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THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO
* * * * * *
_SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME._
AN ATLAS OF
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO.
By JOHN CODMAN ROPES.
Designed to accompany the author’s “Campaign of
Waterloo; a Military History.”
Price, $5.00 _net_.
CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS,
Publishers, New York.
* * * * * *
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO
A Military History
by
JOHN CODMAN ROPES
Member of the Massachusetts Historical Society, the Military
Historical Society of Massachusetts, and the Harvard Historical
Society; Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and
the Royal Historical Society; Honorary Member of the United States
Cavalry Association, etc. Author of “The Army under Pope,” in the
Scribner Series of “Campaigns of the Civil War”; “The First Napoleon,
a Sketch, Political and Military,” etc.
Third Edition.
New York
Charles Scribner’S Sons
1893
Copyright, 1892, by
Charles Scribner’S Sons.
PREFACE
The need of another narrative of the campaign of Waterloo may not be
at first sight apparent. There has been a great deal written on this
subject, and much of it has been written by eminent hands. The last
and the most unfortunate campaign of the great soldier of modern times
has naturally attracted the repeated attention of military historians.
Jomini, Clausewitz, Charras, Siborne, Kennedy, Chesney, Vaudoncourt,
La Tour d’Auvergne, Thiers, Hooper, and many others have sought to
explain the almost inexplicable result,—the complete defeat in a very
brief campaign of the acknowledged master of modern warfare. One would
suppose that the theme had been exhausted, and that nothing more
remained to be said.
But several circumstances have contributed to render the labors of
these writers unusually difficult. In the first place, the overthrow
of Napoleon, which was the immediate result of the campaign, operated
to prevent a satisfactory account of it being given to the public
from the French point of view at the time when the facts were fresh
in men’s minds. The Emperor, exiled at St. Helena, could indeed give
his story; but, unable, as he was, to verify or correct his narrative
by citations from the orders that were given at the time, and by
conferring with the officers who had served under him, he has left us
an account, which, though by no means without historical value, is yet
so defective and erroneous in parts that it has aroused in the minds
of men who are not alive to the great difficulties which always attend
the composition of a military narrative, and who are not concerned
to make fair allowance for the unavoidable and peculiar difficulties
of one writing in the circumstances which surrounded Napoleon at St.
Helena, grave doubts as to the trustworthiness of his recollection
and even as to his veracity. The chief officers of the army have also
rendered little assistance to the historian. Ney was shot a few months
after the battle. Soult, Grouchy, d’Erlon and others were forced into
exile. No detailed reports were ever made by them. The royal government
did not concern itself about this episode in the experience of their
predecessors. What the French commander and his subordinates had to say
about the campaign came out by degrees, and much of it only after long
years of waiting. Many of the narratives were written and published
before all the facts had become known,—hence were necessarily more or
less imperfect.
With a few exceptions, too, the histories of this campaign have been
gravely affected by the partisanship of their authors. It is well-nigh
impossible for Thiers and La Tour d’Auvergne to admit any fault, for
Charras and Quinet to admit any merit, in Napoleon’s management of
affairs. It is equally difficult for the majority of English writers to
avoid taking sides against the Emperor in any of the numerous disputes
to which the campaign of Waterloo has given rise. These influences
have operated in many cases to deflect the narrative of the military
operations into a criticism of those who have written from the opposite
standpoint.
Nevertheless, all this discussion has not been by any means without
use. We have had many obscure corners cleared up, many seemingly
inexplicable problems solved, and we are now in possession, taking
all our information together, of nearly all, if not quite all, the
facts. It only remains to collect and co-ordinate them in a spirit of
impartiality. This is the task attempted in the present volume. It may
be added that the narrative and discussions will be confined to purely
military topics.
In the treatment of the subject, Napoleon will naturally be the central
figure. The campaign was his campaign, planned and executed by him,
frustrated by his opponents. It will be our endeavor to get at, as
nearly as we can, his intentions, his expectations, his views from day
to day of the facts of the case, so that we may, if possible, carry a
personal interest into the varying fortunes of those eventful days.
This will be found entirely consistent, it is believed, with an equally
careful attempt to view events from the standpoints which the English
and Prussian commanders must have occupied from time to time during the
campaign.
The general method of Colonel Chesney in his “Waterloo Lectures” is
adopted; that is, the chapters will first contain a statement or
narrative, and, afterwards, notes. In these we shall have occasion
to examine most of the controversies concerning this campaign. Those
persons who do not care for these discussions can read the chapters
_seriatim_.
Those controversies which would occupy too much space if given in the
text proper will be found in appendices.
A partial list of works relating to the campaign is prefixed.
A map of the theatre of war in Belgium and another of the field of
Waterloo are inserted in the book.
For those students who desire to follow the campaign more carefully,
an Atlas has been prepared, which is sold separately. It contains
a general map of the whole theatre of war, eleven maps of Belgium,
showing the varying positions of the three armies during the campaign,
and two maps of the field of Waterloo, in which the topographical
features are shown by contour lines taken from the government
survey, and on which the positions of the troops are set down at the
commencement and close of the battle. The references in the text to
maps are to the maps in this Atlas.
Copies of all the important orders and despatches will be found in
Appendix C.
The author desires to express his thanks for valuable manuscripts,
books and references kindly furnished him by Major General R. Oldfield,
R. A., and Colonel F. A. Whinyates, R. A.; also for many useful
suggestions, and for assistance in many ways, to Major W. R. Livermore,
Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, and Captain A. H. Russell, Ordnance
Department, U. S. Army.
He desires also to acknowledge the aid rendered him by M. Eugène
Wenseleers, Barrister of the Court of Appeal, Brussels, in ascertaining
the location of the Chateau Marette, at Walhain, where (and not at
Sart-à-Walhain, as has been generally believed) Marshal Grouchy was
when he heard the sound of the cannon of Waterloo.
99 Mount Vernon Street:
Boston: June 1, 1892.
J. C. R.
NOTE TO THE THIRD EDITION.
Since the publication of this book the writer has been put in
possession of facts which have led him to reverse his opinion of the
truth of the story that the Duke of Wellington rode to Wavre on the
evening of the 17th of June, 1815.
J. C. R.
99 Mount Vernon Street:
Boston: May 17, 1893.
CONTENTS.
PAGE
PREFACE
CHAPTER I: THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 1
The general military situation 2
Reasons for taking the offensive 2, 3
Napoleon decides to move against Wellington and
Blücher 3
Positions of the Anglo-Dutch and Prussian Armies 3, 4
Napoleon’s plan 4
As stated in Gourgaud’s Narrative 4
And in the “Memoirs” 5
The other plans which were open to him 6
His expectation that Blücher would accept battle
single-handed 7, 8
NOTE TO CHAPTER I 9
Napoleon’s plan distinguished from certain other
plans attributed to him 9
Alison’s view that he threw himself between the
two allied armies 10
Condemned by Wellington and Clausewitz 10
But adopted by Hooper and Quinet 11
Rogniat’s theory, that Napoleon ought to have aimed
at seizing both Quatre Bras and Sombreffe on
the first day 12
Jomini’s belief, that he did have this intention 12
Adopted by La Tour d’Auvergne 13
And by Charras 13
Their view opposed to that of Napoleon, Wellington
and Clausewitz 13
Napoleon desired and expected a battle with the
Prussians 14, 15
CHAPTER II: THE FRENCH ARMY 16
The army as affected by Napoleon’s return from
Elba 16
Confidence of the soldiers in Napoleon 17
Lack of confidence in the high officers 17
Napoleon’s choice of Soult to take Berthier’s place 17
Soult’s unfitness for the position of chief-of-staff 18
The five corps-commanders 18
Estimate of the defects of the French general officers
by Napoleon and by Charras 19
Probability of the truth of their views 19
What Napoleon expected from his lieutenants 20
Marshal Ney sent for at the last moment 20
Sudden appointment of Marshal Grouchy to the
command of the right wing 21
Napoleon’s error in not taking Marshal Davout with
him 22
Estimate of Napoleon’s own bodily and mental vigor
at this period 23-24
Portrait of Napoleon by General Foy 23
Estimate of the French Army 24
It was not the best army which Napoleon had ever
led 24
But it was a better army than either that of Wellington
or of Blücher 25
Its strength and composition 25-28
NOTE TO CHAPTER II 29
Napoleon’s health—Gardner—Ségur 29
The Gudin story 30
Napoleon more or less a sufferer; but on the whole
possessed of good health and strength 30, 31
CHAPTER III: THE ALLIED ARMIES 32
Strength and composition of the Prussian army 32, 33
Location of the different corps 33
Temper and spirit of the army 34
Marshal Blücher 34
The Duke of Wellington’s army 34
Its strength and composition 35-38
Location of the various divisions 38
Merits and defects of the several parts of the army 39
The generals: the Prince of Orange 40
Lord Hill,—Sir T. Picton 40
The Duke of Wellington 40
The internal economy of the three armies 41, 42
That of the French army 41
That of the English army 42
That of the Prussian army 42
NOTE TO CHAPTER III 43
Defects peculiar to the inexperienced English regiments 43
CHAPTER IV: THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE:
NAPOLEON 44
Napoleon assembles his army near Charleroi 44, 45
He addresses it at Avesnes on the 14th 45
His letters to his brother Joseph and to Davout
confirm the view above given of his plan of
campaign 45
The general order of movement issued on the evening
of the 14th of June 45, 46
Accident in the transmission of his orders to General
Vandamme on the 15th 46
Desertion of General Bourmont 47
The operations in the centre under Napoleon’s immediate
supervision 47
Positions of the centre and right on the night of the
15th and 16th 48
Operations of the left wing. Arrival of Ney 48, 49
He pushes the divisions of Bachelu and Piré to Frasnes 49
And leaves those of Jerome and Foy at Gosselies 49
Backwardness of the 1st Corps 50-52
At 3 A.M. of the 16th one division had not arrived
at the Sambre 51
D’Erlon to blame for this tardiness 52
Napoleon’s own summary of the situation on the
evening of the 15th 53
He had purposely abstained from occupying Sombreffe 53
He expected Blücher to fight the next day for the
preservation of his communications with Wellington 53
He gets a few hours’ sleep during the evening of
the 15th 54
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV 55
1. Marshal Ney’s lack of a proper staff 56
2. Discussion of the results of the operations on
the 15th 56 _et seq._
Jomini and Charras consider them incomplete and
unsatisfactory 56
A. The question, as regards the non-occupation of
Sombreffe on the evening of the 15th 57-61
Rogniat’s criticism 57
Napoleon’s answer 57
Charras and Jomini 58, 59
Re-statement of Napoleon’s plan and expectations 59
The plan suggested by Rogniat, Jomini and Charras
no improvement on that of Napoleon 60
B. The question as regards the non-occupation of
Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th 61-63
(1.) Reasons why the effect on Blücher of the
occupation of Quatre Bras might be different
from that of the occupation of Sombreffe 61
(2.) The occupation of Quatre Bras on the evening
of the 15th not necessary to Napoleon’s scheme 62
3. Reasons why Napoleon blamed Ney for not
having occupied Quatre Bras on the 15th 63
4. Did Napoleon give Ney a verbal order to
seize Quatre Bras on the 15th? 64
The statements of Gourgaud and the Memoirs 64
The statement in the Bulletin of the Army, sent off
in the evening of the 15th 65
The published statement of Marshal Grouchy in
1818 that he heard the Emperor blame Ney for
having disobeyed his orders to seize Quatre
Bras on the 15th 65, n. [122]
The subsequent hearsay evidence of little value 66-67
The Bulletin much the best evidence that we have 67-69
That no mention is made in the written orders of
the 16th of the verbal order of the day before, is
not material 69
CHAPTER V: THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE: BLÜCHER
AND WELLINGTON 70
Blücher on the 14th ordered his army to concentrate
at Sombreffe 70
And without consulting Wellington 70
The nature of the understanding between them 70 _et seq._
Müffling’s statement generally misunderstood 71
There was every intention to act in concert, but no
definite agreement as to details 72
Bülow’s disobedience of orders 73
Gneisenau’s remissness in not giving him full information
of the situation 73
Wellington’s desire to protect Ghent and Brussels 74
He retained his headquarters at Brussels 74
He thought it probable that the French would
advance by way of Mons 74
Hence he would not hastily move in force in the
direction of Quatre Bras 75
The Prince of Orange hears of the French advance 76
And brings word of it to the Duke at Brussels at
3 P.M. of the 15th 77
Wellington’s first orders were issued between 5 and
7 P.M. 77
They were simply for the concentration of the various
divisions of his army 78
But they implied that Nivelles and not Quatre Bras
was likely to be the point of concentration for
the whole army 78
Information that Blücher is concentrating at Sombreffe
arrives in the evening at Brussels 78
And Wellington issues, about 10 P.M., his “After
Orders” which direct a general movement
towards the east 79
Difficulty of reconciling the evidence as to the subsequent
orders of the Duke 79
The Duke’s official report states that he ordered the
whole army to Quatre Bras in the early morning
of the 16th 80
Müffling’s statement 80
The Duke’s conversation with the Duke of Richmond 81, n. [170]
The instructions issued to Colonel De Lancey have
been lost 81
The orders to Hill in the early morning of the 16th 82
They indicate that no decision for a concentration
at Quatre Bras had then been reached 83
This inference may be also drawn from the halt of
Picton’s division at Waterloo 83
It has even been maintained that as late as 10 A.M.
of the 16th the Duke had not decided to hold
Quatre Bras 84, n. [182]
But the Letter of the Duke to Marshal Blücher and
the “Disposition” of Sir W. De Lancey contradict
this supposition 85
Character and meaning of the “Disposition” 86
The “Disposition” evidently the foundation of the
Letter to Blücher 87-88
Taken together, they show that the Duke ordered
a concentration of his army at Quatre Bras in
the early morning of the 16th 88
But not until after he had given the orders above
mentioned to Hill and Picton 88
His decision was probably arrived at while he
was at the Duchess of Richmond’s ball 89
NOTES TO CHAPTER V 90
1. The Duke’s “Memorandum on the Battle of
Waterloo” 90
Its surprising statements 90
2. No definite plan of action agreed on by Wellington
and Blücher in the event of a French
invasion 91
3. Wellington does not deserve credit for promptness
in deciding to concentrate at Quatre
Bras 92
4. Wellington’s original intention of concentrating
at Nivelles considered 93
It is approved by Colonel Maurice 93
A. But when Wellington knew that the French
main army was in front of Blücher at Sombreffe
he could run no great risk in concentrating
at Quatre Bras 94
B. His fault was in delaying to issue the order to
do so 94
If his orders had been strictly carried out, Ney
would have occupied Quatre Bras without
opposition, and been able to assist Napoleon
at Ligny 95
C. Napoleon attached great importance to Quatre
Bras, and gave Ney a large force in order to
make sure of its acquisition 95, 96
5. The extent of the cantonments of the allied
armies criticized 96
Opinion of Sir James Shaw-Kennedy 96
Opinions of Charras and Napoleon 97, 98
6. Napoleon’s criticism on Blücher for fixing Sombreffe
as the point of concentration for his
army, well supported 98
But his censure of Wellington for concentrating at
Quatre Bras undeserved 99
Because this decision of Wellington’s was based
on Napoleon’s having already concentrated in
front of Sombreffe 99, 100
CHAPTER VI: THE DUTCH-BELGIANS 101
Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar occupies Quatre
Bras in the afternoon of the 15th 101
And is attacked by Reille’s advance between 5 and
6 P.M. 101
The other brigade of Perponcher’s division, Bylandt’s,
ordered there also 102
The Prince of Orange arrives at Quatre Bras at 6
A.M. of the 16th 102
NOTE TO CHAPTER VI 103
Maurice’s criticism on the occupation of Quatre
Bras by the Dutch-Belgian generals 103
But the fact that they knew of the concentration of
the French and Prussian armies near Sombreffe
fully justifies their course 103, 104
CHAPTER VII: THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH
OF JUNE: WELLINGTON 105
The Duke leaves Brussels about 7.30 A.M. of the
16th 105
And rides at once to Quatre Bras 106
His letter to Blücher 106
Comparison of the statements in the Letter with
those in the “Disposition” of Sir W. De
Lancey 107-108
He evidently accepted the “Disposition” as conclusive 108
He rides over to Brye to confer with Blücher 108
And returns to Quatre Bras between 2 and 3 P.M. 109
No doubt expecting to find a large part of his army
there 109
Delbrück’s theory, that the Duke deliberately
misrepresented the situation of his army, entirely
unsupported 109, 110
NOTES TO CHAPTER VII 111
1. Actual positions of Wellington’s divisions at
7 A.M. of the 16th 111-113
2. Whether, if the Duke had known the truth, he
would have stayed at Quatre Bras,—_quære_ 114
3. Wellington badly served by his subordinates in
the matter of the transmission of intelligence
from the front 114-115
CHAPTER VIII: THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH
OF JUNE: NEY 116
Ney returns from Charleroi to Gosselies at 2 A.M. 116
And at first orders Reille to set out at once for
Frasnes 116
But afterwards changes his mind, and allows Reille,
with the divisions of Jerome and Foy, to remain
in Gosselies 117
He ought to have sent them to Frasnes at once 117
And to have filled their places at Gosselies with the
divisions of the 1st Corps 118
He does nothing to bring up the 1st Corps till late
in the forenoon 119
Soult’s first order to him on the 16th 120
Received about 6 A.M., and answered before 7 A.M. 120
Ney then returns to Frasnes, leaving Reille at Gosselies,
with instructions to march to the front at
once on receipt of orders from army headquarters 120
About 9 A.M. Reille receives word from Girard
that the Prussians are massing at Fleurus 121
And at 10 A.M. he reads the Emperor’s letter to
Ney, brought by Flahaut 121
But defers his march to Frasnes till he gets further
orders from Ney 122
He gets further orders, and leaves Gosselies at 11.45
A.M. 122
Soult’s second order directs Ney to march on Quatre
Bras 122
The Emperor’s letter to Ney 123
The 1st and 2d Corps and Kellermann’s cavalry are
all put at Ney’s disposal 123
The third order to Ney from Soult that morning 123, 124
Its peremptory character 124
Ney refuses fully to obey his orders 124
His unwillingness to take the risks which they involve 124
He proposes to keep half his force in reserve 125
NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII 126
1. Summary of Ney’s conduct on the morning of
the 16th 126
2. He evidently did not intend to obey his orders
strictly 127
3. The light his conduct on the 16th throws on his
failure to seize Quatre Bras the day before 127
4. No criticism can be made on Napoleon and Soult 128
5. Why Napoleon did not send Ney an earlier order
to seize Quatre Bras, answered in Chapter IX 128
CHAPTER IX: THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH
OF JUNE: NAPOLEON 129
Ney and Napoleon at Charleroi during the night of
the 15th and 16th 129
Napoleon, impressed by the backwardness of
d’Erlon, decides to wait until the left wing is
ready 130
The formal order to Ney to seize Quatre Bras not
given until Ney’s report of the state of his command
had arrived—between 8 and 9 A.M. 131
The advance of the centre and right also delayed to
conform to the movements of the left 131, 132
Napoleon’s expectations as to the forwardness of
Ney’s command 132, 133
Napoleon prepares and sends letters to Ney and
Grouchy, in view of the possible withdrawal
of Marshal Blücher 134, 135
He seems to have thought this probable 136
But he made every preparation for encountering the
enemy in force both at Sombreffe and at Quatre
Bras 137
The 6th Corps regarded as a reserve for the whole
army 138
NOTES TO CHAPTER IX 139
1. The censure generally passed on Napoleon for
his delays on the morning of the 16th not
deserved 139
Opinions of Wellington and Clausewitz 139, n. [310]
2. Ney not responsible for the backwardness of
the 1st Corps during the night 140
3. Ney’s inactivity on returning to Gosselies 140
4. No evidence thus far of indolence or irresolution
on the part of Napoleon 140
5. Error of supposing that he ever thought of
pressing on to Brussels between the two allied
armies—Chesney and Clinton 141
His letters to Ney and Grouchy conclusive as
to this 141, 142
His object was to destroy the allied armies in
succession—Jomini 142
CHAPTER X: THE BATTLE OF LIGNY:
BLÜCHER’S DECISION TO ACCEPT
BATTLE NOT DEPENDENT ON WELLINGTON’S
ASSURANCE OF SUPPORT 143
Blücher concentrated his army without receiving
any assurance of support from Wellington 143
He got Wellington’s letter about noon of the 16th 144
Wellington arrived at Brye at 1 P.M. 144
Their conversation 144
Wellington gave no unconditional promise 145
Blücher’s decision to fight was arrived at before he
heard from or saw Wellington 146
And on entirely independent grounds 147
NOTE TO CHAPTER X 148
Blücher’s reasons for deciding to accept battle at
Ligny as given by Damitz 148
He was unwilling to retreat 148
Suggestions of Ollech and Delbrück not of any
value here 149
Blücher expected to concentrate his whole army of
120,000 men 149
And was unwilling to change his decision when he
found he could not count upon Bülow’s arrival 150
CHAPTER XI: THE BATTLE OF LIGNY 151
Position of the Prussian army at Ligny 151
Napoleon examines the position 152
The most obvious plan of battle was to turn the
Prussian right 152
But Napoleon decides to attack the centre 153
Positions taken by the French 153, 154
The 2 P.M. order sent to Ney to coöperate with
the main army 154
The battle begins at 2.30 by attacking Ligny and
St. Amand 154
The 3.15 P.M. order to Ney 155
Napoleon determines about half-past five o’clock to
put in the Guard 156
The unexpected appearance of d’Erlon’s Corps
causes a delay of nearly two hours 157
The attack by the Guard breaks the Prussian centre 158
The Prussians fall back to Brye and Sombreffe 159
Losses of the Prussians and French 159
The non-employment of the 6th Corps 159, 160
Extent of the victory 160, 161
It was not equal to Napoleon’s hopes, but it had
disposed of the Prussians for a time 161, 162
NOTES TO CHAPTER XI 163
1. Napoleon’s delay in beginning the battle 163
His reasons considered 164
2. His plan of battle criticised by Rogniat and
others 164
Napoleon’s reply to Rogniat 165
His reasons for taking the course he did 165
The criticism of Davout and Clausewitz considered 166
3. Clausewitz’s doubts as to the decisive result of
Ney’s movement 167
The question fully stated and Napoleon’s expectations
justified 167
4. What Napoleon had a right to expect from Ney 168
5. Whether Napoleon’s plan was the best, considering
that he could not absolutely rely on
Ney’s coöperation 169
6. Why Napoleon did not order d’Erlon to remain
and take part in the battle 170
He must have assumed that d’Erlon had come upon
the field for this purpose 170
And there was not time to send him orders 170
7. Napoleon’s skill well displayed at Ligny 171
Clausewitz’s review of the battle 171-173
He points out that Napoleon was more economical
in the use of his troops than Blücher 171
Severe and unwarranted criticism of Marshal Davout
on Napoleon’s tactics 173
Napoleon not responsible for the error which
brought d’Erlon on the field 174
8. Whether Napoleon was wise in arresting the
progress of the battle on the appearance of the
strange corps (d’Erlon’s),—_Quære_ 174-175
9. Napoleon to be censured for not having made
use of the 6th Corps 175
CHAPTER XII: THE BATTLE OF QUATRE
BRAS 176
_Résumé_ of Marshal Ney’s doings in the forenoon
of the 16th 176
He should have ordered Jerome and Foy to Gosselies
in the early morning 177
He scattered his command instead of uniting it, as
he was ordered to do 177
He begins the action at 2 P.M., with the divisions
of Bachelu, Foy and Piré 178
Jerome’s division arrives at 3 P.M. 178
Wellington returns to Quatre Bras at 2.30 P.M. 178
Picton’s division arrives at 3.30 P.M. 178
Alten’s division arrives at 5 P.M. 179
At this hour Ney has only the 2d Corps on the field 179
Reasons for the non-arrival of the 1st Corps 179
Its delay in starting 180
Its leading division—Durutte’s—turned off by an
aide of the Emperor’s from Frasnes towards St.
Amand 180
The corps is seen approaching St. Amand about
5 P.M. 180
It must, therefore, have left the Charleroi road at
Frasnes about 4.30 P.M. 181
This was two hours and a half after Jerome’s division
had passed through Frasnes 181
Responsibility of Ney and d’Erlon for this extraordinary
state of things 181
Marshal Ney not to blame for recalling D’Erlon to
Quatre Bras 181
It was probably the staff-officer who carried the
2 P.M. order who turned the 1st Corps off from
the turnpike 182
For the non-arrival of Kellermann’s cavalry Ney
alone was responsible 182
He ordered it to remain in the rear at Frasnes and
Liberchies 182, 183
In this he deliberately disobeyed orders 183
He finally, at 6 P.M., puts in one brigade of
Kellermann’s Corps 183
Which is at first successful, but is afterwards driven
back with loss 184
The French retire to Frasnes 184
The casualties on both sides 184
If d’Erlon’s Corps had not been turned off, it is
probable that Wellington would have been
badly beaten 184, 185
If Ney had concentrated his whole command between
12 M. and 2 P.M., Quatre Bras would
probably have been evacuated 185, 186
In this case Ney could have spared 10,000 or 20,000
men to assist Napoleon 186
Criticism on Marshal Ney’s management 186
Wellington’s skilful handling of his troops 187, 188
NOTES TO CHAPTER XII 189
1. Charras’ erroneous statements as to Ney’s orders
in regard to the employment of Kellermann’s
cavalry 189
2. Napoleon’s mistakes in his account of the
matter in his Memoirs 190
But his principal censure on Ney for not having got
his command together and used it as a whole,
is fully borne out 191
3. Curious error of Siborne’s 191
4. Jomini’s defence of Reille’s delay to march to
Frasnes 192
It overlooks the necessity of occupying Frasnes in
any event, and therefore cannot be accepted 193
5. Baudus’ account of his carrying an order from
Soult to d’Erlon 193
Reasons for thinking that this order must have been
directed to Ney 194
Baudus probably carried the duplicate of the 3.15
P.M. order to Ney 195
The evidence on certain minor points conflicting 196
CHAPTER XIII: THE SEVENTEENTH OF
JUNE: NAPOLEON 197
_Résumé_ of the campaign up to date 197
Napoleon had no reason for delay 197
He had a disposable army composed almost entirely
of fresh troops 197
Reasons for thinking that the Prussians might soon
recover from the defeat of Ligny 198
Opportunity open to Napoleon of overwhelming
that part of Wellington’s army which was at
Quatre Bras 199
Napoleon’s inactivity on this morning 200
Probably the result of fatigue 200
Ney sends no report to the Emperor 200
Soult’s first order to him to move on Quatre Bras 201
Napoleon presumes that Wellington has long since
fallen back 201
Napoleon’s lack of energy and activity this morning 202
Before noon, however, the 6th Corps and the Guard
are ordered to Marbais 203
Second order to Ney at noon 203
Girard’s division of the 2d Corps left at Ligny 203
Napoleon’s reasons for supposing that Blücher had
retired on Namur 203, 204
Of which the principal was that he had on the day
before employed so large a part of his army in
holding the Namur road 204
Pajol captures some prisoners and a battery on the
road to Namur 205
Napoleon’s neglect to send out cavalry to explore
the country to the north 205
Napoleon determines to send Grouchy with the 3d
and 4th Corps to pursue the Prussians 206
His verbal orders to Grouchy, and Grouchy’s remonstrances 207
Grouchy’s points not well taken 207
Grouchy’s denial that he ever received on that day
a written order 208
Berton reports a whole Prussian corps at Gembloux 209
The Emperor, then, in the absence of Soult, dictates
to Bertrand an order to Grouchy 209
Full text of this order 209, 210
This order changes entirely the task assigned to
Grouchy 210
He is to ascertain whether the Prussians intend to
separate from the English or to unite with them
to cover Brussels or Liége in trying the fate of
another battle 211
And is left full discretion as to his course in either
event 211
Strength and composition of his command 212
He reaches Gembloux that evening 212
And writes to the Emperor a report in which he
says he shall try to separate the Prussians from
Wellington 212, 213
Strength of Wellington’s force at Quatre Bras 214
At Quatre Bras the Emperor in person leads the
pursuit of the English 214
His remark to d’Erlon 215
Interesting picture of the march by the author of
“Napoléon à Waterloo” 215
Skirmish at Genappe 216
The English take up positions south of the hamlet of
Mont St. Jean 216
NOTES TO CHAPTER XIII 217
1. Napoleon not to be blamed for not having pursued
the Prussians in the early morning of the
17th. Clausewitz’s opinion 217
2. Napoleon probably would not have detached
Grouchy had he known that the Prussians had
retired on Wavre 218
3. Effect on the contemporary historians of
Grouchy’s concealment of the Bertrand order—_e. g._,
on Clausewitz 218
4. Curious survival of this effect on historians who
wrote after the order had come to light 219
On Chesney 219
On Maurice 219
On Hamley 221
On Hooper 222
5. Whether the Bertrand order was sufficiently
explicit. Charras’ opinion 222
6. The reasons for directing Grouchy on Gembloux
considered 223
7. Valuable suggestions of Maurice as to the reasons
which induced Napoleon to suppose that
the Prussians had retreated to Namur 223
8. It was an error for Napoleon to trust to the
probabilities, when so much was at stake 224, 225
CHAPTER XIV: THE SEVENTEENTH OF JUNE:
BLÜCHER AND WELLINGTON 226
Zieten and Pirch I. fall back towards Wavre 226
Renunciation of the line of Namur 226
But a general concentration at Wavre not necessarily
implied 226
Although it was rendered possible by Gneisenau’s
action 227
Gneisenau unwilling to renounce all hope of union
with the English 228
Although he recognized the difficulties attending it 228
And doubted whether he could rely on Wellington 229
Blücher carried off the field to Mellery 229
Hardinge’s story of the discussion between Blücher
and Gneisenau 230
The Prussian generals decide to march to join Wellington 230
Movements of Thielemann and Bülow 231
Admirable conduct of the Prussian corps-commanders 231
The Prussians fall back on Wavre 232
Leaving a detachment at Mont St. Guibert 232
The artillery trains arrive at Wavre at 5 P.M. 232
Wellington at Quatre Bras on the morning of the
17th 233
His message to Blücher sent through Lieut. Massow 233
Blücher replies about midnight, promising support 234
Wellington’s uncertainty during the day and evening
of the 17th 234
The risk which he ran 235, 236
NOTES TO CHAPTER XIV 237
1. Maurice’s correction of Siborne 237
2. The story of the Duke’s ride to Wavre on the
evening of the 17th 238-242
Lockhart’s brief statement 239
Lord Ellesmere’s denial of Lockhart’s statement 239
The story as told by the Rev. Julian Charles Young 239-241
Mr. Coltman’s recollection of his father’s statement
about it 241
Reasons for rejecting the story 242
3. Napoleon’s criticism on the course of Wellington
and Blücher after the battle of Ligny 243
Clausewitz denies that Wellington ran any risk 243
His view not tenable 244
The question of the advisability of running the risk
stated 244
CHAPTER XV: THE EIGHTEENTH OF JUNE:
GROUCHY AND BLÜCHER 245
Grouchy’s letter from Gembloux of 10 P.M. not
really satisfactory 245
But Napoleon and Soult do not give him further
instructions or any information 246
Napoleon thinks Grouchy may arrive by the bridge
of Moustier and sends Marbot to look out for him 247
Grouchy was acting under the Bertrand order 248
Which laid upon him the task of ascertaining the
intentions of the Prussians 249
And then left him entire liberty of action 249
Errors of Gardner and Maurice as to this latter point 249, 250
Grouchy at 10 P.M. of the 17th issues his orders
for the next day to move on Sart-à-Walhain at
6 and 8 A.M. 250
But at daybreak he has learned that the Prussians
had retired on Brussels 251
Yet he does not change his orders 252
He should have marched for the bridge of Moustier
at daybreak 253
Opinion of Jomini 253
Opinion of Clausewitz 253
Opinion of Charras 253
Grouchy neglects to reconnoitre to his left 254
He arrives at Walhain and stops at the house of
M. Hollert, a notary 255
He writes a despatch to the Emperor 255
Analysis of this despatch 255, 256
The sound of the cannon of Waterloo is heard 256
Grouchy’s plain duty 256
Gérard’s advice 256
Grouchy refuses to follow it 257
And resumes his march on Wavre 257
Condition of the roads and bridges 258
Grouchy might have crossed the Dyle after having
arrived at La Baraque 259
Three general misconceptions 259
1. As to the place where the sound of the cannon
was heard 259
2. As to the necessity of marching by way of Mont
St. Guibert 259
3. As to the resistance to be expected at the bridges 260
Grouchy might have been across by 4 P.M. 260
Positions of the IVth and IId Prussian Corps at
that moment 261
And of the Ist Corps 261
Probability that Grouchy would have arrested the
march of Bülow and Pirch I. 261
Zieten’s march, however, would not have been
interfered with 261
Bülow reaches St. Lambert at noon 262
Pirch I. and Zieten do not leave Wavre till nearly
noon 262
Tardiness of these movements 263
Accounted for by Gneisenau’s distrust of Wellington 263
His postscript to the letter to Müffling 263
His doubts as to Wellington’s accepting battle dispelled
by the sound of the cannon of Waterloo 264
The combat at Wavre 264, 265
The bridge of Limale carried by the French between
6 and 7 P.M. 265
Soult’s 10 A.M. order to Grouchy 265
Analysis of this order 266
Its main object 266
It furnishes no justification for Grouchy’s course 267
Inconsistency between this despatch and the instructions
given to Marbot 268-270
The despatch probably not revised by Napoleon 270
The 1 P.M. order to Grouchy 270, 271
Both despatches show that Napoleon was relying on
Grouchy 272
The postscript to the second shows that the Emperor
had become alarmed 272
NOTES TO CHAPTER XV 273
1. The wisdom of detaching Grouchy with 33,000
men considered 273
This course was decided on when it was believed
that the Prussians had retreated on Namur 273
For Grouchy was not needed for the battle with the
Anglo-Dutch army 274
But the Bertrand order shows that Napoleon feared
that Blücher might have undertaken to join
Wellington 274
In which case he would have had a long start by
the time when Grouchy could move 275
Yet Napoleon adhered to the original decision to
send Grouchy off, although he gave him a distinct
warning 276
Risks incurred by this course 276
It would have been far safer to have taken Grouchy
and his two corps with the main army 277
2. Kennedy’s reason against the detachment of
Grouchy 277
But it was not to beat Wellington that Grouchy was
needed, but to keep off Blücher 278
3. Importance of treating independently of the
conduct of Napoleon and Grouchy 279
4. Hamley’s opinion as to Grouchy’s proper course
given and commented on 280
5. The probable results, if Grouchy had marched
for Moustier at daybreak 281
It would seem that he might easily have concealed
the object of his march 281
Charras, however, is of a different opinion 282
Examination of his views 282
Probability that Grouchy could have effected a
crossing at Moustier and Ottignies by 11 A.M. 283
And that Bülow would have stopped to concentrate
his corps and fight 283
And that Pirch I. and Thielemann would have reinforced
Bülow 284
Zieten, however, if he chose to do so, might have
continued his march 284
6. Charras’ view as to the difficulty of Grouchy’s
effecting a crossing after he had arrived at La
Baraque 284
His statements as to the Prussian force in the
vicinity of the lower bridges unsupported 285
7. It is generally stated that Grouchy was at
Sart-à-Walhain when he heard the sound of the
cannon of Waterloo 286
Statements of the different narratives 286, 287
He was, however, at Walhain, at the Chateau
Marette, then the residence of M. Hollert, the
Notary of Nil St. Vincent 287, 288
CHAPTER XVI: THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 289
Napoleon examines the allied position at 1 A.M. 289
Early in the morning he again goes to the front to
see if the English are there 290
His expectation of victory 290
The _rôle_ which he expected Grouchy to play 290
He does not seem to have drawn the very natural
inference that Wellington was expecting
Blücher; or, if he did, he certainly did not act
upon it 291
The rain ceased about 8 A.M. 291
The original intention was to begin the battle at
9 o’clock 292
But Drouot suggested delay and Napoleon acquiesced 292
Napoleon forms the army in three lines 292
His delay in beginning the action criticised 293
And his neglect to send word to Grouchy 294
Every hour’s delay a gain to Wellington 294
Whose army was unequal to the shock without the
assistance of the Prussians 294
Kennedy’s explanation of Wellington’s course 295
Risks that Wellington took 295
Wellington had had the field surveyed 296
Description of the English position 297
Composition and strength of Wellington’s army 298
Positions of the various troops 299
Hougomont and La Haye Sainte 300
Strength and composition of the French army 301
Positions of the corps 301
Napoleon’s plan of battle 302
Establishment of a great battery east of the Charleroi
turnpike 302
It has been universally commended 303
The attack on Hougomont, ordered as a preliminary
to the main attack, which was to be on the centre, very
rashly and carelessly conducted 303, 304
The assault by d’Erlon’s Corps 304-307
Formation of the troops 305
No assignable reason for such a peculiar and unwieldy
formation 305
The attack is made and repulsed 307
Napoleon sees the Prussians on the heights of St.
Lambert 307
Capture of La Haye Sainte 307
The great cavalry attacks on the English centre 308
They were made against troops in good condition to
stand them 308
Napoleon is called away at 4 P.M. to take charge
of the resistance to the Prussians 308
Necessity of maintaining the Charleroi road and
Planchenoit against their assaults 309
Napoleon’s personal supervision needed 309
The great cavalry charges 309
They accomplish little and the cavalry is ruined 310
French batteries placed to the south of La Haye
Sainte enfilade the English line west of the
turnpike 310
But this was only done to a limited extent 310
The attack by the heavy cavalry of the Guard 311
Napoleon succeeds in repulsing Bülow 311
The battle against the English not actively carried
on after the cessation of the cavalry attacks 312
But the English line at this period becomes from
various causes very weak. Kennedy’s description
of it 312
What Napoleon might have accomplished against
the English had he not been fighting the Prussians
at this time 313
The fight with the Prussians terminated, Napoleon
returns to the front 314
Wellington has made every effort to restore his
line; its condition to the west of the pike 314
Ney is ordered to make preparations for an attack
to be made by the Imperial Guard 315
Disposition at this time of the various battalions of
the Guard 315, 316
Strength and composition of the attacking force 316
The Emperor leads up and hands to Ney two regiments
of grenadiers and two of chasseurs 317
They are formed in columns of battalions and march
in _échelon_, the right in advance 317
Premature attack of a body of French horse on the
left of the Guard 317
No support furnished by Reille 318
Admirable conduct of d’Erlon 318
The leading battalions of the Guard strike Maitland’s
brigade of guards 319
Captain Powell’s account 319
The leading battalions of the Guard are beaten 320
General Maitland’s account 321
Skilful and gallant conduct of Sir C. Halkett 322
The left and rear battalions of the Guard continue
to advance 323
But are attacked in flank by the 52d regiment 324
And are completely overthrown 324
The failure of the attack largely due to the absence
of supports 324
Arrival of the van of Zieten’s Corps on the field 324
The French right wing retires in confusion 325
Charge of the cavalry-brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur 325
Exertions of Napoleon to restore order 325
He is finally forced to retire 326
The French retreat blocked at Genappe 326
The result of the battle due to the intervention of
the Prussians 327
Probable course of Zieten if Grouchy had detained
Bülow and Pirch I. 328
Grouchy, however, not solely responsible for the defeat 328
NOTES TO CHAPTER XVI 329
1. The French tactics generally censured 329
Napoleon and Ney both to blame 329
Injurious effect on the French chances of success of
Napoleon’s absence at Planchenoit 330
The attack on Hougomont criticised 330
The defence of Planchenoit praised 331
2. The English tactics exceedingly good 331
3. The attack of the Imperial Guard 331
A. No foundation for the hypothesis of two columns 332
B. The claims of the 52d regiment considered 333
The notion that it was only the skirmishers of the
Imperial Guard who were driven off by Maitland’s
brigade refuted by the testimony of eye
witnesses 334
The great credit due to Colborne 335
4. Napoleon’s reasons for ordering the attack considered 336
Zieten’s intervention not anticipated 336
The English reported as growing weaker 337
Ney ordered and expected to support the attack by
Bachelu’s division and by cavalry on the left 337
Ney disappoints the Emperor’s expectations in both
respects 337
The charge of the Guard might have been properly
supported 338
Contrast between Ney and Wellington 338
Note on Ney’s state of mind 338, n. [777]
5. Wellington’s course in leaving 18,000 men at
Hal and Tubize, not to be defended 339
6. As to the effect upon the Prussians of the appearance
of Grouchy’s force marching from
the Dyle 339
7. The rout of the French army due to the irruption
of Zieten’s Corps 340
The comparative weakness of the Anglo-Dutch
army at the close of the action 341
8. Relative responsibility of Napoleon and Grouchy
for the intervention of the Prussians 341
Both are responsible for it 342
CHAPTER XVII: CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 343
The principal points treated of in this book 343-350
APPENDIX A.
On some characteristics of Napoleon’s Memoirs 351
Injustice done Napoleon by Charras and others 351
Peculiarity of Napoleon’s memory 352
He recalls his expectations, but not the tenor of the
orders which he gave 352
Illustration from the orders sent to Ney on the afternoon
of the 16th 352
The same thing probably true as to the order sent
to Grouchy 353
The orders given in the “Memoirs” were probably
never sent 354
And the Bertrand order, which was sent, was forgotten 354
APPENDIX B.
On Marshal Grouchy and the Bertrand order 355
Denials by Marshal Grouchy in his pamphlets published
in Philadelphia that he received on the
17th any written order 355
He relied on the fact that no copy of the Bertrand
order was among the major-general’s papers 356
Publication of the order in 1842 357
It is now recognized in the Grouchy Memoirs 357
Original text of the Bertrand Order 358
Grouchy’s report to the Emperor dated Gembloux,
10 P.M., June 17, given in full 359
It is in reality a reply to the Bertrand order 360
Mutilation by Marshal Grouchy of the text of this
report 360
Object of the change 360
No doubt as to the correct reading 361
APPENDIX C.
I. Napoleon’s Address to his army, June 14, 1815 362
II. Order of movement, June 14, 1815 363
III. Order to the Count Reille, 8.30 A.M., June 15, 1815 366
IV. Order to the Count d’Erlon, 10 A.M., June 1815 367
V. Order to the Count d’Erlon, 3 P.M., June 15, 1815 367
VI. Subsequent Order to the Count d’Erlon, June 15, 1815 367
VII. Order to Gen. Noguès, 3 A.M., June 16, 1815 368
VIII. Bulletin of the army, June 15, 1815, evening 369
IX. Wellington’s first Memorandum of Orders, June 15, 1815 370
X. Wellington’s letter to the Duc de Feltre, 10 P.M.,
June 15, 1815 371
XI. Wellington’s “After Orders,” 10 P.M., June 15, 1815 371
XII. Extract from Wellington’s Report of the
Operations, June 19, 1815 372
XIII. Wellington’s Conversation with the Duke
of Richmond, June 16, 1815 373
XIV. Wellington’s Orders to Lord Hill, June 16, 1815 374
XV. Extract from Wellington’s “Memorandum
on the Battle of Waterloo” 374
XVI. Wellington’s Letter to Blücher, 10.30 A.M.,
June 16, 1815 376
XVII. Soult’s first order to Ney, June 16, 1815 377
XVIII. The Emperor’s Letter to Ney, June 16, 1815 377
XIX. Count Reille’s Letter to Ney, June 16, 1815 379
XX. Ney’s Orders to Reille and d’Erlon, June 16, 1815 379
XXI. Soult’s formal Order to Ney to carry Quatre
Bras, June 16, 1815 380
XXII. Soult’s second Order to Ney to carry Quatre
Bras, June 16, 1815 381
XXIII. Flahaut’s Letter to the Duke of Elchingen 382
XXIV. Napoleon’s Letter to Grouchy, June 16, 1815 382
XXV. The 2 P.M.—June 16th—Order to Ney 383
XXVI. The 3.15 P.M.—June 16th—Order to Ney 384
XXVII. Soult’s Letter to Ney, June 17, 1815 384
XXVIII. Soult’s Order to Ney, 12 M., June 17, 1815 385
XXIX. Capt Bowles’ story of Wellington at Quatre
Bras, June 17, 1815 386
XXX. Grouchy’s report to Napoleon from Sart-à-Walhain,
11 A.M., June 18, 1815 386
XXXI. General Order of preparation for the Battle
of Waterloo, June 18, 1815 387
XXXII. Order for the attack to begin at 1 P.M.,
June 18, 1815 388
XXXIII. The 10 A.M.—June 18th—Order to Grouchy 388
XXXIV. The 1 P.M.—June 18th—Order to Grouchy 389
MAPS
(At end of this volume.)
THE THEATRE OF WAR.
THE FIELD OF WATERLOO AT 11 A.M., JUNE 18, 1815.
A PARTIAL LIST OF WORKS RELATING TO THE CAMPAIGN.[1]
ALISON:
History of Europe from the commencement of the French Revolution to
the Restoration of the Bourbons in 1815. By Archibald Alison, LL. D.
New Edition with Portraits. Vols. XIII and XIV. Wm. Blackwood & Sons,
Edinburgh & London, MDCCCL.
BATTY:
An Historical Sketch of the Campaign of 1815, illustrated by Plans of
the Operations and of the Battles of Quatre-Bras, Ligny and Waterloo.
By Captain Batty, of the First or Grenadier Guards. 2d Edition,
Considerably Enlarged. London, 1820.
BAUDUS:
Études sur Napoléon. Par le lieutenant-colonel de Baudus, ancien
aide-de-camp des Maréchaux Bessières et Soult. 2 Vols. Paris:
Debécourt: 1841.
BERTON:
Précis, historique, militaire et critique, des batailles de Fleurus et
de Waterloo. Avec une Carte. Par le Maréchal-de-Camp Berton. Paris:
Delaunay. 1818.
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE CAMPAIGN:
Prepared, with critical estimates, in October, 1875, by Justin Winsor,
now Librarian of Harvard College, in Bulletin No. 35 of the Public
Library of the City of Boston, of which Mr. Winsor was then Librarian.
It includes a notice of Maps and Plans.
Colonel Chesney gives a list of works cited by himself just after the
Table of Contents in his Waterloo Lectures.
Colonel Maurice in his book entitled “War,”—London and New York:
Macmillan & Co., 1891,—gives in the Appendix, pp. 128 _et seq._, a
list of books relating to the campaign of Waterloo,—with comments and
estimates.
BROWNE:
Wellington: or Public and Private Life of Arthur, first Duke of
Wellington. By G. Lathom Browne. London, W. H. Allen & Co. 1888.
BULLOCK’S DIARY:
Journal of R. H. Bullock, 11th Light Dragoons. English Historical
Magazine. July, 1888.
CAMPAGNE DE LA BELGIQUE:
Contenant
1. L’Ode sur la Bataille de Waterloo ou de Mont St. Jean:
2. Relation Belge sur la Bataille de Waterloo, et de la part qu’y a
prise la troisième division militaire du Royaume des Pays Bas:
3. Relation Française, par un témoin oculaire:
4. Campagne de Walcheren et d’Anvers; 1809:
5. Relation Anglaise, traduite sur le texte, publiée à Londres en
Septembre dernier.
Bruxelles, 1816. (With a portrait of the Prince of Orange, and maps.)
CHARRAS:
Histoire de la Campagne de 1815: Waterloo: Par le Lt-Colonel Charras.
5me Édition, revue et augmentée. Avec un Atlas nouveau. Leipzig: F. A.
Brockhaus. (No date.)
CHESNEY:
Waterloo Lectures: A Study of the Campaign of 1815. By Colonel Charles
C. Chesney, R. E., late Professor of Military Art and History in the
Staff College. Third Edition. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1874.
CHURCHILL’S LETTER:
Letter to his father written by Major Chatham Horace Churchill, of the
1st Foot Guards, Aide to General Lord Hill. (Waterloo Roll Call, pp.
2, 14, 92, and Appendix.) The letter was first printed in the Life
of Sir William Napier, pp. 175 _et seq._ It was reprinted, with some
omissions and some additions, in an English magazine called Atalanta,
in November, 1887, where it erroneously said to have been “hitherto
unpublished.” The writer’s name is not given. Mr. Dalton, the compiler
of the Waterloo Roll Call, states in the Appendix (p. 235) that a copy
of the letter is in his possession. It would be well worth while to
republish it textually with notes.
CLAUSEWITZ:
Der Feldzug von 1815 in Frankreich. Hinterlassenes Werk des Generals
Carl von Clausewitz.
Zweite Auflage. Berlin: Ferd. Dümmler’s Verlagsbuchhandlung: 1862.
CLINTON:
The War in the Peninsula, and Wellington’s Campaigns in France and
Belgium. With original maps and plans. By H. R. Clinton. London:
Frederick Warne & Co. 1878.
CORRESPONDANCE de Napoléon 1er, publiée par ordre de l’Empereur
Napoléon III.
Tome XXVIII.
Tome XXXL Œuvres de Napoléon 1er à St. Hélène. Paris: Imprimerie
Impériale. 1869.
COTTON:
A Voice from Waterloo: a history of the battle, &c. By Sergeant-major
Edward Cotton, late 7th Hussars.
Fifth Edition, revised and enlarged. Printed for the author. London. R.
Green. 1854.
CRAAN, W. B.:
Plan du Champ de Bataille de Waterloo. Bruxelles: 1816.
DAMITZ: Histoire de la Campagne de 1815: Par le major de Damitz,
officier prussien, d’après les documents du Général Grolman,
Quartier-Maître-Général de l’armée prussienne en 1815.
Traduite de l’Allemand par Léon Griffon. Avec Plans. 2 Volumes. Paris.
Correard. 1840.
D’AUVERGNE:
See La Tour d’Auvergne.
DAVOUT:
Histoire de la Vie Militaire, Politique, et Administrative du Maréchal
Davout, Duc de Auerstaedt, Prince d’Eckmühl. D’après les documents
officiels. Par L. J. Gabriel de Chenier. Paris: Gosse, Marchal & Cie:
1866.
DOCUMENTS INÉDITS:
Documents inédits sur la campagne de 1815, publiés par le Duc
d’Elchingen. Paris. 1840.
DRAME DE WATERLOO:
Le Drame de Waterloo: Grande Restitution Historique. Avec un plan. 3me
edition. Paris: Au Bureau de la Revue Spiritualiste. 1868.
DROUET:
Le Maréchal Drouet, Comte d’Erlon. Notice sur la vie militaire, écrite
par lui-même et dediée à ses amis. Publiée par sa famille. Avec
portrait. Paris: Gustave Barba: Libraire Éditeur. 34 Rue Mazarine. 1844.
ELLESMERE:
Essays on History, Biography, Geography, Engineering, &c. Contributed
to the Quarterly Review: By the late Earl of Ellesmere. London: John
Murray. 1858.
FRAGMENTS HISTORIQUES:
See Grouchy.
FRASER: Letters written during the Peninsula and Waterloo Campaigns. By
Sir A. S. Fraser. London: 1859.
FRASER:
Words on Wellington—the Duke-Waterloo—the Ball. By Sir Wm. Fraser,
Baronet. London. John C. Nimmo: 1889.
GARDNER:
Quatre Bras, Ligny and Waterloo. A narrative of the campaign in Belgium
in 1815. By Dorsey Gardner. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. 1882.
GAWLER:
The Crisis and Close of the Action at Waterloo. By an Eyewitness.
Dublin. Richard Milliken & Son: 104 Grafton Street. 1833.
GÉRARD:
1. Quelques Documents sur la Bataille de Waterloo, propres à éclairer
la question portée devant le public par M. le Marquis de Grouchy. Par
le Général Gérard. Paris: Denain: Novembre, 1829. (With a Map.)
2. Dernières Observations sur les Opérations de l’aile droite de
l’Armée Française à la Bataille de Waterloo, en réponse à M. le Marquis
de Grouchy. Par le Général Gérard. Paris: Denain: 1830. (With a Map.)
3. Lettre à MM. Germain Sarrut et B. Saint Edme, Rédacteurs de la
Biographie des Hommes du Jour. Paris: 12 Mars, 1840.
GIRAUD:
The Campaigns of Paris in 1814 and 1815, etc. Translated from the
French of P. F. F. J. Giraud by Edmund Boyce. 2d Edition, enlarged.
London. 1816.
GNEISENAU:
Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Reithardt von Gneisenau. Vierter
Band. 1814, 1815. Von Hans Delbrück. Fortfetzung des Gleichnamigen
Werkes von G. H. Pertz. Berlin. 1880.
GOMM:
Letters and Journals of Field-Marshal Sir William Maynard Gomm, G. C.
B. From 1799 to Waterloo, 1815. Edited by Francis Culling Carr-Gomm.
London: John Murray. 1881.
GORE:
An Historical Account of the Battle of Waterloo; intended to elucidate
the topographical plan executed by W. B. Craän, J. U. D. Translated
from the French, with explanatory notes, by Captain Arthur Gore, 30th
Regiment of Foot. With Plates. London. Printed for Samuel Leigh. 1817.
GOURGAUD (original):[2]
Campagne de dix-huit cent quinze: ou Relation des Opérations Miliaires
qui ont eu lieu en France et en Belgique, pendant les Cent Jours.
Écrite à Sainte Hélène. Par le Général Gourgaud. Paris: 1818.
GOURGAUD (translation):
The Campaign of 1815. Written at St. Helena by General Gourgaud.
London: 1818.
GRENADIER GUARDS:
The Origin and History of the First or Grenadier Guards. By Lieut. Gen.
Sir F. W. Hamilton, K. C. B. In three volumes. London: John Murray.
1874.
GROUCHY:
1. Observations sur la Relation de la Campagne de 1815, publiée par
le Général Gourgaud, et Réfutation de quelques unes des Assertions
d’autres écrits relatifs à la bataille de Waterloo. Par le Maréchal de
Grouchy. Philadelphie. 1818.
2. The same, with omissions and changes. Philadelphia, 1819.
3. The same title except that the author’s name is given as “le Comte
de Grouchy.” Reprinted, with many omissions and changes, from the
Philadelphia edition of 1819. Paris: Chez Chaumerot Jeune, Libraire,
Palais Royal. 1819.[3]
4. Doutes sur l’Authenticité des Mémoires historiques attribués à
Napoléon et première réfutation de quelques unes des assertions qu’ils
renferment. Par le Comte de Grouchy: Philadelphie: Avril, 1820.
5. Fragments Historiques relatifs à la Campagne de 1815 et à la
Bataille de Waterloo. Par le Général Grouchy.
Lettre à Messieurs Méry et Barthélemy.
Paris: Firmin Didot Frères, 20 Novembre, 1829.
6. Fragments Historiques, &c.
De l’influence que peuvent avoir sur l’opinion les documents publiés
par M. le Comte Gérard.
Paris: Firmin Didot Frères, 20 Decembre, 1829.
7. Le Maréchal de Grouchy du 16 au 19 Juin 1815. Par le Général de
Division Sénateur Marquis de Grouchy. Paris. E. Dentu. 1864.
8. Mémoires du Maréchal de Grouchy. Par le Marquis de Grouchy, officier
de l’état-major. vol. 4. Paris: E. Dentu. 1874.
GURWOOD:
The Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington. Compiled from
official and authentic documents, by Lieut.-Colonel Gurwood. Vol. XII.
London: John Murray: 1838.
HAMLEY:
The Operations of War explained and illustrated. By Edward Bruce
Hamley, Colonel in the Army, etc. Second Edition. William Blackwood &
Sons. Edinburgh and London. 1869.
HILL:
The Life of Lord Hill, G. C. B. By the Rev. Edwin Sidney, A.M. Second
edition. London: John Murray: 1845.
HISTOIRE DE L’EX-GARDE:
Depuis sa formation jusqu’à son licenciement. Paris: Delaunay: 1821.
HOOPER:
Waterloo: the Downfall of the First Napoleon: A History of the Campaign
of 1815. By George Hooper: author of “The Italian Campaigns of General
Bonaparte.” With Map and Plans. London: Smith, Elder & Co. 1862.
IMPERIAL GUARD:
See Histoire de l’Ex-Garde.
See St. Hilaire.
JOMINI (original):
Précis Politique et Militaire de la Campagne de 1815, pour servir de
supplement et de rectification à la Vie Politique et Militaire de
Napoléon racontée par lui-même. Par le Général J. Paris: 1839.
JOMINI (translation):[4]
The Political and Military History of the Campaign of Waterloo.
Translated from the French of General Baron de Jomini, by Capt. S. V.
Benét, Ordnance Dept. U. S. Army. Second Edition. New York: D. Van
Nostrand: 1862.
JONES:
The Battle of Waterloo, with those of Ligny and Quatre Bras, described
by eye-witnesses, and by the series of official accounts published by
authority. To which are added Memoirs of F. M. the Duke of Wellington,
F. M. Prince Blücher, the Emperor Napoleon, etc., etc. Illustrated by
Maps, Plans, and Views of the Field, and Thirty-four Etchings from
Drawings. By George Jones, Esq., R. A. Eleventh Edition, enlarged and
corrected. London: L. Booth: Duke Street. 1852.
KENNEDY:
Notes on the Battle of Waterloo. By the late General Sir James
Shaw-Kennedy, K. C. B., acting at the time of the battle on the
Quarter-Master-General’s Staff of the Third Division of the Army.
London: John Murray: 1865.
LA TOUR D’AUVERGNE:
Waterloo: Étude de la Campagne de 1815. Par le Lieutenant-Colonel
Prince Édouard de La Tour d’Auvergne. Avec Cartes et Plans. Paris:
Henri Plon: 1870.
LEEKE:
The History of Lord Seaton’s Regiment (the 52d Light Infantry) at
the Battle of Waterloo. By the Reverend William Leeke, M. A. 2 vols.
London: Hatchard & Co. 1866.
LOBEN SELS:
See Van Loben Sels.
LOCKHART:
The History of Napoleon Buonaparte. By J. G. Lockhart. Third edition. 2
vols. London: John Murray. 1835.
The History of Napoleon Buonaparte. Reprinted from the Family Library.
London: William Tegg. 1867.
MARÉCHAL DE GROUCHY EN 1815:
See Grouchy.
MAURICE: ARTICLES ON WATERLOO:
By Col. J. F. Maurice, R. A. From the United Service Magazine. Vol.
123. In the years 1890 and 1891.
MÉMOIRES (original):
Mémoires pour servir à l’Histoire de France en 1815, avec le plan de la
bataille de Mont St. Jean. Paris: 1820.
MEMOIRS (translation):
Historical Memoirs of Napoleon. Book IX. 1815. Translated from the
original Manuscript by B. E. O’Meara. London: Printed for Sir Richard
Phillips & Co. 1820.
MERCER:
Journal of the Waterloo Campaign. Kept throughout the Campaign of 1815.
By the late General Cavalié Mercer, commanding the 9th Brigade Royal
Artillery. In 2 vols. Wm. Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh & London. 1870.
MORRIS, O’CONNOR:
See O’Connor Morris.
MUDFORD:
An Historical Account of the Campaign in the Netherlands in 1815 under
his Grace the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Prince Blücher. By William
Mudford. Illustrated. London. 1817.
MÜFFLING: PASSAGES:
Passages from my Life; together with Memoirs of the Campaign of 1813
and 1814. By Baron von Müffling. Edited with notes by Col. Philip
Yorke, F. R. S. Second Edition, revised. London: Richard Bentley, New
Burlington Street. 1853.
Part II., beginning with page 197, contains an account of the Waterloo
Campaign.
MÜFFLING: SKETCH:
A Sketch of the Battle of Waterloo, to which are added the Official
Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, Field Marshal
Prince Blücher, and Reflections on the Battles of Ligny and Waterloo.
By General Müffling. With Craän’s Map of the Field. Sixth Edition.
Waterloo. H. Gérard, Publisher. 1870.
MUQUARDT:
Précis de la Campagne de 1815 dans les Pays-Bas. Bruxelles. Libraire
Militaire C. Muquardt: Merzbach and Falk, Éditeurs. 1887.
NAPIER:
Life of General Sir William Napier, K. C. B., Author of the “History of
the Peninsular War.” Edited by H. O. Bruce, M. P. 2 vols. London: John
Murray. 1864.
NAPOLEON:
See Correspondance.
„ Mémoires.
„ Memoirs.
NAPOLÉON À WATERLOO:
Souvenirs Militaires. Napoléon à Waterloo, ou Précis rectifié de la
Campagne de 1815. Avec des Documents nouveaux et des Piéces inédites.
Par un ancien officier de la Garde Impériale, qui est resté près de
Napoléon pendant toute la campagne. Paris: J. Dumaine, 1866.
NIEMAN’S DIARY:
The Journal of Henri Nieman of the 6th Prussian Black Hussars. From the
English Historical Magazine for July, 1888.
O’CONNOR MORRIS:
Great Commanders of Modern Times, and the Campaign of 1815. By William
O’Connor Morris. London: W. H. Allen & Co.: 1891.
OLDFIELD:
Letters on the Battle of Waterloo. MSS. By John Oldfield, Captain and
Brigade-Major, Royal Engineers.
OLLECH:
Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815 nach archivalischen Quellen. Von
Ollech, General der Infanterie. Berlin: 1876.
O’MEARA:
See Memoirs.
PAJOL:
Pajol, Général en Chef. Par le général de division Comte Pajol—son fils
ainé. 3 vols. Paris. Firmin Didot Frères. 1874.
PASCALLET:
Notice Biographique sur M. le Maréchal Marquis de Grouchy, Pair de
France, avec des Éclaircissements et des Détails historiques sur
la Campagne de 1815 dans le midi de France, et sur la Bataille de
Waterloo. Par M. E. Pascallet, Fondateur and Rédacteur en chef de la
Revue Générale, Biographique, Politique and Littéraire. 2e Edition.
Paris. 1842.
QUINET:
Histoire de la Campagne de 1815. Par Edgar Quinet. Paris: Michel Lévy
Frères. 1862.
RELATION BELGE:
See Campagne de la Belgique.
ROGNIAT:
Réponse aux notes critiques de Napoléon sur l’ouvrage intitulé
“Considérations sur l’Art de la Guerre.” Paris. 1823.
SIBORNE:
History of the War in France and Belgium in 1815. Containing minute
Details of the Battles of Quatre Bras, Ligny, Wavre and Waterloo. By
Capt. W. Siborne; Secretary and Adjutant of the Royal Military Asylum
Constructor of the “Waterloo Model.” 2d Edition. 2 vols. London T. & W.
Boone: 1844. With an Atlas of Maps and Plans.
STANHOPE:
Notes of Conversations with the Duke of Wellington. 1831-1851. By
Philip Henry, 5th Earl Stanhope. New York, Longmans, Greene & Co. 1886.
ST. HILAIRE:
Histoire, anecdotique, politique et militaire, de la Garde Impériale.
Par Émile Marco de Saint-Hilaire. Paris: Eugène Penaud. 1847.
SUPPLEMENTARY DESPATCHES:
The Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field
Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington, K. G. Edited by his son, the Duke
of Wellington, K. G. Volume X. London: John Murray. 1863.
THIERS:
History of the Consulate and the Empire of France under Napoleon. By M.
A. Thiers. Vol. XX. London: Willis and Sotheran. 1861.
TREUENFELD:
Die Tage von Ligny und Belle-Alliance. Von v. Treuenfeld,
Premier-Lieutenant im 2 Hessischen Infanterie-Regiment No. 82.
Mit 11 Karten. Hanover, 1880. Helwing’sche Verlags-Buchhandlung:
Schlägerstrasse 20.
VANDAMME:
Le Général Vandamme et sa Correspondance. Par A. Du Casse. 2 Vols.
Paris: Didier et Cie. 1870.
VAN LOBEN SELS:
Précis de la Campagne de 1815 dans les Pays-Bas. Par le major
d’artillerie E. Van Löben Sels, aide-de-camp de S. A. R. le Prince
Frédéric des Pays-Bas. Avec Plans. Traduit du Hollandais. La Haye: Chez
les Heritiers Doorman: 1849.
VAUDONCOURT:
Histoire des Campagnes de 1814 et 1815 en France. Par le Général
Guillaume de Vaudoncourt. Tome Quatrième. Paris. 1826.
VAULABELLE:
Campagne et Bataille de Waterloo. Par Achille de Vaulabelle. Bruxelles.
1853.
WATERLOO LETTERS:
Waterloo Letters. A selection from original and hitherto unpublished
letters bearing on the operations of the 16th, 17th and 18th June,
1815, by officers who served in the campaign. Edited, with explanatory
notes, by Major General H. T. Siborne, late Colonel R. E. Illustrated
with numerous Maps and Plans. London: Cassell & Co. Limited. 1891.
WATERLOO ROLL CALL:
The Waterloo Roll Call. By Charles Dalton, F. R. G. S. London. Wm.
Clowes & Sons, Limited. 13 Charing Cross, S. W. 1890.
WELLINGTON:
See Gurwood, and, also, Supplementary Despatches.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Where these works are cited in this book they are cited by the word
which is printed in capitals; as ALISON, BATTY, BAUDUS.
[2] Our citations are from this (original) edition.
[3] Unless otherwise stated, our quotations are from this edition.
[4] Our citations are from this translation.
CHAPTER I.
THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.
Napoleon entered Paris on his return from Elba on the twentieth of
March, 1815. His first endeavor, after quieting the not very formidable
movements of the royalists in the south and west of France, was to open
communications with the great powers. He proclaimed his policy to be
strictly one of peace, and we have every reason to believe that his
intentions were sincerely pacific. But his agents were turned back on
the frontier. The nations of Europe refused to treat with him on any
terms, and entered into an offensive and defensive alliance against him
with the avowed purpose of driving him from the throne of France. The
armies of the neighboring powers began immediately to concentrate on
the border, and even Russia set her troops in motion for the general
attack upon France and her Emperor.
To meet this formidable coalition Napoleon bent all his energies. The
army had, since his first abdication, been reorganized, and many high
commands had naturally been given to the chiefs of the royalist party.
Much had to be done before the new arrangements, necessitated by the
re-establishment of the Imperial government, could be effected.
These changes in the military organization of the country required
time. Besides, Napoleon was not desirous to precipitate matters.
He was naturally solicitous not to appear to commence an avoidable
war. He was, moreover, much occupied with domestic politics, but of
his dealings with the chambers and of his new constitution we do not
propose to speak.
Besides increasing and reconstituting the army, work was begun on the
fortifications of the principal cities.
By the first of June, no change having taken place in the relations of
France with her neighbors, it became incumbent on the Emperor to decide
what he would do.
The situation was, in brief, as follows: Two large armies, one composed
of English, Dutch, Belgian and Hanoverian troops, with contingents
from Brunswick and Nassau, the whole under command of the Duke of
Wellington, the other composed of Prussians, Saxons, and other Germans
under Marshal Blücher, lay scattered in their cantonments in Belgium
to the north and east of the rivers Sambre and Meuse. On the eastern
frontier, the Austrians were collecting a formidable force, and
were expecting to be reinforced in July by a powerful Russian army.
If Napoleon should maintain a strictly defensive attitude, France
would again be the theatre of hostilities, as in the previous year.
True, time would be gained by the delay, and time was most important
for filling the ranks of the army, completing the fortifications,
manufacturing ammunition, and generally putting the country into
a state of defence. But when the invasion came, it would be made
in overwhelming force. It was possible, certainly, to hope for the
repetition of the exploits of 1814, for victories like Champ Aubert,
Montmirail and Rheims; on the other hand, bloody and indecisive battles
like those of Brienne, Laon, and Arcis-sur-Aube were to be expected
with equal probability. The thing for Napoleon to do, if possible, was
to reduce this tremendous disparity of numbers, and this could only be
effected by beating his enemies in detail. If he could dispose of the
armies of Wellington and Blücher now, he would have so much the better
chance against the Austrians and the Russians. And Napoleon undoubtedly
hoped that if fortune should favor him in 1815 as in 1805 and 1806, for
instance,—if he should be able to repeat in Belgium the astonishing
successes of Austerlitz and Jena,—he would not find it impossible to
make peace with his father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria, and that
Russia, whose interests in the war were remote and really theoretical,
would willingly retire from the contest. When we add to this that
Napoleon’s _forte_ was the offensive, that his genius was specially
adapted for enterprising and daring strategy, we are not surprised that
he should have decided to move at once, with all his available force,
upon the armies of Wellington and Blücher.[5]
These armies were, as has been stated, lying in their cantonments on
and behind the Belgian frontier. (See Map 1.) Their front covered,
roughly speaking, an extent of a hundred miles, from Namur and Huy on
the east to Mons and Tournay on the west. They were distributed in
numerous towns and villages, some of these being as far back as forty
miles from the frontier. With the location of the various detachments
Napoleon was undoubtedly, to a great extent, acquainted. He calculated
that Wellington’s forces, which were scattered over a wide extent of
country, could not be concentrated in less than two days; and that it
would require more than one day for Blücher to assemble the four corps
of which his army was composed.
The high-road, which runs from Charleroi north through Quatre Bras,
Genappe and Waterloo to Brussels, ran between these armies,—that of
the Duke of Wellington lying to the westward of the road and that
of Marshal Blücher lying to the eastward of it. The Prussians lay
considerably closer to the frontier than the English and Dutch.
Wellington’s headquarters were at Brussels; Blücher’s at Namur. The
turnpike, which runs from Namur through Quatre Bras to Nivelles, was
the main avenue of communication between these two armies.
The Prussian lines of supply extended by way of Liége and Maestricht
to the Rhine; the English by way of Ostend and Antwerp to the sea. The
bases of the two armies were thus situated in opposite directions.
It was, of course, probable that if either of these armies should be
obliged to retreat, it would retreat towards its own base. But to
retreat towards its own base would be to march away from its ally. On
this peculiarity in the situation Napoleon’s plan of campaign was, to
a great degree, founded. The situation was far more favorable for him
than if the 220,000 men in Belgium had all belonged to one army, for
now, not only were there two armies, under two commanders, in whose
operations he might safely count upon the existence of more or less
misunderstanding and failure fully to meet each other’s expectations,
but the two armies were bound, in case of disaster to either or both,
to follow lines of retreat which were wholly divergent.
We are now prepared to consider Napoleon’s plan. He proposed to
assemble his own forces with all possible secrecy in the neighborhood
of Charleroi,—near the point of junction of the two opposing armies.
He expected that, on the first news of his approach, the two armies
would respectively concentrate, and then endeavor to unite. He expected
that the Prussians, being less scattered than the English, and being
likely to know of the approach of the French before the English could
possibly hear of it, would be the first to concentrate, and he expected
therefore to encounter them alone and unsupported by their allies.
The statement of Napoleon’s plan of campaign in Gourgaud’s narrative is
as follows:—[6]
“The Prussian army, having intimation of the enemy’s intentions
eight or ten hours before the English, would accordingly be first
concentrated. Hopes were even entertained of attacking the Prussians
before their four corps were united, or of obliging them to fall back
in the direction of Liége and the Rhine, which was their line of
operations; and by thus separating them from the English, to create
an opportunity for new combinations.
“In these calculations, the characters of the enemy’s commanders were
much to be considered. The hussar habits of Marshal Blücher, his
activity and decided character, formed a strong contrast with the
cautious disposition, the deliberate and methodical manner of the
Duke of Wellington. Thus, it was easy to foresee, that the Prussian
army would be the first to be concentrated, and also that it would
evince more decision and promptitude in hastening to the aid of its
ally [than the English army would if the Prussians should be the
first to be attacked]. If Blücher had only two battalions ready to
act, he would be sure to employ them in support of the English army;
but there was reason to believe that Wellington, unless his whole
army was united, would not attack the French to succor Blücher. All
these considerations rendered it desirable that the attack should
be commenced against the Prussian army; it necessarily would, so we
thought, be the first to be concentrated, and this turned out to be
the fact.”
To the same effect the Emperor says in his “Memoirs”:—[7]
“The [Prussian] army was to assemble in rear of Fleurus. * * * In the
night between the 14th and 15th, confidential messengers returned to
the French headquarters at Beaumont, and announced that everything
was tranquil at Namur, Brussels and Charleroi; this was a happy
presage. To have thus succeeded in concealing from the enemy the
movements which the French army had made for the last two days, was
to have already obtained a great advantage. The Prussian army found
itself obliged either to establish a point of concentration further
back than Fleurus, or to receive battle in that position without
being able to be assisted by the Anglo-Dutch army. * * * All the
measures of Napoleon had therefore for their object to attack the
Prussians first.”
In a word, Napoleon believed that the allied generals had fixed the
points of concentration of their armies too near the frontier for
that concentration to be effected in season to oppose to his army an
overwhelming force; he thought it very likely also, for the reasons
above stated, that he would have only the Prussian army to deal with in
the first encounter of the campaign.
There were, to be sure, other courses open to him. He might direct
his army upon the communications of the Prussians by passing to the
eastward of them and turning their left flank. But this operation
involved a wide _détour_ over a difficult country, and in the battle
which was certain to result, the Prussian and the English armies would,
beyond a doubt, both be united against him. On the other hand he could
turn Wellington’s right by moving _viâ_ Lille, Valenciennes or Mons
upon Ghent or Brussels. An advance in this direction presented, to be
sure, fewer difficulties than the one just spoken of, and promised
greater advantages. The Duke himself always maintained that this
would have been Napoleon’s best move. It probably would have cut the
English communications with Ostend, and would very likely have forced
Wellington to evacuate Brussels without a battle, that is, unless
he cared to risk an engagement without the aid of his ally. But the
Prussians in the meantime would have concentrated without molestation
their whole army of 120,000 men, and if Wellington had been successful
in avoiding a battle with the French superior force, the two allied
generals ought to have been able either to manœuvre Napoleon out of
Belgium or to force him to battle on disadvantageous terms. It is
probable that in neither of these flanking movements would there be an
opportunity afforded for a direct, immediate, crushing blow upon one of
the allied armies, such as that which Napoleon thought it very possible
that the temerity of Marshal Blücher was going to present to him, if he
advanced by way of Charleroi.
We have seen that Napoleon seems to have thought it very likely that
Blücher would fight, but, of course, Napoleon could but conjecture
what Blücher would do; he could not certainly know that he would not
now, as he had done in Germany in 1813, avoid a direct conflict with
him, and retire on his base of operations. If Blücher should do this,
the two armies, it is true, would be separated and could be dealt with
accordingly; but the difficulties of the campaign would be vastly
greater than if the Prussian army should be practically disposed of by
a decisive victory at the outset. For if the Prussians should fall back
without hazarding a battle, they would have to be pursued, certainly
far enough to ascertain their real intentions, and to become assured
that they were, for the time being at least, definitely separated
from the army of Wellington. If this should appear to be the case
the question would then arise, which of the two armies should be
followed up; and in considering this question, the importance of the
occupation of Brussels, at that time the capital of the Netherlands,
would naturally influence Napoleon in favor of throwing the bulk of
his forces against the Anglo-Dutch. Napoleon, however, as we have
already said, seems to have thought it on the whole probable, knowing,
as he did, the daring and resolute character of the man, that Blücher
would fight, with or without the assistance of the English army, and
he also thought that the situation of the English army was such that
Blücher would not be likely to get much assistance from it. Napoleon,
therefore, hoped to open the campaign with a signal victory, crippling,
perhaps destroying, the Prussian army, and he knew that the result
of such a victory must be the retreat of the beaten Prussians in a
direction certain to separate them entirely and definitely from their
English and Dutch allies. The French Emperor would then be free to
carry the great bulk of his forces against the English and Dutch. If
Wellington stood, he expected to beat him; if he retreated, he would
leave Belgium and perhaps Holland at the disposal of the French.
Such, in brief, were Napoleon’s calculations and expectations.
_NOTE TO CHAPTER I._
The view given above of Napoleon’s plan has been by no means
universally accepted. It is often stated that he intended to separate
the two armies and attack them in detail, but if this expression is to
be understood as meaning that the former operation was to precede the
latter in point of time, it is not in our judgment a correct statement.
There never was, we believe, any expectation on Napoleon’s part that he
could, by throwing his army between those of Wellington and Blücher,
or by merely occupying strategic points, separate the allied armies
definitely from one another. What he did expect, was, as we have
seen,[8] to encounter one of these armies, that commanded by Marshal
Blücher, alone and unsupported by its ally. If it should decline
an engagement, or should fight and be beaten, he calculated on its
retiring towards its own base of operations, and so separating itself
by every march taken in that direction from its ally.
But several writers on the campaign present us with quite other ideas
of Napoleon’s intended operations. And as it is obviously of the first
importance that we should start with a correct idea of Napoleon’s plan,
if we would follow the events of the campaign intelligently, we will
examine these other theories somewhat in detail.
Take first the view that Napoleon’s intention was to throw his army
between those of Wellington and Blücher. This is Alison’s view.
We cite him, not because his name carries any weight as a military
authority, but because his error has been so clearly pointed out by
no less a person than the Duke of Wellington, in a criticism[9] of
Alison’s History of Europe written by the Earl of Ellesmere, who wrote,
as is well known, under the Duke’s inspiration. In the following
passage a quotation is made from the work of the famous German military
critic, Clausewitz:—
“Mr. Alison (Hist. of Europe,[10] etc., vol. x, p. 991) speaks of
‘Buonaparte’s favorite military manœuvre of interposing between
his adversaries, and striking with a superior force first on the
right hand and then on the left,’ as having been attempted by him
and baffled in this campaign. We doubt whether the expression of
interposing between two adversaries can be correctly applied to any
of Buonaparte’s successful campaigns, and we almost suspect that,
if he had in contemplation a manœuvre of so much hazard on this
occasion, it was the first on which he can be said to have attempted
it. Hear Clausewitz on this matter:—
“All writers who have treated of this campaign set out by saying
that Buonaparte threw himself between the two armies, in order to
separate them. This expression, however, which has become a _terminus
technicus_ in military phraseology, has no clear idea for its
foundation. The space intervening between two armies cannot be an
object of operation.[11] It would have been very unfortunate if a
commander like Buonaparte, having to deal with an enemy of twice his
force, instead of falling on the one half with his united strength,
had lighted on the empty interval, and thus made a blow in the air,
losing his time, whilst he can only double his own force by the
strictest economy of that commodity. Even the fighting the one army
in a direction by which it will be pressed away from the other, even
if it can be effected without loss of time, incurs the great danger
of being attacked in the rear by the other. If the latter, therefore,
be not far enough removed to put this risk out of the question, a
commander will scarcely venture on such a line of attack. Buonaparte,
therefore, chose the direction between the two armies, _not in order
to separate them by wedging himself between_,[12] but because he
expected to find and fall on Blücher’s force in this direction,
either united or in separate bodies [corps].” _Feldzug von 1815_,
&c., p. 54:[13]
* * * * * * * *
His main object was evidently to find the Prussian army, and beat it.”
Nevertheless we find Hooper,[14] who wrote long after Clausewitz, making
the very statement which Clausewitz thought so objectionable:—
“He (Napoleon) calculated that if he struck at the centre of the two
armies he should be able _to wedge himself in between them_, crushing
any divisions which attempted to obstruct his progress, and, having
won a position of vantage, he imagined that it would be in his power
to manœuvre with rapidity from side to side and defeat each army in
succession.”
To the same effect writes Quinet:—
“He (Napoleon) will place himself between the two armies, at the
centre of the line, that is to say, at the extreme right of the
Prussian cantonments. By this move, the Duke of Wellington and
Marshal Blücher will be separated from the first hour. The occasion,
the moment, will decide on which of the two armies it will be best to
strike the first blow.”[15]
It is unnecessary to repeat what has been so well said above in
opposition to this view. It is plain that these writers have
misconceived Napoleon’s plan. But we must consider this more fully.
This conception of the campaign is practically identical with the
theory first put forth by Rogniat in his “Considérations de l’Art de la
Guerre,” and repeated in his “Réponse aux Notes critiques de Napoléon,”
in the form of a criticism of Napoleon’s operations. He maintains that
Napoleon should have aimed first at seizing the two points of Quatre
Bras and Sombreffe on the Nivelles-Namur road, over which the allied
armies communicated with each other.
“If, instead of six leagues, he had made eight or nine (and he had
time enough, inasmuch as the Sambre was crossed at two o’clock), in
pushing his left to Frasnes and his advance-guard to Quatre Bras,
the centre and right to Sombreffe, with the reserves at Fleurus, he
would have obtained the precious advantage he ought to have aimed at,
that of separating the two opposing armies, of retarding the union of
their corps, of taking a central position and of attacking them one
at a time. In fact, Quatre Bras and Sombreffe are on the high-road
from Namur to Brussels; master of these points, he could then have
opposed the junction of the English on one side, of the Prussians on
the other.”[16]
This view has also received the endorsement of Jomini,[17] who
evidently thinks that Napoleon must have entertained it.
“Napoleon perceived that their (the Prussian) army sought to assemble
between Namur and the causeway leading from Charleroi to Brussels, as
it was by this route that the English would come to their assistance:
now, under this supposition, the Emperor had but one wise course to
follow; the most simple glance at the map would sufficiently indicate
that it was essential to seize upon Sombreffe on the one side, and
the central point of Quatre Bras on the other. * * * Because, once
master of these two points, he was in position to act at will on
either of the opposing armies, and prevent their junction.”
To the same effect is the sketch of Napoleon’s plan put forth by his
advocate, the Prince de la Tour d’Auvergne in his “Waterloo”:
“The Sambre crossed, he (Napoleon) would seize the line of
communication of the Anglo-Dutch and Prussians. Two columns would be
charged to establish themselves, one at Quatre Bras, the other at
Sombreffe.
“The separation consummated, he would easily make an end of both
the Prussians and the Anglo-Dutch. For this would only be to renew
a manœuvre familiar to him, and which had so often given him the
victory.”[18]
Charras, one of the Emperor’s hostile critics, takes the same view of
his intentions:
“It requires only a glance at the map to indicate with certainty the
point which it was his intention to reach in dictating his order of
movement. * * *
“The French army, occupying these places [Quatre Bras and Sombreffe]
in force, would find itself placed between the Anglo-Dutch and the
Prussians, thenceforward really capable,—to borrow from Napoleon his
own expression,—of attacking them in detail, leaving to them, if they
would escape from this misfortune,—the greatest that could befall
them,—only the alternative of yielding ground and of uniting their
forces at Brussels or beyond it.”[19]
Against this array of authority we oppose with confidence that of
Napoleon himself, of Wellington, and of Clausewitz. It was Napoleon’s
expectation, as we have seen above, that the Prussian army would be
the first to be concentrated, that it would offer battle at or near
Fleurus, and that he would be able to attack and overcome it before it
could be joined by the Anglo-Dutch forces.[20] If Blücher fought at
all at that stage in the campaign, it stood to reason that he would
fight _to the south_ of Sombreffe, _for the preservation of his line
of communication with Wellington_,—the Namur-Nivelles road. Hence,
the intention of occupying Sombreffe, _as a preliminary to a battle
with the Prussians_, could not, as we venture to think, have entered
Napoleon’s mind. On the contrary, he believed that the seizure of
Sombreffe would inevitably necessitate the retreat of the Prussians
to some point further north, as Wavre, or even to the neighborhood
of Brussels, where their junction with the English could be effected
without molestation.[21]
But the last thing which Napoleon wanted was that the allied armies
should retire to Wavre, or to the neighborhood of Brussels, and there
unite. He needed a battle, and a decisive success,[22] and he needed it
at once. A war of manœuvres was not the game for him to play at this
crisis. It was of vital importance for him to rout, if possible, in
succession, the armies of Blücher and Wellington; a battle, therefore,
was what he sought, and he expected that Blücher would fight him, and
fight him alone. It was only by routing Blüchers army, or forcing it to
retreat, that he expected to separate it from that of Wellington.
It must also be borne in mind, that the mere occupation of two points
on the line of communication between two allied armies does not in any
way prevent the unimpeded concentration of each army, and its being
moved, when concentrated, in any direction that its commander may
decide on. The “line of communication” seized is not to be confounded
with the line of supplies or the line of retreat of either army. No
doubt, the occupation of any point or points on the line by which two
allied armies communicate with each other tends to embarrass them, to
hinder any combined movements, and to delay their union; but to direct
the march of an invading army merely to compass this end, when it is
possible to defeat one of these opposing armies by engaging it where
it cannot be supported by its ally, is to miss the opportunity of the
campaign.
FOOTNOTES:
[5] See Clausewitz, chaps. 8, 14.
[6] Gourgaud, pp. 42, 43.
[7] Corresp., vol. 31, pp. 195, 197, 198.
[8] _Ante_, pp. 4 _et seq._
[9] Ellesmere, pp. 161, 162. See Maurice, pp. 333 _et seq._; Jan. 1891.
[10] In the edition of 1850, this passage (as we suppose it to be) is
found in vol. xiii, p. 625, and reads somewhat differently, but the
idea is precisely the same.
[11] Thiers; vol. xx, book lx, p. 23, says: “He had conceived the
belief that the English and Prussians * * * would leave between their
respective forces a space, not very strongly guarded, and he thought
that, by bringing the whole strength of his army to bear upon this
point, he might become master of the position.”
[12] The italics are our own.
[13] In the edition of 1862, this passage is found in Chap. 22 on pages
46 and 47.
[14] Hooper, p. 58. See also, by the same author, Wellington, p. 207.
To the same effect, see Clinton, p. 378. _Cf._ Rogniat, Considérations,
p. 339, who was the first to announce this theory.
[15] Quinet, p. 75.
[16] Réponse, &c., pp. 261, 262.
[17] Jomini, p. 122, 123; also, pp. 213, 225, 226.
[18] La Tour D’Auvergne, pp. 41, 42; also, pp. 73 _et seq._
[19] Charras, vol. I, pp. 115, 116. See also Quinet, p. 101,—“Pour
empêcher la réunion (of the English and Prussian armies) il était
indispensable de fermer à la fois les deux passages (Sombreffe and
Quatre Bras).”
[20] Siborne (vol. I, p. 47) is perfectly clear on this point.
[21] Corresp.: vol. 31, p. 471.
[22] _Cf._ Clausewitz, ch. 14.