Should I say that I am not distrest by the loss of Scipio,
philosophers may determine with what propriety I should do so; but
assuredly I should be guilty of falsehood. For I am distrest at being
bereaved of such a friend, as no one, I consider, will ever be to me
again, and, as I can confidently assert, no one ever was; but I am not
destitute of a remedy. I comfort myself, and especially with this
consolation, that I am free from that error by which most men, on the
decease of friends, are wont to be tormented; for I feel that no evil
has happened to Scipio; it has befallen myself, if indeed it has
happened to any. Now to be above measure distrest at one's own
troubles is characteristic of the man who loves not his friend, but
himself. In truth, as far as he is concerned, who can deny that his
end was glorious? for unless he had chosen to wish for immortality, of
which he had not the slightest thought, what did he fail to obtain
which it was lawful for a man to wish for? A man who, as soon as he
grew up, by his transcendent merit far surpassed those sanguine hopes
of his countrymen which they had conceived regarding him when a mere
boy, who never stood for the consulship, yet was made Consul twice; on
the first occasion, before his time; on the second, at the proper age
as regarded himself, tho for the commonwealth almost too late; who, by
overthrowing two cities,[29] most hostile to our empire, put an end
not only to all present but all future wars. What shall I say of his
most engaging manners; of his dutiful conduct to his mother; his
generosity to his sisters; his kindness to his friends; his
uprightness toward all? These are known to you; and how dear he was to
the state was displayed by its mourning at his death....
The authority of the ancients has more weight with me, either that of
our own ancestors, who paid such sacred honors to the dead, which
surely they would not have done if they thought those honors did in no
way affect them, or that of those who once lived in this country, and
enlightened, by their institutions and instructions, Magna Graecia[30]
(which now indeed is entirely destroyed, but then was flourishing),
or of him who was pronounced by the oracle of Apollo to be the wisest
of men, who did not say first one thing and then another, as is
generally done, but always the same; namely, that the souls of men are
divine, and that when they have departed from the body, a return to
heaven is opened to them, and the speediest to the most virtuous and
just. This same opinion was also held by Scipio; for he indeed, a very
few days before his death, as if he had a presentiment of it, when
Philus and Manilius were present, and many others, and you also,
Scaevola, had gone with me, for three days descanted on the subject of
government; of which discussion the last was almost entirely on the
immortality of souls, which he said he had learned in sleep through a
vision from Africanus. If this be the fact, that the spirit of the
best man most easily flies away in death, as from the prison-house and
chains of the body, whose passage to the gods can we conceive to have
been readier than that of Scipio? Wherefore, to be afflicted at this
his departure, I fear, would be the part rather of an envious person
than of a friend....
But yet I so enjoy the recollection of our friendship that I seem to
have lived happily because I lived with Scipio, with whom I had a
common anxiety on public and private affairs, and with whom my life
both at home and abroad was associated, and there existed that,
wherein consists the entire strength of friendship, an entire
agreement of inclinations, pursuits, and sentiments. That character
for wisdom, therefore, which Fannius a little while ago mentioned does
not so delight me, especially since it is undeserved, as the hope that
the recollection of our friendship will last forever. And it is the
more gratifying to me because scarcely in the history of the world are
three or four pairs of friends mentioned by name; and I indulge in the
hope that the friendship of Scipio and Laelius will be remembered....
I can only urge you to prefer friendship to all human possessions; for
there is nothing so suited to our nature, so well adapted to
prosperity or adversity. But first of all, I am of opinion that except
among the virtuous friendship can not exist; I do not analyze this
principle too closely, as they do who inquire with too great nicety
into those things, perhaps with truth on their side, but with little
general advantage; for they maintain that there is no good man but the
wise man. Be it so, yet they define wisdom to be such as no mortal has
ever attained to; whereas we ought to contemplate those things which
exist in practise and in common life, and not the subjects of fictions
or of our own wishes. I would never pretend to say that Caius
Fabricius, Marius Curius, and Titus Coruncanius, whom our ancestors
esteemed wise, were wise according to the standard of these moralists.
Wherefore let them keep to themselves the name of wisdom, both
invidious and unintelligible, and let them allow that these were good
men--nay, they will not even do that; they will declare that this can
not be granted except to a wise man.
Let us therefore proceed with our dull genius, as they say. Those who
so conduct themselves and so live that their honor, their integrity,
their justice, and liberality are approved; so that there is not in
them any covetousness, or licentiousness, or boldness; and that they
are of great consistency, as those men whom I have mentioned
above--let us consider these worthy of the appellation of good men, as
they have been accounted such, because they follow (as far as men are
able) nature, which is the best guide of a good life. For I seem to
myself to have this view, that we are so formed by nature that there
should be a certain social tie among all; stronger, however, as each
approaches nearer us. Accordingly, citizens are preferable to
foreigners, and relatives to strangers; for with the last-named,
Nature herself has created a friendly feeling, tho this has not
sufficient strength. For in this respect friendship is superior to
relationship, because from relationship benevolence can be withdrawn
and from friendship it can not; for with the withdrawal of benevolence
the very name of friendship is done away, while that of relationship
remains. Now how great the power of friendship is may be best gathered
from this consideration, that out of the boundless society of the
human race, which Nature herself has joined together, friendship is a
matter so contracted, and brought into so narrow a compass, that the
whole of affection is confined to two, or at any rate to very few.
Now friendship is nothing else than a complete union of feeling on all
subjects, divine and human, accompanied by kindly feeling and
attachment, than which, indeed, I am not aware whether, with the
exception of wisdom, anything better has been bestowed on man by the
immortal gods. Some men prefer riches, others good health, others
influence, others again honors, many prefer even pleasures; the last,
indeed, is the characteristic of beasts; while the former are fleeting
and uncertain, depending not so much on our own purpose as on the
fickleness of fortune. Whereas those who place the supreme good in
virtue, therein do admirably; but this very virtue itself both begets
and constitutes friendship; nor without this virtue can friendship
exist at all. Now let us define this virtue according to the usage of
life and of our common language; and let us not measure it, as certain
learned persons do, by pomp of language; and let us include among the
good those who are so accounted--the Paulli, the Catos, the Galli, the
Scipios, and the Phili; with these men ordinary life is content; and
let us pass over those who are nowhere found to exist. Among men of
this kind, therefore, friendship finds facilities so great that I can
scarcely describe them.
In the first place--to whom can life be "worth living," as Ennius
says, who does not repose on the mutual kind feeling of some friend?
What can be more delightful than to have one to whom you can speak on
all subjects just as to yourself? Where would be the great enjoyment
in prosperity if you had not one to rejoice in it equally with
yourself? And adversity would indeed be difficult to endure without
some one who would bear it even with greater regret than yourself. In
short, all other objects that are sought after are severally suited to
some one single purpose--riches, that you may spend them; power that
you may be courted; honors, that you may be extolled; pleasures, that
you may enjoy them; good health, that you may be exempt from harm, and
perform the functions of the body. Whereas friendship comprizes the
greatest number of objects possible; wherever you turn yourself, it is
at hand; shut out of no place, never out of season, never irksome; and
therefore we do not use fire and water, as they say, on more occasions
than we do friendship. And I am not now speaking of commonplace or
ordinary friendship (tho even that brings delight and benefit), but of
real and true friendship, such as belonged to those of whom very few
are recorded; for prosperity, friendship renders more brilliant, and
adversity more supportable, by dividing and communicating it.
And while friendship embraces very many and great advantages, she
undoubtedly surpasses all in this, that she shines with a brilliant
hope over the future, and never suffers the spirit to be weakened or
to sink. Besides, he who looks on a true friend looks, as it were,
upon a kind of image of himself; wherefore friends, tho absent, are
still present; tho in poverty, they are rich; tho weak, yet in the
enjoyment of health; and, what is still more difficult to assert, tho
dead they are alive; so entirely does the honor, the memory, the
regret of friends attend them; from which circumstance the death of
the one seems to be happy, and the life of the other praiseworthy;
nay, should you remove from nature the cement of kind feelings,
neither a house nor a city will be able to stand; even the cultivation
of the land will not continue. If it be not clearly perceived how
great is the power of friendship and concord, it can be distinctly
inferred from quarrels and dissensions; for what house is there so
established, or what state so firmly settled, that may not utterly be
overthrown by hatred and dissension? From which it may be determined
how much advantage there is in friendship. They relate, indeed, that a
certain learned man of Agrigentum[31] promulgated in Greek verses the
doctrine that all things which cohere throughout the whole world, and
all things that are the subjects of motion, are brought together by
friendship, and are dispelled by discord; and this principle all men
understand, and illustrate by their conduct. Therefore, if at any time
any act of a friend has been exhibited, either in undergoing or in
sharing dangers, who is there that does not extol such an act with the
highest praise?...
Now if such be the influence of integrity, that we love it even in
those whom we have never seen, and, what is much more, even in an
enemy, what wonder if men's feelings are affected when they seem to
discover the goodness and virtue of those with whom they may become
connected by intercourse? altho love is confirmed by the reception of
kindness, and by the discovery of an earnest sympathy, and by close
familiarity, which things being added to the first emotion of the mind
and the affections, there is kindled a large amount of kindly feeling.
And if any imagine that this proceeds from a sense of weakness, so
that there shall be secured a friend, by whom a man may obtain that
which he wants, they leave to friendship a mean and, indeed, if I may
so speak, anything but respectable origin, when they make her to be
born of indigence and want; were this the case, then in proportion as
a man judged that there were the least resources in himself, precisely
in that degree would he be best qualified for friendship, whereas the
fact is far otherwise. For just as a man has most confidence in
himself, and as he is most completely fortified by worth and wisdom,
so that he needs no one's assistance, and feels that all his resources
reside in himself, in the same proportion he is most highly
distinguished for seeking out and forming friendships. For what did
Africanus want of me? Nothing whatever, nor indeed did I need aught
from him; but I loved him from admiration of his excellence; he in
turn perhaps was attached to me from some high opinion which he
entertained of my character, and association fostered our affection.
But altho many and great advantages ensued, yet it was not from any
hope of these that the causes of our attachment sprang; for as we are
beneficent and liberal not to exact favor in return (for we are not
usurers in kind actions), but by nature are inclined to liberality,
thus I think that friendship is to be desired, not attracted by the
hope of reward, but because the whole of its profit consists in love
only. From such opinions, they who, after the fashion of beasts, refer
everything to pleasure, widely differ, and no great wonder, since they
can not look up to anything lofty, magnificent, or divine who east
all their thoughts on an object so mean and contemptible.
Therefore let us exclude such persons altogether from our discourse;
and let us ourselves hold this opinion, that the sentiment of loving
and the attachment of kind feelings are produced by nature when the
evidence of virtue has been established; and they who have eagerly
sought the last-named draw nigh and attach themselves to it, that they
may enjoy the friendship and character of the individual they have
begun to love, and that they may be commensurate and equal in
affection, and more inclined to confer a favor than to claim any
return. And let this honorable struggle be maintained between them; so
not only will the greatest advantages be derived from friendship, but
its origin from nature rather than from a sense of weakness will be at
once more impressive and more true. For if it were expediency that
cemented friendships, the same when changed would dissolve them; but
because nature can never change, therefore true friendships are
eternal....
Listen, then, my excellent friends, to the discussion which was very
frequently held by me and Scipio on the subject of friendship; altho
he indeed used to say that nothing was more difficult than that
friendship should continue to the end of life; for it often happened
either that the same course was not expedient to both parties or that
they held different views of politics; he remarked also that the
characters of men often changed, in some cases by adversity, in
others by old age becoming oppressive; and he derived an authority
for such notions from a comparison with early life, because the
strongest attachments of boys are constantly laid aside with the
praetexta; even if they should maintain it to manhood, yet sometimes it
is broken off by rivalry, for a dowried wife, or some other advantage
which they can not both attain. And even if men should be carried on
still further in their friendship, yet that feeling is often
undermined should they fall into rivalry for preferments; for there is
no greater enemy to friendship than covetousness of money, in most
men, and even in the best, an emulous desire of high offices and
glory, in consequence of which the most bitter enmities have often
arisen between the dearest friends. For great dissensions, and those
in most instances justifiable, arise when some request is made of
friends which is improper, as, for instance, that they should become
either the ministers of their lust or their supporters in the
perpetration of wrong; and they who refuse to do so, it matters not
however virtuously, yet are accused of discarding the claims of
friendship by those persons whom they are unwilling to oblige; but
they who dare to ask anything of a friend, by their very request seem
to imply that they would do anything for the sake of that friend; by
the complaining of such persons, not only are long-established
intimacies put an end to, but endless animosities are engendered. All
these many causes, like so many fatalities, are ever threatening
friendship, so that, he said, to escape them all seemed to him a proof
not merely of wisdom, but even of good fortune....
Let this, therefore, be established as a primary law concerning
friendship, that we expect from our friends only what is honorable,
and for our friends' sake do what is honorable; that we should not
wait till we are asked; that zeal be ever ready, and reluctance far
from us; but that we take pleasure in freely giving our advice; that
in our friendship, the influence of our friends, when they give good
advice, should have great weight; and that this be employed to
admonish not only candidly, but even severely, if the case shall
require, and that we give heed to it when so employed; for, as to
certain persons whom I understand to have been esteemed wise men in
Greece, I am of opinion that some strange notions were entertained by
them; but there is nothing which they do not follow up with too great
subtlety; among the rest, that excessive friendships should be
avoided, lest it should be necessary for one to feel anxiety for many;
that every one has enough, and more than enough, of his own affairs;
that to be needlessly implicated in those of other people is
vexatious; that it was most convenient to hold the reins of friendship
as loose as possible, so as either to tighten or slacken them when you
please; for they argue that the main point toward a happy life is
freedom from care, which the mind can not enjoy if one man be, as it
were, in travail for others.
Nay, they tell us that some are accustomed to declare, still more
unfeelingly (a topic which I have briefly touched upon just above),
that friendships should be cultivated for the purpose of protection
and assistance, and not for kind feeling or affection; and therefore
the less a man possesses of independence and of strength, in the same
degree he most earnestly desires friendships; that thence it arises
that women seek the support of friendship more than men, and the poor
more than the rich, and persons in distress rather than those who are
considered prosperous. Admirable philosophy! for they seem to take
away the sun from the world who withdraw friendship from life; for we
receive nothing better from the immortal gods, nothing more
delightful; for what is this freedom from care?--in appearances,
indeed, flattering; but, in many eases, in reality to be disdained.
Nor is it reasonable to undertake any honorable matter or action lest
you should be anxious, or to lay it aside when undertaken; for if we
fly from care, we must fly from virtue also; for it is impossible that
she can, without some degree of distress, feel contempt and
detestation for qualities opposed to herself; just as kind-heartedness
for malice, temperance for profligacy, and bravery for cowardice.
Accordingly, you see that upright men are most distrest by unjust
actions; the brave with the cowardly; the virtuous with the
profligate; and, therefore, this is the characteristic of a
well-regulated mind, both to be well pleased with what is excellent
and to be distrest with what is contrary. Wherefore, if trouble of
mind befall a wise man (and assuredly it will, unless we suppose that
all humanity is extirpated from his mind), what reason is there why we
should altogether remove friendship from life, lest because of it we
should take upon ourselves some troubles? for what difference is
there (setting the emotions of the mind aside), I do not say between a
man and a beast, but between a man and a stone, or log, or anything of
that kind? For they do not deserve to be listened to who would have
virtue to be callous and made of iron, as it were, which indeed is, as
in other matters, so in friendship also, tender and susceptible; so
that friends are loosened, as it were, by happy events, and drawn
together by distresses.
Wherefore the anxiety which has often to be felt for a friend is not
of such force that it should remove friendship from the world, any
more than that the virtues, because they bring with them certain cares
and troubles, should therefore be discarded. For when it produces
friendship (as I said above), should any indication of virtue shine
forth, to which a congenial mind may attach and unite itself--when
this happens, affection must necessarily arise. For what is so
unmeaning as to take delight in many vain things, such as preferments,
glory, magnificent buildings, clothing and adornment of the body, and
not to take an extreme delight in a soul endued with virtue, in such a
soul as can either love or (so to speak) love in return? for there is
nothing more delightful than the repayment of kindness and the
interchange of devotedness and good offices. Now if we add this, which
may with propriety be added, that nothing so allures and draws any
object to itself as congeniality does friendship, it will of course be
admitted as true that the good must love the good, and unite them to
them selves, just as if connected by relationship and nature; for
nothing is more apt to seek and seize on its like than nature.
Wherefore this certainly is clear, Fannius and Scaevola (in my
opinion), that among the good a liking for the good is, as it were,
inevitable; and this indeed is appointed by Nature herself as the very
fountain of friendship.
But the same kind disposition belongs also to the multitude; for
virtue is not inhuman, or cruel, or haughty, since she is accustomed
to protect even whole nations, and to adopt the best measures for
their welfare, which assuredly she would not do did she shrink from
the affection of the vulgar. And to myself, indeed, those who form
friendships with a view to advantage seem to do away with its most
endearing bond; for it is not so much the advantage obtained through a
friend as the mere love of that friend which delights; and then only
what has proceeded from a friend becomes delightful if it has
proceeded from zealous affection; and that friendship should be
cultivated from a sense of necessity is so far from being the case
that those who, being endowed with power and wealth, and especially
with virtue (in which is the strongest support of friendship), have
least need of another, are most liberal and generous. Yet I am not
sure whether it is requisite that friends should never stand in any
need; for wherein would any devotedness of mine to him have been
exerted if Scipio had never stood in need of my advice or assistance
at home or abroad? Wherefore friendship has not followed upon
advantage, but advantage on friendship.
Persons, therefore, who are wallowing in indulgence will not need to
be listened to if ever they shall descant upon friendship, which they
have known neither by experience nor by theory. For who is there, by
the faith of gods and men, who would desire, on the condition of his
loving no one, and himself being loved by none, to roll in affluence,
and live in a superfluity of all things? For this is the life of
tyrants, in which undoubtedly there can be no confidence, no
affection, no steady dependence on attachment; all is perpetually
mistrust and disquietude--there is no room for friendship. For who can
love either him whom he fears or him by whom he thinks he himself is
feared? Yet are they courted, solely in hypocrisy, for a time;
because, if perchance (as it frequently happens) they have been
brought low, then it is perceived how destitute they were of friends.
And this, they say, Tarquin[32] exprest; that when going into exile,
he found out whom he had as faithful friends, and whom unfaithful
ones, since then he could no longer show gratitude to either party;
altho I wonder that, with such haughtiness and impatience of temper,
he could find one at all. And as the character of the individual whom
I have mentioned could not obtain true friends, so the riches of many
men of rank exclude all faithful friendship; for not only is Fortune
blind herself, but she commonly renders blind those whom she
embraces....
He who, therefore, shall have shown himself in both cases, as regards
friendship, worthy, consistent, and stedfast; such a one we ought to
esteem of a class of persons extremely rare--nay, almost godlike. Now,
the foundation of that stedfastness and constancy, which we seek in
friendship, is sincerity. For nothing is stedfast which is insincere.
Besides, it is right that one should be chosen who is frank and
good-natured, and congenial in his sentiments; one, in fact, who is
influenced by the same motives, all of which qualities have a tendency
to create sincerity. For it is impossible for a wily and tortuous
disposition to be sincere. Nor in truth can the man who has no
sympathy from nature, and who is not moved by the same considerations,
be either attached or steady. To the same requisites must be added
that he shall neither take delight in bringing forward charges nor
believe them when they arise, all of which causes belong to that
consistent principle of which now for some time I have been treating.
Thus the remark is true which I made at first that friendship can
exist only among the good; for it is the part of a good man (whom at
the same time we may call a wise man) to observe these two rules in
friendship: first, that there shall be nothing pretended or simulated
(for even to hate openly better becomes the ingenuous man than by his
looks to conceal his sentiments); in the next place, that not only
does he repel charges when brought (against his friends) by any one,
but is not himself suspicious, ever fancying that some infidelity has
been committed by his friend. To all this there should be added a
certain suavity of conversation and manners, affording, as it does, no
inconsiderable zest to friendship. Now solemnity and gravity on all
occasions, certainly, carry with them dignity; but friendship ought to
be easier and more free and more pleasant, and tending more to every
kind of politeness and good nature....