_Reflections on what gives Occasions to Wars in_ Louisiana. _The Means
of avoiding Wars in that Province, as also the Manner of coming off with
Advantage and little Expence in them._
The experience I have had in the art of war, from some campaigns I
made in a regiment of dragoons till the peace of 1713, my application
to the study of the wars of the Greeks, Romans, and other ancient
people, and the wars I have seen carried on with the Indians of
Louisiana, during the time I resided in that Province, gave me
occasion to make several reflections on what could give rise to a war
with the Indians, on the means of avoiding such a war, and on such
methods as may be employed, in order either to make or maintain a war
to advantage against them, when constrained thereto.
In the space of sixteen years that I resided in Louisiana, I remarked,
that the war, and even the bare disputes we have had with the Indians
of this Colony, never had any other origin, but our too familiar
intercourse with them.
In order to prove this, let us consider the evils produced by this
familiarity. In the first place, it makes them gradually drop that
respect, which they naturally entertain for our nation.
In the second place, the French traffickers, or traders, are generally
young people without experience, who, in order to gain the good-will
of these people, afford them lights, or instruction, prejudicial to
our interest. These young merchants are not, it is true, sensible of
these consequences: but again, these people never lose sight of what
can be of any utility to them, and the detriment thence accruing is
not less great, nor less real.
In the third place, this familiarity gives occasion to vices, whence
dangerous distempers ensue, and corruption of blood, {97} which is
naturally highly pure in this colony. These persons, who frequently
resort to the Indians, imagined themselves authorized to give a loose
to their vices, from the practice of these last, which is to give
young women to their guests upon their arrival; a practice that
greatly injures their health, and proves a detriment to their
merchandizing.
In the fourth place, this resorting to the Indians puts these last
under a constraint, as being fond of solitude; and this constraint is
still more heightened, if the French settlement is near them; which
procures them too frequent visits, that give them so much more
uneasiness, as they care not on any account that people should see or
know any of their affairs. And what fatal examples have we not of the
dangers the settlements which are too near the Indians incur. Let but
the massacre of the French be recollected, and it will be evident that
this proximity is extremely detrimental to the French.
In the fifth and last place, commerce, which is the principal
allurement that draws us to this new world instead of flourishing, is,
on the contrary, endangered by the too familiar resort to the Indians
of North America. The proof of this is very simple.
All who resort to countries beyond sea, know by experience, that when
there is but one ship in the harbour, the Captain sells his cargo at
what price he pleases: and then we hear it said, such a ship gained
two, three, and sometimes as high as four hundred per cent. Should
another ship happen to arrive in that harbour, the profit abates at
least one half; but should three arrive, or even four successively,
the goods then are, so to speak, thrown at the head of the buyer: so
that in this case a merchant has often great difficulty to recover his
very expenses of fitting out. I should therefore be led to believe,
that it would be for the interest of commerce, if the Indians were
left to come to fetch what merchandize they wanted, who having none
but us in their neighbourhood, would come for it, without the French
running any risk in their commerce, much less in their lives.
For this purpose, let us suppose a nation of Indians on the banks of
some river or rivulet, which is always the case, as all {98} men
whatever have at all times occasion for water. This being supposed, I
look out for a spot proper to build a small terras-fort on, with
fraises or stakes, and pallisadoes. In this fort I would build two
small places for lodgings, of no great height; one to lodge the
officers, the other the soldiers: this fort to have an advanced work,
a half-moon, or the like, according to the importance of the post. The
passage to be through this advanced work to the fort, and no Indian
allowed to enter on any pretence whatever; not even to receive the
Pipe of Peace there, but only in the advanced work; the gate of the
fort to be kept shut day and night against all but the French. At the
gate of the advanced work a sentinel to be posted, and that gate to be
opened and shut on each person appearing before it. By these
precautions we might be sure never to be surprised, either by avowed
enemies, or by treachery. In the advanced work a small building to be
made for the merchants, who should come thither to traffick or truck
with the neighbouring Indians; of which last only three or four to be
admitted at a time, all to have the merchandize at the same price, and
no one to be favoured above another. No soldier or inhabitant to go to
the villages of the neighbouring Indians, under severe penalties. By
this conduct disputes would be avoided, as they only arise from too
great a familiarity with them. These forts to be never nearer the
villages than five leagues, or more distant than seven or eight. The
Indians would make nothing of such a jaunt; it would be only a walk
for them, and their want of goods would easily draw them, and in a
little time they would become habituated to it. The merchants to pay a
salary to an interpreter, who might be some orphan, brought up very
young among these people.
This fort, thus distant a short journey, might be built without
obstruction, or giving any umbrage to the Indians: as they might be
told it was built in order to be at hand to truck their furs, and at
the same time to give them no manner of uneasiness. One advantage
would be, besides that of commerce, which would be carried on there,
that these forts would prevent the English from having any
communication with the Indians, as these last would find a great
facility for their truck, and in forts so near them, every thing they
could want.
{99} The examples of the surprise of the forts of the Natchez, the
Yazoux, and the Missouris, shew but too plainly the fatal consequences
of negligence in the service, and of a misplaced condescension in
favour of the soldiers, by suffering them to build huts near the fort,
and to lie in them. None should be allowed to lie out of the fort, not
even the Officers. The Commandant of the Natchez, and the other
Officers, and even the Serjeants, were killed in their houses without
the fort. I should not be against the soldiers planting little fields
of tobacco, potatoes, and other plants, too low to conceal a man: on
the contrary, these employments would incline them to become settlers;
but I would never allow them houses out of the fort. By this means a
fort becomes impregnable against the most numerous; because they never
will attack, should they have ever so much cause, as long as they see
people on their guard.
Should it be objected that these forts would cost a great deal: I
answer, that though there was to be a fort for each nation, which is
not the case, it would not cost near so much as from time to time it
takes to support wars, which in this country are very expensive, on
account of the long journeys, and of transporting all the implements
of war, hitherto made use of. Besides, we have a great part of these
forts already built, so that we only want the advanced works; and two
new forts more would suffice to compleat this design, and prevent the
fraudulent commerce of the English traders.
As to the manner of carrying on the war in Louisiana, as was hitherto
done, it is very expensive, highly fatiguing, and the risk always great;
because you must first transport the ammunition to the landing-place;
from thence travel for many leagues; then drag the artillery along by
main force, and carry the ammunition on men's shoulders, a thing that
harasses and weakens the troops very much. Moreover, there is a great
deal of risk in making war in this manner: you have the approaches of a
fort to make, which cannot be done without loss of lives: and should you
make a breach, how many brave men are lost, before you can force men who
fight like desperadoes, because they prefer death to slavery.
{100} I say, should you make a breach; because in all the time I
resided in this Province, I never saw nor heard that the cannon which
were brought against the Indian forts, ever made a breach for a single
man to pass: it is therefore quite useless to be at that expence, and
to harass the troops to bring artillery, which can be of no manner of
service.
That cannon can make no breach in Indian forts may appear strange: but
not more strange than true; as will appear, if we consider that the
wooden posts or stakes which surround these forts, are too big for a
bullet of the size of those used in these wars, to cut them down,
though it were even to hit their middle. If the bullet gives more
towards the edge of the tree, it glides off, and strikes the next to
it; should the ball hit exactly between two posts, it opens them, and
meets the post of the lining, which stops it short: another ball may
strike the same tree, at the other joining, then it closes the little
aperture the other had made.
Were I to undertake such a war, I would bring only a few Indian
allies; I could easily manage them; they would not stand me so much in
presents, nor consume so much ammunition and provisions: a great
saving this; and bringing no cannon with me, I should also save
expences. I would have none but portable arms; and thus my troops
would not be harassed. The country every where furnishes wherewithal
to make moveable intrenchments and approaches, without opening the
ground: and I would flatter myself to carry the fort in two days time.
There I stop: the reader has no need of this detail, nor I to make it
public.