The President replied, "I deplore the want of concurrence with you

in opinion by your general officers, but I do not see the remedy. Be

cautious, and do not understand that the government or the country is

driving you. I do not yet see how I could profit by changing the command

of the Army of the Potomac, and if I did I would not wish to do it by

accepting the resignation of your commission."

Nevertheless, it was futile for the President to pretend that Burnside's

usefulness as commander of the army was not at an end, and the latter

determined to bring about a crisis himself by recommending for dismissal

from the army General Joseph Hooker for "unjust and unnecessary

criticisms of the actions of his superior officer.... As unfit to hold

an important commission during a crisis like the present when so

much patience, charity, confidence, consideration, and patriotism are

due from every soldier in the field." Burnside also prepared an order

dismissing nine other generals, and with his usual frankness took them

to Washington and asked the President's approval. As an alternative he

tendered his own resignation. Lincoln realized that a commander who

had lost the confidence of his army and the country at large could not

restore it by punishing his critics, so, in the most kindly manner,

he accepted Burnside's resignation and assigned General Hooker to

command. The President was fully aware of Hooker's weakness, and that

the latter's conduct and language concerning Burnside and himself had

been not only indiscreet and insubordinate, but actually insulting. But

he was willing to overlook all that and confer honor and responsibility

upon him because he believed in his ability and patriotism, and knew

that the soldiers held him in higher esteem than any other general in

the East. But accompanying Hooker's commission was a letter which no

man but Abraham Lincoln could have written without giving offence, and

nothing from the pen of the President at that period of his life better

indicates the complete self-control and self-confidence which possessed

him.

"I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac," he said. "Of

course I have done this upon what appears to me sufficient reason, and

yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard

to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave

and skilful soldier, which, of course, I like. I also believe you do

not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have

confidence in yourself, which is a valuable, if not an indispensable

quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good

rather than harm; but I think that during General Burnside's command

of the army you have taken counsel of your ambition and thwarted him

as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country

and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard,

in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the

army and the government needed a dictator. Of course it was not for

this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those

generals who gain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you

is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The government

will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor

less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that

the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising

their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon

you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor

Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army

while such a spirit prevails in it; and now beware of rashness. Beware

of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and give

us victories."

General Hooker received this rebuke and admonition in the spirit in

which it was offered; he recognized its justice, and endeavored to

restore himself in the President's estimation; but his first important

movement was defeated by the enemy, and, although it was not so great

a disaster as that of Burnside at Fredericksburg, the battle of

Chancellorsville, in May, 1863, marked the darkest hour in the Civil War

and inspired Lee and the Confederate authorities with confidence of the

ultimate success of the rebellion. Mr. W. O. Stoddard, an inmate of the

White House at that time, has given us the following picture:

"The darkest hour in the Civil War came in the first week of May, 1863,

after the bloody battle of Chancellorsville. The country was weary of

the long war, with its draining taxes of gold and blood. Discontent

prevailed everywhere, and the opponents of the Lincoln administration

were savage in their denunciation. More than a third of each day's mail

already consisted of measureless denunciation; another large part was

made up of piteous appeals for peace.

"There were callers at the White House. Members of the Senate and House

came with gloomy faces; the members of the Cabinet came to consult or

condole. The house was like a funeral, and those who entered or left it

trod softly for fear they might wake the dead.

"That night the last visitors in Lincoln's room were Stanton and

Halleck, and the President was left alone. Not another soul except

the one secretary busy with the mail in his room across the hall. The

ticking of a clock would have been noticeable; but another sound came

that was almost as regular and as ceaseless. It was the tread of the

President's feet as he strode slowly back and forth across his chamber.

That ceaseless march so accustomed the ear to it that when, a little

after twelve, there was a break of several minutes, the sudden silence

made one put down his letters and listen.

"The President may have been at his table writing, or he may--no man

knows or can guess; but at the end of the minutes, long or short,

the tramp began again. Two o'clock and he was walking yet, and when,

a little after three, the secretary's task was done and he slipped

noiselessly out, he turned at the head of the stairs for a moment. It

was so--the last sound he heard as he went down was the footfall in

Lincoln's room.

"The young man was there again before eight o'clock. The President's

room was open. There sat Lincoln eating his breakfast alone. He had not

been out of his room; but there was a kind of cheery, hopeful morning

light on his face. He had watched all night, but beside his cup of

coffee lay his instructions to General Hooker to push forward. There was

a decisive battle won that night in that long vigil with disaster and

despair. Only a few weeks later the Army of the Potomac fought it over

again as desperately--and they won it--at Gettysburg."

From the time when Hooker took command the President kept closer

watch than ever upon the movements of the Army of the Potomac, and

his directions were given with greater detail than before. He had no

confidence in Hooker's ability to plan, although he felt that he was a

good fighter.

Early in June, 1863, Hooker reported his opinion that Lee intended to

move on Washington, and asked orders to attack the Confederate rear. To

this Lincoln answered in quaint satire, "In case you find Lee coming

north of the Rappahannock I would by no means cross to the south of

it. If he should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg, tempting you

to fall upon it, it would fight you in entrenchments and have you at

a disadvantage, while his main force would in some way be getting an

advantage of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk of

being entangled upon the river, like an ox would jump half over a fence

and be liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance

to gore one way or kick the other."

To illustrate how dependent was the commander of the Army of the Potomac

upon Lincoln I give another despatch, sent by the President to Hooker

when the latter proposed to make a dash upon Richmond while Lee was

moving his army westward towards the Shenandoah Valley.

"If left to me, I would not go south of the Rappahannock upon Lee's

moving north of it. If you had Richmond invested to-day, you would

not be able to take it in twenty days; meanwhile your communications,

and with them your army, would be ruined. I think Lee's army, and not

Richmond, is your true objective point. If he comes towards the upper

Potomac, follow on his flank and on his inside track, shortening your

lines while he lengthens his. Fight him, too, when opportunity offers.

If he stays where he is, fret him and fret him."

A few days later Lincoln telegraphed Hooker, "If the head of Lee's

army is at Martinsburg and the tail of it on the plank road between

Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim

somewhere. Could you not break him?" But Hooker made no attempt to do

so, and merely followed Lee northward through Virginia and Maryland

into Pennsylvania, keeping on the "inside track," as Mr. Lincoln

suggested, between the Confederate army and Washington. Before the

battle of Gettysburg, which ended the most aggressive campaign of the

Confederates, a long-standing feud between Hooker and Halleck became

so acute that the President saw that one or the other of them must be

relieved. Hooker, in a fit of irritation because Halleck had declined

to comply with some unimportant request, asked to be relieved from the

command, and the President selected George G. Meade to succeed him. A

few days later the battle of Gettysburg was fought. The vain ambition

of Lee and Davis to raise the Confederate flag over Independence Hall

and establish the head-quarters of the Confederate government in

Philadelphia was dissipated and Lee fell back, leaving two thousand six

hundred killed, twelve thousand wounded, and five thousand prisoners.

Lincoln's military instincts taught him that the war could be

practically ended there if the advantages gained at Gettysburg were

properly utilized, and so implored Meade to renew his attack. But Meade

held back, Lee escaped, and for once the President lost his patience. In

the intensity of his disappointment he wrote Meade as follows:

"You fought and beat the enemy at Gettysburg, and, of course, his loss

was as great as yours. He retreated, and you did not, as it seemed

to me, pressingly pursue him; but a flood in the river detained him

till, by slow degrees, you were again upon him. You had at least twenty

thousand veteran troops directly with you and as many more raw ones

within supporting distance, all in addition to those who fought with

you at Gettysburg, while it was not possible that he had received a

single recruit, and yet you stood and let the flood run down, bridges be

built, and the enemy move away at his leisure, without attacking him.

Again, my dear general, I do not believe you appreciate the magnitude

of the misfortune involved in Lee's escape. He was within your easy

grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with our other

late successes, have ended the war. As it is, the war will be prolonged

indefinitely. If you could not safely attack Lee last Monday, how can

you possibly do so south of the river, when you can take with you very

few more than two-thirds of the force you then had in hand? I would be

unreasonable to expect, and I do not expect (that) you can now effect

much. Your golden opportunity is gone, and I am distressed immeasurably

because of it."

Before the mails left that night Lincoln's wrath was spent, his

amiability was restored, and this letter was never sent.

It is impossible in the limits of this volume to relate the details

of the war, but from the detached incidents that have been given, and

the narrative of his relations with Scott, McClellan, Frémont, Grant,

and other generals referred to in this chapter, the reader may form

a clear and accurate conception of Abraham Lincoln's military genius

and the unselfish and often ill-advised consideration with which he

invariably treated his commanders. During the last year of the war

the right men seem to have found the right places, and in all the

voluminous correspondence of the President from the White House and

the War Department with Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and Thomas there

appears to have been a perfect understanding and complete unity of

opinion and purpose between them. He allowed them greater liberty than

other commanders had enjoyed, evidently because they had his confidence

to a higher degree; he never was compelled to repeat the entreaties,

admonitions, and rebukes with which the pages of his correspondence

during the earlier part of the war were filled. His relations with

Sherman cannot better be defined than by the following brief letter:

"MY DEAR GENERAL SHERMAN: Many, many thanks for your

Christmas gift, the capture of Savannah. When you were about

leaving Atlanta for the Atlantic coast I was anxious, if not

fearful; but feeling that you were the better judge, and

remembering that 'nothing risked, nothing gained,' I did not

interfere. Now, the undertaking being a success, the honor

is all yours, for I believe none of us went farther than to

acquiesce. And taking the work of General Thomas into the count,

as it should be taken, it is, indeed, a great success. Not only

does it afford the obvious and immediate military advantages,

but in showing to the world that your army could be divided,

putting the stronger part to an important new service, and

yet leaving enough to vanquish the old opposing force of the

whole--Hood's army--it brings those who sat in darkness to see a

great light. But what next? I suppose it will be safe if I leave

General Grant and yourself to decide. Please make my grateful

acknowledgments to your whole army, officers and men."

[Illustration: Copyright, 1900, by McClure, Phillips & Co.

GRAND REVIEW OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC BY PRESIDENT LINCOLN AT

FALMOUTH, VIRGINIA, IN APRIL, 1863]

Lincoln's relations with Sheridan were limited. They never met but

twice, and there was very little correspondence between them, the most

notable being the laconic despatch after Sheridan's fight with Ewell at

Sailor's Creek, near the Appomattox. That was one of the last blows

struck at the Confederacy, and Sheridan, realizing the situation, made a

hasty report, ending with the words,--

"If the thing is pressed I think Lee will surrender."

Grant forwarded the despatch to President Lincoln, who instantly

replied,--

"Let the thing be pressed."

When he had read the telegram describing Sheridan's last fight with

Early in the Shenandoah Valley, he remarked that he once knew a man

who loaded a piece of punk with powder, lighted it, clapped it inside

a biscuit, and tossed it to a savage dog that was snarling at him. In

an instant the dog snapped it up and swallowed it. Presently the fire

touched the powder and away went the dog, his head in one place, a leg

here and another there, and the different parts scattered all over the

country. "And," said the man, "as for the dog, as a dog, I was never

able to find him." "And that," remarked the President, "is very much the

condition of Early's army, as an army."

President Lincoln's appearance in Richmond after the Confederacy fell

to pieces was one of the most dramatic scenes in all history because of

its extreme simplicity and the entire absence of rejoicing or parade.

There was no triumphant entrance, as the world might have expected

when a conqueror occupies the capital of the conquered. Never before

or since has an event of such transcendent significance occurred with

so little ostentation or ceremony. Lincoln was at City Point, the

head-quarters of General Grant, and was lodged upon a little steamer

called the "River Queen" when he heard of the capture of Richmond and

the fire that consumed a large part of that city. The same day he went

up the river without escort of any kind, landed at a wharf near Libby

Prison, found a guide among the colored people that were hanging around

the place, and walked a mile or more to the centre of the city. The

loafers at the wharf soon identified the President and surrounded him,

striving to touch the hem of his garment. To protect the President and

open a passage for him, Admiral Porter called sailors from his boat, who

marched in front and behind him to the town. Lincoln did not realize

the danger that surrounded him; he did not remember that he was in the

midst of a community with whom he was still at war, or that they held

him responsible for the sorrows they had suffered, the distress they had

endured, and the destruction of their property. But, although within an

hour from the time he landed every man, woman, and child knew of his

presence, not a hand was lifted against him, not an unkind word was

said; and, after visiting the head-quarters of General Weitzel, who was

in command of the Union troops, the Capitol of the State which had been

the seat of the Confederate government, the mansion which Jefferson

Davis had occupied, Libby Prison, where so many officers had starved and

died, and holding two important interviews with John A. Campbell, the

Confederate Secretary of War, who had remained in Richmond when the rest

of the government fled, he went leisurely back to his boat, returned to

the steamer, and sailed for Washington, where, only a few days later,

surrounded by his loyal friends and in the midst of an ovation, he was

stricken by the bullet of an assassin.

Lincoln's personal courage was demonstrated early in life. He never

showed a sense of fear. He never refused a challenge for a trial of

strength, nor avoided an adventure that was attended by danger; and

while President he had no fear of assassination, although he had many

warnings and was quite superstitious. He was accustomed to ridicule

the anxiety of his friends, and when the threats of his enemies were

repeated to him he changed the subject of conversation. Senator Sumner

was one of those who believed that he was in continual danger of

assassination, and frequently cautioned him about going out at night.

When the Senator's anxiety was referred to by friends one evening, the

President said, "Sumner declined to stand up with me, back to back, to

see which was the tallest man, and made a fine speech about this being

the time for uniting our fronts against the enemy and not our backs. But

I guess he was afraid to measure, though he is a good piece of a man. I

have never had much to do with bishops where I live, but, do you know?

Sumner is my idea of a bishop."

In his reminiscences, General Butler says, "He was personally a very

brave man and gave me the worst fright of my life. He came to my

head-quarters and said,--

"'General, I should like to ride along your lines and see them, and see

the boys and how they are situated in camp.'

"I said, 'Very well, we will go after breakfast.'

"I happened to have a very tall, easy-riding, pacing horse, and, as the

President was rather long-legged, I tendered him the use of him while

I rode beside him on a pony. He was dressed, as was his custom, in a

black suit, a swallow-tail coat, and tall silk hat. As there rode on

the other side of him at first Mr. Fox, the Secretary of the Navy, who

was not more than five feet six inches in height, he stood out as a

central figure of the group. Of course the staff-officers and orderly

were behind. When we got to the line of intrenchment, from which the

line of rebel pickets was not more than three hundred yards, he towered

high above the works, and as we came to the several encampments the boys

cheered him lustily. Of course the enemy's attention was wholly directed

to this performance, and with the glass it could be plainly seen that

the eyes of their officers were fastened upon Lincoln; and a personage

riding down the lines cheered by the soldiers was a very unusual thing,

so that the enemy must have known that he was there. Both Mr. Fox and

myself said to him,--

"'Let us ride on the side next to the enemy, Mr. President. You are in

fair rifle-shot of them, and they may open fire; and they must know you,

being the only person not in uniform, and the cheering of the troops

directs their attention to you.'

"'Oh, no,' he said, laughing; 'the commander-in-chief of the army must

not show any cowardice in the presence of his soldiers, whatever he

may feel.' And he insisted upon riding the whole six miles, which was

about the length of my intrenchments, in that position, amusing himself

at intervals, where there was nothing more attractive, in a sort of

competitive examination of the commanding general in the science of

engineering, much to the amusement of my engineer-in-chief, General

Weitzel, who rode on my left, and who was kindly disposed to prompt me

while the examination was going on, which attracted the attention of Mr.

Lincoln, who said,--

"'Hold on, Weitzel, I can't beat you, but I think I can beat Butler.'

"In the later summer (1863)," continues General Butler, "I was invited

by the President to ride with him in the evening out to the Soldiers'

Home, some two miles, a portion of the way being quite lonely. He had no

guard--not even an orderly on the box. I said to him,--

"'Is it known that you ride thus alone at night out to the Soldiers'

Home?'

"'Oh, yes,' he answered, 'when business detains me until night. I do go

out earlier, as a rule.'

"I said, 'I think you peril too much. We have passed a half-dozen places

where a well-directed bullet might have taken you off.'

"'Oh,' he replied, 'assassination of public officers is not an American

crime.'

"When he handed me the commission (as major-general), with some kindly

words of compliment, I replied, 'I do not know whether I ought to accept

this. I received my orders to prepare my brigade to march to Washington

while trying a cause to a jury. I stated the fact to the court and

asked that the case might be continued, which was at once consented to,

and I left to come here the second morning after, my business in utter

confusion.'

"He said, 'I guess we both wish we were back trying cases,' with a

quizzical look upon his countenance.

"I said, 'Besides, Mr. President, you may not be aware that I was the

Breckenridge candidate for Governor in my State in the last campaign,

and did all I could to prevent your election.'

"'All the better,' said he; 'I hope your example will bring many of the

same sort with you.'

"'But,' I answered, 'I do not know that I can support the measures of

your administration, Mr. President.'

"'I do not care whether you do or not,' was his reply, 'if you will

fight for the country.'

"'I will take the commission and loyally serve while I may, and bring it

back to you when I can go with you no further.'

"'That is frank; but tell me wherein you think my administration wrong

before you resign,' said he. 'Report to General Scott.'

"'Yes, Mr. President, the bounties which are now being paid to new

recruits cause very large desertions. Men desert and go home, and get

the bounties and enlist in other regiments.'

"'That is too true,' he replied, 'but how can we prevent it?'

"'By vigorously shooting every man who is caught as a deserter until it

is found to be a dangerous business.'

"A saddened, weary look came over his face which I had never seen

before, and he slowly replied,--

"'You may be right--probably are so; but, God help me! how can I have a

butcher's day every Friday in the Army of the Potomac?'"

VII

HOW LINCOLN APPEARED IN THE WHITE HOUSE

Abraham Lincoln(#42526) · 第 20 / 30 段