Produced by Rick Niles, Charlie Kirschner and the Online
Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net
[Illustration: Sir Edward Grey (now Viscount Grey of Fallodon),
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1905-1916]
THE
LIFE AND LETTERS OF
WALTER H. PAGE
BY
BURTON J. HENDRICK
VOLUME
II
GARDEN CITY NEW YORK
DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY
1924
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES
AT
THE COUNTRY LIFE PRESS, GARDEN CITY, N.Y.
CONTENTS
VOLUME II
CHAPTER PAGE
XIV. THE "LUSITANIA" AND AFTER 1
XV. THE AMBASSADOR AND THE LAWYERS 53
XVI. DARK DAYS FOR THE ALLIES 81
XVII. CHRISTMAS IN ENGLAND, 1915 103
XVIII. A PERPLEXED AMBASSADOR 128
XIX. WASHINGTON IN THE SUMMER OF 1916 148
XX. "PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY" 189
XXI. THE UNITED STATES AT WAR 215
XXII. THE BALFOUR MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES 248
XXIII. PAGE--THE MAN 295
XXIV. A RESPITE AT ST. IVES 321
XXV. GETTING THE AMERICAN TROOPS TO FRANCE 349
XXVI. LAST DAYS IN ENGLAND 374
XXVII. THE END 404
APPENDIX 407
INDEX 425
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Sir Edward Grey _Frontispiece_
FACING PAGE
Col. Edward M. House. From a painting by P.A.
Laszlo 88
The Rt. Hon. Herbert Henry Asquith, Prime Minister
of Great Britain, 1908-1916 89
Herbert C. Hoover, in 1914 104
A facsimile page from the Ambassador's letter of
November 24, 1916, resigning his Ambassadorship 105
Walter H. Page, at the time of America's entry into
the war, April, 1917 216
Resolution passed by the two Houses of Parliament,
April 18, 1917, on America's entry into the war 217
The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George, Prime Minister
of Great Britain, 1916-- 232
The Rt. Hon. Arthur James Balfour (now the Earl of
Balfour), Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
1916-1919 233
Lord Robert Cecil, Minister of Blockade, 1916-1918,
Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
1918 344
General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of
the American Expeditionary Force in the Great
War 345
Admiral William Sowden Sims, Commander of
American Naval Forces operating in European
waters during the Great War 360
A silver model of the _Mayflower_, the farewell gift
of the Plymouth Council to Mr. Page 361
THE
LIFE AND LETTERS
OF
WALTER H. PAGE
THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF
WALTER H. PAGE
CHAPTER XIV
THE "LUSITANIA"--AND AFTER
I
The news of the _Lusitania_ was received at the American Embassy at four
o'clock on the afternoon of May 7, 1915. At that time preparations were
under way for a dinner in honour of Colonel and Mrs. House; the first
_Lusitania_ announcement declared that only the ship itself had been
destroyed and that all the passengers and members of the crew had been
saved; there was, therefore, no good reason for abandoning this dinner.
At about seven o'clock, the Ambassador came home; his manner showed that
something extraordinary had taken place; there were no outward signs of
emotion, but he was very serious. The first news, he now informed Mrs.
Page, had been a mistake; more than one thousand men, women, and
children had lost their lives, and more than one hundred of these were
American citizens. It was too late to postpone the dinner but that
affair was one of the most tragic in the social history of London. The
Ambassador was constantly receiving bulletins from his Chancery, and
these, as quickly as they were received, he read to his guests. His
voice was quiet and subdued; there were no indications of excitement in
his manner or in that of his friends, and hardly of suppressed emotion.
The atmosphere was rather that of dumb stupefaction. The news seemed to
have dulled everyone's capacity for thought and even for feeling. If any
one spoke, it was in whispers. Afterward, in the drawing room, this same
mental state was the prevailing one; there was little denunciation of
Germany and practically no discussion as to the consequences of the
crime; everyone's thought was engrossed by the harrowing and
unbelievable facts which the Ambassador was reading from the little
yellow slips that were periodically brought in. An irresistible
fascination evidently kept everybody in the room; the guests stayed
late, eager for every new item. When they finally left, one after
another, their manner was still abstracted and they said their
good-nights in low voices. There were two reasons for this behaviour.
The first was that the Ambassador and his guests had received the
details of the greatest infamy which any supposedly civilized state had
perpetrated since the massacre of Saint Bartholomew. The second was the
conviction that the United States would at once declare war on Germany.
On this latter point several of the guests expressed their ideas and one
of the most shocked and outspoken was Colonel House. For a month the
President's personal representative had been discussing with British
statesmen possible openings for mediation, but all his hopes in this
direction now vanished. That President Wilson would act with the utmost
energy Colonel House took for granted. This act, he evidently believed,
left the United States no option. "We shall be at war with Germany
within a month," he declared.
The feeling that prevailed in the Embassy this evening was the one that
existed everywhere in London for several days. Emotionally the event
acted like an anæsthetic. This was certainly the condition of all
Americans associated with the American Embassy, especially Page
himself. A day or two after the sinking the Ambassador went to Euston
Station, at an early hour in the morning, to receive the American
survivors. The hundred or more men and women who shambled from the train
made a listless and bedraggled gathering. Their grotesque clothes, torn
and unkempt--for practically none had had the opportunity of obtaining a
change of dress--their expressionless faces, their lustreless eyes,
their uncertain and bewildered walk, faintly reflected an experience
such as comes to few people in this world. The most noticeable thing
about these unfortunates was their lack of interest in their
surroundings; everything had apparently been reduced to a blank; the
fact that practically none made any reference to their ordeal, or could
be induced to discuss it, was a matter of common talk in London. And
something of this disposition now became noticeable in Page himself. He
wrote his dispatches to Washington in an abstracted mood; he went
through his duties almost with the detachment of a sleep-walker; like
the _Lusitania_ survivors, he could not talk much at that time about the
scenes that had taken place off the coast of Ireland. Yet there were
many indications that he was thinking about them, and his thoughts, as
his letters reveal, were concerned with more things than the tragedy
itself. He believed that his country was now face to face with its
destiny. What would Washington do?
Page had a characteristic way of thinking out his problems. He performed
his routine work at the Chancery in the daytime, but his really serious
thinking he did in his own room at night. The picture is still a vivid
one in the recollection of his family and his other intimates. Even at
this time Page's health was not good, yet he frequently spent the
evening at his office in Grosvenor Gardens, and when the long day's
labours were finished, he would walk rather wearily to his home at No. 6
Grosvenor Square. He would enter the house slowly--and his walk became
slower and more tired as the months went by--go up to his room and cross
to the fireplace, so apparently wrapped up in his own thoughts that he
hardly greeted members of his own family. A wood fire was kept burning
for him, winter and summer alike; Page would put on his dressing gown,
drop into a friendly chair, and sit there, doing nothing, reading
nothing, saying nothing--only thinking. Sometimes he would stay for an
hour; not infrequently he would remain till two, three, or four o'clock
in the morning; occasions were not unknown when his almost motionless
figure would be in this same place at daybreak. He never slept through
these nights, and he never even dozed; he was wide awake, and his mind
was silently working upon the particular problem that was uppermost in
his thoughts. He never rose until he had solved it or at least until he
had decided upon a course of action. He would then get up abruptly, go
to bed, and sleep like a child. The one thing that made it possible for
a man of his delicate frame, racked as it was by anxiety and over work,
to keep steadily at his task, was the wonderful gift which he possessed
of sleeping.
Page had thought out many problems in this way. The tension caused by
the sailing of the _Dacia_, in January, 1915, and the deftness with
which the issue had been avoided by substituting a French for a British
cruiser, has already been described. Page discovered this solution on
one of these all-night self-communings. It was almost two o'clock in the
morning that he rose, said to himself, "I've got it!" and then went
contentedly to bed. And during the anxious months that followed the
_Lusitania_, the _Arabic_, and those other outrages which have now
taken their place in history, he spent night after night turning the
matter over in his mind. But he found no way out of the humiliations
presented by the policy of Washington.
"Here we are swung loose in time," he wrote to his son Arthur, a few
days after the first _Lusitania_ note had been sent to Germany, "nobody
knows the day or the week or the month or the year--and we are caught on
this island, with no chance of escape, while the vast slaughter goes on
and seems just beginning, and the degradation of war goes on week by
week; and we live in hope that the United States will come in, as the
only chance to give us standing and influence when the reorganization of
the world must begin. (Beware of betraying the word 'hope'!) It has all
passed far beyond anybody's power to describe. I simply go on day by day
into unknown experiences and emotions, seeing nothing before me very
clearly and remembering only dimly what lies behind. I can see only one
proper thing: that all the world should fall to and hunt this wild beast
down.
"Two photographs of little Mollie[1] on my mantelpiece recall persons
and scenes and hopes unconnected with the war: few other things can.
Bless the baby, she couldn't guess what a sweet purpose she serves."
* * * * *
The sensations of most Americans in London during this crisis are almost
indescribable. Washington's failure promptly to meet the situation
affected them with astonishment and humiliation. Colonel House was
confident that war was impending, and for this reason he hurried his
preparations to leave England; he wished to be in the United States, at
the President's side, when the declaration was made. With this feeling
about Mr. Wilson, Colonel House received a fearful shock a day or two
after the _Lusitania_ had gone down: while walking in Piccadilly, he
caught a glimpse of one of the famous sandwich men, bearing a poster of
an afternoon newspaper. This glaring broadside bore the following
legend: "We are too proud to fight--Woodrow Wilson." The sight of that
placard was Colonel House's first intimation that the President might
not act vigorously. He made no attempt to conceal from Page and other
important men at the American Embassy the shock which it had given him.
Soon the whole of England was ringing with these six words; the
newspapers were filled with stinging editorials and cartoons, and the
music halls found in the Wilsonian phrase materials for their choicest
jibes. Even in more serious quarters America was the subject of the most
severe denunciation. No one felt these strictures more poignantly than
President Wilson's closest confidant. A day or two before sailing home
he came into the Embassy greatly depressed at the prevailing revulsion
against the United States. "I feel," Colonel House said to Page, "as
though I had been given a kick at every lamp post coming down
Constitution Hill." A day or two afterward Colonel House sailed for
America.
II
And now came the period of distress and of disillusionment. Three
_Lusitania_ notes were sent and were evasively answered, and Washington
still seemed to be marking time. The one event in this exciting period
which gave Page satisfaction was Mr. Bryan's resignation as Secretary of
State. For Mr. Bryan personally Page had a certain fondness, but as head
of the State Department the Nebraska orator had been a cause of endless
vexation. Many of Page's letters, already printed, bear evidence of the
utter demoralization which existed in this branch of the Administration
and this demoralization became especially glaring during the _Lusitania_
crisis. No attempt was made even at this momentous period to keep the
London Embassy informed as to what was taking place in Washington;
Page's letters and cablegrams were, for the most part, unacknowledged
and unanswered, and the American Ambassador was frequently obliged to
obtain his information about the state of feeling in Washington from Sir
Edward Grey. It must be said, in justice to Mr. Bryan, that this
carelessness was nothing particularly new, for it had worried many
ambassadors before Page. Readers of Charles Francis Adams's
correspondence meet with the same complaints during the Civil War; even
at the time of the _Trent_ crisis, when for a fortnight Great Britain
and the United States were living on the brink of war, Adams was kept
entirely in the dark about the plans of Washington[2]. The letters of
John Hay show a similar condition during his brief ambassadorship to
Great Britain in 1897-1898[3].
But Mr. Bryan's incumbency was guilty of diplomatic vices which were
peculiarly its own. The "leaks" in the State Department, to which Page
has already referred, were constantly taking place; the Ambassador would
send the most confidential cipher dispatches to his superior, cautioning
the Department that they must be held inviolably secret, and then he
would pick up the London newspapers the next morning and find that
everything had been cabled from Washington. To most readers, the
informal method of conducting foreign business, as it is disclosed in
these letters, probably comes as something of a shock. Page is here
discovered discussing state matters, not in correspondence with the
Secretary of State, but in private unofficial communications to the
President, and especially to Colonel House--the latter at that time not
an official person at all. All this, of course, was extremely irregular
and, in any properly organized State Department, it would have been even
reprehensible. But the point is that there was no properly organized
State Department at that time, and the impossibility of conducting
business through the regular channels compelled Page to adopt other
means. "There is only one way to reform the State Department," he
informed Colonel House at this time. "That is to raze the whole
building, with its archives and papers, to the ground, and begin all
over again."
This state of affairs in Washington explains the curious fact that the
real diplomatic history of the United States and Great Britain during
this great crisis is not to be found in the archives of the State
Department, for the official documents on file there consist of the most
routine telegrams, which are not particularly informing, but in the
Ambassador's personal correspondence with the President, Colonel House,
and a few other intimates. The State Department did not have the first
requisite of a properly organized foreign office, for it could not be
trusted with confidential information. The Department did not tell Page
what it was doing, but it apparently told the whole world what Page was
doing. It is an astonishing fact that Page could not write and cable the
most important details, for he was afraid that they would promptly be
given to the reporters.
* * * * *
"I shall not send another confidential message to the State Department,"
Page wrote to Colonel House, September 15, 1914; "it's too dangerous.
Time and time again now the Department has leaked. Last week, I sent a
dispatch and I said in the body of it, '_this is confidential and under
no condition to be given out or made public, but to be regarded as
inviolably secret_.' The very next morning it was telegraphed from
Washington to the London newspapers. Bryan telegraphed me that he was
sure it didn't get out from the Department and that he now had so fixed
it that there could be no leak. He's said that at least four times
before. The Department swarms with newspaper men, I hear. But whether it
does or not the leak continues. I have to go with my tail between my
legs and apologize to Sir Edward Grey and to do myself that shame and to
do my very best to keep his confidence--against these unnecessary odds.
The only way to be safe is to do the job perfunctorily, to answer the
questions the Department sends and to do nothing on your own account.
That's the reason so many of our men do their jobs in that way--or _one_
reason and a strong one. We can never have an alert and energetic and
powerful service until men can trust the Department and until they can
get necessary information from it. I wrote the President that of course
I'd go on till the war ended and all the questions growing out of it
were settled, and that then he must excuse me, if I must continue to be
exposed to this danger and humiliation. In the meantime, I shall send
all my confidential matter in private letters to him."
* * * * *
Page did not regard Mr. Bryan's opinions and attitudes as a joke: to him
they were a serious matter and, in his eyes, Bryan was most interesting
as a national menace. He regarded the Secretary as the extreme
expression of an irrational sentimentalism that was in danger of
undermining the American character, especially as the kind of thought
he represented was manifest in many phases of American life. In a moment
of exasperation, Page gave expression to this feeling in a letter to his
son:
_To Arthur W. Page_
London, June 6, 1915.
DEAR ARTHUR:
... We're in danger of being feminized and fad-ridden--grape juice
(God knows water's good enough: why grape juice?); pensions;
Christian Science; peace cranks; efficiency-correspondence schools;
aid-your-memory; women's clubs; co-this and co-t'other and coddling
in general; Billy Sunday; petticoats where breeches ought to be and
breeches where petticoats ought to be; white livers and soft heads
and milk-and-water;--I don't want war: nobody knows its horrors or
its degradations or its cost. But to get rid of hyphenated
degenerates perhaps it's worth while, and to free us from 'isms and
soft folk. That's the domestic view of it. As for being kicked by a
sauerkraut caste--O Lord, give us backbone!
Heartily yours,
W.H.P.
In the bottom of this note, Page has cut a notch in the paper and
against it he has written: "This notch is the place to apply a match to
this letter."
* * * * *
"Again and ever I am reminded," Page also wrote in reference to Bryan's
resignation, "of the danger of having to do with cranks. A certain
orderliness of mind and conduct seems essential for safety in this short
life. Spiritualists, bone-rubbers, anti-vivisectionists, all sort of
anti's in fact, those who have fads about education or fads against it,
Perfectionists, Daughters of the Dove of Peace, Sons of the Roaring
Torrent, itinerant peace-mongers--all these may have a real genius
among them once in forty years; but to look for an exception to the
common run of yellow dogs and damfools among them is like opening
oysters with the hope of finding pearls. It's the common man we want and
the uncommon common man when we can find him--never the crank. This is
the lesson of Bryan."
* * * * *
At one time, however, Mr. Bryan's departure seemed likely to have
important consequences for Page. Colonel House and others strongly urged
the President to call him home from London and make him Secretary of
State. This was the third position in President Wilson's Cabinet for
which Page had been considered. The early plans to make him Secretary of
the Interior or Secretary of Agriculture have already been described. Of
all cabinet posts, however, the one that would have especially attracted
him would have been the Department of State. But President Wilson
believed that the appointment of an Ambassador at one of the belligerent
capitals, especially of an Ambassador whose sympathies for the Allies
were so pronounced as were Page's, would have been an "un-neutral" act,
and, therefore, Colonel House's recommendation was not approved.
_From Edward M. House_
Roslyn, Long Island,
June 25th, 1915.
DEAR PAGE:
The President finally decided to appoint Lansing to succeed Mr.
Bryan. In my opinion, he did wisely, though I would have preferred
his appointing you.
The argument against your appointment was the fact that you are an
Ambassador at one of the belligerent capitals. The President did
not think it would do, and from what I read, when your name was
suggested I take it there would have been much criticism. I am
sorry--sorrier than I can tell you, for it would have worked
admirably in the general scheme of things.
However, I feel sure that Lansing will do the job, and that you
will find your relations with him in every way satisfactory.
The President spent yesterday with me and we talked much of you. He
is looking well and feeling so. I read the President your letter
and he enjoyed it as much as I did.
I am writing hastily, for I am leaving for Manchester,
Massachusetts, where I shall be during July and August.
Your sincere friend,
E.M. HOUSE.
III
But, in addition to the _Lusitania_ crisis, a new terror now loomed on
the horizon. Page's correspondence reveals that Bryan had more reasons
than one for his resignation; he was now planning to undertake a
self-appointed mission to Europe for the purpose of opening peace
negotiations entirely on his own account.
_From Edward M. House_
Manchester, Massachusetts,
August 12th, 1915.
DEAR PAGE:
The Bryans have been stopping with the X's. X writes me that Bryan
told him that he intended to go to Europe soon and try peace
negotiations. He has Lloyd George in mind in England, and it is
then his purpose to go to Germany.
I take it he will want credentials from the President which, of
course, he will not want to give, but just what he will feel
obliged to give is another story. I anticipated this when he
resigned. I knew it was merely a matter of time when he would take
this step.
He may find encouragement in Germany, for he is in high favour now
in that quarter. It is his purpose to oppose the President upon the
matter of "preparedness," and, from what we can learn, it will not
be long before there will be open antagonism between the
Administration and himself.
It might be a good thing to encourage his going to Europe. He would
probably come back a sadder and wiser man. I take it that no one in
authority in England would discuss the matter seriously with him,
and, in France, I do not believe he could even get a hearing.
Please let me have your impressions upon this subject.
I wish I could be near you to-day for there are so many things I
could tell that I cannot write.
Your friend,
E.M. House.
_To Edward M. House_
American Embassy, London [Undated].
DEAR HOUSE:
Never mind about Bryan. Send him over here if you wish to get rid
of him. He'll cut no more figure than a tar-baby at a Negro
camp-meeting. If he had come while he was Secretary, I should have
jumped off London Bridge and the country would have had one
ambassador less. But I shall enjoy him now. You see some peace
crank from the United States comes along every week--some crank or
some gang of cranks. There've been two this week. Ever since the
Daughters of the Dove of Peace met at The Hague, the game has
become popular in America; and I haven't yet heard that a single
one has been shot--so far. I think that some of them are likely
soon to be hanged, however, because there are signs that they may
come also from Germany. The same crowd that supplies money to buy
labour-leaders and the press and to blow up factories in the United
States keeps a good supply of peace-liars on tap. It'll be fun to
watch Bryan perform and never suspect that anybody is lying to him
or laughing at him; and he'll go home convinced that he's done the
job and he'll let loose doves all over the land till they are as
thick as English sparrows. Not even the President could teach him
anything permanently. He can do no harm on this side the world.
It's only your side that's in any possible danger; and, if I read
the signs right, there's a diminishing danger there.
No, there's never yet come a moment when there was the slightest
chance of peace. Did the Emperor not say last year that peace would
come in October, and again this year in October? Since he said it,
how can it come?
The ambitions and the actions of men, my friend, are determined by
their antecedents, their surroundings, and their opportunities--the
great deeds of men before them whom consciously or unconsciously
they take for models, the codes they are reared by, and the chances
that they think they see. These influences shaped Alexander and
Cæsar, and they shaped you and me. Now every monarch on the
Continent has behind him the Napoleonic example. "Can I do that?"
crosses the mind of every one. Of course every one thinks of
himself as doing it beneficently--for the good of the world.
Napoleon, himself, persuaded himself of his benevolent intentions,
and the devil of it was he persuaded other people also. Now the
only monarch in Europe in our time who thought he had a chance is
your friend in Berlin. When he told you last year (1914) that of
course he didn't want war, but that he was "ready," that's what he
meant. A similar ambition, of course, comes into the mind of every
professional soldier of the continent who rises to eminence. In
Berlin you have both--the absolute monarch and the military class
of ambitious soldiers and their fighting machine. Behind these men
walks the Napoleonic ambition all the time, just as in the United
States we lie down every night in George Washington's feather-bed
of no entangling alliances.
Then remember, too, that the German monarchy is a cross between the
Napoleonic ambition and its inheritance from Frederick the Great
and Bismarck. I suppose the three damnedest liars that were ever
born are these three--old Frederick, Napoleon, and Bismarck--not, I
take it, because they naturally loved lying, but because the game
they played constantly called for lying. There was no other way to
play it: they _had_ to fool people all the time. You have abundant
leisure--do this: Read the whole career of Napoleon and write down
the startling and exact parallels that you will find there to what
is happening to-day. The French were united and patriotic, just as
the Germans now are. When they invaded other people's territory,
they said they were attacked and that the other people had brought
on war. They had their lying diplomats, their corruption funds;
they levied money on cities and states; they took booty; and they
were God's elect. It's a wonderful parallel--not strangely, because
the game is the same and the moral methods are the same. Only the
tools are somewhat different--the submarine, for example. Hence the
_Lusitania_ disaster (not disavowed, you will observe), the
_Arabic_ disaster, the propaganda, underground and above, in the
United States. And there'll be more. The Napoleonic Wars were
about eleven years long. I fancy that we shall have war and wars
from this attempt to dominate Europe, for perhaps as long a period.
The Balkans can't be quieted by this war only, nor Russia and Italy
perhaps. And Germany may have a series of earthquakes
herself--internal explosions. Then Poland and perhaps some of the
Scandinavian States. Nobody can tell.
I cannot express my admiration of the President's management, so
far at least, of his colossal task of leading us right. He has
shown his supreme wisdom up to this point and I have the
profoundest confidence in his judgment. But I hope he doesn't fool
himself about the future; I'm sure he doesn't. I see no possible
way for us to keep out, because I know the ignorance and falseness
of the German leaders. They'll drown or kill more Americans--on the
sea and in America. They _may_ at last even attack one of our own
passenger ships, or do something that will dramatically reveal them
to the whole American people. Then, of course, the tune will be
called. It's only a question of time; and I am afraid the war will
last long enough to give them time. An early peace is all that can
prevent them from driving us at last into war; and I can see no
chance of an early peace. You had as well prepare as fast as the
condition of public opinion will permit.
There could be no better measure of the immeasurable moral advance
that the United States has made over Europe than the incredulity of
our people. They simply can't comprehend what the Napoleonic legend
can do, nor the low political morality of the Continent--of Berlin
in particular. Hence they don't believe it. We have gone on for 100
years working might and main to better our condition and the
condition of people about us--the greatest effort made by the
largest number of people since the world began to further the mood
and the arts of peace. There is no other such chapter in human
history as our work for a hundred years. Yet just a hundred years
ago the Capitol at Washington was burned by--a political oligarchy
in the freest country of Europe--as damnable an atrocity as you
will find in history. The Germans are a hundred years behind the
English in political development and political morality.
So, let Willum J. come. He can't hurt Europe--nor help it; and you
can spare him. Let all the Peace-gang come. You can spare _them_,
too; and they can do no harm here. Let somebody induce Hoke Smith
to come, too. You have hit on a great scheme--friendly deportation.
And Bryan won't be alone. Daughters of the Dove of Peace and Sons
of the Olive Branch come every week. The latest Son came to see me
to-day. He said that the German Chancellor told him that he wanted
peace--wants it now and wants it bad, and that only one thing stood
in the way--if England would agree not to take Belgium, Germany
would at once make peace! This otherwise sensible American wanted
me to take him to see Sir Edward to tell him this, and to suggest
to him to go over to Holland next week to meet the German
Chancellor and fix it up. A few days ago a pious preacher chap
(American) who had come over to "fix it all up," came back from
France and called on me. He had seen something in France--he was
excited and he didn't quite make it clear what he had seen; but he
said that if they'd only let him go home safely and quickly he'd
promise not to mention peace any more--did I think the American
boats _entirely_ safe?--So, you see, I do have some fun even in
these dark days.
Yours heartily,
W.H. PAGE.
IV
This letter discloses that Page was pinning his faith in President
Wilson, and that he still had confidence in the President's
determination to uphold the national honour. Page was not one of those
who thought that the United States should declare war immediately after
the _Lusitania_. The President's course, in giving Germany a chance to
make amends, and to disavow the act, met with his approval, and he
found, also, much to admire in Mr. Wilson's first _Lusitania_ note. His
judgment in this matter was based first of all upon the merits of the
case; besides this, his admiration for Mr. Wilson as a public man was
strong. To think otherwise of the President would have been a great
grief to the Ambassador and to differ with his chief on the tremendous
issue of the war would have meant for Page the severance of one of the
most cherished associations of his life. The interest which he had shown
in advocating Wilson's presidential candidacy has already been set
forth; and many phases of the Wilson administration had aroused his
admiration. The President's handling of domestic problems Page regarded
as a masterpiece in reconciling statesmanship with practical politics,
and his energetic attitude on the Panama Tolls had introduced new
standards into American foreign relations. Page could not sympathize
with all the details of the Wilsonian Mexican policy, yet he saw in it a
high-minded purpose and a genuine humanitarianism. But the outbreak of
war presented new aspects of Mr. Wilson's mind. The President's attitude
toward the European struggle, his conception of "neutrality," and his
failure to grasp the meaning of the conflict, seemed to Page to show a
lack of fundamental statesmanship; still his faith in Wilson was
deep-seated, and he did not abandon hope that the President could be
brought to see things as they really were. Page even believed that he
might be instrumental in his conversion.
But in the summer and autumn of 1915 one agony followed another. The
"too proud to fight" speech was in Page's mind nothing less than a
tragedy. The president's first _Lusitania_ note for a time restored the
Ambassador's confidence; it seemed to show that the President intended
to hold Germany to that "strict accountability" which he had threatened.
But Mr. Wilson's course now presented new difficulties to his
Ambassador. Still Page believed that the President, in his own way and
in his own time, would find a path out of his dilemma that would protect
the honour and the safety of the United States. If any of the Embassy
subordinates became impatient over the procedure of Washington, he did
not find a sympathetic listener in the Ambassador. The whole of London
and of Europe might be resounding with denunciations of the White House,
but Page would tolerate no manifestations of hostility in his presence.
"The problem appears different to Washington than it does to us," he
would say to his confidants. "We see only one side of it; the President
sees all sides. If we give him all the facts, he will decide the thing
wisely." Englishmen with whom the Ambassador came into contact soon
learned that they could not become flippant or critical about Mr. Wilson
in his presence; he would resent the slightest hostile remark, and he
had a way of phrasing his rebukes that usually discouraged a second
attempt. About this time Page began to keep closely to himself, and to
decline invitations to dinners and to country houses, even those with
which he was most friendly. The reason was that he could not meet
Englishmen and Englishwomen, or even Americans who were resident in
England, on his old easy familiar terms; he knew the ideas which
everybody entertained about his country, and he knew also what they were
saying, when he was not among them; the restraint which his presence
necessarily put upon his friends produced an uncongenial atmosphere, and
the Ambassador therefore gave up, for a time, those distractions which
had ordinarily proved such a delightful relief from his duties. For the
first time since he had come to England he found himself a solitary man.
He even refused to attend the American Luncheon Club in London because,
in speeches and in conversation, the members did not hesitate to assail
the Wilson policies.
Events, however, eventually proved too strong for the most devoted
supporter of President Wilson. After the _Arabic_ and the _Hesperian_,
Page's official intimates saw signs that the Ambassador was losing
confidence in his old friend. He would discuss Mr. Wilson occasionally,
with those secretaries, such as Mr. Laughlin, in whom his confidence was
strongest; his expressions, however, were never flippant or violent.
That Page could be biting as well as brilliant in his comments on public
personages his letters abundantly reveal, yet he never exercised his
talent for sarcasm or invective at the expense of the White House. He
never forgot that Mr. Wilson was President and that he was Ambassador;
he would still defend the Administration; and he even now continued to
find consolation in the reflection that Mr. Wilson was living in a
different atmosphere and that he had difficulties to confront of which a
man in London could know nothing. The Ambassador's emotion was rather
one of disappointment and sorrow, mingled with anxiety as to the plight
into which his country was being led. As to his duty in this situation,
however, Page never hesitated. In his relations with his Embassy and
with the British world he maintained this non-critical attitude; but in
his letters to President Wilson and Colonel House, he was describing the
situation, and expressing his convictions, with the utmost freedom and
frankness. In both these attitudes Page was consistent and absolutely
loyal. It was his duty to carry out the Wilson instructions and he had
too high a conception of the Ambassadorial office to show to the world
any unfavourable opinions he may have held about his country's course.
His duty to his post made it just as imperative that he set forth to the
President the facts exactly as they were. And this the Ambassador now
proceeded to do. For the mere ornamental dignities of an Ambassadorship
Page cared nothing; he was wasting his health in his duties and
exhausting his private resources; much as he loved the English and
congenial as were his surroundings, the fear of being recalled for
"disloyalty" or insubordination never influenced him. The letters which
he now wrote to Colonel House and to President Wilson himself are
probably without parallel in the diplomatic annals of this or of any
other country. In them he told the President precisely what Englishmen
thought of him and of the extent to which the United States was
suffering in European estimation from the Wilson policy. His boldness
sometimes astounded his associates. One day a friend and adviser of
President Wilson's came into the Ambassador's office just as Page had
finished one of his communications to Washington.
"Read that!" the Ambassador said, handing over the manuscript to his
visitor.
As the caller read, his countenance displayed the progressive stages of
his amazement. When he had finished, his hands dropped helplessly upon
his knees.
"Is that the way you write to the President?" he gasped.
"Of course," Page replied, quietly. "Why not? Why shouldn't I tell him
the truth? That is what I am here for."
"There is no other person in the world who dare talk to him like that!"
was the reply.
This is unquestionably the fact. That President Wilson did not like
people about him whose views were opposed to his own is now no secret,
and during the period when his policy was one of the great issues of the
world there was probably no one except Page who intruded upon his
solitude with ideas that so abruptly disagreed with the opinions of the
White House. The letters which Page wrote Colonel House were intended,
of course, for the President himself, and practically all of them
Colonel House read aloud to the head of the nation. The two men would
closet themselves in the old cabinet room on the second floor of the
White House--that same room in which Lincoln had met his advisers during
Civil War days; and here Colonel House would quietly read the letters in
which Page so mercilessly portrayed the situation as it appeared in
English and European eyes. The President listened impassively, giving no
sign of approval or disapproval, and hardly, at times, of much interest.
In the earlier days, when Page's letters consisted of pictures of
English life and English men, and colourful descriptions of England
under the stress of war, the President was vastly entertained; he would
laugh loudly at Page's wit, express his delight at his graphic and
pungent style and feel deeply the horrors of war as his Ambassador
unfolded them. "I always found Page compelling on paper," Mr. Wilson
remarked to Mr. Laughlin, during one of the latter's visits to
Washington. "I could never resist him--I get more information from his
letters than from any other single source. Tell him to keep it up." It
was during this period that the President used occasionally to read
Page's letters to the Cabinet, expressing his great appreciation of
their charm and historical importance. "The President quoted from one of
the Ambassador's letters to the Cabinet to-day," a member of the Cabinet
wrote to Mrs. Page in February, 1915. "'Some day,' the President said,
'I hope that Walter Page's letters will be published. They are the best
letters I have ever read. They make you feel the atmosphere in England,
understand the people, and see into the motives of the great actors.'"
The President repeated this statement many times, and his letters to
Page show how greatly he enjoyed and profited from this correspondence.
But after the sinking of the _Lusitania_ and the _Arabic_ his attitude
toward Page and his letters changed.
He now found little pleasure or satisfaction in the Page communications.
When Mr. Wilson found that one of his former confidants had turned out
to be a critic, that man instantaneously passed out of his life. And
this was now Page's fate; the friendship and associations of forty years
were as though they had never been. Just why Mr. Wilson did not recall
his Ambassador is a question that has puzzled Page's friends. He would
sometimes refer to him as a man who was "more British than the British,"
as one who had been taken completely captive by British blandishments,
but he never came to the point of dismissing him. Perhaps he did not
care to face the public scandal that such an act would have caused; but
a more plausible reason is that Page, despite the causes which he had
given for irritation, was indispensable to him. Page's early letters had
furnished the President ideas which had taken shape in Wilson's
policies, and, disagreeable as the communications now became, there are
evidences that they influenced the solitary statesman in the White
House, and that they had much to do in finally forcing Mr. Wilson into
the war. The alternative question, as to why Page did not retire when he
found himself so out of sympathy with the President, will be
sufficiently answered in subsequent chapters; at present it may be said
that he did resign and only consented to remain at the urgent request of
Washington. In fact, all during 1915 and 1916, there seemed to be a fear
in Washington that Page would definitely abandon the London post. On one
occasion, when the newspapers published rumours to this effect, Page
received an urgent despatch from Mr. Lansing. The message came at a
time--the date was October 26, 1915--when Page was especially
discouraged over the Washington policy. "Representatives of the press,"
said Mr. Lansing, "have repeated rumours that you are planning to
resign. These have been brought to the President's attention, and both
he and I have denied them. Still these rumours persist, and they cause
both the President and me great anxiety. We cannot believe that they are
well founded.
"In view of the fact that they are so persistent, we have thought it
well to inform you of them and to tell you how earnestly we hope that
they are baseless. We trust that you will set both our minds at rest."
If Page had ever had any compunction about addressing the President in
blunt phrases these expressions certainly convinced him that he was a
free agent.
Yet Page himself at times had his doubts as to the value of this
correspondence. He would frequently discuss the matter with Mr.
Laughlin. "That's a pretty harsh letter," he would say. "I don't like to
talk that way to the President, yet it doesn't express half what I
feel."
"It's your duty to tell the President the real state of affairs," Mr.
Laughlin would urge.
"But do you suppose it does any good?" Page would ask.
"Yes, it's bound to, and whether it does or not, it's your business to
keep him informed."
If in these letters Page seems to lay great stress on the judgment of
Great Britain and Europe on American policy, it must be remembered that
that was his particular province. One of an Ambassador's most important
duties is to transmit to his country the public opinion of the country
to which he is accredited. It was Page's place to tell Washington what
Great Britain thought of it; it was Washington's business to formulate
policy, after giving due consideration to this and other matters.
_To Edward M. House_
July 21, 1915.
DEAR HOUSE:
I enclose a pamphlet in ridicule of the President. I don't know who
wrote it, for my inquiries so far have brought no real information.
I don't feel like sending it to him. I send it to you--to do with
as you think best. This thing alone is, of course, of no
consequence. But it is symptomatic. There is much feeling about the
slowness with which he acts. One hundred and twenty people
(Americans) were drowned on the _Lusitania_ and we are still
writing notes about it--to the damnedest pirates that ever blew up
a ship. Anybody who knows the Germans knows, of course, that they
are simply playing for time, that they are not going to "come
down," that Von Tirpitz is on deck, that they'd just as lief have
war with us as not--perhaps had rather--because they don't want any
large nation left fresh when the war ends. They'd like to have the
whole world bankrupt. There is a fast growing feeling here,
therefore, that the American Government is pusillanimous--dallies
with 'em, is affected by the German propaganda, etc., etc. Of
course, such a judgment is not fair. It is formed without knowing
the conditions in the United States. But I think you ought to
realize the strength of this sentiment. No doubt before you receive
this, the President will send something to Germany that will amount
to an ultimatum and there will be at least a momentary change of
sentiment here. But looking at the thing in a long-range way, we're
bound to get into the war. For the Germans will blow up more
American travellers without notice. And by dallying with them we do
not change the ultimate result, but we take away from ourselves the
spunk and credit of getting in instead of being kicked and cursed
in. We've got to get in: they won't play the game in any other way.
I have news direct from a high German source in Berlin which
strongly confirms this....
It's a curious thing to say. But the only solution that I see is
another _Lusitania_ outrage, which would force war.
W.H.P.
P.S. The London papers every day say that the President will send a
strong note, etc. And the people here say, "Damn notes: hasn't he
written enough?" Writing notes hurts nobody--changes nothing. The
Washington correspondents to the London papers say that Burleson,
the Attorney-General, and Daniels are Bryan men and are holding the
President back.
* * * * *
The prophecy contained in this letter was quickly fulfilled. A week or
two after Colonel House had received it, the _Arabic_ was sunk with loss
of American life.
Page was taking a brief holiday with his son Frank in Rowsley,
Derbyshire, when this news came. It was telegraphed from the Embassy.
"That settles it," he said to his son. "They have sunk the _Arabic_.
That means that we shall break with Germany and I've got to go back to
London."
_To Edward M. House_
American Embassy, London, August 23, 1915.
DEAR HOUSE:
The sinking of the _Arabic_ is the answer to the President and to
your letter to me. And there'll be more such answers. You said to
me one day after you had got back from your last visit to Berlin:
"They are impossible." I think you told the truth, and surely you
know your German and you know your Berlin--or you did know them
when you were here.
The question is not what we have done for the Allies, not what any
other neutral country has done or has failed to do--such
comparisons, I think, are far from the point. The question is when
the right moment arrives for us to save our self-respect, our
honour, and the esteem and fear (or the contempt) in which the
world will hold us.
Berlin has the Napoleonic disease. If you follow Napoleon's
career--his excuses, his evasions, his inventions, the wild French
enthusiasm and how he kept it up--you will find an exact parallel.
That becomes plainer every day. Europe may not be wholly at peace
in five years--may be ten.
Hastily and heartily,
W.H.P.
I have your note about Willum J.... Crank once, crank always. My
son, never tie up with a crank.
W.H.P.
_To Edward M. House_
London, September 2nd, 1915.
DEAR HOUSE:
You write me about pleasing the Allies, the big Ally in particular.
That doesn't particularly appeal to me. We don't owe them
anything. There's no obligation. I'd never confess for a moment
that we are under any obligation to any of them nor to anybody. I'm
not out to "please" anybody, as a primary purpose: that's not my
game nor my idea--nor yours either. As for England in particular,
the account was squared when she twice sent an army against us--in
her folly--especially the last time when she burnt our Capitol.
There's been no obligation since. The obligation is on the other
foot. We've set her an example of what democracy will do for men,
an example of efficiency, an example of freedom of opportunity. The
future is ours, and she may follow us and profit by it. Already we
have three white English-speaking men to every two in the British
Empire: we are sixty per cent. of the Anglo-Saxons in the world. If
there be any obligation to please, the obligation is on her to
please us. And she feels and sees it now.
My point is not that, nor is it what we or any other neutral nation
has done or may do--Holland or any other. This war is the direct
result of the over-polite, diplomatic, standing-aloof,
bowing-to-one-another in gold lace, which all European nations are
guilty of in times of peace--castes and classes and uniforms and
orders and such folderol, instead of the proper business of the
day. Every nation in Europe knew that Germany was preparing for
war. If they had really got together--not mere Hague Sunday-school
talk and resolutions--but had really got together for business and
had said to Germany, "The moment you fire a shot, we'll all fight
against you; we have so many millions of men, so many men-of-war,
so many billions of money; and we'll increase all these if you do
not change your system and your building-up of armies"--then there
would have been no war.
My point is not sentimental. It is:
(1) We must maintain our own self-respect and safety. If we submit
to too many insults, _that_ will in time bring Germany against us.
We've got to show at some time that we don't believe, either, in
the efficacy of Sunday-School resolves for peace--that we are
neither Daughters of the Dove of Peace nor Sons of the Olive
Branch, and
(2) About nagging and forever presenting technical legal points as
lawyers do to confuse juries--the point is the point of efficiency.
If we do that, we can't carry our main points. I find it harder and
harder to get answers now to important questions because we ask so
many unimportant and nagging ones.
I've no sentiment--perhaps not enough. My gushing days are gone, if
I ever had 'em. The cutting-out of the "100 years of peace"
oratory, etc., etc., was one of the blessings of the war. But we
must be just and firm and preserve our own self-respect and keep
alive the fear that other nations have of us; and we ought to have
the courage to make the Department of State more than a bureau of
complaints. We must learn to say "No" even to a Gawdamighty
independent American citizen when he asks an improper or
impracticable question. Public Opinion in the United States
consists of something more than the threats of Congressmen and the
bleating of newspapers; it consists of the judgment of honourable
men on courageous and frank actions--a judgment that cannot be made
up till action is taken.
Heartily yours,
W.H.P.
_To Edward M. House_
American Embassy, London, Sept. 8, 1915.
(This is not prudent. It is only true--nothing more.)
DEAR HOUSE:
I take it for granted that Dumba[4] is going, of course. But I must
tell you that the President is being laughed at by our best friends
for his slowness in action. I hardly ever pick up a paper without
seeing some sarcastic remark. I don't mean they expect us to come
into the war. They only hoped we would be as good as our
word--would regard another submarine attack on a ship carrying
Americans as an unfriendly act and would send Bernstorff home. Yet
the _Arabic_ and now the _Hesperian_ have had no effect in action.
Bernstorff's personal _note to Lansing[5], even as far as it goes,
does not bind his Government_.
The upshot of all this is that the President is fast losing in the
minds of our best friends here all that he gained by his courageous
stand on the Panama tolls. They feel that if he takes another
insult--keeps taking them--and is satisfied with Bernstorff's
personal word, which is proved false in four days--he'll take
anything. And the British will pay less attention to what we say.
That's inevitable. If the American people and the President accept
the _Arabic_ and the _Hesperian_ and do nothing to Dumba till the
Government here gave out his letter, which the State Department had
(and silently held) for several days--then nobody on this side the
world will pay much heed to anything we say hereafter.
This, as I say, doesn't mean that these (thoughtful) people wish or
expect us to go to war. They wish only that we'd prove ourselves as
good as the President's word. That's the conservative truth; we're
losing influence more rapidly than I supposed it were possible.
Dumba's tardy dismissal will not touch the main matter, which is
the rights of neutrals at sea, and keeping our word in action.
Yours sincerely,
W.H.P.
P.S. They say it's Mexico over again--watchful waiting and nothing
doing. And the feeling grows that Bryan has really conquered, since
his programme seems to prevail.
_To Edward M. House_
London, Tuesday night, Sept. 8, 1915.
DEAR HOUSE:
The Germans seem to think it a good time to try to feel about for
peace. They have more to offer now than they may have again. That's
all. A man who seriously talks peace now in Paris or in London on
any terms that the Germans will consider, would float dead that
very night in the Seine or in the Thames. The Germans have for the
time being "done-up" the Russians; but the French have shells
enough to plough the German trenches day and night (they've been at
it for a fortnight now); Joffre has been to see the Italian
generalissimo; and the English destroy German submarines now almost
as fast as the Germans send them out. I am credibly told that
several weeks ago a group of Admiralty men who are in the secret
had a little dinner to celebrate the destruction of the 50th
submarine.
While this is going on, you are talking on your side of the water
about a change in German policy! The only change is that the number
of submarines available becomes smaller and smaller, and that they
wish to use Uncle Sam's broad, fat back to crawl down on when they
have failed.
Consequently, they are laughing at Uncle Sam here--it comes near to
being ridicule, in fact, for seeming to jump at Bernstorff's
unfrank assurances. And, as I have telegraphed the President,
English opinion is--well, it is very nearly disrespectful. Men say
here (I mean our old friends) that with no disavowal of the
_Lusitania_, the _Falaba_, the _Gulflight_, or the _Arabic_ or of
the _Hesperian_, the Germans are "stuffing" Uncle Sam, that Uncle
Sam is in the clutches of the peace-at-any-price public opinion,
that the United States will suffer any insult and do nothing. I
hardly pick up a paper that does not have a sarcastic paragraph or
cartoon. We are on the brink of convincing the English that we'll
not act, whatever the provocation. By the English, I do not mean
the lighter, transitory public opinion, but I mean the thoughtful
men who do not wish us or expect us to fire a gun. They say that
the American democracy, since Cleveland's day, has become a mere
agglomeration of different races, without national unity, national
aims, and without courage or moral qualities. And (I deeply regret
to say) the President is losing here the high esteem he won by his
Panama tolls repeal. They ask, why on earth did he raise the issue
if under repeated provocation he is unable to recall Gerard or to
send Bernstorff home? The _Hesperian_ follows the _Arabic_; other
"liners" will follow the _Hesperian_, if the Germans have
submarines. And, when Sackville-West[6] was promptly sent home for
answering a private citizen's inquiry about the two political
parties, Dumba is (yet awhile) retained in spite of a far graver
piece of business. There is a tone of sad disappointment here--not
because the most thoughtful men want us in the war (they don't),
but because for some reason, which nobody here understands, the
President, having taken a stand, seems unable to do anything.
All this is a moderate interpretation of sorrowful public opinion
here. And the result will inevitably be that they will pay far less
heed to anything we may hereafter say. In fact men now say here
every day that the American democracy has no opinion, can form no
opinion, has no moral quality, and that the word of its President
never gets as far as action even of the mildest form. The
atmosphere is very depressing. And this feeling has apparently got
beyond anybody's control. I've even heard this said: "The voice of
the United States is Mr. Wilson's: its actions are controlled by
Mr. Bryan."
So, you see, the war will go on a long long time. So far as English
opinion is concerned, the United States is useful to make
ammunition and is now thought of chiefly in this connection. Less
and less attention is paid to what we say. Even the American
telegrams to the London papers have a languid tone.
Yet recent revelations have made it clearer than ever that the same
qualities that the English accuse us of having are in them and that
these qualities are directly to blame for this war. I recall that
when I was in Germany a few weeks, six years ago, I became
convinced that Germany had prepared to fight England; I didn't
know when, but I did know that was what the war-machine had in
mind. Of course, I had no opportunities to find out anything in
particular. You were told practically that same thing by the
Kaiser, before the war began. "We are ready," said he. Of course
the English feared it and Sir Edward put his whole life into his
effort to prevent it. The day the war began, he told me with tears
that it seemed that his life had been wasted--that his life work
had gone for naught.--Nobody could keep from wondering why England
didn't--
(Here comes a parenthesis. Word came to me a little while ago that
a Zeppelin was on its way to London. Such a remark doesn't arouse
much attention. But just as I had finished the fifth line above
this, Frank and Mrs. Page came in and challenged me to play a game
of cards before we should go to bed. We sat down, the cards were
dealt, and bang! bang!--with the deep note of an explosion. A
third, a fourth shot. We went into the street. There the Zeppelin
was revealed by a searchlight--sailing along. I think it had
probably dropped its bombs; but the aircraft guns were cracking
away at it. Some of them shot explosive projectiles to find the
range. Now and then one such explosive would almost reach the
Zeppelin, but it was too high for them and it sailed away, the air
guns doing their ineffectual best. I couldn't see whether airplanes
were trying to shoot it or not. The searchlight revealed the
Zeppelin but nothing else.--While we were watching this battle in
the air, the maids came down from the top of the house and went
into the cellar. I think they've already gone back. You can't
imagine how little excitement it caused. It produces less fright
than any other conceivable engine of war.
We came back as soon as the Zeppelin was out of sight and the
firing had ceased; we played our game of cards; and here I am
writing you the story-all within about half an hour.--There was a
raid over London last night, too, wherein a dozen or two women and
children and a few men were killed. I haven't the slightest idea
what harm this raid to-night has done. For all I know it may not be
all done. But of all imaginable war-experiences this seems the most
futile. It interrupted a game of cards for twenty minutes!)
Now--to go on with my story: I have wondered ever since the war
began why the Allies were not better prepared--especially England
on land. England has just one _big_ land gun--no more. Now it has
turned out, as you have doubtless read, that the British Government
were as good as told by the German Government that Germany was
going to war pretty soon--this in 1912 when Lord Haldane[7] was
sent to make friends with Germany.
The only answer he brought back was a proposition that England
should in any event remain neutral--stand aside while Germany
whipped Russia and France. This insulting proposal was kept secret
till the other day. Now, why didn't the British Cabinet inform the
people and get ready? They were afraid the English people wouldn't
believe it and would accuse them of fomenting war. The English
people were making money and pursuing their sports. Probably they
wouldn't have believed it. So the Liberal Cabinet went on in
silence, knowing that war was coming, but not exactly when it was
coming, and they didn't make even a second big gun.
Now here was the same silence in this "democracy" that they now
complain of in ours. Rather an interesting and discouraging
parallel--isn't it? Public opinion has turned Lord Haldane out of
office because he didn't tell the public what he declares they
wouldn't have believed. If the English had raised an army in 1912,
and made a lot of big guns, Austria would not have trampled Serbia
in the earth. There would have been no war now; and the strong
European Powers might have made then the same sort of protective
peace-insurance combine that they will try to make after this war
is ended. Query: A democracy's inability to _act_--how much is this
apparently inherent quality of a democracy to blame for this war
and for--other things?
When I am asked every day "Why the United States doesn't _do_
something--send Dumba and Bernstorff home?"--Well, it is not the
easiest question in the world to answer.
Yours heartily,
W.H.P.
P.S. This is the most comical of all worlds: While I was writing
this, it seems the maids went back upstairs and lighted their
lights without pulling their shades down--they occupy three rooms,
in front. The doorbell rang furiously. Here were more than half a
dozen policemen and special constables--must investigate! "One
light would be turned on, another would go out; another one
on!"--etc., etc. Frank tackled them, told 'em it was only the maids
going to bed, forgetting to pull down the shades. Spies and
signalling were in the air! So, in the morning, I'll have to send
over to the Foreign Office and explain. The Zeppelin did more
"frightfulness" than I had supposed, after all. Doesn't this strike
you as comical?
W.H.P.
Friday, September 10, 1915.
P.S. The news is just come that Dumba is dismissed. That will clear
the atmosphere--a little, but only a little. Dumba committed a
diplomatic offence. The German Government has caused the death of
United States citizens, has defied us, has declared it had changed
its policy and yet has gone on with the same old policy. Besides,
Bernstorff has done everything that Dumba did except employ
Archibald, which was a mere incident of the game. The President
took a strong stand: they have disregarded it--no apology nor
reparation for a single boat that has been sunk. Now the English
opinion of the Germans is hardly a calm, judicial opinion--of
course not. There may be facts that have not been made known. There
must be good reasons that nobody here can guess, why the President
doesn't act in the long succession of German acts against us. _But
I tell you with all solemnity that British opinion and the British
Government have absolutely lost their respect for us and their
former high estimate of the President. And that former respect is
gone for good unless he acts now very quickly_[8]. They will pay
nothing more than formal and polite attention to anything we may
hereafter say. This is not resentful. They don't particularly care
for us to get into the war. Their feeling (I mean among our best
old friends) is not resentful. It is simply sorrowful. They had the
highest respect for our people and our President. The Germans defy
us; we sit in silence. They conclude here that we'll submit to
anything from anybody. We'll write strong notes--nothing more.
I can't possibly exaggerate the revulsion of feeling. Members of
the Government say (in private, of course) that we'll submit to any
insult. The newspapers refuse to publish articles which attempt to
make the President's silence reasonable. "It isn't defensible,"
they say, "and they would only bring us thousands of insulting
letters from our readers." I can't think of a paper nor of a man
who has a good word to say for us--except, perhaps, a few Quaker
peace-at-any-price people. And our old friends are disappointed and
sorrowful. They feel that we have dropped out of a position of
influence in the world.
I needn't and can't write more. Of course there are more important
things than English respect. But the English think that every Power
has lost respect for us--the Germans most of all. And (unless the
President acts very rigorously and very quickly) we'll have to get
along a long time without British respect.
W.H.P.
P.S. The last Zeppelin raid--which interrupted the game of
cards--killed more than twenty persons and destroyed more than
seven million dollars' worth of private business property--all
non-combatants!
W.H.P.
_To Edward M. House_
21st of September, 1915.
DEAR HOUSE:
The insulting cartoon that I enclose (destroy it without showing
it) is typical of, I suppose, five hundred that have appeared here
within a month. This represents the feeling and opinion of the
average man. They say we wrote brave notes and made courageous
demands, to none of which a satisfactory reply has come, but only
more outrages and no guarantee for the future. Yet we will not even
show our displeasure by sending Bernstorff home. We've simply
"gone out," like a snuffed candle, in the regard and respect of the
vast volume of British opinion. (The last _Punch_ had six
ridiculing allusions to our "fall.")
It's the loneliest time I've had in England. There's a tendency to
avoid me.
They can't understand here the continued declaration in the United
States that the British Government is trying to take our trade--to
use its blockade and navy with the direct purpose of giving British
trade profit out of American detentions. Of course, the Government
had no such purpose and has done no such thing--with any such
purpose. It isn't thinking about trade but only about war.
The English think they see in this the effect on our Government and
on American opinion of the German propaganda. I have had this
trade-accusation investigated half a dozen times--the accusation
that this Government is using its military power for its own trade
advantage to our detriment: it simply isn't true. They stop our
cargoes, not for their advantage, but wholly to keep things from
the enemy. Study our own trade reports.
In a word, our importers are playing (so the English think)
directly into the hands of the Germans. So matters go on from bad
to worse.
Bryce[9] is very sad. He confessed to me yesterday the utter
hopelessness of the two people's ever understanding one another.
The military situation is very blue--very blue. The general feeling
is that the long war will begin next March and end--nobody dares
predict.
W.H.P.
P.S. There's not a moral shadow of a doubt (1) that the commander
of the submarine that sunk the _Arabic_ is dead--although he makes
reports to his government! nor (2) that the _Hesperian_ was
torpedoed. The State Department has a piece of the torpedo.
V
The letters which Page sent directly to the President were just as
frank. "Incidents occur nearly every day," he wrote to President Wilson
in the autumn of 1915, "which reveal the feeling that the Germans have
taken us in. Last week one of our naval men, Lieutenant McBride, who has
just been ordered home, asked the Admiralty if he might see the piece of
metal found on the deck of the _Hesperian_. Contrary to their habit, the
British officer refused. 'Take my word for it,' he said. 'She was
torpedoed. Why do you wish to investigate? Your country will do
nothing--will accept any excuse, any insult and--do nothing.' When
McBride told me this, I went at once to the Foreign Office and made a
formal request that this metal should be shown to our naval attaché, who
(since Symington is with the British fleet and McBride has been ordered
home) is Lieutenant Towers. Towers was sent for and everything that the
Admiralty knows was shown to him and I am sending that piece of metal by
this mail. But to such a pass has the usual courtesy of a British naval
officer come. There are many such instances of changed conduct. They are
not hard to endure nor to answer and are of no consequence in themselves
but only for what they denote. They're a part of war's bitterness. But
my mind runs ahead and I wonder how Englishmen will look at this subject
five years hence, and it runs afield and I wonder how the Germans will
regard it. A sort of pro-German American newspaper correspondent came
along the other day from the German headquarters; and he told me that
one of the German generals remarked to him: 'War with America? Ach no!
Not war. If trouble should come, we'd send over a platoon of our
policemen to whip your little army.' (He didn't say just how he'd send
'em.)"
_To the President_
American Embassy, London, Oct. 5, 1915.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
I have two letters that I have lately written to you but which I
have not sent because they utterly lack good cheer. After reading
them over, I have not liked to send them. Yet I should fail of my
duty if I did not tell you bad news as well as good.
The high esteem in which our Government was held when the first
_Lusitania_ note to Germany was sent seems all changed to
indifference or pity--not hatred or hostility, but a sort of
hopeless and sad pity. That ship was sunk just five months ago; the
German Government (or its Ambassador) is yet holding conversations
about the principle involved, making "concessions" and promises for
the future, and so far we have done nothing to hold the Germans to
accountability[10]. In the meantime their submarine fleet has been
so reduced that probably the future will take care of itself and we
shall be used as a sort of excuse for their failure. This is what
the English think and say; and they explain our failure to act by
concluding that the peace-at-any-price sentiment dominates the
Government and paralyzes it. They have now, I think, given up hope
that we will ever take any action. So deeply rooted (and, I fear,
permanent) is this feeling that every occurrence is made to fit
into and to strengthen this supposition. When Dumba was dismissed,
they said: "Dumba, merely the abject tool of German intrigue. Why
not Bernstorff?" When the Anglo-French loan[11] was oversubscribed,
they said: "The people's sympathy is most welcome, but their
Government is paralyzed." Their respect has gone--at least for the
time being.
It is not that they expect us to go to war: many, in fact, do not
wish us to. They expected that we would be as good as our word and
hold the Germans to accountability. Now I fear they think little of
our word. I shudder to think what our relations might be if Sir
Edward Grey were to yield to another as Foreign Minister, as, of
course, he must yield at some time.
The press has less to say than it had a few weeks ago. _Punch_, for
instance, which ridiculed and pitied us in six cartoons and
articles in each of two succeeding numbers, entirely forgets us
this week. But they've all said their say. I am, in a sense,
isolated--lonely in a way that I have never before been. I am not
exactly avoided, I hope, but I surely am not sought. They have a
polite feeling that they do not wish to offend me and that to make
sure of this the safest course is to let me alone. There is no
mistaking the great change in the attitude of men I know, both in
official and private life.
It comes down and comes back to this--that for five months after
the sinking of the _Lusitania_ the Germans are yet playing with us,
that we have not sent Bernstorff home, and hence that we will
submit to any rebuff or any indignity. It is under these
conditions--under this judgment of us--that we now work--the
English respect for our Government indefinitely lessened and
instead of the old-time respect a sad pity. I cannot write more.
Heartily yours,
WALTER H. PAGE.
"I have authoritatively heard," Page writes to President Wilson in early
September, "of a private conversation between a leading member of the
Cabinet and a group of important officials all friendly to us in which
all sorrowfully expressed the opinion that the United States will submit
to any indignity and that no effect is now to be hoped for from its
protests against unlawful submarine attacks or against anything else.
The inactivity of our Government, or its delay, which they assume is the
same as inactivity, is attributed to domestic politics or to the lack of
national, consciousness or unity.
"No explanation has appeared in the British press of our Government's
inactivity or of any regret or promise of reparation by Germany for the
sinking of the _Lusitania_, the _Falaba_, the _Gulflight_, the
_Nebraskan_, the _Arabic_, or the _Hesperian_, nor any explanation of a
week's silence about the Dumba letter; and the conclusion is drawn that,
in the absence of action by us, all these acts have been practically
condoned.
"I venture to suggest that such explanations be made public as will
remove, if possible, the practically unanimous conclusion here that our
Government will permit these and similar future acts to be explained
away. I am surprised almost every hour by some new evidence of the loss
of respect for our Government, which, since the sinking of the _Arabic_,
has become so great as to warrant calling it a complete revulsion of
English feeling toward the United States. There is no general wish for
us to enter the war, but there is genuine sorrow that we are thought to
submit to any indignity, especially after having taken a firm stand. I
conceive I should be lacking in duty if I did not report this rapid and
unfortunate change in public feeling, which seems likely to become
permanent unless facts are quickly made public which may change it."
* * * * *
There are many expressions of such feelings in Page's letters of this
time. They brought only the most perfunctory acknowledgment from the
White House. On January 3, 1916, Page sent the President a mass of
clippings from the British press, all criticizing the Wilson
Administration in unrestrained terms. In his comment on these, he writes
the President:
"Public opinion, both official and unofficial, is expressed by these
newspaper comments, with far greater restraint than it is expressed in
private conversation. Ridicule of the Administration runs through the
programmes of the theatres; it inspires hundreds of cartoons; it is a
staple of conversation at private dinners and in the clubs. The most
serious class of Englishmen, including the best friends of the United
States, feel that the Administration's reliance on notes has reduced our
Government to a third-or fourth-rate power. There is even talk of
spheres of German influence in the United States as in China. No
government could fall lower in English opinion than we shall fall if
more notes are sent to Austria or to Germany. The only way to keep any
shred of English respect is the immediate dismissal without more
parleying of every German and Austrian official at Washington. Nobody
here believes that such an act would provoke war.
"I can do no real service by mincing matters. My previous telegrams and
letters have been purposely restrained as this one is. We have now come
to the parting of the ways. If English respect be worth preserving at
all, it can be preserved only by immediate action. Any other course than
immediate severing of diplomatic relations with both Germany and Austria
will deepen the English opinion into a conviction that the
Administration was insincere when it sent the _Lusitania_ notes and that
its notes and protests need not be taken seriously on any subject. And
English opinion is allied opinion. The Italian Ambassador[12] said to
me, 'What has happened? The United States of to-day is not the United
States I knew fifteen years ago, when I lived in Washington.' French
officers and members of the Government who come here express themselves
even more strongly than do the British. The British newspapers to-day
publish translations of ridicule of the United States from German
papers."
_To the President_
London,
January 5, 1916.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
I wish--an impossible thing of course--that some sort of guidance
could be given to the American correspondents of the English
newspapers. Almost every day they telegraph about the visits of the
Austrian Chargé or the German Ambassador to the State Department to
assure Mr. Lansing that their governments will of course make a
satisfactory explanation of the latest torpedo-act in the
Mediterranean or to "take one further step in reaching a
satisfactory understanding about the _Lusitania_." They usually go
on to say also that more notes are in preparation to Germany or to
Austria. The impression made upon the European mind is that the
German and Austrian officials in Washington are leading the
Administration on to endless discussion, endless notes, endless
hesitation. Nobody in Europe regards their pledges or promises as
worth anything at all: the _Arabic_ follows the _Lusitania_, the
_Hesperian_ follows the _Arabic_, the _Persia_ follows the
_Ancona_. "Still conferences and notes continue," these people say,
"proving that the American Government, which took so proper and
high a stand in the _Lusitania_ notes, is paralyzed--in a word is
hoodwinked and 'worked' by the Germans." And so long as these
diplomatic representatives are permitted to remain in the United
States, "to explain," "to parley" and to declare that the
destruction of American lives and property is disavowed by their
governments, atrocities on sea and land will of course continue;
and they feel that our Government, by keeping these German and
Austrian representatives in Washington, condones and encourages
them and their governments.
This is a temperate and even restrained statement of the English
feeling and (as far as I can make out) of the whole European
feeling.
It has been said here that every important journal published in
neutral or allied European countries, daily, weekly, or monthly,
which deals with public affairs, has expressed a loss of respect
for the United States Government and that most of them make
continuous severe criticisms (with surprise and regret) of our
failure by action to live up to the level of our _Lusitania_ notes.
I had (judiciously) two American journalists, resident here--men of
judgment and character--to inquire how true this declaration is.
After talking with neutral and allied journalists here and with men
whose business it is to read the journals of the Continent, they
reported that this declaration is substantially true--that the
whole European press (outside Germany and its allies) uses the same
tone toward our Government that the English press uses--to-day,
disappointment verging on contempt; and many of them explain our
keeping diplomatic intercourse with Germany by saying that we are
afraid of the German vote, or of civil war, or that the
peace-at-any-price people really rule the United States and have
paralyzed our power to act--even to cut off diplomatic relations
with governments that have insulted and defied us.
Another (similar) declaration is that practically all men of public
influence in England and in the European allied and neutral
countries have publicly or privately expressed themselves to the
same effect. The report that I have about this is less definite
than about the newspapers, for, of course, no one can say just what
proportion of men of public influence have so expressed themselves;
but the number who have so expressed themselves is overwhelming.
In this Kingdom, where I can myself form some opinion more or less
accurate, and where I can check or verify my opinion by various
methods--I am afraid, as I have frequently already reported, that
the generation now living will never wholly regain the respect for
our Government that it had a year ago. I will give you three little
indications of this feeling; it would be easy to write down
hundreds of them:
(One) The governing class: Mr. X [a cabinet member] told Mrs. Page
a few nights ago that for sentimental reasons only he would be
gratified to see the United States in the war along with the
Allies, but that merely sentimental reasons were not a sufficient
reason for war--by no means; that he felt most grateful for the
sympathetic attitude of the large mass of the American people, that
he had no right to expect anything from our Government, whose
neutral position was entirely proper. Then he added; "But what I
can't for the life of me understand is your Government's failure
to express its disapproval of the German utter disregard of its
_Lusitania_ notes. After eight months, it has done nothing but
write more notes. My love for America, I must confess, is offended
at this inaction and--puzzled. I can't understand it. You will
pardon me, I am sure."
(Two) "Middle Class" opinion: A common nickname for Americans in
the financial and newspaper districts of London is "Too-prouds."
(Three) The man in the street: At one of the moving picture shows
in a large theatre a little while ago they filled in an interval by
throwing on the screen the picture of the monarch, or head of
state, and of the flag of each of the principal nations. When the
American picture appeared, there was such hissing and groaning as
caused the managers hastily to move that picture off the screen.
Some time ago I wrote House of some such incidents and expressions
as these; and he wrote me that they were only part and parcel of
the continuous British criticism of their own Government--in other
words, a part of the passing hysteria of war. This remark shows how
House was living in an atmosphere of illusion.
As the matter stands to-day our Government has sunk lower, as
regards British and European opinion, than it has ever been in our
time, not as a part of the hysteria of war but as a result of this
process of reasoning, whether it be right or wrong:
We said that we should hold the Germans to strict accountability on
account of the _Lusitania_. We have not settled that yet and we
still allow the German Ambassador to discuss it after the
_Hesperian_ and other such acts showed that his _Arabic_ pledge was
worthless.
The _Lusitania_ grows larger and larger in European memory and
imagination. It looks as if it would become the great type of war
atrocities and barbarities. I have seen pictures of the drowned
women and children used even on Christmas cards. And there is
documentary proof in our hands that the warning, which was really
an advance announcement, of that disaster was paid for by the
German Ambassador and charged to his Government. It is the
_Lusitania_ that has caused European opinion to regard our foreign
policy as weak. It is not the wish for us to go to war. No such
general wish exists.
I do not know, Mr. President, who else, if anybody, puts these
facts before you with this complete frankness. But I can do no less
and do my duty.
No Englishman--except two who were quite intimate friends--has
spoken to me about our Government for months, but I detect all the
time a tone of pity and grief in their studied courtesy and in
their avoidance of the subject. And they talk with every other
American in this Kingdom. It is often made unpleasant for Americans
in the clubs and in the pursuit of their regular business and
occupations; and it is always our inaction about the _Lusitania_.
Our controversy with the British Government causes little feeling
and that is a sort of echo of the _Lusitania_. They feel that we
have not lived up to our promises and professions.
That is the whole story.
Believe me always heartily,
WALTER H. PAGE.
* * * * *
This dismissal of Dumba and of the Attachés has had little more effect
on opinion here than the dismissal of the Turkish Ambassador[13].
Sending these was regarded as merely kicking the dogs of the man who
had stolen our sheep.
VI
One of the reasons why Page felt so intensely about American policy at
this time was his conviction that the severance of diplomatic relations,
in the latter part of 1915, or the early part of 1916, in itself would
have brought the European War to an end. This was a conviction from
which he never departed. Count Bernstorff was industriously creating the
impression in the United States that his dismissal would immediately
cause war between Germany and the United States, and there is little
doubt that the Administration accepted this point of view. But Page
believed that this was nothing but Prussian bluff. The severance of
diplomatic relations at that time, in Page's opinion, would have
convinced the Germans of the hopelessness of their cause. In spite of
the British blockade, Germany was drawing enormous quantities of food
supplies from the United States, and without these supplies she could
not maintain indefinitely her resistance. The severance of diplomatic
relations would naturally have been accompanied by an embargo suspending
trade between the United States and the Fatherland. Moreover, the
consideration that was mainly leading Germany to hope for success was
the belief that she could embroil the United States and Great Britain
over the blockade. A break with Germany would of course mean an end to
that manoeuvre. Page regarded all Mr. Wilson's attempts to make peace in
1914 and early 1915--before the _Lusitania_--as mistakes, for reasons
that have already been set forth. Now, however, he believed that the
President had a real opportunity to end the war and the unparalleled
suffering which it was causing. The mere dismissal of Bernstorff, in
the Ambassador's opinion, would accomplish this result.
In a communication sent to the President on February 15, 1916, he made
this plain.
_To the President_
February 15, 7 P.M.
The Cabinet has directed the Censor to suppress, as far as he can
with prudence, comment which is unfavourable to the United States.
He has taken this action because the public feeling against the
Administration is constantly increasing. Because the _Lusitania_
controversy has been going on so long, and because the Germans are
using it in their renewed U-boat campaign, the opinion of this
country has reached a point where only prompt action can bring a
turn in the tide. Therefore my loyalty to you would not be complete
if I should refrain from sending, in the most respectful terms, the
solemn conviction which I hold about our opportunity and our duty.
If you immediately refuse to have further parley or to yield one
jot or tittle of your original _Lusitania_ notes, and if you at
once break diplomatic relations with the German Empire, and then
declare the most vigorous embargo of the Central Powers, you will
quickly end the war. There will be an immediate collapse in German
credit. If there are any Allies who are wavering, such action will
hold them in line. Certain European neutrals--Sweden, Rumania,
Greece, and others--will put up a firm resistance to Germanic
influences and certain of them will take part with Great Britain
and France. There will be an end at once to the German propaganda,
which is now world-wide. The moral weight of our country will be a
determining influence and bring an early peace. The credit you
will receive for such a decision will make you immortal and even
the people of Germany will be forever grateful.
It is my conviction that we would not be called upon to fire a gun
or to lose one human life.
Above all, such an action will settle the whole question of
permanent peace. The absolute and grateful loyalty of the whole
British Empire, of the British Fleet, and of all the Allied
countries will be ours. The great English-speaking nations will be
able to control the details of the peace and this without any
formal alliance. There will be an incalculable saving of human life
and of treasure. Such an act will make it possible for Germany to
give in honourably and with good grace because the whole world will
be against her. Her bankrupt and blockaded people will bring such
pressure to bear that the decision will be hastened.
The sympathies of the American people will be brought in line with
the Administration.
If we settle the _Lusitania_ question by compromising in any way
your original demands, or if we permit it to drag on longer,
America can have no part in bringing the war to an end. The current
of allied opinion will run so strongly against the Administration
that no censorship and no friendly interference by an allied
government can stem the distrust of our Government which is now so
strong in Europe.
We shall gain by any further delay only a dangerous, thankless, and
opulent isolation. The _Lusitania_ is the turning point in our
history. The time to act is now.
PAGE.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: The Ambassador's granddaughter.]
[Footnote 2: "A Cycle of Adams Letters, 1861-1865," edited by
Worthington Chauncey Ford. Vol. I, p. 84.]
[Footnote 3: "The Life and Letters of John Hay," by William Roscoe
Thayer. Vol. II, p. 166.]
[Footnote 4: On September 6th, certain documents seriously compromising
Dr. Constantin Dumba, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the United States,
were published in the British press. They disclosed that Dr. Dumba was
fomenting strikes in the United States and conducting other intrigues.
The American Government gave Dr. Dumba his passports on September 17th.]
[Footnote 5: August 26th, Count Bernstorff gave a pledge to the United
States Government, that, in future, German submarines would not attack
liners without warning. This promise was almost immediately violated.]
[Footnote 6: Sir Lionel Sackville-West was British Minister to the
United States from 1881 to 1888. In the latter year a letter was
published which he had written to an American citizen of British origin,
the gist of which was that the reëlection of President Cleveland would
be of advantage to British interests. For this gross interference in
American domestic affairs, President Cleveland immediately handed Sir
Lionel his passports. The incident ended his diplomatic career.]
[Footnote 7: In this passage the Ambassador touches on one of the
bitterest controversies of the war. In order completely to understand
the issues involved and to obtain Lord Haldane's view, the reader should
consult the very valuable book recently published by Lord Haldane:
"Before the War." Chapter II tells the story of Lord Haldane's visit to
the Kaiser, and succeeding chapters give the reasons why the creation of
a huge British army in preparation for the war was not a simple matter.]
[Footnote 8: The italics are Page's.]
[Footnote 9: Viscount Bryce, author of "The American Commonwealth" and
British Ambassador to the United States, 1907-1913.]
[Footnote 10: In a communication sent February 10, 1915, President
Wilson warned the German Government that he would hold it to a "strict
accountability" for the loss of American lives by illegal submarine
attack.]
[Footnote 11: A reference to the Anglo-French loan for $500,000,000,
placed in the United States in the autumn of 1915.]
[Footnote 12: The Marquis Imperiali.]
[Footnote 13: Rustem Bey, the Turkish Ambassador to the United States,
was sent home early in the war, for publishing indiscreet newspaper and
magazine articles.]