THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE OF 1907
The Increased Responsibilities of the United States in the Caribbean
Sea Since 1900--The San José Conference--The War of 1907--The
Washington Conference and the Conventions Adopted by it--Their
Effectiveness in Promoting Internal and International Peace--Work of
the Central American Court--The Central American Conferences and the
Central American Bureau.
The first years of the twentieth century have brought about a decided
change in the attitude of the United States towards its neighbors
around the Caribbean Sea. The increasing importance of our political
and economic interests in those countries has made their domestic
prosperity and the maintenance of their independence from European
influence more than ever before essential to our own well-being.
American investments and trade in the West Indies have attained such
great proportions that anything which affects the normal life of one
of the countries of that region is felt at once in commercial and
financial centers in the United States. The sugar plantations of
Cuba and the banana plantations of Central America, to take only two
examples, represent many millions of dollars of American capital,
and at the same time are important sources of the food supply of the
American people. Simultaneously with the expansion of our economic
interests, our political interests in the Caribbean have become of
paramount national importance. The acquisition of Porto Rico, and much
more the building of the Panama Canal, have made it impossible for the
United States to remain indifferent when international complications
arise which affect the military situation or the political status
of countries close to these possessions. The Monroe Doctrine, as
applied to the American tropics, has thus become more than ever an
indispensable national policy.
At the same time, the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine has involved
increasingly heavy responsibilities and burdens, because the commercial
and financial interests of other countries in the Caribbean have
also increased as that region has been developed economically and
commercially. Even when they have had no ulterior political motives,
the European powers have been unable to stand by with equanimity while
the security and the interests of their citizens were endangered by
the continual revolutions and other disorders which have occurred in
some tropical American states. There has consequently been evident
an increasing disposition on their part to use force both to secure
protection for their nationals and to obtain the payment of debts due
to the latter by irresponsible and unscrupulous governments. To such
interventions, which necessarily tend to assume a political character,
the United States cannot possibly remain indifferent. Neither, however,
can it oppose itself to the protection by another country of the lives
and property of the latter’s subjects. European interference in the
affairs of American countries can only be averted if the United States
itself assumes the duty of protecting foreigners in the more turbulent
of the neighboring republics, and the Monroe Doctrine can only be
upheld in the long run if intelligent and disinterested efforts are
made to help those republics to remedy the conditions which at present
expose them to aggression. As President Roosevelt said in 1905:
“We cannot permanently adhere to the Monroe Doctrine unless we succeed
in making it evident, in the first place, that we do not intend to
treat it in any shape or way as an excuse for aggrandizement on our
part at the expense of the Republics to the south of us; second, that
we do not intend to permit it to be used by any of these Republics
as a shield to protect that Republic from the consequences of its
own misdeeds against foreign nations; third, that inasmuch as by
this doctrine we prevent other nations from interfering on this side
of the water, we shall ourselves in good faith try to help those of
our sister republics which need such help, upward toward peace and
order.”[45]
The first occasion on which the new policy of the United States became
evident in its dealings with the Central American republics was in
1906, when there was a war between Guatemala and Salvador, in which
Honduras, as the ally of the latter country, also became involved. The
conflict had arisen from the aid furnished by some of the officials
of Salvador to a revolutionary movement directed against President
Estrada Cabrera. After exerting his influence in vain to prevent the
outbreak of hostilities, President Roosevelt invited President Díaz
of Mexico to join him in offering mediation. The efforts of the two
governments, seconded by those of Costa Rica, resulted in the holding
of a peace conference on the deck of the U. S. S. Marblehead, at
which representatives of the United States, Mexico, Costa Rica, and
Nicaragua were present, as well as the plenipotentiaries of the three
belligerents. At this meeting an agreement was signed providing for the
cessation of hostilities and the disarmament of the contending forces,
and for another conference, to be held later, to conclude a general
treaty of peace.[46]
The second conference was held at San José, Costa Rica, in September
of the same year. Each of the Central American republics was invited
to send delegates, and all did so with the exception of Nicaragua.
President Zelaya declined because he was unwilling to recognize
the right of the United States to intervene in Central American
affairs.[47] The governments, represented agreed that all differences
arising out of the late war should be arbitrated by the United States
and Mexico, and that future disputes should be settled by Central
American tribunals, specially organized to deal with each case as it
arose. They pledged themselves to keep political refugees from other
states away from the frontiers of the countries from which they had
been exiled, and not to allow their territory to be used as a base for
revolutionary movements against their neighbors. Provision was made
also for the establishment of a Central American Bureau in Guatemala
City and a pedagogical institute in Costa Rica; and general conventions
were signed regulating commerce, navigation, and extradition. The work
of the San José Conference was superseded by that of the Washington
Conference of the following year, when the treaties entered into were
reaffirmed and given greater weight by the moral support of the United
States and Mexico.[48]
The San José Conference was followed by a year of almost continuous
disorder. In December, 1906, a revolution was started in Honduras
against the government of Manuel Bonilla. The rebels were operating
close to the Nicaraguan boundary, and it was asserted that they were
receiving aid from President Zelaya. Whether or not this was so, an
alleged violation of Nicaraguan territory by the troops of Honduras
soon made war seem inevitable. At the urgent request of the United
States and of the other Central American republics, both Zelaya and
Bonilla agreed to submit the dispute to the arbitration of a tribunal
composed of one member from each Central American republic, which met
at once at San Salvador. Before taking up the matter in dispute, this
body demanded that both parties withdraw their armies from the border.
As Zelaya refused to do this, and furthermore declared in advance that
he would not accept any settlement which did not make full reparation
for the violation of the Nicaraguan frontier, the tribunal dissolved.
Zelaya at once declared war on Honduras, and sent forces to co-operate
with the revolutionists there. Salvador, on the other hand, assisted
the Bonilla administration, at first indirectly and later by sending
troops, although her government remained ostensibly neutral. Despite
this aid, Bonilla’s forces were completely defeated at Namasigue, on
March 18, 1907, and not long afterward Tegucigalpa and Amapala, where
Bonilla made his last stand, were captured by the Nicaraguan troops
and the Honduranean revolutionists. Miguel Dávila was inaugurated as
provisional president of Honduras.[49]
By this time, another general conflict seemed inevitable. Zelaya was
preparing to attack Salvador, and President Estrada of Guatemala,
fearing the extension of Nicaraguan influence, was apparently ready to
intervene in defense of his neighbor. The United States and Mexico,
however, at the request of the governments of Costa Rica, Guatemala,
and Salvador, again exerted their good offices, and finally brought
about a conference at Amapala between the ministers of foreign affairs
of Nicaragua and Salvador. Here, with the assistance of the diplomatic
representatives of the United States, an effort was made to settle
the differences between these two countries. The chief question at
issue was the presidency of Honduras, for Salvador declared that she
could not accept terms of peace which did not assure the existence of
a government in that Republic which would be satisfactory to her and
to Guatemala, which had now become her ally against Zelaya. After a
long discussion of various names in an effort to find a candidate who
would not only be acceptable to all of the neighboring governments,
but who would also be able to maintain himself in power in Honduras,
the delegates finally agreed upon General Terencio Sierra, a former
president of Honduras, who was then in command of the Nicaraguan forces
at Amapala. They accordingly signed a secret treaty, by which they
pledged themselves to overthrow the Dávila government and to set up one
under Sierra in its place. Nicaragua, however, as the fifth article
stated, found it difficult to attack President Dávila, who was her
ally, and therefore left this to Salvador. After Dávila was disposed
of, both were to join in assisting Sierra, and he was to be considered
the ally of both.[50] Having settled this matter, they drew up a
general peace treaty.
The terms of these treaties were never carried out. The exigencies of
her internal politics prevented Salvador from supporting Sierra, and
Dávila was consequently able to establish himself firmly in power.
His government, set up by Nicaraguan arms, was of course perfectly
acceptable to Zelaya, but the latter nevertheless made the failure
of Salvador to carry out the stipulations of the Amapala agreement
a pretext for again beginning hostilities against that country.
Animated, as he said, by a desire for the union of Central America, he
openly aided a revolt against the government of President Figueroa,
sending men and supplies to Acajutla on a Nicaraguan gunboat.[51] This
expedition was repulsed, and further hostilities were averted by the
energetic representations of the United States.
Zelaya’s avowed aggressive designs against the other states, and his
control over the government of Honduras, created a situation which
was intolerable to Guatemala and Salvador. It was soon evident that
these countries were planning to attack him, by the usual means of
aiding revolutions in Nicaragua and Honduras. The situation became
very threatening in the latter part of the summer of 1907, for the
four states were already massing armies on their frontiers. In view
of the imminent danger of war, Presidents Roosevelt and Díaz jointly
offered their mediation, and brought pressure to bear on the various
governments to cease their hostile preparations. As a result, it was
agreed that a conference should be held in Washington to settle all
outstanding difficulties and permanently to establish the relations of
the Central American republics on a peaceful basis. The United States
and Mexico were invited to appoint representatives “to lend their good
and impartial offices in a purely friendly way towards the realization
of the objects of the Conference.”[52]
The delegates of the five Central American countries met in the Bureau
of American Republics on November 14, 1907. The United States was
represented by Mr. William I. Buchanan, whose tact and perseverance
were inestimably valuable in the negotiations of the succeeding five
weeks. Secretary of State Root and Señor Creel, the Mexican ambassador,
made speeches at the inaugural session, and the Conference began its
work under the most favorable auspices, animated by a spirit of mutual
good will and by a genuine desire to bring about peace in Central
America. Following the lead of Salvador, each government in turn
declared that it had no claims or grievances against its neighbors,
and that it was ready to proceed at once to a discussion of plans
for a closer union between the republics. A proposal by Nicaragua
and Honduras for the immediate establishment of a Central American
federation caused a temporary interruption of the prevailing good
feeling, but harmony was soon restored, and the work of the Conference
proceeded smoothly until December 20, when eight conventions,
representing the fruit of its deliberations, were signed by the
delegates.[53]
The first of these was a general treaty of peace and amity, by which
the five governments sought to remove several of the chief causes of
revolutions and international wars in the Isthmus, and to provide for a
closer co-operation in promoting their common interests. Among its most
important provisions were the following:
Article I. “The Republics of Central America ... bind themselves to
always observe the most complete harmony, and decide every difference
or difficulty that may arise amongst them, of whatever nature it may
be, by means of the Central American Court of Justice created by the
Convention which they have concluded for that purpose on this date.”
Art. II. “... They declare that any disposition or measure which
may tend to disturb the constitutional organization” [that is, the
existing government] “of one of the Republics is to be deemed a menace
to the peace of all.”
Art. III. “Taking into account the central geographical position
of Honduras, and the facilities which owing to this circumstance
have made its territory most often the theater of Central American
conflicts, Honduras declares from now on its absolute neutrality in
event of any conflict between the other republics; and the latter, in
their turn, provided such neutrality be observed, bind themselves to
respect it, and in no case to violate the Honduranean territory.”
Art. XVI. “... Desiring to prevent one of the most frequent causes
of disturbances in the Republics, the contracting Governments shall
not permit the leaders or principal chiefs of political refugees, or
their agents, to reside in the departments bordering on the countries
whose peace they might disturb.”
Art. XVII. “Every person, no matter what his nationality, who, within
the territory of one of the contracting parties, shall initiate or
foster revolutionary movements against any of the others, shall be
immediately brought to the capital of the Republic, where he shall be
submitted to trial according to law.”
The other provisions of the treaty aimed to make the relations
between the republics closer and more friendly, and to foster their
co-operation for the furthering of their mutual interests. It
provided for a reciprocal recognition of the validity of judicial
proceedings, professional degrees, patents, and copyrights. Citizens
of each country, residing in the territory of one of the others, were
to enjoy the same privileges as nationals of the latter, and were
to be considered as citizens of the latter if they fulfilled other
constitutional requirements. Each Republic pledged itself to accredit
a permanent legation to each of the others, and agreed that its
diplomatic and consular agents in foreign countries should afford the
same protection to the persons, ships, and properties of the citizens
of other Central American states as to their compatriots. Vessels
of any Central American state were to receive the same treatment as
national vessels in the ports of others, and an agreement was to be
entered into for the encouragement by subsidies of the coasting trade
and of foreign steamship connections. The establishment of a practical
agricultural school in Salvador, a school of mines and mechanics in
Honduras, and one of arts and trades in Nicaragua, as well as the
proposed pedagogical institute in Costa Rica and the Central American
Bureau in Guatemala, was recommended, although not specifically
provided for.
An additional convention to the General Treaty contained radical and
rather impractical provisions aiming to make revolutions less frequent:
Art. I. “The Governments of the High Contracting Parties shall not
recognize any other Government which may come into power in any of the
five Republics as a consequence of a _coup d’état_, or of a revolution
against a recognized government, so long as the freely elected
representatives of the people thereof have not constitutionally
reorganized the country.”
Art. II. “No Government of Central America shall in case of civil war
intervene in favor of or against the Government of the country where
the struggle takes place.”
Art. III. “The Governments of Central America, in the first place, are
recommended to endeavor to bring about, by the means at their command,
a constitutional reform in the sense of prohibiting the re-election
of the President of a Republic, where such prohibition does not
exist; secondly, to adopt all measures necessary to effect a complete
guarantee of the principle of alternation in power.”
Another convention established a Central American Court of Justice,
consisting of five judges, one to be elected by the legislature of each
state. To this tribunal, the five republics bound themselves “to submit
all controversies or questions which may arise among them, of whatever
nature and no matter what their origin may be, in case the respective
Departments of Foreign Affairs shall not have been able to reach an
understanding.” The Court was also to take cognizance of suits which
citizens of one of the contracting parties might bring against the
government of one of the others on account of violation of treaties or
denial of justice and of the other cases of an international character,
including those which two or more of the Central American governments,
or one of them and a foreign government, might agree to submit to it.
It was to be “competent to determine its own jurisdiction, interpreting
the Treaties and Conventions germane to the matter in dispute, and
applying the principles of international law.” Article XIII provided:
“From the moment in which any suit is instituted against any one
or more governments up to that in which a final decision has been
pronounced, the Court may at the solicitation of any one of the
parties fix the situation in which the contending parties must remain,
to the end that the difficulty shall not be aggravated and that things
shall be conserved in _statu quo_ pending a final decision.”
In the exercise of its duties, the Court might address itself to the
governments or the tribunals of the respective states, to have its
orders carried out, or it might provide for securing their execution
through special commissioners, whom the parties were to assist in every
way possible. The latter solemnly bound themselves to submit to the
judgments of the Court, and agreed “to lend all moral support that may
be necessary in order that they may be properly fulfilled.”
Every effort was made to secure the complete independence of the
Court. It was to sit at Cartago, Costa Rica,[54] where it would be
more free from political or personal pressure than in some other parts
of the Isthmus. The judges were to serve for five years, receiving
a fixed salary paid out of the treasury of the Court, to which each
state contributed, and enjoying the privileges and immunities of
diplomatic agents; and they were not to exercise their profession or
hold public office during their term of service. They were not to
consider themselves barred from sitting in a case to which their
own governments were parties, for they were to represent, not the
individual states, but the “national conscience of Central America.”
An additional article proposed to give the Court “jurisdiction over
the conflicts which may arise between the Legislative, Executive, and
Judicial powers--when as a matter of fact the judicial decisions and
the resolutions of the National Congress are not respected.” This
provision, which would have authorized the tribunal to intervene in
the internal affairs of the contracting powers in times of internal
disorder, was never ratified.
The Convention which established the Central American Bureau recognized
certain interests as being “those to which special attention should
be paid.” These were: “the peaceful reorganization of their mother
country, Central America”; the establishment of a broad, practical,
and complete system of education of an essentially Central American
character; the development of commerce and the advancement of
agriculture and industry; and the uniformity of civil, commercial,
and criminal legislation, customs tariffs, and monetary systems. The
functions of the Bureau were to be all those considered necessary and
expedient to achieve the objects placed in its care. It was to have an
organ of publicity, and was to serve as a center for the distribution
of information about Central American conditions both in the Isthmus
and in foreign countries.
At the same time, several other conventions were signed. One provided
for the extradition of criminals; another for the establishment of a
pedagogical institute directed by the government of Costa Rica but
supported by all of the others; another for the co-operation of the
five countries in making plans for the construction of the Central
American sections of the Pan American railway and the improvement of
other means of intercommunication. By still another treaty, each of
the contracting governments obligated itself to name one or more
commissions to study the currency systems, customs tariffs, weights and
measures, and other matters of an economic and fiscal nature in their
respective countries. After these had reported, delegates were to be
appointed to a Central American Conference, which was to discuss the
measures recommended by the commissioners, and especially the reform
of the various currency systems on a gold basis. Similar conferences
were to be held annually thereafter to consider matters which the
governments might agree to submit to them.
The Conference’s program for the political and economic regeneration
of the Isthmus was obviously too ambitious to be carried out at
once, for evils arising from deep-rooted habits and fundamental
social conditions could not be done away with by mere international
agreement, however sincere the contracting parties might be in their
desire for peace and for a realization of a closer union. No one
could reasonably expect that the five governments would turn at once
from their attitude of mutual suspicion and hostility to a harmonious
co-operation in undertakings for their common welfare. Neither of the
two main objects of the Washington Conventions,--the elimination of
civil and international wars and the creation of closer ties between
the five republics with a view to uniting them eventually under one
government,--seemed to have been realized to any appreciable extent in
the years immediately following 1907, and this led many who had hoped
that there would at once be a marked improvement in international
relations to brand the treaties as a failure. A careful examination
of their results, however, shows that the treaties have been very far
from a failure, even though their effects have as yet only begun to
make themselves felt. Both of the objects of the Conference have been
realized to some extent, and there is every prospect that they will be
realized more and more fully as time goes on.
At first, indeed, there was little change in the relations between
the five republics. Some of the governments, and especially that of
Nicaragua, showed little inclination to carry out the obligations
of the conventions in good faith. President Zelaya, who already
practically controlled Honduras through the Dávila government,
continued his machinations against the tranquillity of other
neighboring states, directing his efforts mainly towards placing one of
his own supporters in the presidency of Salvador. His open assistance
to Prudencio Alfaro, who made repeated attempts to invade that republic
in 1908 and 1909, finally forced the United States to authorize the
commanders of its naval vessels in Central American waters to use force
to prevent the launching of filibustering expeditions from Nicaraguan
ports.[55] Zelaya’s policy created a situation which was intolerable
to Guatemala and Salvador, and soon convinced all who were interested
in Central American affairs that he was the greatest obstacle to
the establishment of permanent peace in the Isthmus. President Taft
expressed this belief in his annual message to Congress in December,
1909, when he said:
“Since the Washington Conventions of 1907 were communicated to the
Government of the United States as a consulting and advising party,
this Government has been almost continuously called upon by one or
another, and in turn by all of the five Central American republics,
to exert itself for the maintenance of the conventions. Nearly every
complaint has been against the Zelaya government of Nicaragua, which
has kept Central America in constant tension and turmoil.”
In the early part of the summer of 1908, a band of revolutionists
invaded Honduras from Salvador, and another band, led by General Lee
Christmas, an American soldier of fortune, attacked some of the towns
on the north coast of that republic. There was little doubt in the
minds of well-informed people that one or both of Zelaya’s principal
enemies, the Presidents of Guatemala and Salvador, were aiding the
revolutionists with a view to striking at him through the government
of Honduras. Zelaya at once prepared for war, and the treaties of
peace, hardly six months old, seemed to have been forgotten. The United
States and Mexico, however, made strong representations to all the
parties concerned, and Costa Rica, by a happy inspiration, suggested
to the newly established Central American Court that it interpose
its influence to prevent the threatened conflict. On July 8, this
tribunal addressed a telegram to the presidents of Guatemala, Salvador,
Honduras, and Nicaragua, urging them to submit their differences to
arbitration. On receipt of this communication, Nicaragua and Honduras
made formal complaints to the Court in accordance with the terms of the
Washington Conventions,--Honduras charging that Guatemala and Salvador
had fomented and assisted the revolution, and had failed to restrain
the Honduranean exiles residing in their territory, and Nicaragua
appearing as an interested party. The Court acted with promptness and
decision. The complainants were asked to submit proofs in support of
their charges, and Guatemala, Salvador, and Nicaragua were ordered to
refrain from any military movements which might suggest intervention
in the internal affairs of Honduras, and to reduce their forces to a
peace basis. These messages were transmitted and answered by telegraph,
so that within five days of the Court’s first note a _modus vivendi_
had been established and the immediate danger of a conflict had been
dispelled. After Guatemala and Salvador complied with the orders of
the Court, the revolution in Honduras subsided. The Court handed down
its decision on December 19, 1908. Salvador was absolved of all
responsibility for the revolution in Honduras by the votes of the
judges representing Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica against those
of the judges from Honduras and Nicaragua. Guatemala was exonerated by
all except the representative of Honduras. This decision was severely
criticised by many persons in Central America, and it lost much of its
force from the fact that most of the judges had obviously voted as the
interests of the governments which named them dictated. There could
be no doubt, however, that the Court had averted a general Central
American war, and had thus done a signal service to the cause of
peace.[56]
By this time it was clear that the Washington Conventions would have
little effect so long as Zelaya continued to be president of Nicaragua.
When a revolution broke out against him in the fall of 1909, therefore,
it was regarded with more sympathy and favor by those who had been
interested in the work of the Conference than was consistent with the
spirit, at least, of the Conference’s acts. The attitude of the United
States and of the other Central American governments, as we shall see
in the next chapter, did much to make this uprising a success. Zelaya’s
defeat naturally involved the fall of Dávila a short time afterward.
After the elimination of Zelaya, the beneficial effects of the
Conventions began to show themselves somewhat more than had been
possible while the same conditions which had caused the disturbances
of the years 1906-7 had continued to exist. It became evident after
1910 that they marked a turning point in the relations of the five
republics. Since that year, and in fact, if we except occasional
attempts to render covert aid to revolutions, since 1907, there has not
been one international war in Central America. It would be difficult
to point to another ten years in the history of the Isthmus of which
this has been true. It is, moreover, hardly conceivable under present
conditions, and especially in view of the influence exerted in behalf
of peace by the United States, that there should be an armed conflict
between two or more of the five republics. The principal object of the
Washington Conference may therefore be said to have been realized.
The change which has taken place has been in large part due to the
fact that the five countries themselves have generally abided by the
provisions of the Treaty of Amity and the Treaty establishing the
Central American Court, for they have refrained from sending troops
to intervene in one another’s internal affairs, and have shown a
readiness which had been rare before 1907 to submit differences which
arose between them to settlement by diplomatic means or arbitration
rather than by a resort to arms. Their relations with one another
have undoubtedly been improved by the new spirit which the Conference
called into being, and their feeling of common nationality and their
readiness to co-operate for the realization of their mutual purposes
and ambitions have been strengthened by an increasing realization of
the external dangers which confront a Central America divided and
distracted by internal wars.
The Conventions did less to bring about stability of government in
the individual states, but even in this their effect has been by
no means negligible. Internal disorders cannot, of course, be done
away with while their fundamental causes remain; and the convention
providing that governments coming into office by the use of force
should not be recognized until after they had received the approval
of the voters at a popular election, and that the state constitutions
should be so amended as to insure alternation in power, have been
entirely disregarded. Nevertheless, revolutionary uprisings have been
made decidedly less frequent by the fact that several of the republics
have faithfully observed their obligations to exercise surveillance
over political exiles from neighboring countries and not to encourage
or permit the organization within their territories of attempts to
overthrow nearby governments. Enemies of the established order in one
of the republics now find it far more difficult than ever before to
secure the base of operations and the financial and military assistance
which are usually indispensable for the success of a revolt.
The measure of success which the work of the Conference has attained
has been very largely due to the energetic support by the United States
of the principles which it established. The government at Washington
has several times intervened diplomatically, or even by the use of
force, to prevent violations of the more important conventions, to
which it was practically, if not formally, a party. In doing this,
it has usually acted upon the invitation of one or the other of the
five republics. It has not hesitated to use any means necessary to
prevent unjustified attacks by one country on another, and it has
often brought strong pressure to bear to deter the signatory powers
from permitting their territory to be used as a base of revolutionary
operations against their neighbors. Sometimes North American influence
has apparently been the only factor which has secured respect for
the obligations imposed by the peace treaty, for one or two of the
parties which signed that treaty have shown little disposition to abide
by its provisions and have thus endangered the peace of the Isthmus
despite the fact that their neighbors were endeavoring to carry out the
provisions of the Conventions in good faith.
The Central American Court of Justice, which was to have been the
crowning work of the Conference, has not entirely fulfilled the
expectations of its founders. It cannot be said to be a tribunal
independent of and superior to the five governments, to which
any aggrieved person or state may appeal in the confidence of
securing justice. Several of the men appointed as judges have been
distinguished lawyers of conspicuous ability and undoubted integrity,
but at the same time there have been others, sometimes constituting
the majority of the Court, who have owed their nominations purely
to domestic political considerations. The honor and the large
salary attached to them have made the judgeships one of the most
attractive positions in the gift of the state governments, and there
has consequently been a keen competition for them among prominent
politicians, which has made it more difficult to select a man solely
on his merits. In addition to this, the importance of controlling the
Court as a means of influencing the international politics of the
Isthmus has made almost inevitable the appointment of men who could
be relied upon to vote as their governments wished when important
questions were at issue. The control exerted over the judges by the
powers which named them has prevented the Court from becoming in any
true sense independent, and has given it the position of a standing
commission of distinguished diplomats rather than that of a true court
of justice. This was perhaps inevitable, because the states of the
Isthmus, which had never known a judicial tribunal not subject in some
degree at least to official influence, could hardly grasp the idea of
an international body which would be entirely free from the dictation
of the authority which created it. There has been, therefore, no strong
force of public opinion to support the Court in asserting its right to
speak for the “National Conscience of Central America,” and even the
judges themselves have shown little inclination to seize and hold the
position of complete freedom from control with which the Washington
Conference had intended to invest them.
That this was true was evident in the first case that was brought
before the tribunal. In deciding the suit of Honduras and Nicaragua
against Guatemala and Salvador in 1908, each of the judges from the
four states interested voted, as we have seen, on the side supported
by the country which had appointed him. The general belief that the
dictation of the governments involved, rather than the facts as shown
by the evidence, had determined the decision of this question, did
much to injure the Court and to deprive it of public confidence. Its
independence suffered another serious blow as the result of the action
taken in another question which arose three years later after the
revolution in Nicaragua. The government which succeeded Zelaya failed
to contribute its share towards the expenses of the Court, in which
the judge appointed by the late administration was still sitting.
Now the salaries of the judges, according to the convention founding
the tribunal, were to be paid out of the latter’s treasury, from a
general fund to which each of the states contributed. In this way
the Conference had hoped to establish the financial independence of
the judges with respect to their governments, but its intention does
not seem to have been carried out, for the refusal of Nicaragua to
contribute her quota was regarded as the equivalent of withholding her
judge’s salary. The latter was thus forced to withdraw temporarily from
the Court, whereupon that body, instead of calling upon the substitute
provided by its constitution, admitted a new magistrate appointed
by the Conservative government of Nicaragua. This action entirely
disillusioned those who had hoped that the Court would be above party
politics and independent of outside pressure, for it established the
dependence of the judges on the governments that named them, and
constituted a recognition by the tribunal itself of the fact that its
members were representatives of the administration in power in their
respective countries, rather than magistrates whose tenure was secure
without regard to political changes during their legal term of office.
Since its action in averting a general war in 1908, the Court has been
more ornamental than useful. It has served as a symbol of Central
American unity, and it has kept alive the principle of international
arbitration, but it has actually decided very few cases. Three or
four suits have been brought against the government of one of the
countries by citizens of another, charging violation of treaty rights
or denial of justice, but the Court has refused in every instance to
adjudicate them, on the ground that the petitioners had not exhausted
the means of redress at their disposal in the countries where they
claimed that they had been mistreated. It also refused to intervene in
the internal affairs of Costa Rica in 1914 to determine the validity
of a presidential election. During the two revolutions in Nicaragua,
in 1910 and 1912, it endeavored to bring about an agreement between
the contending factions, and in 1912 it even sent a commission of
its members to confer with the rival leaders; but its efforts came
to naught in both cases because the Conservatives, who had the moral
support of the United States, were confident of their ability to defeat
their opponents, and therefore refused to agree to a compromise.
Its most recent, and in many ways its most important decisions, were
those handed down on September 30, 1916, and March 2, 1917, in the
suits brought against Nicaragua by Costa Rica and Salvador, which
claimed that their rights had been violated by the recent treaty
between that country and the United States. The Court refused to
declare the treaty void, saying that it had no jurisdiction over the
United States, but it held, nevertheless, that the complainants’ rights
had been violated, thus condemning Nicaragua’s action as illegal. This
case has raised a very serious question as to the extent to which the
authority of the tribunal will be recognized. Despite Nicaragua’s
refusal to appear as a party to the case or to accept the verdict,
there can be no doubt that the Court had jurisdiction over the question
at issue, or that Nicaragua is bound, by the Washington Conventions,
to respect its decision. Whether she will do so, however, seems very
doubtful. If she continues in her refusal, and is supported in her
attitude by the Government of the United States, the prestige of the
Court will be seriously impaired, if, indeed, its very existence is not
endangered. It is already rather unpopular because of the expense which
it involves and because it has accomplished so little, and it seems
probable that it would have been disbanded before this if the United
States had not exerted a strong influence in behalf of its continuance.
The measures planned by the Conference for promoting closer economic
relations between the five republics have only been carried out in
part, and their results have been far from satisfactory. Although the
provisions for granting citizens of each Central American state the
rights of citizens in all the others, and the mutual recognition of
professional degrees, patents, and copyrights, have undoubtedly done
much to encourage travel and commerce and to promote good feeling, the
more ambitious projects outlined in the Conventions have been almost,
if not quite, fruitless. Few of the educational institutions which
the Conference contemplated have been established, and those which
individual states have founded as a result of its recommendations have
not attained a truly international character because of the reluctance
of other governments to appropriate money for their support. The
Central American conferences met annually for five years, drawing up
conventions for the reform of the currency and fiscal systems, the
establishment of free trade, the adoption of a comprehensive unified
system of education, and the improvement of interstate communications;
but they were finally discontinued because none of their work had been
given any practical effect by the governments. The Central American
Bureau (Oficina Internacional Centroamericana) has perhaps been the
only institution provided for at the meeting in 1907 which has thus
far fully justified its creation. This office, which has been sort of
a clearing house for statistical and other data, has done much useful
work in distributing commercial information in Central America and
abroad, and has also served as an international agency for elaborating
plans for joint action on subjects of general importance. Its organ,
“Centro America,” is the most important periodical published in the
Isthmus.
It is still too early to attempt a final estimate of the results
of the Washington Conference, or to judge of the ultimate economic
and political effects of its work. Some of the stipulations of the
conventions adopted by it have never been carried out, and others have
been rendered obsolete by the events of the last ten years, but in the
main the agreements entered into are still in force, and are by no
means without practical value. The provisions restraining the states
from interfering in one another’s affairs and binding them to submit
their disputes to arbitration cannot but make a great change in the
political conditions of the Isthmus, if the five countries continue to
observe them and if the United States continues to exert its influence
to secure respect for them. The spirit of Central American unity, which
inspired the actions of the Conference, is growing stronger daily as
the states realize more fully their dependence upon one another and
the importance of presenting a united front to the world. It seems not
improbable that the meeting in Washington in 1907 will be looked back
upon in the future as a turning point in the history of the Isthmus,
marking a first and decisive step towards the elimination of the
international and internal wars which had hitherto been so frequent and
so destructive.
FOOTNOTES:
[45] Quoted by Critchfield (_American Supremacy_, Vol. II, p. 419) from
a speech made at Chautauqua.
[46] U. S. Foreign Relations, 1906, I, 834ff. Mexico, _Boletín Oficial
de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores_, Vol. 22, p. 235.
[47] Nicaragua, _Mem. de Relaciones Exteriores_, ’07, p. xxvii, 5.
[48] For the text of these conventions, see U. S. For. Rel., ’06, I, p.
857.
[49] U. S. Foreign Relations, ’07, p. 606; Nicaragua, _Memoria de
Relaciones Exteriores_, ’07, most of which is devoted to an account of
the events here discussed.
[50] For the text of this treaty, see Nicaragua, _Memoria de Relaciones
Exteriores_, ’07, p. 405.
[51] Annual message to Nicaraguan Congress, Dec. 1, 1907.
[52] Article II of preliminary protocol, signed Sept. 17, 1907. U. S.
For. Rel., ’07, II, p. 644.
[53] Mr. Buchanan’s report, with the text of the conventions, is
printed in U. S. For. Rel., ’07, pp. 665-723.
[54] After the destruction of Cartago by an earthquake in 1910 it was
moved to San José.
[55] See the article by Professor P. M. Brown, at the time U. S.
Minister to Honduras, in the American Political Science Review, Vol.
VI, Supplement, p. 160.
[56] For an account of the case, in addition to the official report of
the Court, see the Am. Journal of International Law, Vol. II, p. 835.