CHAPTER XXII

THE BALFOUR MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES

I

Page now took up a subject which had been near his heart for a long

time. He believed that one of the most serious causes of Anglo-American

misunderstanding was the fact that the leading statesmen of the two

countries had never had any personal contact with one another. At one

time, as this correspondence shows, the Ambassador had even hoped that

President Wilson himself might cross the ocean and make the British

people an official visit. The proposal, however, was made before the

European war broke out, the occasion which Page had in mind being the

dedication of Sulgrave Manor, the old English home of the Washington

family, as a perpetual memorial to the racial bonds and common ideals

uniting the two countries. The President found it impossible to act upon

this suggestion and the outbreak of war made the likelihood of such a

visit still more remote. Page had made one unsuccessful attempt to bring

the American State Department and the British Foreign Office into

personal contact. At the moment when American irritation had been most

keen over the blockade and the blacklist, Page had persuaded the Foreign

Office to invite to England Mr. Frank L. Polk, at that time Counsellor

of the Department; the Ambassador believed that a few conversations

between such an intelligent gentleman as Mr. Polk and the British

statesmen would smooth out all the points which were then making things

so difficult. Unfortunately the pressure of work at Washington prevented

Mr. Polk from accepting Sir Edward Grey's invitation.

But now a greater necessity for close personal association had arisen.

The United States had entered the war, and this declaration had

practically made this country an ally of Great Britain and France. The

British Government wished to send a distinguished commission to the

United States, for two reasons: first, to show its appreciation of the

stand which America had taken, and secondly, to discuss plans for

coöperation in the common task. Great Britain frankly admitted that it

had made many mistakes in the preceding three years--mistakes naval,

military, political, and economic; it would welcome an opportunity to

display these errors to Washington, which might naturally hope to profit

from them. As soon as his country was in the war, Page took up this

suggestion with the Foreign Office. There was of course one man who was

preëminently fitted, by experience, position, and personal qualities, to

head such a commission; on this point there was no discussion. Mr.

Balfour was now in his seventieth year; his activities in British

politics dated back to the times of Disraeli; his position in Great

Britain had become as near that of an "elder statesman" as is tolerable

under the Anglo-Saxon system. By this time Page had established the

friendliest possible relations with this distinguished man. Mr. Balfour

had become Foreign Secretary in December, 1916, in succession to Lord

Grey. Greatly as Page regretted the resignation of Grey, he was much

gratified that Mr. Balfour had been selected to succeed him. Mr.

Balfour's record for twenty-five years had been one of consistent

friendliness toward the United States. When President Cleveland's

Venezuelan message, in 1896, had precipitated a crisis in the relations

of the two countries, it was Mr. Balfour's influence which was

especially potent in causing Great Britain to modify its attitude and to

accept the American demand for arbitration. That action not only

amicably settled the Venezuelan question; it marked the beginning of a

better feeling between the English-speaking countries and laid the basis

for that policy of benevolent neutrality which Great Britain had

maintained toward the United States in the Spanish War. The excellent

spirit which Mr. Balfour had shown at this crisis he had manifested on

many occasions since. In the criticisms of the United States during the

_Lusitania_ troubles Mr. Balfour had never taken part. The era of

"neutrality" had not ruffled the confidence which he had always felt in

the United States. During all this time the most conspicuous dinner

tables of London had rung with criticisms of American policy; the fact

was well known, however, that Mr. Balfour had never sympathized with

these reproaches; even when he was not in office, no unfriendly word

concerning the United States had ever escaped his lips. His feeling

toward this country was well shown in a letter which he wrote Page, in

reply to one congratulating him on his seventieth birthday. "I have now

lived a long life," said Mr. Balfour, "and most of my energies have been

expended in political work, but if I have been fortunate enough to

contribute, even in the smallest degree, to drawing closer the bonds

that unite our two countries, I shall have done something compared with

which all else that I may have attempted counts in my eyes as nothing."

Page's letters and notes contain many references to Mr. Balfour's kindly

spirit. On the day following the dismissal of Bernstorff the American

Ambassador lunched with the Foreign Secretary at No. 4 Carlton Gardens.

"Mr. Balfour," Page reported to Washington, "gave expression to the

hearty admiration which he entertained for the President's handling of a

difficult task. He said that never for a moment had he doubted the

President's wisdom in the course he was pursuing. He had the profoundest

admiration for the manner in which he had promptly broken with Germany

after receiving Germany's latest note. Nor had he ever entertained the

slightest question of the American people's ready loyalty to their

Government or to their high ideals. One of his intellectual pleasures,

he added, had long been contemplation of the United States as it is and,

even more, as its influence in the world will broaden. 'The world,' said

Mr. Balfour, 'will more and more turn on the Great Republic as on a

pivot.'"

Occasionally Mr. Balfour's discussion of the United States would take a

more pensive turn. A memorandum which Page wrote a few weeks after the

above touches another point:

March 27, 1917.

I had a most interesting conversation with Mr. Balfour this

afternoon. "It's sad to me," said he, "that we are so unpopular, so

much more unpopular than the French, in your country. Why is it?

The old school books?"

I doubted the school-book influence.

"Certainly their influence is not the main cause. It is the

organized Irish. Then it's the effect of the very fact that the

Irish question is not settled. You've had that problem at your very

door for 300 years. What's the matter that you don't solve it?"

"Yes, yes,"--he saw it. But the plaintive tone of such a man asking

such a question was significant and interesting and--sad.

Then I told him the curious fact that a British Government made up

of twenty individuals, every one of whom is most friendly to the

United States, will, when they act together as a Government, do the

most offensive things. I mentioned the blacklist; I mentioned

certain complaints that I then held in my hand--of Americans here

who are told by the British Government that they must turn over to

the British Government's agent in New York their American

securities which they hold in America!

There's a sort of imperious, arrogant, Tory action that comes

natural to the English Government, even when not natural to the

individual Englishman.

* * * * *

On April 5th, the day before the United States formally declared war,

Page notified Washington that the British Government wished Mr. Balfour

to go to the United States as the head of a Commission to confer with

our Government. "Mr. Balfour is chosen for this mission," Page reported,

"not only because he is Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but

because he is personally the most distinguished member of the

Government." Page tells the story in more detail in a letter to Mr.

Polk, at that time Counsellor of the State Department.

_To Frank L. Polk_

London, May 3, 1917.

DEAR MR. POLK:

... Mr. Balfour accurately represents British character, British

opinion, and the British attitude. Nobody who knows him and knows

British character and the British attitude ever doubted that. I

know his whole tribe, his home-life, his family connections, his

friends; and, of course, since he became Foreign Secretary, I've

come to know him intimately. When the question first came up here

of his going, of course I welcomed it enthusiastically. About that

time during a two-hour conversation he asked me why the British

were so unpopular in the United States. Among other reasons I told

him that our official people on both sides steadfastly refused to

visit one another and to become acquainted. Neither he nor Lord

Grey, nor Mr. Asquith, nor Mr. Lloyd George, had ever been to the

United States, nor any other important British statesman in recent

times, and not a single member of the Administration was personally

known to a single member of the British Government. "I'll go," said

he, "if you are perfectly sure my going will be agreeable to the

President." He himself recalled the fact, during one of our several

conversations just before he left, that you had not come when he

and Lord Grey had invited you. If you had come, by the way, this

era of a better understanding would have begun then, and half our

old troubles would then have been removed. Keeping away from one

another is the best of all methods of keeping all old

misunderstandings alive and of making new ones.

I have no doubt that Mr. Balfour's visit will cause visits of many

first-class British statesmen during the war or soon afterward.

That's all we need to bring about a perfect understanding.

You may remember how I tried to get an official report about the

behaviour of the _Benham_[58], and how, in the absence of that,

Lord Beresford made a disagreeable speech about our Navy in the

House of Lords, and how, when months later you sent me

Roosevelt's[59] letter, Lord Beresford expressed regret to me and

said that he would explain in another speech. I hadn't seen the old

fellow for a long time till a fortnight ago. He greeted me

cheerily, and I said, "I don't think I ought to shake hands with

you till you retract what you said about our navy." He insisted on

my dining with him. He invited Admiral Sims also, and those two

sailors had a jolly evening of it. Sims's coming has straightened

out all that naval misunderstanding and more. He is of immense help

to them and to us. But I'm going to make old Beresford's life a

burden till he gets up in the Lords and takes that speech

back--publicly. He's really all right; but it's just as well to

keep the records right. The proceedings of the House of Lords are

handsomely bound and go into every gentleman's library. I have seen

two centuries of them in many a house.

We can now begin a distinctly New Era in the world's history and in

its management if we rise to the occasion: there's not a shadow of

doubt about that. And the United States can play a part bigger than

we have yet dreamed of if we prove big enough to lead the British

and the French instead of listening to Irish and Germans. Neither

England nor France is a democracy--far from it. We can make them

both democracies and develop their whole people instead of about 10

per cent. of their people. We have simply to conduct our affairs by

a large national policy and not by the complaints of our really

non-American people. See how a declaration of war has cleared the

atmosphere!

We're happy yet, on rations. There are no potatoes. We have

meatless days. Good wheat meantime is sunk every day. The

submarine must be knocked out. Else the earth will be ruled by the

German bayonet and natural living will be _verboten_. We'll all

have to goose-step as the Crown Prince orders or--be shot. I see

they now propose that the United States shall pay the big war

indemnity in raw materials to the value of hundreds of billions of

dollars! Not just yet, I guess!

As we get reports of what you are doing, it's most cheerful. I

assure you, God has yet made nothing or nobody equal to the

American people; and I don't think He ever will or can.

Sincerely yours,

WALTER H. PAGE.

One of the curious developments of this Balfour Mission was a request

from President Wilson that Great Britain should take some decisive step

for the permanent settlement of the Irish question. "The President,"

this message ran, "wishes that, when you next meet the Prime Minister,

you would explain to him that only one circumstance now appears to stand

in the way of perfect coöperation with Great Britain. All Americans who

are not immediately connected with Germany by blood ties find their one

difficulty in the failure of Great Britain so far to establish a

satisfactory form of self-government in Ireland. In the recent debates

in Congress on the War Resolution, this sentiment was especially

manifest. It came out in the speeches of those enemies of the

Declaration who were not Irish themselves nor representatives of

sections in which Irish voters possessed great influence--notably

members from the Southern States.

"If the American people were once convinced that there was a likelihood

that the Irish question would soon be settled, great enthusiasm and

satisfaction would result and it would also strengthen the coöperation

which we are now about to organize between the United States and Great

Britain. Say this in unofficial terms to Mr. Lloyd George, but impress

upon him its very great significance. If the British Government should

act successfully on this matter, our American citizens of Irish descent

and to a great extent the German sympathizers who have made common cause

with the Irish, would join hands in the great common cause."

_To the President_

London, May 4, 1917.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

... It is a remarkable commentary on the insularity of the British

and on our studied isolation that till Mr. Balfour went over not a

member of this Government had ever met a member of our

Administration! Quite half our misunderstandings were due to this.

If I had the making of the laws of the two governments, I'd have a

statutory requirement that at least one visit a year by high

official persons should be made either way. We should never have

had a blacklist, etc., if that had been done. When I tried the

quite humble task of getting Polk to come and the excuse was made

that he couldn't be spared from his desk--Mr. President, I fear we

haven't half enough responsible official persons in our Government.

I should say that no man even of Polk's rank ought to have a desk:

just as well give him a mill-stone. Even I try not to have a desk:

else I'd never get anything of importance done; for I find that

talks and conferences in my office and in the government offices

and wherever else I can find out things take all my waking hours.

The Foreign Office here has about five high position men to every

one in the State Department. God sparing me, I'm going one of

these days to prepare a paper for our Foreign Affairs Committee on

the Waste of Having too Few High Grade Men in the Department of

State; a Plea for Five Assistant Secretaries for Every One Now

Existing and for Provision for International Visits by Them.

Here's an ancient and mouldy precedent that needs shattering--for

the coming of our country into its proper station and influence in

the world.

I am sure that Mr. Balfour's visit has turned out as well as I

hoped, and my hopes were high. He is one of the most interesting

men that I've ever had the honour to know intimately--he and Lord

Grey. Mr. Balfour is a Tory, of course; and in general I don't like

Tories, yet liberal he surely is--a sort of high-toned Scotch

democrat. I have studied him with increasing charm and interest.

Not infrequently when I am in his office just before luncheon he

says, "Come, walk over and we'll have lunch with the family." He's

a bachelor. One sister lives with him. Another (Lady Rayleigh, the

wife of the great chemist and Chancellor of Cambridge University)

frequently visits him. Either of those ladies could rule this

Empire. Then there are nieces and cousins always about--people of

rare cultivation, every one of 'em. One of those girls confirmed

the story that "Uncle Arthur" one day concluded that the niblick

was something more than a humble necessity of a bad golfer--that it

had positive virtues of its own and had suffered centuries of

neglect. He, therefore, proceeded to play with the niblick only,

till he proved his case and showed that it is a club entitled to

the highest respect.

A fierce old Liberal fighter in Parliamentary warfare, who entered

politics about the time Mr. Balfour did, told me this story the

other day. "I've watched Balfour for about forty years as a cat

watches a rat. I hate his party. I hated him till I learned better,

for I hated that whole Salisbury crowd. They wanted to Cecil

everything. But I'll tell you, Sir, apropos of his visit to your

country, that in all those years he has never spoken of the United

States except with high respect and often with deep affection. I

should have caught him, if he had."

I went with him to a college in London one afternoon where he

delivered a lecture on Dryden, to prove that poetry can carry a

certain cargo of argument but that argument can't raise the

smallest flight of poetry. Dry as it sounds, it was as good a

literary performance as I recall I ever heard.

At his "family" luncheon, I've found Lord Milner or Lord Lansdowne,

or some literary man who had come in to find out from Lady Rayleigh

how to conduct the Empire or to write a great book; and the modest

old chemical Lord sits silent most of the time and now and then

breaks loose to confound them all with a pat joke. This is a

vigorous family, these Balfours. There's one of them (a cousin of

some sort, I think, of the Foreign Secretary) who is a Lord of much

of Scotland, about as tall as Ben Nevis is high--a giant of a man.

One of his sons was killed early in the war and one was

missing--whether dead or not he did not know. Mrs. Page expressed

her hope one day to the old man that he had had news from his

missing son. "No, no," said he simply, "and me lady is awearying."

We've been lucky, Mr. President, in these days of immortal horrors

and of difficulties between two governments that did not know one

another--uncommonly lucky, in the large chances that politics gives

for grave errors, to have had two such men in the Foreign Office

here as Lord Grey and Mr. Balfour. There are men who were

mentioned for this post that would have driven us mad--or to war

with them. I'm afraid I've almost outgrown my living hero worship.

There isn't worshipful material enough lying around in the world to

keep a vigorous reverence in practice. But these two gentlemen by

birth and culture have at least sometimes seemed of heroic size to

me. It has meant much to know them well. I shall always be grateful

to them, for in their quiet, forceful way they helped me much to

establish right relations with these people--which, pray God, I

hope to retain through whatever new trials we may yet encounter.

For it will fall to us yet to loose and to free the British, and a

Briton set free is an American. That's all you can do for a man or

for a nation of men.

These Foreign Secretaries are not only men of much greater

cultivation than their Prime Ministers but of greater moral force.

But I've come to like Lloyd George very much. He'd never deliver a

lecture on Dryden, and he doesn't even play a good game of golf;

but he has what both Lord Grey and Mr. Balfour lack--a touch of

genius--whatever that is--not the kind that takes infinite pains,

but the kind that acts as an electric light flashed in the dark. He

said to me the other day that experts have nearly been the death of

him. "The Government has experts, experts, experts, everywhere. In

any department where things are not going well, I have found boards

and committees and boards of experts. But in one department at

least I've found a substitute for them. I let twenty experts go and

I put in one Man, and things began to move at once. Do you know any

real Men? When you hear of any, won't you let me know?"

A little while ago he dined with me, and, after dinner, I took him

to a corner of the drawing room and delivered your message to him

about Ireland. "God knows, I'm trying," he replied. "Tell the

President that. And tell him to talk to Balfour." Presently he

broke out--"Madmen, madmen--I never saw any such task," and he

pointed across the room to Sir Edward Carson, his First Lord of the

Admiralty--"Madmen." "But the President's right. We've got to

settle it and we've got to settle it now." Carson and Jellicoe came

across the room and sat down with us. "I've been telling the

Ambassador, Carson, that we've got to settle the Irish question

now--in spite of you.

"I'll tell you something else we've got to settle now," said

Carson. "Else it'll settle us. That's the submarines. The press and

public are working up a calculated and concerted attack on Jellicoe

and me, and, if they get us, they'll get you. It's an attack on the

Government made on the Admiralty. Prime Minister," said this Ulster

pirate whose civil war didn't come off only because the big war was

begun--"Prime Minister, it may be a fierce attack. Get ready for

it." Well, it has been developing ever since. But I can't for the

life of me guess at the possible results of an English

Parliamentary attack on a government. It's like a baseball man

watching a game of cricket. He can't see when the player is out or

why, or what caused it. Of course, the submarine may torpedo Lloyd

George and his Government. It looks very like it may overturn the

Admiralty, as Gallipoli did. If this public finds out the whole

truth, it will demand somebody's head. But I'm only a baseball man;

cricket is beyond me.

But Lloyd George will outlive the war as an active force, whatever

happen to him in the meantime. He's too heavily charged with

electricity to stop activity. The war has ended a good many careers

that seemed to have long promise. It is ending more every day. But

there is only one Lloyd George, and, whatever else he lack, he

doesn't lack life.

I heard all the speeches in both Houses on the resolution of

appreciation of our coming into the war--Bonar Law's, Asquith's

(one of the best), Dillon's, a Labour man's, and, in the Lords,

Curzon's, Crewe's, the Archbishop's (who delivered in the course of

his remarks a benediction on me) and Bryce's (almost the best of

all). It wasn't "oratory," but it was well said and well meant.

They know how badly they need help and they do mean to be as good

to us as their benignant insularity will permit. They are changing.

I can't describe the great difference that the war has made in

them. They'll almost become docile in a little more time.

And we came in in the nick of time for them--in very truth. If we

hadn't, their exchange would have gone down soon and they know it.

I shall never forget the afternoon I spent with Mr. Balfour and Mr.

Bonar Law on that subject. They saw blue ruin without our financial

help. And now, if we can save them from submarines, those that know

will know how vital our help was. Again, the submarine is the great

and grave and perhaps the only danger now. If that can be scotched,

I believe the whole Teutonic military structure would soon tumble.

If not, the Germans may go on as long as they can feed their army,

allowing their people to starve.

Of course, you know, we're on rations now--yet we suffer no

inconvenience on that score. But these queer people (they are the

most amusing and confusing and contradictory of all God's

creatures, these English, whose possibilities are infinite and

whose actualities, in many ways, are pitiful)--these queer people

are fiercely pursuing food-economy by discussing in the newspapers

whether a hen consumes more food than she produces, and whether

what dogs eat contains enough human food to justify the shooting of

every one in the Kingdom. That's the way we are coming down to

humble fare. But nothing can quite starve a people who all live

near the sea which yields fish enough near shore to feed them

wastefully.

All along this South shore, where I am to-day[60], I see the Stars

and Stripes; and everywhere there is a demand for the words and

music of the Battle Hymn of the Republic and the Star Spangled

Banner.

This our-new-Ally business is bringing me a lot of amusing

troubles. Theatres offer me boxes, universities offer me degrees,

hospitals solicit visits from me, clubs offer me dinners--I'll have

to get a new private secretary or two well-trained to say "No"

politely, else I shall not have my work done. But all that will

presently wear away as everything wears away (quickly, too) in the

grim face of this bloody monster of war which is consuming men as a

prairie fire consumes blades of grass. There's a family that lives

around the corner from this hotel. One son is in the trenches,

another is in a madhouse from shell-shock, a third coming home

wounded the other day was barely rescued when a torpedo sunk a

hospital ship and may lose his reason. I suppose I saw one hundred

men this afternoon on a single mile of beach who had lost both

legs. Through the wall from my house in London is a hospital. A

young Texan has been there, whose legs are gone at the thighs and

one arm at the elbow. God pity us for not having organized the

world better than this! We'll do it, yet, Mr. President--_you'll_

do it; and thank God for you. If we do not organize Europe and

make another such catastrophe impossible, life will not be worth

being born into except to the few whose days happen to fall between

recurring devastations of the world.

Yours sincerely,

WALTER H. PAGE.

"I hope that the English people," Colonel House wrote to Page about this

time, "realize how successful Mr. Balfour's visit to America really was.

There is no man they could have sent who could have done it better. He

and the President got along marvellously well. The three of us dined and

spent the evening together and it was delightful to see how sympathetic

their minds were."

A letter from Mr. Polk also discloses the impression which Mr. Balfour

made upon Washington:

_From Frank L. Polk_

Washington, May 25, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PAGE:

I just want to get off a line to catch the pouch.

You probably know what a wonderful success the British Mission has

been, but I do not think you can realize what a deep impression

they have made on all of us. Mr. Balfour really won the affection

of us all, and I do not know when I was more sorry to have a man

leave than I was to have him go last night. He expressed himself as

having been very much impressed with his reception and the way he

was treated. He was most fair in all discussions, and I think has a

better understanding of our point of view. I had the good fortune

of being present at the financial and the diplomatic conferences,

and I think we all felt that we were dealing with a sympathetic

friend.

He and the President got on tremendously. The best evidence of that

was the fact that the President went up to Congress and sat in the

gallery while Mr. Balfour addressed the House. This is without

precedent.

The difficult problem of course was the blacklist and bunkering

agreement, but I think we are by that. The important thing now is

for the British to make all the concessions possible in connection

with the release of goods in Rotterdam and the release of goods in

Prize Court, though the cases have not been begun. Of course I mean

cases of merely suspicion rather than where there is evidence of

wrongdoing.

The sending of the destroyers and troops abroad is going to do a

great deal toward impressing our people with the fact that we

really are in the war. I do not think it is thoroughly borne home

on the majority yet what a serious road we have chosen.

With warm regards,

Yours faithfully,

FRANK L. POLK.

Mr. Polk's reference to the blacklist recalls an episode which in itself

illustrates the changed character of the relations that had now been

established between the American and the British governments. Mr.

Balfour discussed shipping problems for the most part with Mr. Polk,

under whose jurisdiction these matters fell. As one of these conferences

was approaching its end Mr. Balfour slightly coughed, uttered an "er,"

and gave other indications that he was about to touch upon a ticklish

question.

"Before I go," he said, "there--er--is one subject I would--er--like to

say something about."

Mr. Polk at once grasped what was coming.

"I know what you have in mind," said Mr. Polk in his characteristically

quick way. "You want us to apply your blacklist to neutrals."

In other words, the British hoped that the United States, now that it

was in the war, would adopt against South America and other offenders

those same discriminations which this country had so fiercely objected

to, when it was itself a neutral.

The British statesman gave Mr. Polk one of his most winning smiles and

nodded.

"Mr. Balfour," said Mr. Polk, "it took Great Britain three years to

reach a point where it was prepared to violate all the laws of blockade.

You will find that it will take us only two months to become as great

criminals as you are!"

Mr. Balfour is usually not explosive in his manifestations of mirth, but

his laughter, in reply to this statement, was almost uproarious. And the

State Department was as good as its word. It immediately forgot all the

elaborate "notes" and "protests" which it had been addressing to Great

Britain. It became more inexorable than Great Britain had ever been in

keeping foodstuffs out of neutral countries that were contiguous to

Germany. Up to the time the United States entered the war, Germany, in

spite of the watchful British fleet, had been obtaining large supplies

from the United States through Holland, Denmark, and the Scandinavian

peninsula. But the United States now immediately closed these leaks. In

the main this country adopted a policy of "rationing"; that is, it would

furnish the little nations adjoining Germany precisely the amount of

food which they needed for their own consumption. This policy was one of

the chief influences in undermining the German people and forcing their

surrender. The American Government extended likewise the blacklist to

South America and other countries, and, in doing so, it bettered the

instruction of Great Britain herself.

Though the whole story of the blockade thus seems finally to have ended

in a joke, the whole proceeding has its serious side. The United States

had been posing for three years as the champion of neutral rights; the

point of view of Washington had been that there was a great principle at

stake. If such a principle were involved, it was certainly present in

just the same degree after the United States became belligerent as in

the days when we were neutrals. The lofty ideals by which the

Administration had professed to be guided should have still controlled

its actions; the mere fact that we, as a belligerent, could obtain

certain advantages would hardly have justified a great and high-minded

nation in abandoning its principles. Yet abandon them we did from the

day that we declared war. We became just as remorseless in disregarding

the rights of small states as Great Britain--according to our numerous

blockade notes--had been. Possibly, therefore, Mr. Balfour's mirth was

not merely sympathetic or humorous; it perhaps echoed his discovery that

our position for three years had really been nothing but a sham; that

the State Department had been forcing points in which it did not really

believe, or in which it did not believe when American interests were

involved. At any rate, this ending of our long argument with Great

Britain was a splendid justification for Page; his contention had always

been that the preservation of civilization was more important than the

technicalities of the international lawyers. And now the Wilson

Administration, by throwing into the waste basket all the finespun

theories with which it had been embarrassing the Allied cause since

August 4, 1914, accepted--and accepted joyously--his point of view.

II

One of the first things which Mr. Balfour did, on his arrival in

Washington, was personally to explain to President Wilson about the

so-called "secret treaties." The "secret treaty" that especially preyed

upon Mr. Wilson's mind, and which led to a famous episode at the

Versailles Conference, was that which had been made with Italy in 1915,

as consideration for Italy's participation in the war. Mr. Balfour, in

telling the President of these territorial arrangements with Italy,

naturally did not criticise his ally, but it was evident that he

regarded the matter as something about which the United States should be

informed.

"This is the sort of thing you have to do when you are engaged in a

war," he explained, and then he gave Mr. Wilson the details.

Probably the most important information which Mr. Balfour and the French

and Italian Commissions brought to Washington was the desperate

situation of the Allied cause. On that point not one of the visiting

statesmen or military and naval advisers made the slightest attempt at

concealment. Mr. Balfour emphasized the seriousness of the crisis in one

of his earliest talks with Mr. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury. The

British statesman was especially interested in the financial situation

and he therefore took up this matter at an early date with the Treasury

Department.

"Mr. Balfour," said Mr. McAdoo, "before we make any plans of financial

assistance it is absolutely necessary that we know precisely where we

stand. The all-important thing is the question as to how long the war is

likely to last. If it is only to last a few months, it is evident that

we need to make very different arrangements than if it is to last

several years. Just what must we make provision for? Let us assume that

the United States goes in with all its men and resources--that we

dedicate all our money, our manufacturing plants, our army, our navy,

everything we have got, to bringing the war to an end. How long will it

take?"

Mr. Balfour replied that it would be necessary to consult his naval and

military advisers before he answered that question. He said that he

would return in a day or two and make an explicit statement. He did so

and his answer was this: Under these circumstances--that the United

States should make war to the full limit of its power, in men and

resources--the war could not be ended until the summer or the autumn of

1919. Mr. McAdoo put the same question in the same form to the French

and Italian Missions and obtained precisely the same answer.

Page's papers show that Mr. Balfour, in the early stages of American

participation, regarded the financial situation as the thing which

chiefly threatened the success of the Allied cause. So much greater

emphasis has been laid upon the submarine warfare that this may at first

seem rather a misreading of Great Britain's peril. Yet the fact is that

the high rate of exchange and the depredatory U-boat represented almost

identically the same danger. The prospect that so darkened the horizon

in the spring of 1917 was the possible isolation of Great Britain.

England's weakness, as always, consisted in the fact that she was an

island, that she could not feed herself with her own resources and that

she had only about six weeks' supply of food ahead of her at any one

time. If Germany could cut the lines of communication and so prevent

essential supplies from reaching British ports, the population of Great

Britain could be starved into surrender in a very brief time, France

would be overwhelmed, and the triumph of the Prussian cause would be

complete. That the success of the German submarine campaign would

accomplish this result was a fact that the popular mind readily grasped.

What it did not so clearly see, however, was that the financial collapse

of Great Britain would cut these lines of communication quite as

effectually as the submarine itself. The British were practically

dependent for their existence upon the food brought from the United

States, just as the Allied armies were largely dependent upon the steel

which came from the great industrial plants of this country. If Great

Britain could not find the money with which to purchase these supplies,

it is quite apparent that they could not be shipped. The collapse of

British credit therefore would have produced the isolation of the

British Isles and led to a British surrender, just as effectively as

would the success of the German submarine campaign.

As soon as Bernstorff was sent home, therefore, and the participation of

this country in the war became extremely probable, Mr. Balfour took up

the financial question with Page.

_To the President_

March 5, 1917.

The inquiries which I have made here about financial conditions

disclose an international situation which is most alarming to the

financial and industrial outlook of the United States. England has

not only to pay her own war bills, but is obliged to finance her

Allies as well. Up to the present time she has done these tasks out

of her own capital. But she cannot continue her present extensive

purchases in the United States without shipping gold as payment for

them, and there are two reasons why she cannot make large

shipments of gold. In the first place, both England and France must

keep the larger part of the gold they have to maintain issues of

their paper at par; and, in the second place, the German U-boat has

made the shipping of gold a dangerous procedure even if they had it

to ship. There is therefore a pressing danger that the

Franco-American and Anglo-American exchange will be greatly

disturbed; the inevitable consequence will be that orders by all

the Allied Governments will be reduced to the lowest possible

amount and that trans-Atlantic trade will practically come to an

end. The result of such a stoppage will be a panic in the United

States. The world will therefore be divided into two hemispheres,

one of them, our own, will have the gold and the commodities; the

other, Great Britain and Europe, will need these commodities, but

it will have no money with which to pay for them. Moreover, it will

have practically no commodities of its own to exchange for them.

The financial and commercial result will be almost as bad for the

United States as for Europe. We shall soon reach this condition

unless we take quick action to prevent it. Great Britain and France

must have a credit in the United States which will be large enough

to prevent the collapse of world trade and the whole financial

structure of Europe.

If the United States declare war against Germany, the greatest help

we could give Great Britain and its Allies would be such a credit.

If we should adopt this policy, an excellent plan would be for our

Government to make a large investment in a Franco-British loan.

Another plan would be to guarantee such a loan. A great advantage

would be that all the money would be kept in the United States. We

could keep on with our trade and increase it, till the war ends,

and after the war Europe would purchase food and an enormous supply

of materials with which to reëquip her peace industries. We should

thus reap the profit of an uninterrupted and perhaps an enlarging

trade over a number of years and we should hold their securities in

payment.

On the other hand, if we keep nearly all the gold and Europe cannot

pay for reëstablishing its economic life, there may be a world-wide

panic for an indefinite period.

Of course we cannot extend such a credit unless we go to war with

Germany. But is there no way in which our Government might

immediately and indirectly help the establishment in the United

States of a large Franco-British credit without violating armed

neutrality? I do not know enough about our own reserve bank law to

form an opinion. But these banks would avert such a danger if they

were able to establish such a credit. Danger for us is more real

and imminent, I think, than the public on either side the Atlantic

understands. If it be not averted before its manifestations become

apparent, it will then be too late to save the day.

The pressure of this approaching crisis, I am certain, has gone

beyond the ability of the Morgan financial agency for the British

and French governments. The financial necessities of the Allies are

too great and urgent for any private agency to handle, for every

such agency has to encounter business rivalries and sectional

antagonisms.

It is not improbable that the only way of maintaining our present

preëminent trade position and averting a panic is by declaring war

on Germany. The submarine has added the last item to the danger of

a financial world crash. There is now an uncertainty about our

being drawn into the war; no more considerable credits can be

privately placed in the United States. In the meantime a collapse

may come.

PAGE.

Urgent as this message was, it really understated the desperate

condition of British and Allied finances. That the warring powers were

extremely pressed for money has long been known; but Page's papers

reveal for the first time the fact that they were facing the prospect of

bankruptcy itself. "The whole Allied combination on this side the ocean

are very much nearer the end of their financial resources," he wrote in

July, "than anybody has guessed or imagined. We only can save them....

The submarines are steadily winning the war. Pershing and his army have

bucked up the French for the moment. But for his coming there was more

or less danger of a revolution in Paris and of serious defection in the

army. Everybody here fears that the French will fail before another

winter of the trenches. Yet--the Germans must be still worse off."

The matter that was chiefly pressing at the time of the Balfour visit

was the fact that the British balances in the New York banks were in a

serious condition. It should always be remembered, however, that Great

Britain was financing not only herself, but her Allies, and that the

difficult condition in which she now found herself was caused by the not

too considerate demands of the nations with which she was allied in the

war. Thus by April 6, 1917, Great Britain had overdrawn her account with

J.P. Morgan to the extent of $400,000,000 and had no cash available with

which to meet this overdraft. This obligation had been incurred in the

purchase of supplies, both for Great Britain and the allied governments;

and securities, largely British owned stocks and bonds, had been

deposited to protect the bankers. The money was now coming due; if the

obligations were not met, the credit of Great Britain in this country

would reach the vanishing point. Though at first there was a slight

misunderstanding about this matter, the American Government finally

paid this over-draft out of the proceeds of the first Liberty Loan. This

act saved the credit of the allied countries; it was, of course, only

the beginning of the financial support that America brought to the

allied cause; the advances that were afterward furnished from the

American Treasury made possible the purchases of food and supplies in

enormous quantities. The first danger that threatened, the isolation and

starvation of Great Britain, was therefore overcome. It was the joint

product of Page's work in London and that of the Balfour Commission in

the United States.

III

Until these financial arrangements had been made there was no certainty

that the supplies which were so essential to victory would ever leave

the United States; this obstruction at the source had now been removed.

But the greater difficulty still remained. The German submarines were

lying off the waters south and west of Ireland ready to sink the supply

ships as soon as they entered the prohibited zone. Mr. Balfour and his

associates were working also on this problem in Washington; and, at the

same time, Page and Admiral Sims and the British Admiralty were bending

all their energies in London to obtain immediate coöperation.

A remark which Mr. Balfour afterward made to Admiral Sims shows the

frightful nature of the problem which was confronting Great Britain at

that time.

"That was a terrible week we spent at sea in that voyage to the United

States," Mr. Balfour said. "We knew that the German submarine campaign

was succeeding. Their submarines were destroying our shipping and we

had no means of preventing it. I could not help thinking that we were

facing the defeat of Great Britain."

Page's papers show that as early as February 25th he understood in a

general way the disheartening proportions of the German success. "It is

a momentous crisis," he wrote at that time. "The submarines are

destroying shipping at an appalling rate." Yet it was not until Admiral

Sims arrived in London, on April 9th, that the Ambassador learned all

the details. In sending the Admiral to England the Navy Department had

acted on an earnest recommendation from Page. The fact that the American

Navy was inadequately represented in the British capital had long been a

matter of embarrassment to him. The ability and personal qualifications

of our attachés had been unquestioned; but none of them during the war

had been men of high rank, and this in itself proved to be a constant

impediment to their success. While America was represented by

Commanders, Japan, Italy, and France had all sent Admirals to London.

Page's repeated requests for an American Admiral had so far met with no

response, but the probability that this country would become involved in

the war now gave new point to his representations. In the latter part of

March, Page renewed his request in still more urgent form, and this time

the President and the Navy Department responded favourably. The result

was that, on April 9th, three days after the American declaration of

war, Admiral Sims and his flag-lieutenant, Commander Babcock, presented

themselves at the American Embassy. There was little in the appearance

of these men to suggest a violent naval demonstration against Germany.

Both wore civilian dress, their instructions having commanded them not

to bring uniforms; both were travelling under assumed names, and both

had no more definite orders than to investigate the naval situation and

cable the results to Washington. In spite of these attempts at secrecy,

the British had learned that Admiral Sims was on the way; they rejoiced

not only in this fact, but in the fact that Sims had been chosen, for

there was no American naval officer whose professional reputation stood

so high in the British Navy or who was so personally acceptable to

British officialdom and the British public. The Admiralty therefore met

Admiral Sims at Liverpool, brought him to London in a special train,

and, a few hours after his arrival, gave him the innermost secrets on

the submarine situation--secrets which were so dangerous that not all

the members of the British Cabinet had been let into them.

Page welcomed Admiral Sims with a cordiality which that experienced sea

veteran still gratefully remembers. He at once turned over to him two

rooms in the Embassy. "You can have everything we've got," the

Ambassador said. "If necessary to give you room, we'll turn the whole

Embassy force out into the street." The two men had not previously met,

but in an instant they became close friends. A common sympathy and a

common enthusiasm were greatly needed at that crisis. As soon as Admiral

Sims had finished his interview with Admiral Jellicoe, he immediately

sought out the Ambassador and laid all the facts before him. Germany was

winning the war. Great Britain had only six weeks' food supply on hand,

and the submarines were sinking the ships at a rate which, unless the

depredations should be checked, meant an early and unconditional

surrender of the British Empire. Only the help of the United States

could prevent this calamity.

Page, of course, was aghast: the facts and figures Admiral Sims gave him

disclosed a situation which was even more desperate than he had

imagined. He advised the Admiral to cable the whole story immediately to

Washington. Admiral Sims at first had some difficulty in obtaining the

Admiralty's consent to doing this, and the reason was the one with which

Page had long been familiar--the fear, altogether too justified, that

the news would "leak" out of Washington. Of course there was no

suspicion in British naval circles of the good faith of the Washington

officials, but important facts had been sent so many times under the

seal of the strictest secrecy and had then found their way into the

newspapers that there was a deep distrust of American discretion.

Certainly no greater damage could have been done the allied cause at

that time than to have the Germans learn how successfully their

submarine campaign was progressing. The question was referred to the

Imperial War Council and its consent obtained. The report, however, was

sent to the Navy Department in the British naval code, and decoded in

the British Embassy in Washington.

Admiral Sims's message gave all the facts about the submarine situation,

and concluded with the recommendation that the United States should

assemble all floating craft that could be used in the anti-submarine

warfare, destroyers, tugs, yachts, light cruisers, and similar vessels,

and send them immediately to Queenstown, where they would do valuable

service in convoying merchant vessels and destroying the U-boats. At

that time the American Navy had between fifty and sixty destroyers that

were patrolling the American coast; these could have been despatched,

almost immediately, to the scene of operations; but, in response to this

request, the Department sent six to Queentown.

The next few months were very unhappy ones for Admiral Sims. He was the

representative in London of one of the world's greatest naval powers,

participating in the greatest war that had ever enlisted its energies,

yet his constant appeals for warships elicited the most inadequate

response, his well-reasoned recommendations for meeting the crisis were

frequently unanswered and at other times were met with counter-proposals

so childish that they seemed almost to have originated in the brains of

newspaper amateurs, and his urgent pictures of a civilization rapidly

going to wreck were apparently looked upon with suspicion as the

utterances of a man who had been completely led astray by British guile.

To give a fair idea of Washington's neglect during this period it is

only necessary to point out that, for four months, Admiral Sims occupied

the two rooms in the Embassy directly above Page's, with Commander

Babcock as his only aid. Sims's repeated requests to Secretary Daniels

for an additional staff went unheeded. Had it not been for the Admiral's

constant daily association with Page and the comfort and encouragement

which the Ambassador gave him, this experience would have been almost

unbearable. In the latter part of April, the Admiral's appeals to

Washington having apparently fallen on deaf ears, he asked Page to

second his efforts. The Admiral and Commander Babcock wrote another

message, and drove in a motor car to Brighton, where Page was taking a

little rest. The Admiral did not know just how strong a statement the

Ambassador would care to sponsor, and so he did not make this

representation as emphatic as the judgment of both men would have

preferred.

The Admiral handed Page the paper, saying that he had prepared it with

the hope that the Ambassador would sign it and send it directly to

President Wilson.

"It is quite apparent," Admiral Sims said, "that the Department doesn't

believe what I have been saying. Or they don't believe what the British

are saying. They think that England is exaggerating the peril for

reasons of its own. They think I am hopelessly pro-British and that I

am being used. But if you'll take it up directly with the President,

then they may be convinced."

Page put on his spectacles, took the paper, and read it through. Then,

looking over the rim of his glasses in his characteristic way, he leaned

toward Admiral Sims and said:

"Admiral, it isn't half strong enough! I think I can write a better

despatch than that, myself! At least let me try."

He immediately took a pen and paper and in a few minutes he had written

his own version which he gave the Admiral to read. The latter was

delighted with it and in a brief time it was on its way to Washington.

From: Ambassador Page.

To: Secretary of State.

Sent: 27 April, 1917.

_Very confidential for Secretary and President_

There is reason for the greatest alarm about the issue of the war

caused by the increasing success of the German submarines. I have

it from official sources that during the week ending 22nd April, 88

ships of 237,000 tons, allied and neutral, were lost. The number of

vessels unsuccessfully attacked indicated a great increase in the

number of submarines in action.

This means practically a million tons lost every month till the

shorter days of autumn come. By that time the sea will be about

clear of shipping. Most of the ships are sunk to the westward and

southward of Ireland. The British have in that area every available

anti-submarine craft, but their force is so insufficient that they

hardly discourage the submarines.

The British transport of troops and supplies is already strained to

the utmost, and the maintenance of the armies in the field is

threatened. There is food enough here to last the civil population

only not more than six weeks or two months.

Whatever help the United States may render at any time in the

future, or in any theatre of the war, our help is now more

seriously needed in this submarine area for the sake of all the

Allies than it can ever be needed again, or anywhere else.

After talking over this critical situation with the Prime Minister

and other members of the Government, I can not refrain from most

strongly recommending the immediate sending over of every destroyer

and all other craft that can be of anti-submarine use. This seems

to me the sharpest crisis of the war, and the most dangerous

situation for the Allies that has arisen or could arise.

If enough submarines can be destroyed in the next two or three

months, the war will be won, and if we can contribute effective

help immediately, it will be won directly by our aid. I cannot

exaggerate the pressing and increasing danger of this situation.

Thirty or more destroyers and other similar craft sent by us

immediately would very likely be decisive.

There is no time to be lost.

(Signed) PAGE.

This cablegram had a certain effect. The reply came from Washington that

"eventually" thirty-six destroyers would be sent.

* * * * *

Page's letters of this period are full of the same subject.

_To the President_

London, May 4, 1917.

Dear Mr. President:

The submarines have become a very grave danger. The loss of British

and allied tonnage increases with the longer and brighter days--as

I telegraphed you, 237,000 tons last week; and the worst of it is,

the British are not destroying them. The Admiralty publishes a

weekly report which, though true, is not the whole truth. It is

known in official circles here that the Germans are turning out at

least two a week--some say three; and the British are not

destroying them as fast as new ones are turned out. If merely the

present situation continue, the war will pretty soon become a

contest of endurance under hunger, with an increasing proportion of

starvation. Germany is yet much the worse off, but it will be

easily possible for Great Britain to suffer to the danger point

next winter or earlier unless some decided change be wrought in

this situation.

The greatest help, I hope, can come from us--our destroyers and

similar armed craft--provided we can send enough of them quickly.

The area to be watched is so big that many submarine hunters are

needed. Early in the war the submarines worked near shore. There

are very many more of them now and their range is one hundred

miles, or even two hundred, at sea.

The public is becoming very restive with its half information, and

it is more and more loudly demanding all the facts. There are

already angry threats to change the personnel of the Admiralty;

there is even talk of turning out the Government. "We must have

results, we must have results." I hear confidentially that Jellicoe

has threatened to resign unless the Salonica expedition is brought

back: to feed and equip that force requires too many ships.

And there are other troubles impending. Norway has lost so many of

her ships that she dare not send what are left to sea. Unarmed

they'll all perish. If she arms them, Germany will declare war

against her. There is a plan on foot for the British to charter

these Norwegian ships and to arm them, taking the risk of German

war against Norway. If war comes (as it is expected) England must

then defend Norway the best she can. And _then England may ask for

our big ships to help in these waters_. All this is yet in the

future, but possibly not far in the future.

For the present the only anti-submarine help is the help we may be

able to give to patrol the wide area off Ireland. If we had one

hundred destroyers to send, the job there could, I am told, be

quickly done. A third of that number will help mightily. At the

present rate of destruction more than four million tons will be

sunk before the summer is gone.

Such is this dire submarine danger. The English thought that they

controlled the sea; the Germans, that they were invincible on land.

Each side is losing where it thought itself strongest.

Admiral Sims is of the greatest help imaginable. Of course, I gave

him an office in one of our Embassy buildings, and the Admiralty

has given him an office also with them. He spends much of his time

there, and they have opened all doors and all desks and drawers to

him. He strikes me (and the English so regard him) as a man of

admirable judgment--unexcitable and indefatigable. I hope we'll

soon send a general over, to whom the War Department will act

similarly. Hoover, too, must have a good man here as, I dare say,

he has already made known. These will cover the Navy, the Army,

Food, and Shipping. Perhaps a Censor and an Intelligence (Secret

Service) group ought to come. I mean these for permanent--at least

indefinite--service. Exchange visits by a Congressional Committee

(such as the French and British make) and by high official persons

such as members of your Cabinet (such also as the French and

British make)--you will have got ideas about these from Mr.

Balfour.

W.H.P.

In the latter part of June Admiral Sims went to Queenstown. Admiral

Bayly, who directed the operation of the anti-submarine forces there,

had gone away for a brief rest, and Admiral Sims had taken over the

command of both the British and American forces at that point. This

experience gave Admiral Sims a first-hand picture of a really deplorable

situation. The crisis was so desperate that he made another appeal to

Page.

_From Admiral William S. Sims_

Admiralty House, Queenstown,

June 25, 1917.

My Dear Mr. Page:

I enclose herewith a letter on the submarine situation[61].

I think I have made it plain therein that the Allies are losing the

war; that it will be already lost when the loss of shipping reaches

the point where fully adequate supplies cannot be maintained on the

various battle fronts.

I cannot understand why our Government should hesitate to send the

necessary anti-submarine craft to this side.

There are at least seventeen more destroyers employed on our

Atlantic coast, _where there is no war_, not to mention numerous

other very useful anti-submarine craft, including sea-going tugs,

etc.

Can you not do something to bring our Government to an

understanding of how very serious the situation is? Would it not be

well to send another telegram to Mr. Lansing and the President, and

also send them the enclosed correspondence?

I am sending this by mail because I may be somewhat delayed in

returning to London.

Very sincerely yours,

Wm. S. Sims.

Page immediately acted on this suggestion.

_Most confidential for the Secretary of State and President only_

Sims sends me by special messenger from Queenstown the most

alarming reports of the submarine situation which are confirmed by

the Admiralty here. He says that the war will be won or lost in

this submarine zone within a few months. Time is of the essence of

the problem, and anti-submarine craft which cannot be assembled in

the submarine zone almost immediately may come too late. There is,

therefore, a possibility that this war may become a war between

Germany and the United States alone. Help is far more urgently and

quickly needed in this submarine zone than anywhere else in the

whole war area.

Page.

The United States had now been in the war for three months and only

twenty-eight of the sixty destroyers which were available had been sent

into the field. Yet this latest message of Page produced no effect, and,

when Admiral Sims returned from Queenstown, the two men, almost in

despair, consulted as to the step which they should take next. What was

the matter? Was it that Washington did not care to get into the naval

war with its full strength, or was it that it simply refused to believe

the representations of its Admiral and its Ambassador? Admiral Sims and

Page went over the whole situation and came to the conclusion that

Washington regarded them both as so pro-British that their reports were

subject to suspicion. Just as Page had found that the State Department,

and its "trade advisers," had believed that the British were using the

blockade as a means of destroying American trade for the benefit of

Britain, so now he believed that Mr. Daniels and Admiral Benson, the

Chief of Naval Operations, evidently thought that Great Britain was

attempting to lure American warships into European waters, to undergo

the risk of protecting British commerce, while British warships were

kept safely in harbour. Page suggested that there was now only one thing

left to do, and that was to request the British Government itself to

make a statement to President Wilson that would substantiate his own

messages.

"Whatever else they think of the British in Washington," he said, "they

know one thing--and that is that a British statesman like Mr. Balfour

will not lie."

Mr. Balfour by this time had returned from America. The fact that he had

established these splendid personal relations with Mr. Wilson, and that

he had impressed the American public so deeply with his sincerity and

fine purpose, made him especially valuable for this particular appeal.

Page and Admiral Sims therefore went to the Foreign Office and laid all

the facts before him. Their own statements, Page informed the Foreign

Secretary, were evidently regarded as hysterical and biased by an

unreasoning friendliness to Great Britain. If Mr. Balfour would say the

same things over his own signature, then they would not be disbelieved.

Mr. Balfour gladly consented. He called in Admiral Jellicoe and asked

him to draft a despatch, so that all the technical facts would be

completely accurate. He also consulted with Sir Edward Carson, the First

Lord of the Admiralty. Then Mr. Balfour put the document in its final

shape and signed it. It was as follows:

_Mr. Balfour to the President_

June 30, 1917.

The forces at present at the disposal of the British Admiralty are

not adequate to protect shipping from submarine attack in the

danger zone round the British Islands. Consequently shipping is

being sunk at a greater rate than it can be replaced by new tonnage

of British origin.

The time will come when, if the present rate of loss continues, the

available shipping, apart from American contribution, will be

insufficient to bring to this country sufficient foodstuffs and

other essentials, including oil fuel. The situation in regard to

our Allies, France, and Italy, is much the same.

Consequently, it is absolutely necessary to add to our forces as a

first step, pending the adoption or completion of measures which

will, it is hoped, eventually lead to the destruction of enemy

submarines at a rate sufficient to ensure safety of our sea

communications.

The United States is the only allied country in a position to help.

The pressing need is for armed small craft of every kind available

in the area where commerce concentrates near the British and French

coasts. Destroyers, submarines, gunboats, yachts, trawlers, and

tugs would all give invaluable help, and if sent in sufficient

numbers would undoubtedly save a situation which is manifestly

critical. But they are required now and in as great numbers as

possible. There is no time for delay. The present method of

submarine attack is almost entirely by torpedo with the submarine

submerged. The gun defense of merchant ships keeps the submarine

below the surface but does no more; offensively against a submerged

submarine it is useless, and the large majority of the ships

torpedoed never see the attacking submarine until the torpedo has

hit the ship[62].

The present remedy is, therefore, to prevent the submarine from

using its periscope for fear of attack by bomb or ram from small

craft, and this method of defense for the shipping and offense

against the submarine requires small craft in very large numbers.

The introduction of the convoy system, provided there are

sufficient destroyers to form an adequate screen to the convoy,

will, it is hoped, minimize losses when it is working, and the

provision of new offensive measures is progressing; but for the

next few months there is only one safeguard, viz., the immediate

addition to patrols of every small vessel that can possibly be sent

to European waters.

Page, moreover, kept up his own appeal:

_To the President_

July 5th.

_Strictly confidential to the President and the Secretary_

The British Cabinet is engaging in a threatening controversy about

the attitude which they should take toward the submarine peril.

There is a faction in the Admiralty which possesses the

indisputable facts and which takes a very disheartening view of

the situation. This group insists that the Cabinet should make a

confession at least to us of the full extent of the danger and that

it should give more information to the public. The public does not

feel great alarm simply because it has been kept in too great

ignorance. But the political faction is so far the stronger. It

attempts to minimize the facts, and, probably for political

reasons, it refuses to give these discouraging facts wide

publicity. The politicians urge that it is necessary to conceal the

full facts from the Germans. They also see great danger in throwing

the public into a panic.

Mr. Lloyd George is always optimistic and he is too much inclined

to yield his judgment to political motives. In his recent address

in Glasgow he gave the public a comforting impression of the

situation. But the facts do not warrant the impression which he

gave.

This dispute among the political factions is most unfortunate and

it may cause an explosion of public feeling at any time. Changes in

the Cabinet may come in consequence. If the British public knew all

the facts or if the American people knew them, the present British

Government would probably fall. It is therefore not only the

submarine situation which is full of danger. The political

situation is in a dangerous state also.

PAGE.

_To Arthur W. Page_

Wilsford Manor, Salisbury,

July 8, 1917.

DEAR ARTHUR:

Since admirals and generals began to come from home, they and the

war have taken my time so completely, day and night, that I haven't

lately written you many things that I should like to tell you. I'll

try here--a house of a friend of ours where the only other guest

besides your mother and me is Edward Grey. This is the first time

I've seen him since he left office. Let me take certain big

subjects in order and come to smaller things later:

1. The German submarines are succeeding to a degree that the public

knows nothing about. These two things are true: (a) The Germans are

building submarines faster than the English sink them. In this way,

therefore, they are steadily gaining. (b) The submarines are

sinking freight ships faster than freight ships are being built by

the whole world. In this way, too, then, the Germans are

succeeding. Now if this goes on long enough, the Allies' game is

up. For instance, they have lately sunk so many fuel oil ships,

that this country may very soon be in a perilous condition--even

the Grand Fleet may not have enough fuel. Of course the chance is

that oil ships will not continue to fall victims to the U-boats and

we shall get enough through to replenish the stock. But this

illustrates the danger, and it is a very grave danger.

The best remedy so far worked out is the destroyer. The submarines

avoid destroyers and they sink very, very few ships that are

convoyed. If we had destroyers enough to patrol the whole approach

(for, say, 250 miles) to England, the safety of the sea would be

very greatly increased; and if we had enough to patrol and to

convoy every ship going and coming, the damage would be reduced to

a minimum. The Admiral and I are trying our best to get our

Government to send over 500 improvised destroyers--yachts,

ocean-going tugs--any kind of swift craft that can be armed. Five

hundred such little boats might end the war in a few months; for

the Germans are keeping the spirit of their people and of their

army up by their submarine success. If that success were stopped

they'd have no other cry half so effective. If they could see this

in Washington as we see it, they'd do it and do it not halfway but

with a vengeance. If they don't do it, the war may be indefinitely

prolonged and a wholly satisfactory peace may never be made. The

submarine is the most formidable thing the war has produced--by

far--and it gives the German the only earthly chance he has to win.

And he _may_ substantially win by it yet. That's what the British

conceal. In fact, half of them do not see it or believe it. But

nothing is truer, or plainer. One hundred thousand submarine

chasers next year may be worth far less than 500 would be worth

now, for next year see how few ships may be left! The mere arming

of ships is not enough. Nearly all that are sunk are armed. The

submarine now carries a little periscope and a big one, each

painted the colour of the sea. You can't see a little periscope

except in an ocean as smooth as glass. It isn't bigger than a

coffee cup. The submarine thus sinks its victims without ever

emerging or ever being seen. As things now stand, the Germans are

winning the war, and they are winning it on the sea; that's the

queer and the most discouraging fact. My own opinion is that all

the facts ought to be published to all the world. Let the Germans

get all the joy they can out of the confession. No matter, if the

Government and the people of the United States knew all the facts,

we'd have 1,000 improvised destroyers (yachts, tugs, etc., etc.)

armed and over here very quickly. Then the tide would turn.

Then there'd be nothing to fear in the long run. For the military

authorities all agree that the German Army is inferior to the

British and French and will be whipped. That may take a long time

yet; but of the result nobody who knows seems to have any

doubt--unless the French get tired and stop. They have periods of

great war weariness and there is real danger that they may quit and

make a separate peace. General Pershing's presence has made the

situation safe for the moment. But in a little while something else

spectacular and hopeful may be required to keep them in line.

Such is an accurate picture of the war as it is now, and it is a

dangerous situation.

2. The next grave danger is financial. The European Allies have so

bled the English for money that the English would by this time

probably have been on a paper money basis (and of course all the

Allies as well) if we had not come to their financial aid. And

we've got to keep our financial aid going to them to prevent this

disastrous result. That wouldn't at once end the war, if they had

all abandoned specie payments; but it would be a frightfully severe

blow and it might later bring defeat. That is a real danger. And

the Government at Washington, I fear, does not know the full extent

of the danger. They think that the English are disposed to lie down

on them. They don't realize the cost of the war. This Government

has bared all this vast skeleton to me; but I fear that Washington

imagines that part of it is a deliberate scare. It's a very real

danger.

Now, certain detached items:

Sims is the idol of the British Admiralty and he is doing his job

just as well as any man could with the tools and the chance that he

has. He has made the very best of the chance and he has completely

won the confidence and admiration of this side of the world.

Pershing made an admirable impression here, and in France he has

simply set them wild with joy. His coming and his little army have

been worth what a real army will be worth later. It is well he came

to keep the French in line.

The army of doctors and nurses have had a similar effect.

Even the New England saw-mill units have caused a furor of

enthusiasm. They came with absolute Yankee completeness of

organization--with duplicate parts of all their machinery, tents,

cooks, pots, and pans, and everything ship-shape. The only question

they asked was: "Say, where the hell are them trees you want sawed

up?" That's the way to do a job! Yankee stock is made high here by

such things as that.

We're getting a crowd of Yankee lecturers on the United States to

go up and down this Kingdom. There's the greatest imaginable

curiosity to hear about the United States in all kinds of society

from munition workers to universities. I got the British Government

to write Buttrick[63] to come as its guest, and the Rockefeller

Boards rose to the occasion. He'll probably be along presently. If

he hasn't already sailed when you get this, see him and tell him to

make arrangements to have pictures sent over to him to illustrate

his lectures. Who else could come to do this sort of a job?

I am myself busier than I have ever been. The kind of work the

Embassy now has to do is very different from the work of the days

of neutrality. It continues to increase--especially the work that I

have to do myself. But it's all pleasant now. We are trying to help

and no longer to hinder. To save my life I don't see how the

Washington crowd can look at themselves in a mirror and keep their

faces straight. Yesterday they were bent on sending everything into

European neutral states. The foundations of civilization would give

way if neutral trade were interfered with. Now, nothing must go in

except on a ration basis. Yesterday it must be a peace without

victory. Now it must be a complete victory, every man and every

dollar thrown in, else no peace is worth having. I don't complain.

I only rejoice. But I'm glad that kind of a rapid change is not a

part of my record. The German was the same beast yesterday that he

is to-day; and it makes a simple-minded, straight-minded man like

me wonder which attitude was the (or is the) attitude of real

conviction. But this doesn't bother me now as a real problem--only

as a speculation. What we call History will, I presume, in time

work this out. But History is often a kind of lie. But never mind

that. The only duty of mankind now is to win. Other things can

wait.

I walked over to Stonehenge and back (about six miles) with Lord

Grey (Sir Edward, you know) and we, like everybody else, fell to

talking about when the war may end. We know as well as anybody and

no better than anybody else. I have very different moods about

it--no convictions. It seems to me to depend, as things now are,

more on the submarines than on anything else. If we could

effectually discourage them so that the Germans would have to

withdraw them and could no more keep up the spirit of their people

by stories of the imminent starvation of England, I have a feeling

that the hunger and the war weariness of the German people would

lead them to force an end. But, the more they are called on to

suffer the more patriotic do they think themselves and they _may_

go on till they drop dead in their tracks.

What I am really afraid of is that the Germans may, before winter,

offer all that the Western Allies most want--the restoration of

Belgium and France, the return of Alsace-Lorraine, etc., in the

West and the surrender of the Colonies--provided Austria is not

dismembered. That would virtually leave them the chance to work out

their Middle Europe scheme and ultimately there'd probably have to

be another war over that question. That's the real eventuality to

be feared--a German defeat in the West but a German victory in the

Southeast. Everybody in Europe is so war weary that such a plan

_may_ succeed.

On the other hand, what Hoover and Northcliffe fear may come

true--that the Germans are going to keep up the struggle for

years--till their armies are practically obliterated, as Lee's army

was. If the Allies were actually to kill (not merely wound, but

actually kill) 5,000 Germans a day for 300 days a year, it would

take about four years to obliterate the whole German Army. There is

the bare possibility, therefore, of a long struggle yet. But I

can't believe it. My dominant mood these days is an end within a

very few months after the submarines are knocked out. Send over,

therefore, 1,000 improvised destroyers the next two months, and

I'll promise peace by Christmas. Otherwise I can make no promises.

That's all that Lord Grey and I know, and surely we are two wise

men. What, therefore, is the use in writing any more about this?

The chief necessity that grows upon me is that all the facts must

be brought out that show the kinship in blood and ideals of the two

great English-speaking nations. We were actually coming to believe

ourselves that we were part German and Slovene and Pole and

What-not, instead of essentially being Scotch and English. Hence

the unspeakable impudence of your German who spoke of eliminating

the Anglo-Saxon element from American life! The truth should be

forcibly and convincingly told and repeated to the end of the

chapter, and our national life should proceed on its natural

historic lines, with its proper historic outlook and background. We

can do something to bring this about.

Affectionately,

W.H.P.

The labour of getting the American Navy into the war was evidently at

first a difficult one, but the determination of Page and Admiral Sims

triumphed, and, by August and September, our energies were fully

engaged. And the American Navy made a record that will stand

everlastingly to its glory. Without its help the German submarines could

never have been overcome.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 58: The reference is to the attack made in October, 1916, by

the German Submarine U-53, off Nantucket on several British ships. An

erroneous newspaper account said that the _Benham_, an American

destroyer, had moved in a way that facilitated the operations of the

German submarine. This caused great bitterness in England, until Page

showed the Admiralty a report from the Navy Department proving that the

story was false.]

[Footnote 59: This, of course, is Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant

Secretary of the Navy in 1917.]

[Footnote 60: This letter is dated London and was probably begun there.

It is evident, however, that the latter part was written at Brighton,

where the Ambassador was taking a brief holiday.]

[Footnote 61: This was a long document describing conditions in great

detail.]

[Footnote 62: The Navy Department had taken the position that arming

merchantmen was the best protection against the submarine. This

statement was intended to refute this belief.]

[Footnote 63: Dr. Wallace Buttrick, President of the General Education

Board, who was sent at this time to deliver lectures throughout Great

Britain on the United States.]