in statecraft is known as diplomacy was possessed by Abraham Lincoln
to a degree that was remarkable for a man of his meagre education
and limited experience. Before his nomination to the Presidency his
fame and activity had been almost exclusively provincial, and in a
province which had not yet grown out of the formative period; but he
was a profound student of human nature, and possessed a quality called
sagacity, which is the nearest approach to wisdom and is a gift of
nature. This knowledge and quality were developed during his political
life. A successful politician must be a diplomatist and a statesman. The
English language lacks terms to describe men of Lincoln's attainments.
The French, Spaniards, and Germans have definitions for different grades
of politicians, while the English are limited to that single word,
and apply it to every person who participates in political affairs,
from a ward-worker in the slums of the cities to an occupant of the
Executive chair of the nation. William McKinley, like Abraham Lincoln,
was a consummate politician and at the same time a statesman and a
diplomatist. The dictionary definition of the latter is "a man who has
dexterity or skill in managing negotiations of any kind;" and diplomacy,
by the same authority, is "artful management with a view of securing
advantages."
According to this definition, Lincoln, as a diplomatist, was unsurpassed
in his generation either at home or abroad, as the history of the
foreign relations of our government during his administration will show.
He guided the foreign policy of the United States from 1861 to 1865
as closely as he directed its military campaigns until 1864, when he
yielded the responsibility to General Grant; and, although the public
gave the credit to Seward, the members of the Cabinet, the foreign
committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and others
intimately associated with that branch of the administration recognized
his genius in all the larger attributes of diplomacy. The untrained
lawyer from the prairies without hesitation assumed the responsibility
of conducting the foreign policy of the government in the most critical
period of its existence, and revised the diplomatic correspondence of
his Secretary of State, who had the reputation of being one of the most
subtle and far-sighted statesmen of his age. But the developments showed
that Lincoln alone had a complete grasp of a situation unprecedented in
our history.
He was a diplomatist by nature, and developed the talent early. When
a boy, he was selected as umpire at wrestling-matches, cock-fights,
horse- and foot-races, and other rude sports of the neighborhood because
his associates had confidence in his judgment and honesty. Because he
had tact, in addition to those qualities, he was the peacemaker and
court of appeals in quarrels; the referee in disputes; the arbiter in
controversies concerning literature, theology, woodcraft, and morals.
His decisions were rarely, if ever, questioned. He had a rule for
evading difficulties which was expressed in a homely remark to Mr.
Seward, who jokingly remarked at a Cabinet meeting one day,--
"Mr. President, I hear that you turned out for a colored woman on a
muddy crossing the other day."
"I don't remember," answered Lincoln, musingly; "but I think it very
likely, for I have always made it a rule that if people won't turn out
for me I will for them. If I didn't there would be a collision."
And he always avoided collisions. It was not because he lacked courage
or confidence. Obstinacy is often mistaken for courage, and, as one
of Lincoln's advisers remarked, "Political graveyards are filled with
buried ambitions and crushed hopes because of that mistake, which Mr.
Lincoln never made." He never allowed an antagonist to fathom his
thoughts or to see the line along which he was working. He gave way in
matters of small importance to secure a firmer position to fight a more
important battle. He overcame obstacles and escaped entanglements by
the exercise of this faculty called diplomacy, without surrendering a
principle or making an important concession.
General Fry, who was Provost-Marshal of the War Department and received
daily instructions from the President in regard to the draft for troops,
which was one of the most embarrassing and perplexing questions that
arose during the war, illustrates this peculiar trait by an anecdote. He
says,--
"Upon one occasion the Governor of a State came to my office bristling
with complaints in relation to the number of troops required from his
State, the details for drafting the men, and the plan of compulsory
service in general. I found it impossible to satisfy his demands, and
accompanied him to the Secretary of War's office, whence, after a stormy
interview with Stanton, he went alone to press his ultimatum upon
the highest authority. After I had waited anxiously for some hours,
expecting important orders or decisions from the President, or at least
a summons to the White House for explanation, the Governor returned, and
said, with a pleasant smile, that he was going home by the next train,
and merely dropped in _en route_ to say good-by. Neither the business he
came upon nor his interview with the President was alluded to.
"As soon as I could see Lincoln, I said, 'Mr. President, I am very
anxious to learn how you disposed of Governor ----. He went to your
office from the War Department in a towering rage. I suppose you found
it necessary to make large concessions to him, as he returned from you
entirely satisfied.'
"'Oh, no,' he replied, 'I did not concede anything. You know how that
Illinois farmer managed the big log that lay in the middle of his field?
To the inquiries of his neighbors, one Sunday, he announced that he had
got rid of the big log. "Got rid of it!" said they, "how did you do
it? It was too big to haul out, too knotty to split, and too wet and
soggy to burn; what did you do?" "Well, now, boys," replied the farmer,
"if you won't divulge the secret, I'll tell you how I got rid of it.
_I ploughed around it._" Now,' said Lincoln, 'don't tell anybody, but
that's the way I got rid of Governor ----. _I ploughed around him_, but
it took me three mortal hours to do it, and I was afraid every moment
he'd see what I was at.'"
Those who were associated with Lincoln noticed the rapid development of
his diplomatic talent. In meeting emergencies he constantly surprised
them by the manifestation of a capacity to grapple with hidden and
unknown difficulties that could have been possessed only by so strong
and deep a nature. His secretaries testify that he could receive any
kind of tidings without emotion or variation in face and manner.
"He never seemed to hear anything with reference to itself," one of
them described it, "but solely with a quick forward grasping for
the consequences; for what must be done next. The announcement of a
defeat or disaster did not bring to him the blow only, but rather the
consideration of a counter-stroke. With a calm, sublime reliance upon
God and the everlasting principles of right, he was able to conduct
the nation through the most tremendous civil war ever waged and never
committed a serious mistake."
Lincoln was pre-eminently a Democrat because he believed in a government
of the people by the people for the people. His early training, his
contact with "the plain people," as he loved to call them, his knowledge
of their prejudices and preferences, their habits of thought and methods
of judgment, enabled him to judge accurately of public opinion, and his
deep sympathy with them gave him confidence that whatever met their
approval was right and just. That explains his loyal obedience to the
will of the majority, his refusal to adopt radical measures, and his
strength of purpose when he believed that his plans would be approved
by them. His critics asserted that his procrastination with McClellan,
his postponement of the emancipation of the slaves, and his apparent
reluctance to act upon measures which were considered necessary to the
salvation of the country were signs of weakness and cowardice; but no
man ever showed greater courage when he felt that he was right.
When Lincoln came to Washington he had no experience in diplomacy or
statesmanship; as an attorney, he had dealt only with local and State
statutes; as a legislator, his experience was limited to provincial
affairs; his only knowledge of the operations of the general government
was acquired during the two years he was in Congress and from books that
he read. He had never argued a case before the Supreme Court, he had
never studied international law, he knew nothing of the organization
of armies, and he was unfamiliar with the relations between the Chief
Executive and his Cabinet; but we have seen in Chapter V. how promptly,
firmly, and conclusively, and at the same time with what tact and
diplomacy, he rebuked Seward's suggestion that he should surrender the
prerogatives of his office to the Secretary of State, how positive yet
how gentle was his treatment of Frémont, and how thorough his knowledge
of the laws of nations is disclosed by his correspondence concerning
the movement of troops through Maryland and Virginia, regarding the
suspension of the writ of _habeas corpus_, the arrest of Vallandigham,
and especially in connection with the Emancipation Proclamation.
President Lincoln made it a rule never to deny or explain any charge
against himself, nor to reply to an attack, except when the fortunes of
his country seemed to be involved; and when he did make a reply it was
always complete and satisfactory.
Almost the very moment that he crossed the threshold of the White House
Lincoln was confronted with the gravest diplomatic problem of his
experience, and its solution required not only knowledge of precedent
but skill in argument. The claim of the Confederacy to be recognized
as a nation by the powers of Europe had practically been waived by
President Buchanan when he admitted that the Federal government had
no authority to keep a State in the Union if it desired to secede.
This admission had been confirmed by the apparent acquiescence in the
withdrawal of South Carolina and other States; by the organization of
the Confederacy at Montgomery without interference or protest; by the
failure to reinforce Fort Sumter; and by Buchanan's practical abdication
of executive power when, in his message of January 8, 1861, he threw the
entire responsibility of the situation upon Congress.
All through these rapid and radical changes the foreign powers received
no official explanation or information from the Department of State at
Washington, and were left to draw their own inferences from the news
which appeared in the public press, until February 28, when Jeremiah S.
Black, for a few weeks Secretary of State, issued a circular instructing
our representatives at foreign capitals that the government of the
United States had not relinquished its constitutional jurisdiction
anywhere within its territory and did not intend to do so. In the same
circular he gave instructions that a recognition of the Confederacy
must not be allowed. Upon assuming the duties of Secretary of State,
Mr. Seward hastily confirmed these instructions and expressed the
confidence of the President in the speedy suppression of the Rebellion
and the restoration of the unity and harmony of the nation. From France
and England came non-committal and unsatisfactory replies, and before
Mr. Adams, who had been appointed minister to England, could arrive
in London, an unfriendly ministry issued a proclamation of neutrality
practically recognizing the Confederate States as an independent
government and conceding it the privileges of a belligerent power.
Thus, before it had a single ship afloat, its fleets were tendered the
hospitality of the British ports on terms of equality with the fleets
of the United States. France at once imitated this precipitate action,
which was prompted by the desire of the British manufacturers to secure
free trade and cheap cotton. The Emperor of the French was actuated
by confidence that a division of the American Union would aid in the
advancement of his plans to erect an empire in Mexico.
Exasperated by the injustice of this action, Mr. Seward wrote Mr. Adams
a despatch which would have imperilled our relations with Great Britain
had it been delivered in its original form. Fortunately, the President
had enjoined the Secretary of State not to send anything of importance
without first submitting it to him; hence Lincoln was able to modify
what Mr. Seward's inflammable temper had suggested and at the same
time add to the force and the dignity of the despatch. A comparison of
the text of the original with the final copy as sent to the American
legation at London demonstrates the superiority of Lincoln's judgment
as well as his mastery of the language of diplomacy. It is remarkable
that a mind untrained to consider the consequences of international
discourtesy and a hand unaccustomed to frame the phrases of diplomacy
should have been so apt and so skilful in removing the sting from the
indignant paragraphs of an experienced statesman without diminishing
their tone, or force, or dignity.
If the letter, as it came from the hands of Mr. Seward, had been
delivered at the British Foreign Office according to instructions, Mr.
Adams would have burned his bridges behind him. He would have placed
himself in the attitude of breaking off intercourse, and thus made it
impossible for him to use any further influence or even to ascertain the
disposition and intention of the British government. The only thing left
for him would have been to close the legation and return to the United
States. Lincoln's modifications left him free to manage a delicate
situation as circumstances and his own judgment indicated. He was not
only left within the range of personal and diplomatic courtesy, but
by Lincoln's clever phrasing the burden of proof was thrown upon the
British government.
This skilful use of terms until that time unfamiliar to Lincoln has
always excited the admiration of philologists and diplomatists because
of the nice sense he displayed of the shades of meaning and the effect
of adding emphasis and improving the courtesy of expression at the same
time. The comprehensive knowledge of the situation and the appreciation
of the results which might follow seem almost supernatural in a man who
had been only three months in office, was entirely without experience
in diplomacy, had never before prepared a diplomatic note, and whose
mind was perplexed about home affairs. The highest authorities have
pronounced it the work of a master, as showing a freedom of knowledge of
and insight into foreign affairs, a skill in shaping phrases, a delicate
sense of propriety, an appreciation of the methods of diplomatic
dealings, and a penetration which entitled the President to the highest
honors of statesmanship.
And thus was a misunderstanding and perhaps a war with England avoided
by a simple change in terms and phrases. We can only conjecture what
might have happened; but, had Seward's despatch been sent as originally
written, it would probably have resulted in the formal recognition and
the success of the Southern Confederacy.
During the first term of General Grant's administration, Mr. Fish,
then Secretary of State, brought the original manuscript to a Cabinet
meeting, and it excited so much interest that Mr. Boutwell proposed
to have twelve fac-similes made by the photographer of the Treasury
Department. Twelve copies were taken and the negative then destroyed.
It was not long before the government was again involved in a
complication with Great Britain owing to the zeal of Captain Charles
Wilkes, of the gunboat "San Jacinto," who overhauled the British mail
steamer "Trent" and took from the passenger cabin ex-Senators J. M.
Mason and John Slidell, who had been accredited by the Confederate
government as envoys to the European courts, and had managed to elude
the blockade and sail from Havana. The British government, people,
and press regarded the act as a violation of international law and an
outrage upon the British flag, and preparations for war were begun,
while Lord Lyons, the British minister at Washington, was instructed
to close his legation and return to England unless the prisoners were
released and a satisfactory apology offered within seven days.
If it had not been for the kindly sympathy of Queen Victoria, President
Lincoln would not have been allowed to apologize; but with her own hand
she modified the instructions to Lord Lyons and gave our government an
opportunity to withdraw from an untenable position. The situation was
exceedingly embarrassing and critical, because the action of Captain
Wilkes was not only applauded by the public, but it was officially
approved by the Secretary of the Navy, and the House of Representatives
unanimously passed a resolution commending him for his brave and
patriotic conduct.
While the President and his Cabinet no doubt admired Captain Wilkes
for the qualities he had displayed, they were placed in a serious
dilemma because of the energetic and peremptory demands of the British
government. The President took the matter into his own hands, and the
most experienced diplomatist or the most skilful lawyer could not have
prepared a clearer, stronger, more dignified, or courteous despatch
than he wrote for Mr. Seward's signature, suggesting that the matter be
submitted to friendly arbitration.
"The President is unwilling to believe," he wrote, "that Her Majesty's
government will press for a categorical answer upon what appears to
him to be only a partial record in the making up of which he has been
allowed no part. He is reluctant to volunteer his view of the case, with
no assurance that Her Majesty's government will consent to hear him;
yet this much he directs me to say, that this government has intended
no affront to the British flag or to the British nation; nor has it
intended to force into discussion an embarrassing question; all of
which is evident by the fact hereby asserted, that the act complained
of was done by the officer without orders from, or expectation of, the
government. But, being done, it was no longer left to us to consider
whether we might not, to avoid a controversy, waive an unimportant
though a strict right; because we, too, as well as Great Britain, have
a people justly jealous of their rights, and in whose presence our
government could undo the act complained of only upon a fair showing
that it was wrong, or at least very questionable. The United States
government and people are still willing to make reparation upon such
showing.
"Accordingly, I am instructed by the President to inquire whether
Her Majesty's government will hear the United States upon the matter
in question. The President desires, among other things, to bring
into view, and have considered, the existing rebellion in the United
States; the position Great Britain has assumed, including Her Majesty's
proclamation in relation thereto; the relation the persons whose seizure
is the subject of complaint bore to the United States, and the object
of their voyage at the time they were seized; the knowledge which the
master of the 'Trent' had of their relation to the United States, and of
the object of their voyage, at the time he received them on board for
the voyage; the place of the seizure; and the precedents and respective
positions assumed in analogous cases between Great Britain and the
United States.
"Upon a submission containing the foregoing facts, with those set forth
in the before-mentioned despatch to your lordship, together with all
other facts which either party may deem material, I am instructed to say
the government of the United States will, if agreed to by Her Majesty's
government, go to such friendly arbitration as is usual among nations,
and will abide the award."
This despatch was not sent; nor was it ever submitted to the Cabinet.
Before the opportunity arrived the President was convinced of the danger
of temporizing. Eight thousand troops were despatched from London to
Canada, a British fleet was ordered to American waters, and the export
of arms and ammunition from Great Britain was forbidden. The President's
cool judgment and common sense also taught him that the position of our
government was untenable, and, with his keen perceptions as a lawyer,
he saw how the United States could honorably withdraw and at the same
time use the incident to its own advantage and get the better of the
controversy.
"We must stick to American principles concerning the rights of
neutrals," he said. "We fought Great Britain for insisting by theory and
practice on the right to do precisely what Captain Wilkes has done.
If Great Britain shall now protest against the act and demand their
release, we must give them up and apologize for the act as a violation
of our own doctrines, and thus forever bind her over to keep the peace
in relation to neutrals, and so acknowledge that she has been wrong for
sixty years."
Mr. Seward prepared a long and remarkable presentation of the case of
the United States which is considered one of the ablest of his many
state papers. He admitted that Captain Wilkes had done wrong and had
exceeded his instructions, but asserted that "this government has
neither meditated, nor practised, nor approved any deliberate wrong
in the transaction to which they have called its attention, and, on
the contrary, that what has happened has been simply an inadvertency,
consisting in the departure by the naval officer, free from any wrongful
motive, from a rule uncertainly established, and probably by the
several parties concerned either imperfectly understood or entirely
unknown. For this error the British government has a right to expect
the same reparation that we, as an independent state, should expect
from Great Britain or any other friendly nation in a similar case....
If I decide this case in favor of my own government, I must disavow
its most cherished principles, and reverse and forever abandon its
essential policy. The country cannot afford the sacrifice. If I maintain
those principles and adhere to that policy, I must surrender the case
itself.... The four persons in question are now held in military custody
at Fort Warren, in the State of Massachusetts. They will be cheerfully
liberated."
Thus, through Lincoln's penetration and judgment, a great international
peril was not only averted, but Great Britain was forced to relinquish
her own contentions and adopt the American doctrine respecting this
class of neutral rights.
There were frequent matters of controversy between the British Foreign
Office and the Department of State at Washington during the four years
of war because of the systematic violation of the neutrality laws by
English subjects, and they were aggravated by the unconcealed sympathy
of the British people with the Confederate States. Our government was
ably represented in London by Charles Francis Adams, in whom Lincoln had
great confidence, and his voluminous instructions from time to time,
although prepared by Secretary Seward, were always carefully revised by
the President. Altogether, the diplomatic correspondence during that
period, both in matters of controversy and particularly concerning
offers of mediation in our affairs made by the European powers, shows a
diplomatic penetration and skill which excite the admiration of students.
Among other perplexing questions with which he was compelled to deal
was the invasion of Mexico and the attempt to establish an empire at
the city of the Montezumas. The President took the most positive and
determined ground in support of the Monroe doctrine--more advanced
than had been attempted at that time. He expressed an unqualified
disapproval of the French invasion; and, although he was not in a
position to intervene with force, lost no opportunity of making known
to the other powers of Europe, and through our minister in Paris to
the Emperor of France himself, that the movement to erect a monarchy
on American soil was repugnant to the United States. To strengthen his
position he suggested that Governor Dennison, who was to be chairman
of the Baltimore Convention in 1864, give a strong endorsement of the
Monroe doctrine in his opening speech, and that the Convention adopt
a resolution declaring that the people of the United States would not
permit the overthrow of a republican government or the establishment of
a monarchy upon the Western continent.