I hold, then, that the "struggle for existence" belongs to an

underlying order of facts to which moral epithets cannot be properly

applied. It denotes a condition of which the moralist has to take

account, and to which morality has to be adapted; but which, just

because it is a "cosmic process," cannot be altered, however much we

may alter the conduct which it dictates. Under all conceivable

circumstances, the race has to adapt itself to the environment, and

that necessarily implies a conflict as well as an alliance. The

preservation of the fittest, which is surely a good thing, is merely

another aspect of the dying out of the unfit, which is hardly a bad

thing. The feast which Nature spreads before us, according to Malthus's

metaphor, is only sufficient for a limited number of guests, and the

one question is how to select them. The tendency of morality is to

humanise the struggle, to minimise the suffering of those who lose the

game; and to offer the prizes to the qualities which are advantageous

to all, rather than to those which increase and intensify the

bitterness of the conflict. This implies the growth of foresight, which

is an extension of the earlier instinct, and enables men to adapt

themselves to the future and to learn from the past, as well as to act

up to immediate impulse of present events. It implies still more the

development of the sympathy which makes every man feel for the hurts of

all, and which, as social organisation is closer, and the dependence of

each constituent atom upon the whole organisation is more vividly

realised, extends the range of a man's interests beyond his own private

needs. In that sense, again, it must stimulate "collectivism" at the

expense of a crude individualism, and condemns the doctrine which, as

Professor Huxley puts it, would forbid us to restrain the member of a

community from doing his best to destroy it. To restrain such conduct

is surely to carry on the conflict against all anti-social agents or

tendencies. For I should certainly hold any form of collectivism to be

immoral which denied the essential doctrine of the abused

individualist, the necessity, that is, for individual responsibility.

We have surely to suppress the murderer, as our ancestors suppressed

the wolf. We have to suppress both the external enemies, the noxious

animals whose existence is incompatible with our own, and the internal

enemies which are injurious elements in the society itself. That is, we

have to work for the same end of eliminating the least fit. Our methods

are changed; we desire to suppress poverty, not to extirpate the poor

man. We give inferior races a chance of taking whatever place they are

fit for, and try to supplant them with the least possible severity if

they are unfit for any place. But the suppression of poverty supposes

not the confiscation of wealth, which would hardly suppress poverty in

the long run, nor even the adoption of a system of living which would

enable the idle and the good-for-nothing to survive. The progress of

civilisation depends, I should say, on the extension of the sense of

duty which each man owes to society at large. That involves such a

constitution of society that, although we abandon the old methods of

hanging and flogging and shooting down--methods which corrupted the

inflicters of punishment by diminishing their own sense of

responsibility--may give an advantage to the prudent and industrious,

and make it more probable that they will be the ancestors of the next

generation. A system which should equalise the advantages of the

energetic and the helpless would begin by demoralising, and would very

soon lead to an unprecedented intensification of the struggle for

existence. The probable result of a ruthless socialism would be the

adoption of very severe means for suppressing those who did not

contribute their share of work. But, in any case, as it seems, we never

get away or break away from the inevitable fact. If individual ends

could be suppressed, if every man worked for the good of society as

energetically as for his own, we should still feel the absolute

necessity of proportioning the whole body to the whole supplies

obtainable from the planet, and to preserve the equilibrium of mankind

relatively to the rest of nature. That day is probably distant; but

even upon that hypothesis the struggle for existence would still be

with us, and there would be the same necessity for preserving the

fittest and killing out, as gently as might be, those who were unfit.

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