Let the orator, then, whom I propose to form, be such a one as is
characterized by the definition of Marcus Cato, _a good man skilled in
speaking_.
But the requisite which Cato has placed first in this definition, that
an orator should be _a good man_, is naturally of more estimation and
importance than the other. It is of importance that an orator should
be good, because, should the power of speaking be a support to evil,
nothing would be more pernicious than eloquence alike to public
concerns and private, and I myself, who, as far as is in my power,
strive to contribute something to the faculty of the orator, should
deserve very ill of the world, since I should furnish arms, not for
soldiers, but for robbers. May I not draw an argument from the
condition of mankind? Nature herself, in bestowing on man that which
she seems to have granted him preeminently, and by which she appears
to have distinguished us from all other animals, would have acted, not
as a parent, but as a stepmother, if she had designed the faculty of
speech to be the promoter of crime, the oppressor of innocence, and
the enemy of truth; for it would have been better for us to have been
born dumb, and to have been left destitute of reasoning powers, than
to have received endowments from providence only to turn them to the
destruction of one another.
My judgment carries me still further; for I not only say that he who
would answer my idea of an orator must be a good man, but that no man,
unless he be good, can ever be an orator. To an orator discernment and
prudence are necessary; but we can certainly not allow discernment to
those, who when the ways of virtue and vice are set before them,
prefer to follow that of vice; nor can we allow them prudence, since
they subject themselves, by the unforeseen consequences of their
actions, often to the heaviest penalty of the law, and always to that
of an evil conscience. But if it be not only truly said by the wise,
but always justly believed by the vulgar, that no man is vicious who
is not also foolish, a fool, assuredly, will never become an orator.
It is to be further considered that the mind can not be in a condition
for pursuing the most noble of studies, unless it be entirely free
from vice; not only because there can be no communion of good and evil
in the same breast, and to meditate at once on the best things and the
worst is no more in the power of the same mind than it is possible
for the same man to be at once virtuous and vicious; but also because
a mind intent on so arduous a study should be exempt from all other
cares, even such as are unconnected with vice; for then, and then
only, when it is free and master of itself, and when no other object
harasses and distracts its attention, will it be able to keep in view
the end to which it is devoted. But if an inordinate attention to an
estate, a too anxious pursuit of wealth, indulgence in the pleasures
of the chase, and the devotion of our days to public spectacles, rob
our studies of much of our time (for whatever time is given to one
thing is lost to another), what effect must we suppose that ambition,
avarice, and envy will produce, whose excitements are so violent as
even to disturb our sleep and our dreams? Nothing indeed is so
preoccupied, so unsettled, so torn and lacerated with such numerous
and various passions, as a bad mind; for when it intends evil, it is
agitated with hope, care, and anxiety, and when it has attained the
object of its wickedness, it is tormented with uneasiness, and the
dread of every kind of punishment.
No man, certainly, will doubt, that it is the object of all oratory,
that what is stated to the judge may appear to him to be true and
just; and which of the two, let me ask, will produce such a conviction
with the greater ease, the good man or the bad? A good man, doubtless,
will speak of what is true and honest with greater frequency; but even
if, from being influenced by some call of duty, he endeavors to
support what is fallacious (a case which, as I shall show, may
sometimes occur), he must still be heard with greater credit than a
bad man. But with bad men, on the other hand, dissimulation sometimes
fails, as well through their contempt for the opinion of mankind, as
through their ignorance of what is right; hence they assert without
modesty, and maintain their assertions without shame; and, in
attempting what evidently can not be accomplished, there appears in
them a repulsive obstinacy and useless perseverance; for bad men, as
well in their pleadings as in their lives, entertain dishonest
expectations; and it often happens, that even when they speak the
truth, belief is not accorded them, and the employment of advocates of
such a character is regarded as a proof of the badness of a cause.
I must, however, notice those objections to my opinion, which appear
to be clamored forth, as it were, by the general consent of the
multitude. Was not then Demosthenes, they ask, a great orator? yet we
have heard that he was not a good man. Was not Cicero a great orator?
yet many have thrown censure upon his character. To such questions how
shall I answer? Great displeasure is likely to be shown at any reply
whatever; and the ears of my audience require first to be propitiated.
The character of Demosthenes, let me say, does not appear to me
deserving of such severe reprehension, that I should believe all the
calumnies that are heaped upon him by his enemies, especially when I
read his excellent plans for the benefit of his country and the
honorable termination of his life. Nor do I see that the feeling of an
upright citizen was, in any respect, wanting to Cicero. As proofs of
his integrity, may be mentioned his consulship, in which he conducted
himself with so much honor, his honorable administration of his
province; his refusal to be one of the twenty commissioners; and,
during the civil wars, which fell with great severity on his times,
his uprightness of mind, which was never swayed, either by hope or by
fear, from adhering to the better party, or the supporters of the
commonwealth. He is thought by some to have been deficient in courage,
but he has given an excellent reply to this charge, when he says that
he was timid, not in encountering dangers, but in taking precautions
against them; an assertion of which he proved the truth at his death,
to which he submitted with the noblest fortitude. But even should the
height of virtue have been wanting to these eminent men, I shall reply
to those who ask me whether they were orators as the Stoics reply when
they are asked whether Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus were wise men;
they say that they were great and deserving of veneration, but that
they did not attain the highest excellence of which human nature is
susceptible.
Pythagoras desired to be called, not wise, like those who preceded
him, but a lover of wisdom. I, however, in speaking of Cicero, have
often said, according to the common mode of speech, and shall continue
to say, that he was a perfect orator, as we term our friends, in
ordinary discourse, good and prudent men, tho such epithets can be
justly given only to the perfectly wise. But when I have to speak
precisely, and in conformity with the exactness of truth, I shall
express myself as longing to see such an orator as he himself also
longed to see; for tho I acknowledge that Cicero stood at the head of
eloquence, and that I can scarcely find a passage in his speeches to
which anything can be added, however many I might find which I may
imagine that he would have pruned (for the learned have in general
been of opinion that he had numerous excellences and some faults, and
he himself says that he had cut off most of his juvenile exuberance),
yet, since he did not claim to himself, tho he had no mean opinion of
his merits, the praise of perfection, and since he might certainly
have spoken better if a longer life had been granted him, and a more
tranquil season for composition, I may not unreasonably believe that
the summit of excellence was not attained by him, to which,
notwithstanding, no man made nearer approaches. If I had thought
otherwise, I might have maintained my opinion with still greater
determination and freedom. Did Marcus Antonius declare that he had
seen no man truly eloquent, tho to be eloquent is much less than to be
a perfect orator; does Cicero himself say that he is still seeking for
an orator, and merely conceives and imagines one; and shall I fear to
say that in that portion of eternity which is yet to come something
may arise still more excellent than what has yet been seen? I take no
advantage of the opinion of those who refuse to allow great merit to
Cicero and Demosthenes even in eloquence; tho Demosthenes, indeed,
does not appear sufficiently near perfection even to Cicero himself,
who says that he sometimes nods; nor does Cicero appear so to Brutus
and Calvus, who certainly find fault with his language.