HARPER’S FERRY
1861 Immediately it became apparent that the North was bent upon
re-conquest Jackson offered his sword to his native State. He was
determined to take his share in defending her rights and liberties,
even if it were only as a private soldier. Devotion to Virginia was his
sole motive. He shrank from the horrors of civil strife. The thought
that the land he loved so well was to be deluged with the blood of her
own children, that the happy hearths of America were to be desecrated
by the hideous image of war, stifled the promptings of professional
ambition. “If the general Government,” he said, “should persist in the
measures now threatened, there must be war. It is painful enough to
discover with what unconcern they speak of war, and threaten it. They
do not know its horrors. I have seen enough of it to make me look upon
it as the sum of all evils.”
The methods he resorted to in order that the conflict might be averted
were characteristic. He proposed to the minister of his church that all
Christian people should be called upon to unite in prayer; and in his
own devotions, says his wife, he asked with importunity that, if it
were God’s will, the whole land might be at peace.
His work, after the Ordinance of Secession had been passed, was
constant and absorbing. The Governor of Virginia had informed the
Superintendent of the Institute that he should need the services of the
more advanced classes as drill-masters, and that they must be prepared
to leave for Richmond, under the command of Major Jackson, at a
moment’s notice.
The Lexington Presbytery was holding its spring meeting in the church
which Jackson attended, and some of the members were entertained at his
house; but he found no time to attend a single service—every hour was
devoted to the duty he had in hand.
On the Saturday of that eventful week he expressed the hope that he
would not be called upon to leave till Monday; and, bidding his wife
dismiss from her thoughts everything pertaining to the war and his
departure, they spent that evening as they had been accustomed, reading
aloud from religious magazines, and studying together the lesson which
was to be taught on the morrow in the Sunday-school.
But at dawn the next morning came a telegram, directing Major Jackson
to bring the cadets to Richmond immediately. He repaired at once to the
Institute; and at one o’clock, after divine service, at his request,
had been held at the head of the command, the cadet battalion marched
to Staunton, on the Virginia Central Railway, and there took train.
Camp Lee, the rendezvous of the Virginia army, presented a peculiar if
animated scene. With few exceptions, every man capable of serving in
the field belonged either to the militia or the volunteers. Some of the
companies had a smattering of drill, but the majority were absolutely
untaught, and the whole were without the slightest conception of what
was meant by discipline. And it was difficult to teach them. The
non-commissioned officers and men of the United States army were either
Irish or Germans, without State ties, and they had consequently no
inducement to join the South. With the officers it was different. They
were citizens first, and soldiers afterwards; and as citizens, their
allegiance, so far as those of Southern birth were concerned, was due
to their native States. Out of the twelve hundred graduates of West
Point who, at the beginning of 1861, were still fit for service, a
fourth were Southerners, and these, almost without exception, at once
took service with the Confederacy. But the regular officers were almost
all required for the higher commands, for technical duties,
and the staff; thus very few were left to instruct the volunteers. The
intelligence of the men was high, for every profession and every class
was represented in the ranks, and many of the wealthiest planters
preferred, so earnest was their patriotism, to serve as privates; but
as yet they were merely the elements of a fine army, and nothing more.
Their equipment left as much to be desired as their training. Arms were
far scarcer than men. The limited supply of rifles in the State
arsenals was soon exhausted. Flintlock muskets, converted to percussion
action, were then supplied; but no inconsiderable numbers of
fowling-pieces and shot-guns were to be seen amongst the infantry,
while the cavalry, in default of sabres, carried rude lances fabricated
by country blacksmiths. Some of the troops wore uniform, the blue of
the militia or the grey of the cadet; but many of the companies drilled
and manœuvred in plain clothes; and it was not till three months later,
on the eve of the first great battle, that the whole of the infantry
had received their bayonets and cartridge boxes.
An assemblage so motley could hardly be called an army; and the daring
of the Government, who, with this _levée en masse_ as their only
bulwark against invasion, had defied a great power, seems at first
sight strongly allied to folly. But there was little cause for
apprehension. The Federal authorities were as yet powerless to enforce
the policy of invasion on which the President had resolved. The great
bulk of the Northern troops were just as far from being soldiers as the
Virginians, and the regular army was too small to be feared.
The people of the United States had long cherished the Utopian dream
that war was impossible upon their favoured soil. The militia was
considered an archæological absurdity. The regular troops, admirable as
was their work upon the frontier, were far from being a source of
national pride. The uniform was held to be a badge of servitude. The
drunken loafer, bartering his vote for a dollar or a dram, looked down
with the contempt of a sovereign citizen upon men who submitted to the
indignity of discipline; and, in denouncing the expense of a standing
army, unscrupulous politicians found a sure path to popular favour. So,
when secession became something more than a mere threat, the armed
forces of the commonwealth had been reduced almost to extinction; and
when the flag was fired upon, the nation found itself powerless to
resent the insult. The military establishment mustered no more than
16,000 officers and men. There was no reserve, no transport, no
organisation for war, and the troops were scattered in distant
garrisons. The navy consisted of six screw-frigates, only one of which
was in commission, of five steam sloops, some twenty sailing ships, and
a few gun-boats. The majority of the vessels, although well armed, were
out of date. 9,000 officers and men were the extent of the personnel,
and several useful craft, together with more than 1,200 guns, were laid
up in Norfolk dockyard, on the coast of Virginia, within a hundred
miles of Richmond.[1]
The cause of the Confederacy, although her white population of seven
million souls was smaller by two-thirds than that of the North, was
thus far from hopeless. The North undoubtedly possessed immense
resources. But an efficient army, even when the supply of men and arms
be unlimited, cannot be created in a few weeks, or even in a few
months, least of all an army of invasion. Undisciplined troops, if the
enemy be ill-handled, may possibly stand their ground on the defensive,
as did Jackson’s riflemen at New Orleans, or the colonials at Bunker’s
Hill. But fighting behind earthworks is a very different matter to
making long marches, and executing complicated manœuvres under heavy
fire. Without a trained staff and an efficient administration, an army
is incapable of movement. Even with a well-organised commissariat it is
a most difficult business to keep a marching column supplied with food
and forage; and the problem of transport, unless a railway or
a river be available, taxes the ability of the most experienced leader.
A march of eighty or one hundred miles into an enemy’s country sounds a
simple feat, but unless every detail has been most carefully thought
out, it will not improbably be more disastrous than a lost battle. A
march of two or three hundred miles is a great military operation; a
march of six hundred an enterprise of which there are few examples. To
handle an army in battle is much less difficult than to bring it on to
the field in good condition; and the student of the Civil War may note
with profit how exceedingly chary were the generals, during the first
campaigns, of leaving their magazines. It was not till their auxiliary
services had gained experience that they dared to manœuvre freely; and
the reason lay not only in deficiencies of organisation, but in the
nature of the country. Even for a stationary force, standing on the
defensive, unless immediately backed by a large town or a railway, the
difficulties of bringing up supplies were enormous. For an invading
army, increasing day by day the distance from its base, they became
almost insuperable. In 1861, the population of the United States,
spread over a territory as large as Europe, was less than that of
England, and a great part of that territory was practically unexplored.
Even at the present day their seventy millions are but a handful in
comparison with the size of their dominions, and their extraordinary
material progress is not much more than a scratch on the surface of the
continent. In Europe Nature has long since receded before the works of
man. In America the struggle between them has but just begun; and
except upon the Atlantic seaboard man is almost lost to sight in the
vast spaces he has yet to conquer. In many of the oldest States of the
Union the cities seem set in clearings of the primeval forest. The wild
woodland encroaches on the suburbs, and within easy reach of the very
capital are districts where the Indian hunter might still roam
undisturbed. The traveller lands in a metropolis as large as Paris;
before a few hours have passed he may find himself in a wilderness as
solitary as the Transvaal; and although within the boundaries of the
townships he sees little
that differs from the England of the nineteenth century—beyond them
there is much that resembles the England of the Restoration. Except
over a comparatively small area an army operating in the United States
would meet with the same obstacles as did the soldiers of Cromwell and
Turenne. Roads are few and indifferent; towns few and far between; food
and forage are not easily obtainable, for the country is but partially
cultivated; great rivers, bridged at rare intervals, issue from the
barren solitudes of rugged plateaus; in many low-lying regions a single
storm is sufficient to convert the undrained alluvial into a fetid
swamp, and tracts as large as an English county are covered with
pathless forest. Steam and the telegraph, penetrating even the most
lonely jungles, afford, it is true, such facilities for moving and
feeding large bodies of men that the difficulties presented by untamed
Nature have undoubtedly been much reduced. Nevertheless the whole
country, even to-day, would be essentially different from any European
theatre of war, save the steppes of Russia; and in 1861 railways were
few, and the population comparatively insignificant.
The impediments, then, in the way of military operations were such as
no soldier of experience would willingly encounter with an improvised
army. It was no petty republic that the North had undertaken to coerce.
The frontiers of the Confederacy were far apart. The coast washed by
the Gulf of Mexico is eight hundred miles south of Harper’s Ferry on
the Potomac; the Rio Grande, the river boundary of Texas, is seventeen
hundred miles west of Charleston on the Atlantic. And over this vast
expanse ran but six continuous lines of railway:—
_From the Potomac._
1. [Washington,] Richmond, Lynchburg, Chattanooga, Memphis, New
Orleans.
2. [Washington,] Richmond, Weldon, Greensboro, Columbia, Atlanta, New
Orleans.
(These connected Richmond with the Mississippi.)
_From the Ohio._
3. Cairo, Memphis, New Orleans.
4. Cairo, Corinth, Mobile.
5. Louisville, Nashville, Dalton, Atlanta, Mobile.
(These connected the Ohio with the Gulf of Mexico.)
6. Richmond, Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah.
(This connected Richmond with the ports on the Atlantic.)
Although in the Potomac and the Ohio the Federals possessed two
excellent bases of invasion, on which it was easy to accumulate both
men and supplies, the task before them, even had the regular army been
large and well equipped, would have been sufficiently formidable. The
city of Atlanta, which may be considered as the heart of the
Confederacy, was sixty days’ march from the Potomac, the same distance
as Vienna from the English Channel, or Moscow from the Niemen. New
Orleans, the commercial metropolis, was thirty-six days’ march from the
Ohio, the same distance as Berlin from the Moselle. Thus space was all
in favour of the South; even should the enemy overrun her borders, her
principal cities, few in number, were far removed from the hostile
bases, and the important railway junctions were perfectly secure from
sudden attack. And space, especially when means of communication are
scanty, and the country affords few supplies, is the greatest of all
obstacles. The hostile territory must be subjugated piecemeal, state by
state, province by province, as was Asia by Alexander; and after each
victory a new base of supply must be provisioned and secured, no matter
at what cost of time, before a further advance can be attempted. Had
Napoleon in the campaign against Russia remained for the winter at
Smolensko, and firmly established himself in Poland, Moscow might have
been captured and held during the ensuing summer. But the occupation of
Moscow would not have ended the war. Russia in many respects was not
unlike the Confederacy. She had given no hostages to fortune in the
shape of rich commercial towns; she possessed no historic fortresses;
and so offered but few objectives to an invader. If defeated or
retreating, her armies could always find refuge in distant fastnesses.
The climate was severe; the internal trade inconsiderable; to bring the
burden of war home to the mass of the
population was difficult, and to hold the country by force
impracticable. Such were the difficulties which the genius of Napoleon
was powerless to overcome, and Napoleon invaded Russia with half a
million of seasoned soldiers.
And yet with an army of 75,000 volunteers, and without the least
preparation, the Federal Government was about to attempt an enterprise
of even greater magnitude. The Northern States were not bent merely on
invasion, but on re-conquest; not merely on defeating the hostile
armies, on occupying their capital, and exacting contributions, but on
forcing a proud people to surrender their most cherished principles, to
give up their own government, and to submit themselves, for good and
all, to what was practically a foreign yoke. And this was not all. It
has been well said by a soldier of Napoleon, writing of the war in
Spain, that neither the government nor the army are the real bulwarks
against foreign aggression, but the national character. The downfall of
Austria and of Prussia was practically decided by the first great
battle. The nations yielded without further struggle. Strangers to
freedom, crushed by military absolutism, the prostration of each and
all to an irresponsible despot had paralysed individual energy. Spain,
on the other hand, without an army and without a ruler, but deriving
new strength from each successive defeat, first taught Napoleon that he
was not invincible. And the same spirit of liberty which inspired the
people of the Peninsula inspired, to an even higher degree, the people
of the Confederate States.
[Illustration: Map of the United States 1861.] For larger view click on
image.
The Northern States, moreover, were about to make a new departure in
war. The manhood of a country has often been called upon to defend its
borders; but never before had it been proposed to invade a vast
territory with a civilian army, composed, it is true, of the best blood
in the Republic, but without the least tincture of military experience.
Nor did the senior officers, professionals though they were, appear
more fitted for the enterprise than the men they led. The command of a
company or squadron against the redskins was hardly an adequate
probation for the
command of an army,[2] or even a brigade, of raw troops against a
well-armed foe. Had the volunteers been associated with an equal number
of trained and disciplined soldiers, as had been the case in Mexico,[3]
they would have derived both confidence from their presence, and
stability from their example; had there been even an experienced staff,
capable of dealing with large forces, and an efficient commissariat,
capable of rapid expansion, they might have crushed all organised
opposition. But only 3,000 regulars could be drawn from the Western
borders; the staff was as feeble as the commissariat; and so, from a
purely military point of view, the conquest of the South appeared
impossible. Her self-sustaining power was far greater than has been
usually imagined. On the broad prairies of Texas, Arkansas, and
Louisiana ranged innumerable herds. The area under cultivation was
almost equal to that north of the Potomac and the Ohio. The pastoral
districts—the beautiful Valley of Virginia, the great plains of
Georgia, the fertile bottoms of Alabama, were inexhaustible granaries.
The amount of live stock—horses, mules, oxen, and sheep—was actually
larger than in the North; and if the acreage under wheat was less
extensive, the deficiency was more than balanced by the great harvests
of rice and maize.[4] Men of high ability, but profoundly ignorant of
the conditions which govern military operations, prophesied that the
South would be brought back to the Union within ninety days; General
Winfield Scott, on the other hand, Commander-in-Chief of the Federal
armies, declared that its conquest might be achieved “in two or three
years, by a young and able general—a Wolfe, a Desaix, a Hoche—with
300,000 disciplined men kept up to that number.”
Nevertheless, despite the extent of her territory and her scanty means
of communication, the South was peculiarly vulnerable. Few factories or
foundries had been established
within her frontiers. She manufactured nothing; and not only for all
luxuries, but for almost every necessary of life, she was dependent
upon others. Her cotton and tobacco brought leather and cloth in
exchange from England. Metals, machinery, rails, rolling stock, salt,
and even medicines came, for the most part, from the North. The weapons
which she put into her soldiers’ hands during the first year of the
war, her cannon, powder, and ammunition, were of foreign make. More
than all, her mercantile marine was very small. Her foreign trade was
in the hands of Northern merchants. She had ship-yards, for Norfolk and
Pensacola, both national establishments, were within her boundaries;
but her seafaring population was inconsiderable, and shipbuilding was
almost an unknown industry. Strong on land, she was powerless at sea,
and yet it was on the sea that her prosperity depended. Cotton, the
principal staple of her wealth, demanded free access to the European
markets. But without a navy, and without the means of constructing one,
or of manning the vessels that she might easily have purchased, she was
unable to keep open her communications across the Atlantic.
Nor was it on the ocean alone that the South was at a disadvantage. The
Mississippi, the main artery of her commerce, which brought the
harvests of the plantations to New Orleans, and which divided her
territory into two distinct portions, was navigable throughout; while
other great rivers and many estuaries, leading into the heart of her
dominions, formed the easiest of highways for the advance of an
invading army. Very early had her fatal weakness been detected.
Immediately Fort Sumter fell, Lincoln had taken measures to isolate the
seceding States, to close every channel by which they could receive
either succour or supplies, and if need be to starve them into
submission. The maritime resources of the Union were so large that the
navy was rapidly expanded. Numbers of trained seamen, recruited from
the merchant service and the fisheries, were at once available.
The Northern shipbuilders had long been famous; and both men and
vessels, if the necessity should arise, might
be procured in Europe. Judicious indeed was the policy which, at the
very outset of the war, brought the tremendous pressure of the
sea-power to bear against the South; and, had her statesmen possessed
the knowledge of what that pressure meant, they must have realised that
Abraham Lincoln was no ordinary foe. In forcing the Confederates to
become the aggressors, and to fire on the national ensign, he had
created a united North; in establishing a blockade of their coasts he
brought into play a force, which, like the mills of God, “grinds
slowly, but grinds exceeding small.”
But for the present the Federal navy was far too small to watch three
thousand miles of littoral indented by spacious harbours and secluded
bays, protected in many cases by natural breakwaters, and communicating
by numerous channels with the open sea. Moreover, it was still an even
chance whether cotton became a source of weakness to the Confederacy or
a source of strength. If the markets of Europe were closed to her by
the hostile battle-ships, the credit of the young Republic would
undoubtedly be seriously impaired; but the majority of the Southern
politicians believed that the great powers beyond the Atlantic would
never allow the North to enforce her restrictive policy. England and
France, a large portion of whose population depended for their
livelihood on the harvests of the South, were especially interested;
and England and France, both great maritime States, were not likely to
brook interference with their trade. Nor had the Southern people a high
opinion of Northern patriotism. They could hardly conceive that the
maintenance of the Union, which they themselves considered so light a
bond, had been exalted elsewhere to the height of a sacred principle.
Least of all did they believe that the great Democratic party, which
embraced so large a proportion of the Northern people, and which, for
so many years, had been in close sympathy with themselves, would
support the President in his coercive measures.
History, moreover, not always an infallible guide, supplied many
plausible arguments to those who sought to forecast the immediate
future. In the War of Independence,
not only had the impracticable nature of the country, especially of the
South, baffled the armies of Great Britain, but the European powers,
actuated by old grudges and commercial jealousy, had come to the aid of
the insurgents. On a theatre of war where trained and well-organised
forces had failed, it was hardly to be expected that raw levies would
succeed; and if England, opposed in 1782 by the fleets of France,
Spain, and Holland, had been compelled to let the colonies go, it was
hardly likely that the North, confronted by the naval strength of
England and France, would long maintain the struggle with the South.
Trusting then to foreign intervention, to the dissensions of their
opponents, and to their own hardihood and unanimity, the Southerners
faced the future with few misgivings.
At Richmond, finding himself without occupation, Major Jackson
volunteered to assist in the drilling of the new levies. The duty to
which he was first assigned was distasteful. He was an indifferent
draughtsman, and a post in the topographical department was one for
which he was hardly fitted. The appointment, fortunately, was not
confirmed. Some of his friends in the Confederate Congress proposed
that he should be sent to command at Harper’s Ferry, an important
outpost on the northern frontier of Virginia. There was some
opposition, not personal to Jackson and of little moment, but it called
forth a remark that shows the estimation in which he was held by men
who knew him.
“Who is this Major Jackson?” it was asked.
“He is one,” was the reply, “who, if you order him to hold a post, will
never leave it alive to be occupied by the enemy.”
Harper’s Ferry, the spot where the first collision might confidently be
expected, was a charge after Jackson’s own heart.
April 26 “Last Saturday,” he writes to his wife, “the Governor handed
me my commission as Colonel of Virginia Volunteers, the post I prefer
above all others, and has given me an independent command. Little one,
you must not expect to hear from me very often, as I expect to have
more work than I ever had in the same
length of time before; but don’t be concerned about your husband, for
our kind Heavenly Father will give every needful aid.”
The garrison at Harper’s Ferry consisted of a large number of
independent companies of infantry, a few light companies, as they were
called, of cavalry, and fifteen smooth-bore cannon of small calibre.
This force numbered 4,500 officers and men, of whom all but 400 were
Virginians. Jackson’s appearance was not hailed with acclamation. The
officers of the State militia had hitherto exercised the functions of
command over the ill-knit concourse of enthusiastic patriots. The
militia, however, was hardly more than a force on paper, and the camps
swarmed with generals and field-officers who were merely civilians in
gaudy uniform. By order of the State Legislature these gentlemen were
now deprived of their fine feathers. Every militia officer above the
rank of captain was deposed; and the Governor of Virginia was
authorised to fill the vacancies. This measure was by no means popular.
Both by officers and men it was denounced as an outrage on freemen and
volunteers; and the companies met in convention for the purpose of
passing denunciatory resolutions.
Their new commander was a sorry substitute for the brilliant figures he
had superseded. The militia generals had surrounded themselves with a
numerous staff, and on fine afternoons, it was said, the official
display in Harper’s Ferry would have done no discredit to the
Champs-Elysées. Jackson had but two assistants, who, like himself,
still wore the plain blue uniform of the Military Institute. To eyes
accustomed to the splendid trappings and prancing steeds of his
predecessors there seemed an almost painful want of pomp and
circumstance about the colonel of volunteers. There was not a particle
of gold lace about him. He rode a horse as quiet as himself. His seat
in the saddle was ungraceful. His well-worn cadet cap was always tilted
over his eyes; he was sparing of speech; his voice was very quiet, and
he seldom smiled. He made no orations, he held no reviews, and his
orders were remarkable for their brevity. Even with his officers
he had little intercourse. He confided his plans to no one, and not a
single item of information, useful or otherwise, escaped his lips.
Some members of the Maryland Legislature, a body whom it was important
to conciliate, visited Harper’s Ferry during his tenure of command.
They were received with the utmost politeness, and in return plied the
general with many questions. His answers were unsatisfactory, and at
length one more bold than the rest asked him frankly how many men he
had at his disposal. “Sir,” was the reply, “I should be glad if
President Lincoln thought I had fifty thousand.” Nor was this reticence
observed only towards those whose discretion he mistrusted. He was
silent on principle. In the campaign of 1814, the distribution of the
French troops at a most critical moment was made known to the allies by
the capture of a courier carrying a letter from Napoleon to the
Empress. There was little chance of a letter to Mrs. Jackson, who was
now in North Carolina, falling into the hands of the Federals; but even
in so small a matter Jackson was consistent.
“You say,” he wrote, “that your husband never writes you any news. I
suppose you mean military news, for I have written you a great deal
about your _sposo_ and how much he loves you. What do you want with
military news? Don’t you know that it is unmilitary and unlike an
officer to write news respecting one’s post? You couldn’t wish your
husband to do an unofficer-like thing, could you?”
And then, the claims of duty being thus clearly defined, he proceeds to
describe the roses which climbed round the window of his temporary
quarters, adding, with that lover-like devotion which every letter
betrays, “but my sweet little sunny face is what I want to see most of
all.”
Careful as he was to keep the enemy in the dark, he was exceedingly
particular when he visited his distant posts on the Potomac that his
presence should be unobserved. Had it become known to the Federal
generals that the commander at Harper’s Ferry had reconnoitred a
certain point of passage, a clue might have been given to his designs.
The Confederate officers, therefore, in charge of these posts,
were told that Colonel Jackson did not wish them to recognise him. He
rode out accompanied by a single staff officer, and the men were seldom
aware that the brigadier had been through their camps.
Never was a commander who fell so far short of the popular idea of a
dashing leader. This quiet gentleman, who came and went unnoticed, who
had nothing to say, and was so anxious to avoid observation, was a type
of soldier unfamiliar to the volunteers. He was duty personified and
nothing more.
But at the same time the troops instinctively felt that this absence of
ostentation meant hard work. They began to realise the magnitude of the
obligations they had assumed. Soldiering was evidently something more
than a series of brilliant spectacles and social gatherings. Here was a
man in earnest, who looked upon war as a serious business, who was
completely oblivious to what people said or thought; and his example
was not without effect. The conventions came to nothing; and when the
companies were organised in battalions, and some of the deposed
officers were reappointed to command, the men went willingly to work.
Their previous knowledge, even of drill, was of the scantiest. Officers
and men had to begin as recruits, and Jackson was not the man to cut
short essential preliminaries. Seven hours’ drill daily was a heavy tax
upon enthusiasm; but it was severely enforced, and the garrison of the
frontier post soon learned the elements of manœuvre. Discipline was a
lesson more difficult than drill. The military code, in all its rigour,
could not be at once applied to a body of high-spirited and
inexperienced civilians. Undue severity might have produced the very
worst results. The observance, therefore, of those regulations which
were not in themselves essential to efficiency or health was not
insisted on. Lapses in military etiquette were suffered to pass
unnoticed; no attempt was made to draw a hard and fast line between
officers and men; and many things which in a regular army would be
considered grossly irregular were tacitly permitted. Jackson was well
aware that volunteers of the type he commanded needed most delicate and
tactful handling. The chief use of minute regulations and exacting
routine is the creation of the instinct of obedience. Time was wanting
to instil such instinct into the Confederate troops; and the
intelligence and patriotism of the men, largely of high class and good
position, who filled the ranks, might be relied upon to prevent serious
misconduct. Had they been burdened with the constant acknowledgment of
superior authority which becomes a second nature to the regular
soldier, disgust and discontent might have taken the place of high
spirit and good-will. But at the same time wilful misbehaviour was
severely checked. Neglect of duty and insubordination were crimes which
Jackson never forgave, and deliberate disobedience was in his eyes as
unmanly an offence as cowardice. He knew when to be firm as well as
when to relax, and it was not only in the administration of discipline
that he showed his tact. He was the most patient of instructors. So
long as those under him were trying to do their best, no one could have
been kinder or more forbearing; and he constantly urged his officers to
come to his tent when they required explanation as to the details of
their duty.
Besides discipline and instruction, Jackson had the entire
administration of his command upon his hands. Ammunition was
exceedingly scarce, and he had to provide for the manufacture of
ball-cartridges. Transport there was none, but the great waggons of the
Valley farmers supplied the deficiency. The equipment of the artillery
left much to be desired, and ammunition carts (or caissons) were
constructed by fixing roughly made chests on the running gear of
waggons. The supply and medical services were non-existent, and
everything had to be organised _de novo._ Thus the officer in command
at Harper’s Ferry had his hands full; and in addition to his
administrative labours there was the enemy to be watched, information
to be obtained, and measures of defence to be considered. A glance at
the map will show the responsibilities of Jackson’s position.
The Virginia of the Confederacy was cut in two by the Blue Ridge, a
chain of mountains three hundred and thirty miles in length, which,
rising in North Carolina, passes
under different names through Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York, and
Vermont, and sinks to the level on the Canadian frontier.
The Blue Ridge varies in height from 2,000 to 6,000 feet. Densely
wooded, it is traversed in Virginia only by the Gaps, through which ran
three railways and several roads. These Gaps were of great strategic
importance, for if they were once secured, a Northern army, moving up
the Valley of the Shenandoah, would find a covered line of approach
towards the Virginia and Tennessee railway, which connected Richmond
with the Mississippi. Nor was this the only advantage it would gain.
From Lexington at its head, to Harper’s Ferry, where it strikes the
Potomac, throughout its whole length of one hundred and forty miles,
the Valley was rich in agricultural produce. Its average width, for it
is bounded on the west by the eastern ranges of the Alleghenies, is not
more than four-and-twenty miles; but there are few districts of the
earth’s surface, of equal extent, more favoured by Nature or more
highly cultivated. It was the granary of Virginia; and not Richmond
only, but the frontier garrisons, depended largely for subsistence on
the farms of the Shenandoah.
Moreover, if the Valley were occupied by the Federals, North-western
Virginia would be cut off from the Confederacy; and Jackson’s native
mountains, inhabited by a brave and hardy race, would be lost as a
recruiting ground.
In order, then, to secure the loyalty of the mountaineers, to supply
the armies, and to protect the railways, the retention of the Valley
was of the utmost importance to the Confederacy. The key of the
communication with the North-west was Winchester, the chief town of the
lower Valley, twenty-six miles, in an air-line, south-west of Harper’s
Ferry. From Winchester two highways lead westward, by Romney and
Moorefield; four lead east and south-east, crossing the Blue Ridge by
Snicker’s, Ashby’s, Manassas, and Chester’s Gaps; and the first object
of the Confederate force at Harper’s Ferry was to cover this nucleus of
roads.
During the month of May the garrison of the frontier
post was undisturbed by the enemy. Lincoln’s first call had been for
75,000 volunteers. On May 3 he asked for an additional 40,000; these
when trained, with 18,000 seamen and a detachment of regulars, would
place at his disposal 150,000 men. The greater part of this force had
assembled at Washington; but a contingent of 10,000 or 12,000 men under
General Patterson, a regular officer of many years’ service, was
collecting in Pennsylvania, and an outpost of 3,000 men was established
at Chambersburg, forty-five miles north of Harper’s Ferry.
These troops, however, though formidable in numbers, were as
ill-prepared for war as the Confederates, and no immediate movement was
to be anticipated. Not only had the Federal authorities to equip and
organise their levies, but the position of Washington was the cause of
much embarrassment. The District of Columbia—the sixty square miles set
apart for the seat of the Federal Government—lies on the Potomac, fifty
miles south-east of Harper’s Ferry, wedged in between Virginia on the
one side and Maryland on the other.
The loyalty of Maryland to the Union was more than doubtful. As a
slave-holding State, her sympathies were strongly Southern; and it was
only her geographical situation, north of the Potomac, and with no
strong frontier to protect her from invasion, which had held her back
from joining the Confederacy. As only a single line of railway
connected Washington with the North, passing through Baltimore, the
chief city of Maryland, a very hot-bed of secession sentiment, the
attitude of the State was a matter of the utmost anxiety to the Federal
Government. An attempt to send troops through Baltimore to Washington
had provoked a popular commotion and some bloodshed. Stern measures had
been necessary to keep the railway open. Baltimore was placed under
martial law, and strongly garrisoned. But despite these precautions,
for some weeks the feeling in Maryland was so hostile to the Union that
it was not considered safe for the Northern troops to cross her
territory except in large numbers; and the concentration
at Washington of a force sufficient to defend it was thus attended with
much difficulty.
A single railroad, too, the Baltimore and Ohio, connected Washington
with the West. Crossing the Potomac at Harper’s Ferry, and following
the course of the river, it ran for one hundred and twenty miles within
the confines of Virginia. Thus the district commanded by Jackson
embraced an artery of supply and communication which was of great
importance to the enemy. The natural course would have been to destroy
the line at once; but the susceptibilities of both Maryland and West
Virginia had to be considered. The stoppage of all traffic on their
main trade route would have done much to alienate the people from the
South, and there was still hope that Maryland might throw in her lot
with her seceded sisters.
The line was therefore left intact, and the company was permitted to
maintain the regular service of trains, including the mails. For this
privilege, however, Jackson exacted toll. The Confederate railways were
deficient in rolling stock, and he determined to effect a large
transfer from the Baltimore and Ohio. From Point of Rocks, twelve miles
east of Harper’s Ferry, to Martinsburg, fifteen miles west, the line
was double. “The coal traffic along it,” says General Imboden, “was
immense, for the Washington Government was accumulating supplies of
coal on the seaboard. These coal trains passed Harper’s Ferry at all
hours of the day and night, and thus furnished Jackson with a pretext
for arranging a brilliant capture. A detachment was posted at Point of
Rocks, and the 5th Virginia Infantry at Martinsburg. He then complained
to the President of the Baltimore and Ohio that the night trains,
eastward bound, disturbed the repose of his camp, and requested a
change of schedule that would pass all east-bound trains by Harper’s
Ferry between eleven and one o’clock in the daytime. The request was
complied with, and thereafter for several days was heard the constant
roar of passing trains for an hour before and an hour after noon. But
since the ‘empties’ were sent up the road at night, Jackson again
complained that the nuisance was as great as ever, and, as the road had
two tracks, said he must insist that the west-bound trains should pass
during the same hour as those going east. Again he was obliged, and we
then had, for two hours every day, the liveliest railroad in America.
“One night, as soon as the schedule was working at its best, Jackson
instructed the officer commanding at Point of Rocks to take a force of
men across to the Maryland side of the river the next day at eleven
o’clock, and letting all west-bound trains pass till twelve o’clock, to
permit none to go east. He ordered the reverse to be done at
Martinsburg.
“Thus he caught all the trains that were going east or west between
these points, and ran them up to Winchester, thirty-two miles on the
branch line, whence they were removed by horse power to the railway at
Strasbourg, eighteen miles further south.”[5]
May 24 This capture was Jackson’s only exploit whilst in command at
Harper’s Ferry. On May 24 he was relieved by General Joseph E.
Johnston, one of the senior officers of the Confederate army. The
transfer of authority was not, however, at once effected. Johnston
reached Harper’s Ferry in advance of his letter of appointment. Jackson
had not been instructed that he was to hand over his command, and,
strictly conforming to the regulations, he respectfully declined to
vacate his post. Fortunately a communication soon came from General
Lee, commanding the Virginia troops, in which he referred to Johnston
as in command at Harper’s Ferry. Jackson at once recognised this letter
as official evidence that he was superseded, and from that time forth
rendered his superior the most faithful and zealous support. He seems
at first to have expected that he would be sent to North-west Virginia,
and his one ambition at this time was to be selected as the instrument
of saving his native mountains to the South. But the Confederate
Government had other views. At the beginning of June a more compact
organisation was given to the regiments at Harper’s Ferry, and Jackson
was
assigned to the command of the First Brigade of the Army of the
Shenandoah.[6]
Recruited in the Valley of the Shenandoah and the western mountains,
the brigade consisted of the following regiments:—
The 2nd Virginia, Colonel Allen.
The 4th Virginia, Colonel Preston.
The 5th Virginia, Colonel Harper.
The 27th Virginia, Lieutenant-Colonel Echols.
The 33rd Virginia, Colonel Cummings.
A battery of artillery, raised in Rockbridge County, was attached to
the brigade. Commanded by the Reverend Dr. Pendleton, the rector of
Lexington, an old West Point graduate, who was afterwards distinguished
as Lee’s chief of artillery, and recruited largely from theological
colleges, it soon became peculiarly efficient.[7]
No better material for soldiers ever existed than the men of the
Valley. Most of them were of Scotch-Irish descent, but from the more
northern counties came many of English blood, and from those in the
centre of Swiss and German. But whatever their origin, they were
thoroughly well qualified for their new trade. All classes mingled in
the ranks, and all ages; the heirs of the oldest families, and the
humblest of the sons of toil; boys whom it was impossible to keep at
school, and men whose white beards hung below their cross-belts; youths
who had been reared in luxury, and rough hunters from their lonely
cabins. They were a mountain people, nurtured in a wholesome climate,
bred to manly sports, and hardened by the free life of the field and
forest. To social distinctions they gave little heed. They were united
for a common purpose; they had taken arms to defend Virginia and to
maintain her rights; and their patriotism was
proved by the sacrifice of all personal consideration and individual
interest. Nor is the purity of their motives to be questioned. They had
implicit faith in the righteousness of their cause. Slave-owners were
few in the Valley, and the farms were tilled mainly by free labour. The
abolition of negro servitude would have affected but little the
population west of the Blue Ridge. But, nevertheless, west of the Blue
Ridge the doctrine of State Rights was as firmly rooted as in the
Carolinas, the idea that a State could be coerced into remaining within
the Union as fiercely repudiated; and the men of the Valley faced the
gathering hosts of the North in the same spirit that they would have
faced the hosts of a foreign foe.
In the first weeks of June the military situation became more
threatening. The Union armies were taking shape. The levies of
volunteers seemed sufficiently trained to render reconquest
practicable, and the great wave of invasion had already mounted the
horizon. A force of 25,000 men, based on the Ohio, threatened
North-west Virginia. There had been collisions on the Atlantic
seaboard, where the Federals held Fortress Monroe, a strong citadel
within eighty miles of Richmond, and Richmond had become the capital of
the Confederacy. There had been fighting in Missouri, and the partisans
of the South in that State had already been badly worsted. The vast
power of the North was making itself felt on land, and on the sea had
asserted an ascendency which it never lost. The blue waters of the Gulf
of Mexico were patrolled by a fleet with which the Confederates had no
means of coping. From the sea-wall of Charleston, the great Atlantic
port of the South, the masts of the blockading squadron were visible in
the offing; and beyond the mouths of the Mississippi, closing the
approaches to New Orleans, the long black hulls steamed slowly to and
fro.
But it was about Manassas Junction—thirty miles south-west of
Washington and barring the road to Richmond—that all interest centred
during the first campaign. Here was posted the main army of the
Confederacy, 20,000 volunteers under General Beauregard,
the Manassas Gap Railway forming an easy means of communication with
the Army of the Shenandoah.
Johnston’s force had been gradually increased to 10,000 officers and
men. But the general was by no means convinced of the desirability of
holding Harper’s Ferry. The place itself was insignificant. It had
contained an arsenal, but this had been burnt by the Federals when they
evacuated the post; and it was absolutely untenable against attack. To
the east runs the Shenandoah; and immediately above the river stands a
spur of the Blue Ridge, the Loudoun Heights, completely commanding the
little town. Beyond the Potomac is a crest of equal altitude, covered
with forest trees and undergrowth, and bearing the name of the Maryland
Heights.
Jackson, without waiting for instructions, had taken on himself to hold
and fortify the Maryland Heights. “I am of opinion,” he had written to
General Lee, “that this place should be defended with the spirit which
actuated the defenders of Thermopylæ, and if left to myself such is my
determination. The fall of this place would, I fear, result in the loss
of the north-western part of the State, and who can estimate the moral
power thus gained to the enemy and lost to ourselves?”[8]
Lee, also, was averse to evacuation. Such a measure, he said, would be
depressing to the cause of the South, and would leave Maryland
isolated. The post, it was true, could be easily turned. By crossing
the Potomac, at Williamsport and Shepherdstown, twenty and ten miles
north-west respectively, the Federals would threaten the communications
of the garrison with Winchester; in case they were attacked, the
Confederates would have to fight with their backs to the Shenandoah,
broad, deep, and unbridged; and the ground westward of Harper’s Ferry
was ill adapted for defence. Attack, in Lee’s opinion, would have been
best met by a resolute offensive.[9] Johnston, however, believed his
troops unfitted for active manœuvres, and he was permitted to choose
his own course. The incident is of small
importance, but it serves to show an identity of opinion between Lee
and Jackson, and a regard for the moral aspect of the situation which
was to make itself manifest, with extraordinary results, at a later
period.
June 14 On June 14, Johnston destroyed the railway bridge over the
Potomac, removed the machinery that had been rescued from the arsenal,
burned the public buildings, and the next day retired on Winchester.
His immediate opponent, General Patterson, had crossed the Pennsylvania
border, and, moving through Maryland, had occupied Williamsport with
14,000 men. A detachment of Confederate militia had been driven from
Romney, thirty-five miles north-west of Winchester, and the general
forward movement of the enemy had become pronounced.
June 20 On June 20 Jackson’s brigade was ordered to destroy the
workshops of the Baltimore and Ohio Railway at Martinsburg, together
with the whole of the rolling stock that might there be found, and to
support the cavalry. The first of these tasks, although Martinsburg is
no more than ten miles distant from Williamsport, was easily
accomplished. Four locomotives were sent back to Winchester, drawn by
teams of horses; and several more, together with many waggons, were
given to the flames. The second task demanded no unusual exertions. The
Federals, as yet, manifested no intention of marching upon Winchester,
nor was the Confederate cavalry in need of immediate assistance. The
force numbered 300 sabres. The men were untrained; but they were
first-rate horsemen, they knew every inch of the country, and they were
exceedingly well commanded. Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. B. Stuart, who had
been a captain of dragoons in the United States army, had already given
token of those remarkable qualities which were afterwards to make him
famous. Of an old Virginia family, he was the very type of the
Cavalier, fearless and untiring, “boisterous as March, yet fresh as
May.”
“Educated at West Point, and trained in Indian fighting in the
prairies, he brought to the great struggle upon which he had now
entered a thorough knowledge of
arms, a bold and fertile conception, and a constitution of body which
enabled him to bear up against fatigues which would have prostrated the
strength of other men. Those who saw him at this time are eloquent in
their description of the energy and the habits of the man. They tell
how he remained almost constantly in the saddle; how he never failed to
instruct personally every squad which went out on picket; how he was
everywhere present, at all hours of the day and night, along the line
which he guarded; and how, by infusing into the raw cavalry his own
activity and watchfulness, he was enabled, in spite of the small force
which he commanded, to observe the whole part of the Potomac from Point
of Rocks to beyond Williamsport. His animal spirits were unconquerable,
his gaiety and humour unfailing; he had a ready jest for all, and made
the forests ring with his songs as he marched at the head of his
column. So great was his activity that General Johnston compared him to
that species of hornet called ‘a yellow jacket,’ and said that ‘he was
no sooner brushed off than he lit back again.’ When the general was
subsequently transferred to the West he wrote to Stuart: ‘How can I
eat, sleep, or rest in peace without you upon the outpost?’”[10]
No officer in the Confederacy was more trusted by his superiors or more
popular with the men; and Jackson was no more proof than others against
the attractions of his sunny and noble nature. As a soldier, Stuart was
a colleague after his own heart; and, as a man, he was hardly less
congenial. The dashing horseman of eight-and-twenty, who rivalled Murat
in his fondness for gay colours, and to all appearance looked upon war
as a delightful frolic, held a rule of life as strict as that of his
Presbyterian comrade; and outwardly a sharp contrast, inwardly they
were in the closest sympathy. Stuart’s fame as a leader was to be won
in larger fields than those west of the Blue Ridge, and, although
sprung from the same Scotch-Irish stock, he was in no way connected
with the Valley soldiers. But from the very outbreak of the war he was
intimately associated with
Jackson and his men. Fortune seemed to take a curious delight in
bringing them together; they were together in their first skirmish, and
in their last great victory; and now, on the banks of the Potomac,
watching the hostile masses that were assembling on the further shore,
they first learned to know each other’s worth.
July 2 On July 2 Patterson crossed the river. The movement was at once
reported by Stuart, and Jackson, with the 5th Virginia and a battery,
advanced to meet the enemy. His instructions from Johnston were to
ascertain the strength of the hostile force, and then to retire under
cover of the cavalry. Four regiments of his brigade were therefore left
in camp; the baggage was sent back, and when the 5th Virginia had
marched out a short distance, three of the four guns were halted. Near
Falling Waters, a country church some five miles south of the Potomac,
Patterson’s advanced guard was discovered on the road. The country on
either hand, like the greater part of the Valley, was open, undulating,
and highly cultivated, view and movement being obstructed only by rail
fences and patches of high timber.
The Virginians were partially concealed by a strip of woodland, and
when the Federal skirmishers, deployed on either side of the highway,
moved forward to the attack, they were received by a heavy and
unexpected fire. As the enemy fell back, a portion of the Confederate
line was thrown forward, occupying a house and barn; and despite the
fire of two guns which the Federals had brought up, the men, with the
impetuous rashness of young troops, dashed out to the attack. But
Jackson intervened. The enemy, who had two brigades of infantry well
closed up, was deploying a heavy force; his skirmishers were again
advancing, and the 5th Virginia, in danger of being outflanked, was
ordered to retire to its first position. The movement was misconstrued
by the Federals, and down the high road, in solid column, came the
pursuing cavalry. A well-aimed shot from the single field-piece
sufficed to check their progress; a confused mass of horsemen went
flying to the rear; and the Confederate gunners turned their attention
to the hostile
battery. Stuart, at the same time, performed a notable feat. He had
moved with fifty troopers to attack the enemy’s right flank, and in
reconnoitring through the woods had become detached for the moment from
his command. As he rode along a winding lane he saw resting in a field
a company of Federal infantry. He still wore the uniform of the United
States army; the enemy suspected nothing, taking him for one of their
own cavalry, and he determined to effect their capture. Riding up to
the fence he bade one of the men remove the bars. This was done with
respectful alacrity, and he then galloped among them, shouting “Throw
down your arms, or you are all dead men!” The stentorian order was at
once obeyed: the raw troops not only dropped their rifles but fell upon
their faces, and the Confederate troopers, coming to their leader’s
aid, marched the whole company as prisoners to the rear.
So firm was the attitude of Jackson’s command that General Patterson
was thoroughly imposed upon. Slowly and cautiously he pushed out right
and left, and it was not till near noon that the Confederates were
finally ordered to retreat. Beyond desultory skirmishing there was no
further fighting. The 5th Virginia fell back on the main body; Stuart
came in with his string of captives, and leaving the cavalry to watch
the enemy, the First Brigade went into camp some two miles south of
Martinsburg. Patterson reported to his Government that he had been
opposed by 3,500 men, exactly ten times Jackson’s actual number.[11]
The losses on either side were inconsiderable, a few men killed and 10
or 15 wounded; and if the Confederates carried off 50 prisoners, the
Federals had the satisfaction of burning some tents which Jackson had
been unable to remove. The engagement, however, had the best effect on
the morale of the Southern troops, and they were not so ignorant as to
overlook the skill and coolness with which they had been manœuvred. It
is possible that their commander appeared in an unexpected light, and
that they had watched his behaviour with some amount of curiosity. They
certainly discovered that a
distaste for show and frippery is no indication of an unwarlike spirit.
In the midst of the action, while he was writing a dispatch, a cannon
ball had torn a tree above his head to splinters. Not a muscle moved,
and he wrote on as if he were seated in his own tent.
July 3 The day after Falling Waters, on Johnston’s recommendation,
Jackson received from General Lee his commission as brigadier-general
in the Confederate army. “My promotion,” he wrote to his wife, “was
beyond what I had anticipated, as I only expected it to be in the
Volunteer forces of the State. One of my greatest desires for
advancement is the gratification it will give my darling, and (the
opportunity) of serving my country more efficiently. I have had all
that I ought to desire in the line of promotion. I should be very
ungrateful if I were not contented, and exceedingly thankful to our
kind Heavenly Father.”
Of Patterson’s further movements it is unnecessary to speak at length.
The Federal army crawled on to Martinsburg. Halting seven miles
south-west Jackson was reinforced by Johnston’s whole command; and
here, for four days, the Confederates, drawn up in line of battle,
awaited attack. But the Federals stood fast in Martinsburg; and on the
fourth day Johnston withdrew to Winchester. The Virginia soldiers were
bitterly dissatisfied. At first even Jackson chafed. He was eager for
further action. His experiences at Falling Waters had given him no
exalted notion of the enemy’s prowess, and he was ready to engage them
single-handed. “I want my brigade,” he said, “to feel that it can
itself whip Patterson’s whole army, and I believe we can do it.” But
Johnston’s self-control was admirable. He was ready to receive attack,
believing that, in his selected position, he could repulse superior
numbers. But he was deaf to all who clamoured for an offensive
movement, to the murmurs of the men, and to the remonstrances of the
officers. The stone houses of Martinsburg and its walled inclosures
were proof against assault, and promised at most a bloody victory. His
stock of ammunition was scanty in
the extreme; the infantry had but fourteen cartridges apiece; and
although his patience was construed by his troops as a want of
enterprise, he had in truth displayed great daring in offering battle
south of Martinsburg.
The Federal army at Washington, commanded by General McDowell, amounted
to 50,000 men; a portion of this force was already south of the
Potomac, and Beauregard’s 20,000 Confederates, at Manassas Junction,
were seriously threatened. In West Virginia the enemy had advanced,
moving, fortunately, in the direction of Staunton, at the southern end
of the Valley, and not on Winchester.
July 11 On July 11, this force of 20,000 men defeated a Confederate
detachment at Rich Mountain, not far from Jackson’s birthplace; and
although it was still in the heart of the Alleghenies, a few marches,
which there were practically no troops to oppose, would give it the
control of the Upper Valley.
Thus menaced by three columns of invasion, numbering together over
80,000 men, the chances of the Confederates, who mustered no more than
32,000 all told, looked small indeed. But the three Federal columns
were widely separated, and it was possible, by means of the Manassas
Gap Railway, for Johnston and Beauregard to unite with greater rapidity
than their opponents.
President Davis, acting on the advice of General Lee, had therefore
determined to concentrate the whole available force at Manassas
Junction, and to meet at that point the column advancing from
Washington.[12] The difficulty was for the Army of the Shenandoah to
give Patterson the slip. This could easily have been done while that
officer stood fast at Martinsburg; but, in Lee’s opinion, if the enemy
found that the whole force of the Confederacy was concentrating at
Manassas Junction, the Washington column would remain within its
intrenchments round the capital, and the Confederates “would be put to
the great disadvantage of achieving nothing, and leaving the other
points (Winchester and Staunton) exposed.” The concentration,
therefore, was to be postponed until the Washington column
advanced.[13]
But by that time Patterson might be close to Winchester or threatening
the Manassas Railway. Johnston had thus a most delicate task before
him; and in view of the superior numbers which the Federals could bring
against Manassas, it was essential that not a man should he wasted in
minor enterprises. The defeat of Patterson, even had it been
practicable, would not have prevented the Washington column from
advancing; and every Confederate rifleman who fell in the Valley would
be one the less at Manassas.
July 15 On July 15 Patterson left Martinsburg and moved in the
direction of Winchester. On the 16th he remained halted at Bunker’s
Hill, nine miles north; and on the 17th, instead of continuing his
advance, moved to his left and occupied Charlestown. His indecision was
manifest. He, too, had no easy part to play. His instructions were to
hold Johnston in the Valley, while McDowell advanced against
Beauregard. But his instructions were either too definite or not
definite enough, and he himself was overcautious. He believed, and so
did General Scott, that Johnston might be retained at Winchester by
demonstrations—that is, by making a show of strength and by feigned
attacks. For more vigorous action Patterson was not in the least
inclined; and we can hardly wonder if he hesitated to trust his
ill-trained regiments to the confusion and chances of an attack. Even
in that day of raw soldiers and inexperienced leaders his troops had an
unenviable reputation. They had enlisted for three months, and their
term of service was nearly up. Their commander had no influence with
them; and, turning a deaf ear to his appeals, they stubbornly refused
to remain with the colours even for a few days over their term of
service. They were possibly disgusted with the treatment they had
received from the Government. The men had received no pay. Many were
without shoes, and others, according to their general, were “without
pants!” “They cannot march,” he adds, “and,
unless a paymaster goes with them, they will be indecently clad and
have just cause of complaint.”[14]
Nevertheless, the Federal authorities made a grievous mistake when they
allowed Patterson and his _sans-culottes_ to move to Charlestown.
McDowell marched against Beauregard on the afternoon of the 16th, and
Patterson should have been instructed to attack Johnston at any cost.
Even had the latter been successful, he could hardly have reinforced
the main army in time to meet McDowell.
July 18 At 1 a.m. on the morning of the 18th Johnston received a
telegram from the President to the effect that McDowell was advancing
on Manassas. Stuart was immediately directed to keep Patterson amused;
and leaving their sick, 1,700 in number, to the care of Winchester, the
troops were ordered to strike tents and prepare to march. No man knew
the object of the movement, and when the regiments passed through
Winchester, marching southward, with their backs to the enemy, the step
was lagging and the men dispirited. A few miles out, as they turned
eastward, the brigades were halted and an order was read to them. “Our
gallant army under General Beauregard is now attacked by overwhelming
numbers. The Commanding General hopes that his troops will step out
like men, and make a forced march to save the country.” The effect of
this stirring appeal was instantaneous. “The soldiers,” says Jackson,
“rent the air with shouts of joy, and all was eagerness and animation.”
The march was resumed, and as mile after mile was passed, although
there was much useless delay and the pace was slow, the faint outlines
of the Blue Ridge, rising high above the Valley, changed imperceptibly
to a mighty wall of rock and forest. As the night came down a long
reach of the Shenandoah crossed the road. The ford was waist-deep, but
the tall Virginians, plunging without hesitation into the strong
current, gained the opposite shore with little loss of time. The guns
and waggons followed in long succession through the darkling waters,
and still the heavy tramp of the toiling column passed eastward through
the quiet fields.
The Blue Ridge was crossed at Ashby’s Gap; and at two o’clock in the
morning, near the little village of Paris, the First Brigade was halted
on the further slope. They had marched over twenty miles, and so great
was their exhaustion that the men sank prostrate on the ground beside
their muskets.[15] They were already sleeping, when an officer reminded
Jackson that there were no pickets round the bivouac. “Let the poor
fellows sleep,” was the reply; “I will guard the camp myself.” And so,
through the watches of the summer night, the general himself stood
sentry over his unconscious troops.[16]
[Illustration: Map of the situation on the night of July 17th, 1861.]
[1] Strength of the Federal Navy at different periods:—
March 4, 1861: 42 ships in commission.
December 1, 1861: 264 ships in commission.
December 1, 1862: 427 ships in commission.
December 1, 1863: 588 ships in commission.
December 1, 1864: 671 ships in commission.
[2] Even after the Peninsular War had enlarged the experience of the
British army, Sir Charles Napier declared that he knew but one general
who could handle 100,000 men, and that was the Duke of Wellington.
[3] Grant’s _Memoirs,_ vol. i, p. 168.
[4] Cf. U.S. Census Returns 1860.
[5] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. i.
[6] The Virginia troops were merged in the army of the Confederate
States on June 8, 1861. The total strength was 40,000 men and 115
guns. O.R., vol. ii, p. 928.
[7] When the battery arrived at Harper’s Ferry, it was quartered in a
church, already occupied by a company called the Grayson Dare-devils,
who, wishing to show their hospitality, assigned the pulpit to Captain
Pendleton as an appropriate lodging. The four guns were at once
christened Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John.
[8] O.R., vol. ii, p. 814.
[9] _Ibid.,_ pp. 881, 889, 897, 898, 901, 923.
[10] Cooke, p. 47.
[11] O.R., vol. ii, p. 157.
[12] O.R., vol. ii, p. 515.
[13] O.R., vol. ii, p. 507.
[14] O.R., vol. ii, pp. 169, 170.
[15] “The discouragements of that day’s march,” says Johnston, “to one
accustomed to the steady gait of regular soldiers, is indescribable.
The views of military obedience and command then taken both by
officers and men confined their duties and obligations almost
exclusively to the drill-ground and guards. In camps and marches they
were scarcely known. Consequently, frequent and unreasonable delays
caused so slow a rate of marching as to make me despair of joining
General Beauregard in time to aid him.”— Johnston’s _Narrative._
[16] Letter to Mrs. Jackson, _Memoirs,_ p. 176.