three thousand yards in length, and to
every yard of this line there were more than five muskets, so that half
the force could be retained in third line or reserve. The position was
thus strongly held and strong by nature. The embankments formed stout
parapets, the cuttings deep ditches.
Before the right and the right centre the green pastures, shorn for
thirteen hundred yards of all obstacles save a few solitary cottages,
sloped almost imperceptibly to the brook which is called Young’s
Branch. The left centre and left, however, were shut in by a belt of
timber, from four hundred to six hundred yards in width, which we may
call the Groveton wood. This belt closed in upon, and at one point
crossed, the railroad, and, as regards the field of fire, it was the
weakest point. In another respect, however, it was the strongest, for
the defenders were screened by the trees from the enemy’s artillery.
The rocky hill on the left, facing north-east, was a point of vantage,
for an open corn-field lay between it and Bull Run. Within the
position, behind the copses and undulations, there was ample cover for
all troops not employed on the fighting-line; and from the ridge in
rear the general could view the field from commanding ground.
5.15 a.m. Shortly after 5 a.m., while the Confederates were still
taking up their positions, the Federal columns were seen moving down
the heights near the Henry House. Jackson had ridden round his lines,
and ordering Early to throw forward two regiments east of the turnpike,
had then moved to the great battery forming in rear of his right
centre. His orders had already been issued. The troops were merely to
hold their ground, no general counterstroke was intended, and the
divisional commanders were to confine themselves to repulsing the
attack. The time for a strong offensive return had not yet come.
The enemy advanced slowly in imposing masses. Shortly after seven
o’clock, hidden to some extent by the woods, four divisions of infantry
deployed in several lines at the foot of the Henry Hill, and their
skirmishers became
engaged with the Confederate pickets. At the same moment three
batteries came into action on a rise north-east of Groveton, opposite
the Confederate centre, and Sigel, supported by Reynolds, prepared to
carry out his instructions, and hold Jackson until the remainder of
Pope’s army should arrive upon the field. At the end of July, Sigel’s
army corps had numbered 13,000 men. Allowing for stragglers and for
casualties on the Rappahannock, where it had been several times
engaged, it must still have mustered 11,000. It was accompanied by ten
batteries, and Reynolds’ division was composed of 8,000 infantry and
four batteries. The attack was thus no stronger than the defence, and
as the Federal artillery positions were restricted by the woods, there
could be little doubt of the result. In other respects, moreover, the
combatants were not evenly matched. Reynolds’ Pennsylvanians were fine
troops, already seasoned in the battles on the Peninsula, and commanded
by such officers as Meade and Seymour. But Sigel, who had been an
officer in the Baden army, had succeeded Frémont, and his corps was
composed of those same Germans whom Ewell had used so hardly at Cross
Keys. Many of them were old soldiers, who had borne arms in Europe; but
the stern discipline and trained officers of conscript armies were
lacking in America, and the Confederate volunteers had little respect
for these foreign levies. Nor were Sigel’s dispositions a brilliant
example of offensive tactics. His three divisions, Schurz’, Schenck’s,
and Steinwehr’s, supported by Milroy’s independent brigade, advanced to
the attack along a wide front. Schurz, with two brigades, moving into
the Groveton wood, assailed the Confederate left, while Milroy and
Schenck advanced over the open meadows which lay in front of the right.
Steinwehr was in reserve, and Reynolds, somewhat to the rear, moved
forward on the extreme left. The line was more than two miles long; the
artillery, hampered by the ground, could render but small assistance;
and at no single point were the troops disposed in sufficient depth to
break through the front of the defence. The attack, too, was piecemeal.
Advancing
through the wood, Schurz’ division was at once met by a sharp
counterstroke, delivered by the left brigade (Gregg’s South Carolina)
of A. P. Hill’s division, which drove the two Federal brigades apart.
Reinforcements were sent in by Milroy, who had been checked on the open
ground by the heavy fire of Jackson’s guns, and the Germans rallied;
but, after some hard fighting, a fresh counterstroke, in which Thomas’
brigade took part, drove them in disorder from the wood; and the South
Carolinians, following to the edge, poured heavy volleys into their
retreating masses. Schenck, meanwhile, deterred by the batteries on
Jackson’s right, had remained inactive; the Federal artillery, such as
had been brought into action, had produced no effect; Reynolds, who had
a difficult march, had not yet come into action; and in order to
support the broken troops Schenck was now ordered to close in upon the
right. But the opportunity had already passed.
10.15 a.m. It was now 10.30 a.m., and Jackson had long since learned
that Lee was near at hand. Longstreet’s advanced guard had passed
through Gainesville, and the main body was closing up. Not only had
time been gained, but two brigades alone had proved sufficient to hold
the enemy at arm’s length, and the rough counterstrokes had
disconcerted the order of attack. A fresh Federal force, however, was
already approaching. The troops from Centreville, comprising the
divisions of Hooker, Kearney, and Reno, 17,000 or 18,000 men, were
hurrying over the Stone Bridge; and a second and more vigorous attack
was now to be withstood. Sigel, too, was still capable of further
effort. Bringing up Steinwehr’s division, and demanding reinforcements
from Reno, he threw his whole force against the Confederate front.
Schenck, however, still exposed to the fire of the massed artillery,
was unable to advance, and Milroy in the centre was hurled back. But
through the wood the attack was vigorously pressed, and the fight raged
fiercely at close quarters along the railway. Between Gregg’s and
Thomas’ brigades a gap of over a hundred yards, as the men closed in
upon the
centre, had gradually opened. Opposite the gap was a deep cutting, and
the Federals, covered by the wood, massed here unobserved in heavy
force. Attack from this quarter was unexpected, and for a moment Hill’s
first line was in jeopardy. Gregg, however, had still a regiment in
second line, and throwing it quickly forward he drove the enemy across
the railroad. Then Hill, bringing up Branch from the third line, sent
this fresh brigade to Gregg’s support, and cleared the front.
The Germans had now been finally disposed of. But although Longstreet
had arrived upon the ground, and was deploying in the woods on
Jackson’s right, thus relieving Early, who at once marched to support
the centre, Jackson’s men had not yet finished with the enemy. Pope had
now taken over command; and besides the troops from Centreville, who
had already reached the field, McDowell and Porter, with 27,000 men,
were coming up from Manassas, and Reynolds had not yet been engaged.
But it is one thing to assemble large numbers on the battle-field,
another to give them the right direction.
In the direction of Gainesville high woods and rolling ridges had
concealed Longstreet’s approach, and the Federal patrols had been
everywhere held in check by Stuart’s squadrons. In ignorance,
therefore, that the whole Confederate army was concentrated before him,
Pope, anticipating an easy victory, determined to sweep Jackson from
the field. But it was first necessary to relieve Sigel. Kearney’s
division had already deployed on the extreme right of the Federal line,
resting on Bull Run. Hooker was on the left of Kearney and a brigade of
Reno’s on the left of Hooker. While Sigel assembled his shattered
forces, these 10,000 fresh troops, led by some of the best officers of
the Army of the Potomac, were ordered to advance against A. P. Hill.
Reynolds, under the impression that he was fighting Jackson, was
already in collision with Longstreet’s advanced-guard; and McDowell and
Porter, marching along the railway from Manassas, might be expected to
strike the Confederate right rear at any moment. It was then with good
hope of victory that Pope rode along his line and explained the
situation to his generals.
But the fresh attack was made with no better concert than those which
preceded it. Kearney, on the right, near Bull Run, was held at bay by
Jackson’s guns, and Hooker and Reno advanced alone.
[Illustration: Positions on August 29th, 1862.]
1 p.m. As the Federals moved forward the grey skirmishers fell back
through the Groveton wood, and scarcely had they reached the railroad
before the long blue lines came crashing through the undergrowth.
Hill’s riflemen, lying down to load, and rising only to fire, poured in
their deadly volleys at point-blank range. The storm of bullets,
shredding leaves and twigs, stripped the trees of their verdure, and
the long dry grass, ignited by the powder sparks, burst into flames
between the opposing lines. But neither flames nor musketry availed to
stop Hooker’s onset. Bayonets flashed through the smoke, and a gallant
rush placed the stormers on the embankment. The Confederates reeled
back in confusion, and men crowded round the colours to protect them.
But assistance was at hand. A fierce yell and a heavy volley, and the
regiments of the second line surged forward, driving back the
intruders, and closing the breach. Yet the Federal ranks reformed; the
wood rang with cheers, and a fresh brigade advanced to the assault.
Again the parapet was carried; again the Southern bayonets cleared the
front. Hooker’s leading brigade, abandoning the edge of the wood, had
already given ground. Reno’s regiments, suffering fearful slaughter,
with difficulty maintained their place; and Hill, calling once more
upon his reserves, sent in Pender to the counterstroke. Passing by the
right of Thomas, who, with Field, had borne the brunt of the last
attack, Pender crossed the railroad, and charged into the wood. Many of
the men in the fighting-line joined in the onward movement. The
Federals were borne back; the brigades in rear were swept away by the
tide of fugitives; the wood was cleared, and a battery near by was
deserted by the gunners.
Then Pender, received with a heavy artillery fire from the opposite
heights, moved boldly forward across the open. But the counterstroke
had been pushed too far. The line
faltered; hostile infantry appeared on either flank, and as the
Confederates fell back to the railroad, the enemy came forward in
pursuit. Grover’s brigade of Hooker’s division had hitherto been held
in reserve, sheltered by a roll of the land opposite that portion of
the front which was held by Thomas.
3 p.m. It was now directed to attack. “Move slowly forward,” were the
orders which Grover gave to his command, “until the enemy opens fire.
Then advance rapidly, give them one volley, and then the bayonet.” The
five regiments moved steadily through the wood in a single line. When
they reached the edge they saw immediately before them the red earth of
the embankment, at this point ten feet high and lined with riflemen.
There was a crash of fire, a swift rush through the rolling smoke, and
the Federals, crossing the parapet, swept all before them. Hill’s
second line received them with a scattered fire, turned in confusion,
and fled back upon the guns. Then beckoned victory to him who had held
his reserves in hand. Jackson had seen the charge, and Forno’s
Louisianians, with a regiment of Lawton’s, had already been sent
forward with the bayonet.
In close order the counterstroke came on. The thinned ranks of the
Federals could oppose no resolute resistance. Fighting they fell back,
first to the embankment, where for a few moments they held their own,
and then to the wood. But without supports it was impossible to rally.
Johnson’s and Starke’s brigades swept down upon their flank, the
Louisianians, supported by Field and Archer, against their front, and
in twenty minutes, with a loss of one-fourth his numbers, Grover in his
turn was driven beyond the Warrenton turnpike.
Four divisions, Schurz’, Steinwehr’s, Hooker’s, and Reno’s, had been
hurled in succession against Jackson’s front. Their losses had been
enormous. Grover’s brigade had lost 461 out of 2,000, of which one
regiment, 288 strong, accounted for 6 officers and 106 men; three
regiments of Reno’s lost 530; and it is probable that more than 4,000
men had fallen in the wood which lay in front of Hill’s brigades.
The fighting, however, had not been without effect on
the Confederates. The charges to which they had been exposed, impetuous
as they were, were doubtless less trying than a sustained attack,
pressed on by continuous waves of fresh troops, and allowing the
defence no breathing space. Such steady pressure, always increasing in
strength, saps the morale more rapidly than a series of fierce
assaults, delivered at wide intervals of time. But such pressure
implies on the part of the assailant an accumulation of superior force,
and this accumulation the enemy’s generals had not attempted to
provide. In none of the four attacks which had shivered against Hill’s
front had the strength of the assailants been greater than that of his
own division; and to the tremendous weight of such a stroke as had won
the battles of Gaines’ Mill or Cedar Run, to the closely combined
advance of overwhelming numbers, Jackson’s men had not yet been
subjected.
The battle, nevertheless, had been fiercely contested, and the strain
of constant vigilance and close-range fighting had told on the Light
Division. The Federal skirmishers, boldly advancing as Pender’s men
fell back, had once more filled the wood, and their venomous fire
allowed the defenders no leisure for repose.[25] Ammunition had already
given out; many of the men had but two or three cartridges remaining,
and the volunteers who ran the gauntlet to procure fresh supplies were
many of them shot down. Moreover, nine hours’ fighting, much of it at
close range, had piled the corpses thick upon the railroad, and the
ranks of Hill’s brigades were terribly attenuated. The second line had
already been brought up to fill the gaps, and every brigade had been
heavily engaged.
4 p.m. It was about four o’clock, and for a short space the pressure on
the Confederate lines relaxed. The continuous
roar of the artillery dwindled to a fitful cannonade; and along the
edge of the wood, drooping under the heat, where the foliage was white
with the dust of battle, the skirmishers let their rifles cool. But the
Valley soldiers knew that their respite would be short. The Federal
masses were still marching and counter-marching on the opposite hills;
from the forest beyond long columns streamed steadily to the front, and
near the Warrenton turnpike fresh batteries were coming into action.
Pope had ordered Kearney and Reno to make a fresh attack. The former,
one of the most dashing officers in the Federal army, disposed his
division in two lines. Reno, in the same formation, deployed upon
Kearney’s right, and with their flank resting on Bull Run the five
brigades went forward to the charge. The Confederate batteries, posted
on the ridge in rear, swept the open ground along the stream; but,
regardless of their fire, the Federals came rapidly to close quarters,
and seized the railroad.
4.30 p.m. When Hill saw this formidable storm bursting on his lines he
felt that the supreme moment had arrived. Would Gregg, on whose front
the division of Reno was bearing down, be able to hold his own? That
gallant soldier, although more than one half of his command lay dead or
wounded, replied, in answer to his chief’s enquiry, that his ammunition
was almost expended, but that he had still the bayonet. Nevertheless,
the pressure was too heavy for his wearied troops. Foot by foot they
were forced back, and, at the same moment, Thomas, Field, and Branch,
still fighting desperately, were compelled to yield their ground. Hill,
anxiously looking for succour, had already called on Early. The enemy,
swarming across the railroad, had penetrated to a point three hundred
yards within the Confederate position. But the grey line was not yet
shattered. The men of the Light Division, though borne backwards by the
rush, still faced towards the foe; and Early’s brigade, supported by
two regiments of Lawton’s division, advanced with levelled bayonets,
drove through the tumult, and opposed a solid line to the crowd of
Federals.
Once more the fresh reserve, thrown in at the propitious
moment, swept back numbers far superior to itself. Once more order
prevailed over disorder, and the cold steel asserted its supremacy. The
strength of the assailants was already spent. The wave receded more
swiftly than it had risen, and through the copses and across the
railroad the Confederates drove their exhausted foe. General Hill had
instructed Early that he was not to pass beyond the original front; but
it was impossible to restrain the troops, and not till they had
advanced several hundred yards was the brigade halted and brought back.
5.15 p.m. The counterstroke was as completely successful as those that
had preceded it. Early’s losses were comparatively slight, those
inflicted on the enemy very heavy, and Hill’s brigades were finally
relieved. Pope abandoned all further efforts to crush Jackson. Five
assaults had failed. 30,000 infantry had charged in vain through the
fatal wood; and of the 8,000 Federal casualties reported on this day,
by far the larger proportion was due to the deadly fire and dashing
counterstrokes of Jackson’s infantry.
While Pope was hurling division after division against the Confederate
left, Lee, with Longstreet at his side, observed the conflict from
Stuart’s Hill, the wooded eminence which stands south-west of Groveton.
On this wing, though a mile distant from Jackson’s battle, both
Federals and Confederates were in force. At least one half of Pope’s
army had gradually assembled on this flank. Here were Reynolds and
McDowell, and on the Manassas road stood two divisions under Porter.
Within the woods on Stuart’s Hill, with the cavalry on his flank,
Longstreet had deployed his whole force, with the exception of
Anderson, who had not yet passed Thoroughfare Gap. But although both
Pope and Lee were anxious to engage, neither could bring their
subordinates to the point. Pope had sent vague instructions to Porter
and McDowell, and when at Length he had substituted a definite order it
was not only late in arriving, but the generals found that it was based
on an absolutely incorrect view of the situation. The Federal commander
had no knowledge that Longstreet,
with 25,000 men, was already in position beyond his left. So close lay
the Confederates that under the impression that Stuart’s Hill was still
untenanted, he desired Porter to move across it and envelop Jackson’s
right. Porter, suspecting that the main body of the Southern army was
before him, declined to risk his 10,000 men until he had reported the
true state of affairs. A peremptory reply to attack at once was
received at 6.30, but it was then too late to intervene.
Nor had Lee been more successful in developing a counterstroke.
Longstreet, with a complacency it is difficult to understand, has
related how he opposed the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief. Three
times Lee urged him forward. The first time he rode to the front to
reconnoitre, and found that the position, in his own words, was not
inviting. Again Lee insisted that the enemy’s left might be turned.
While the question was under discussion, a heavy force (Porter and
McDowell) was reported advancing from Manassas Junction. No attack
followed, however, and Lee repeated his instructions. Longstreet was
still unwilling. A large portion of the Federal force on the Manassas
road now marched northward to join Pope, and Lee, for the last time,
bade Longstreet attack towards Groveton. “I suggested,” says the
latter, “that the day being far spent, it might be as well to advance
before night on a forced reconnaissance, get our troops into the most
favourable positions, and have all things ready for battle the next
morning. To this General Lee reluctantly gave consent, and orders were
given for an advance to be pursued under cover of night, until the main
position could be carefully examined. It so happened that an order to
advance was issued on the other side at the same time, so that the
encounter was something of a surprise on both sides.[26] Hood, with his
two Texan brigades, led the Confederates, and King’s division, now
commanded by Hatch, met him on the slopes of Stuart’s Hill. Although
the Federals, since 1 a.m. the same morning, had marched to Manassas
and back again, the fight was spirited. Hood, however, was strongly
supported, and the Texans pushed forward
a mile and a half in front of the position they had held since noon.
Longstreet had now full leisure to make his reconnaissance. The ground
to which the enemy had retreated was very strong. He believed it
strongly manned, and an hour after midnight Hood’s brigades were
ordered to withdraw.
The firing, even of the skirmishers, had long since died away on the
opposite flank. The battle was over, and the Valley army had been once
more victorious. But when Jackson’s staff gathered round him in the
bivouac, “their triumph,” says Dabney, “bore a solemn hue.” Their great
task had been accomplished, and Pope’s army, harassed, starving, and
bewildered, had been brought to bay. But their energies were worn down.
The incessant marching, by day and night, the suspense of the past
week, the fierce strife of the day that had just closed, pressed
heavily on the whole force. Many of the bravest were gone. Trimble,
that stout soldier, was severely wounded, Field and Forno had fallen,
and in Gregg’s brigade alone 40 officers were dead or wounded. Doctor
McGuire, fresh from the ghastly spectacle of the silent battle-field,
said, “General, this day has been won by nothing but stark and stern
fighting.” “No,” replied Jackson, very quietly, “it has been won by
nothing but the blessing and protection of Providence.” And in this
attitude of acknowledgment general and soldiers were as one. When the
pickets had been posted, and night had fallen on the forest, officers
and men, gathered together round their chaplains, made such
preparations for the morrow’s battle as did the host of King Harry on
the eve of Agincourt.
NOTE
Students of war will note with interest the tactical details of the
passage of the Rappahannock by the Army of Northern Virginia.
_August 21._—FEDERALS.
In position behind the river from Kelly’s Ford to Freeman’s Ford.
_Tête de pont_ covering the railway bridge, occupied by a brigade.
CONFEDERATES.
Longstreet to Kelly’s Ford.
Jackson to Beverley Ford.
Stuart to above Beverley Ford.
Constant skirmishing and artillery fire.
_August 22._—FEDERALS.
In position from Kelly’s Ford to Freeman’s Ford.
Bayard’s cavalry brigade on right flank.
Buford’s cavalry brigade at Rappahannock Station.
CONFEDERATES.
Jackson to Sulphur Springs. Early crosses the river.
Longstreet to Beverley Ford and railway.
Constant skirmishing and artillery fire.
_August 23._—FEDERALS.
Pope abandons _tête de pont_ and burns railway bridge.
Sigel moves against Early, but his advance is repulsed.
Army to a position about Warrenton, with detachments along the river,
and a strong force at Kelly’s Ford.
CONFEDERATES.
Early moves north to Great Run, and is reinforced by Lawton.
Stuart to Catlett’s Station.
Longstreet demonstrates against railway bridge.
_August 24._—FEDERAL.
Buford’s and Bayard’s cavalry to Waterloo.
Army to Waterloo and Sulphur Springs.
CONFEDERATES.
Jackson in the evening retires to Jefferson, and is relieved after dark
opposite Sulphur Springs and Waterloo by Longstreet.
Anderson relieves Longstreet on the railway.
Constant skirmishing and artillery fire all along the line.
_August 25._—FEDERALS.
Pope extends his left down the river to Kelly’s Ford, determining to
receive attack at Warrenton should the Confederates cross.
CONFEDERATES.
Jackson moves north and crosses the river at Hinson’s Mills.
Longstreet demonstrates at Waterloo, and Anderson at the Sulphur
Springs.
_August 26._—FEDERALS.
A reconnaissance in force, owing to bad staff arrangements, comes to
nothing. At nightfall the whole army is ordered to concentrate at
Warrenton.
CONFEDERATES.
2 a.m. Stuart follows Jackson.
Late in the afternoon, Longstreet, having been relieved by Anderson,
marches to Hinson’s Mills.
Jackson captures Manassas Junction.
Skirmishing all day along the Rappahannock.
_August 27._—FEDERALS.
7 a.m. Hooker’s division from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe Station.
8.30 a.m. Army ordered to concentrate at Gainesville, Buckland Mills,
and Greenwich. Porter and Banks at Warrenton Junction.
3 p.m. Action at Bristoe Station.
6.30 p.m. Pope arrives at Bristoe Station.
Army ordered to march to Manassaa Junction at dawn.
CONFEDERATES.
Jackson at Manassas Junction.
Longstreet to White Plains.
[1] The _Times,_ September 4, 1862.
[2] Letter to the author.
[3] June 9, 1863.
[4] O.R., vol. xii, part ii, p. 67. “It may have been fortunate for
the Confederates,” says Longstreet, “that he was not instructed to
fight like Jackson.”
[5] General George H. Gordon. _The Army of Virginia,_ p. 9.
[6] Between August 21 and 25 Pope received the following
reinforcements for the Army of the Potomac, raising his strength to
over 80,000 men:
Third Corps Heintzleman Hooker’s Division Kearney’s
Division 10,000 Fifth Corps Porter Morell’s Division Sykes’
Division 10,000 Pennsylvania Reserves. Reynolds 8,000
[7] Letter to the author.
[8] Pope, 80,000; Washington and Aquia Creek, 20,000. Lee was well
aware, from the correspondence which Stuart had captured, if indeed he
had not already inferred it, that Pope had been strictly enjoined to
cover Washington, and that he was dependent on the railway for
supplies. There was not the slightest fear of his falling back towards
Aquia Creek to join McClellan.
[9] _The Army of Northern Virginia,_ Colonel Allan, p. 200.
[10] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 533.
[11] The report received at Alexandria from Manassas Junction ran as
follows: “No. 6 train, engine Secretary, was fired into at Bristoe by
a party of cavalry, some 500 strong. They had piled ties on the track,
but the engine threw them off. Secretary is completely riddled by
bullets.”
[12] These troops were sent forward, without cavalry, by order of
General Halleck. O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 680. The Federal
Commander-in-Chief expected that the opposition would be slight. He
had evidently no suspicion of the length to which the daring of Lee
and Jackson might have carried them.
[13] _The Army of Virginia._ General George H. Gordon.
[14] “Up to the night of August 28 we received,” says Longstreet,
“reports from General Jackson at regular intervals, assuring us of his
successful operation, and of confidence in his ability to baffle all
efforts of the enemy, till we should reach him.” _Battles and
Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 517.
[15] Five messages were sent in between 8.45 a.m. and 11 a.m., but
evidently reached headquarters much later. O.R., vol. xii, part iii,
pp. 654–5.
[16] There is a curious undated report on page 671, O.R., vol. xii,
part iii, from Colonel Duffie, a French officer in the Federal
service, which speaks of a column passing through Thoroughfare Gap;
but, although the compilers of the Records have placed it under the
date August 26, it seems evident, as this officer (_see_ page 670) was
at Rappahannock Station on the 26th and 27th (O.R., vol. xii, part
iii, p. 688), that the report refers to Longstreet’s and not Jackson’s
troops, and was written on August 28.
[17] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 672. Pope to Porter, p. 675. Pope to
Halleck, p. 684.
[18] O.R., vol. xii, part ii, p. 72.
[19] A. P. Hill had marched fourteen miles, Ewell fifteen, and
Taliaferro, with whom were the trains, from eight to ten.
[20] The order, dated 2 a.m., August 25, was to the following effect:—
“1. Sigel’s Corps to march from Gainesville to Manassas Junction,
the right resting on the Manassas railroad.
“2. Reynolds to follow Sigel.
“3. King to follow Reynolds.
“4. Ricketts to follow King; but to halt at Thoroughfare Gap if the
enemy threatened the pass.
King was afterwards, while on the march, directed to Centreville by
the Warrenton–Alexandria road.”
[21] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, pp. 507, 508.
[22] Longstreet had been unable to march with the same speed as
Jackson. Leaving Jefferson on the afternoon of August 26, he did not
reach Thoroughfare Gap until “just before night” on August 28. He had
been delayed for an hour at White Plains by the Federal cavalry, and
the trains of the army, such as they were, may also have retarded him.
In two days he covered only thirty miles.
[23] Twenty pieces had been ordered to the front soon after the
infantry moved forward. The dense woods, however, proved impenetrable
to all but three horse-artillery guns, and one of these was unable to
keep up.
[24] Ricketts’ report would have been transmitted through McDowell,
under whose command he was, and as McDowell was not to be found, it
naturally went astray.
[25] “The Federal sharpshooters at this time,” says Colonel McCrady,
of the Light Division, “held possession of the wood, and kept up a
deadly fire of single shots whenever any one of us was exposed. Every
lieutenant who had to change position did so at the risk of his life.
What was my horror, during an interval in the attack, to see General
Jackson himself walking quickly down the railroad cut, examining our
position, and calmly looking into the wood that concealed the enemy!
Strange to say, he was not molested.”—_Southern Historical Society
Papers,_ vol. xiii, p. 27.
[26] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 519.