The election occurred on November 6, 1860, and the result was what he

had expected since his nomination. The Republican electors did not

receive a majority by nearly a million votes, but the division of the

Democrats left them a plurality.

The city of Springfield had never cast so large a vote for any candidate

for office up to that time, and it celebrated its triumph with a jubilee

of rejoicing. The people called Lincoln from his house and demanded a

speech, but he asked to be excused. He thanked them for their support

and congratulations, and remarked, "In all our rejoicing let us

neither express nor cherish any hard feeling towards any citizen who

has differed from us. Let us at all times remember that all American

citizens are brothers of a common country and should dwell together in

the bonds of fraternal feeling."

After the excitement had quieted down, Lincoln resumed his former habits

and daily routine. Springfield was crowded with politicians those

days,--office-seekers and advisers, men who came to ask favors and to

offer them. The announcement of his election had been the signal for

the conspirators in the South to throw off their masks. During long

years of controversy, the pro-slavery party had a hope of ultimate

triumph, but until the actual election of Lincoln there was no actual

treason or revolutionary act. Four days after the Senators from South

Carolina resigned, six weeks later that State declared its separation

from the Union and organized an independent government, and, while he

was still waiting at Springfield, Lincoln read the newspaper reports of

conventions in all the Gulf States, at which they also declared their

independence. But he was obliged to sit inactive and helpless; unable to

do anything to check the dissolution of the Union, although appeals came

from every quarter. He described his situation to an old friend who came

to see him at Springfield.

"Joe," he said, sadly, "I suppose you have forgotten the trial down in

Montgomery County where your partner gave away your case in his opening

speech. I saw you motioning to him and how uneasy you were, but you

couldn't stop him, and that's just the way with Buchanan and me. He is

giving away the case and I can't stop him."

It was not the Republicans of the North alone that appealed to Lincoln.

Unionists of the South came to him for pledges that he would do nothing,

for assurances that there was nothing to fear from his election, and he

went so far as to make an exception in their case to gratify them. In

December he wrote a letter to Alexander H. Stephens, whom he had known

and admired in Congress, marked "For your eye only," in which he stated

his position in the most positive and unmistakable language, and asked,

"Do the people of the South really entertain fears that a Republican

administration would directly or indirectly interfere with the slaves?

If they do, I wish to assure you as once a friend, and still, I hope,

not an enemy, that there is no cause for such fears. The South would be

in no more danger in this respect than it was in the days of Washington.

I suppose, however, that this does not meet the case. You think slavery

is right and ought to be extended, while we think it is wrong and ought

to be restricted. That, I suppose, is the rub. It is certainly the only

substantial difference between us."

General Duff Green came to Springfield in December, 1860, as an emissary

from President Buchanan to invite the President-elect to Washington

for a conference upon the situation, with the hope that his presence

there might prevent civil war, and General Green was bold enough to

tell him that, if he did not go, "upon his conscience must rest the

blood that would be shed." Here Lincoln's political shrewdness and

diplomacy were demonstrated in as conspicuous a manner, perhaps, as

at any other crisis in his life. He detected at once the intention to

unload upon him the responsibility for disunion and war, and met it

with a counter-proposition which must have excited the admiration of

the conspirators who were trying to entrap him. He received General

Green with great courtesy, heard him with respectful attention, and

gave him a letter in which he said that he did not desire any amendment

to the Constitution, although he recognized the right of the American

people to adopt one; that he believed in maintaining inviolate the

rights of each State to control its own domestic institutions; and

that he considered the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of

any State or Territory as the gravest of crimes. While those were his

sentiments, and while they indicated the policy he should pursue as

President, he would not consent to their publication unless the Senators

from Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Louisiana, and Texas would

sign a pledge which he had written below his signature to this letter

and upon the same piece of paper. It was a pledge "to suspend all

action for the dismemberment of the Union until some act deemed to be

violative of our rights shall be done by the incoming administration."

Thus the responsibility was thrown back upon the representatives of the

seceding States, and it is unnecessary to say that Duff Green's mission

to Springfield was not considered a success by the rebel leaders. In

order to protect himself, Lincoln sent a copy of his letter to Senator

Trumbull, calling his attention to the fact that part of its text and

all of its sentiment were copied from the Chicago platform.

By this time Lincoln had become thoroughly convinced that the Southern

leaders were in earnest and that nothing could prevent the secession

of their States, although he continued his efforts to reassure them

and to apply every means his ingenuity could suggest to reconcile them

to the situation. Notwithstanding all his anxiety, his sense of humor

remained, and, as was his habit, he illustrated the situation with a

story about a pious man named Brown who was on a committee to erect a

bridge over a very dangerous river. They called in an engineer named

Jones, who had great confidence in himself, and, after the difficulties

had been explained, asked him whether he was able to build the bridge.

Jones was a profane man, and replied that he would build a bridge to

hell if he could get a contract, or words to that effect. The churchmen

were horrified, and when the contractor retired, Brown attempted to

allay their indignation by saying all the good things he could remember

or invent about Jones. At the same time he was a very cautious man and

would not commit himself to any doubtful proposition.

"I know Jones," he said, "and he is a man who will keep his promises. If

he agrees to build a bridge to Hades he will do it, although I have my

doubts about the 'butments on the infernal side."

The infinite patience exhibited by Lincoln during this period of anxious

helplessness, amidst the clamors of office-seekers, the importunities of

sincere but timid men who besought him to yield to the South and avoid

trouble and bloodshed, the threats of his enemies, the intrigues of the

politicians, the conspiracies of the disunionists, showed his strength

of character and sense of discretion, and did much to establish him in

the confidence of the public. He indulged neither in hope nor fear, he

made no boasts, he showed no alarm, he answered neither yea nor nay, but

maintained complete self-control and waited for his time to come. To

intimate friends who possessed his confidence he never failed to assert

his determination to maintain the Union, no matter what it cost, and to

resist to the end every proposition for dissolution or dismemberment,

but his words were as gentle and as kindly as they were firm.

"The right of a State to secede is not an open or debatable question,"

he said. "That was fully discussed in Jackson's time and denied not

only by him but by the vote of Congress. It is the duty of a President

to execute the laws and maintain the existing government. He cannot

entertain any proposition for dissolution or dismemberment. He was not

elected for any such purpose. As a matter of theoretical speculation it

is probably true that if the people, with whom the whole question rests,

should become tired of the present government they might change it in

the manner prescribed by the Constitution."

At the same time, without being dictatorial, he kept the Republican

leaders inspired with his own confidence and determination and

endeavored to prevent them from the mistake of yielding to compromise

or making concessions. He wrote Representative Washburne with emphasis,

"Prevent our friends from demoralizing themselves and their cause

by entertaining propositions for compromise of any sort on slavery

extensions. There is no possible compromise upon it but what puts us

under again, and all our work to do over again. On that point hold firm

as a chain of steel."

To Seward he wrote, "I say now, as I have all the while said, that

on the question of extending slavery I am inflexible. I am for no

compromise which assists or permits the extension of the institution on

soil owned by the nation."

He knew what was going on under the direction of the disloyal members

of Buchanan's Cabinet. He was aware that the Northern States were being

stripped of arms and ammunition and that large quantities of military

stores were being sent South where they could easily be seized when the

time came. He knew also that disloyal officers of the army were being

placed in command of the forts and military posts in the South, and

other strategical points, and he asked Washburne to present his respects

to General Scott, "and tell him confidentially that I should be obliged

to him to be as well prepared as he can either to hold or retake the

forts as the case may require after the inauguration."

Mr. Seward and other Republican leaders were apprehensive lest an

attempt be made to prevent the counting of the electoral vote and the

inauguration of Lincoln. The secessionists controlled both Houses and

could have prevented constitutional proceeding if they had chosen to do

so, but offered no interference. Mr. Seward always claimed--and he had

an excessive degree of admiration for his own acts--that a speech which

he made at the Astor House in January deceived the secession leaders

into permitting the vote to be canvassed and Lincoln inaugurated. "When

I made that speech the electoral vote was not counted," said Mr. Seward

with pride, "and I knew it never would be if Jeff Davis believed there

would be war. I had to deceive Davis and I did it. That's why I said it

would all be settled in sixty days."

The will of the people to make Abraham Lincoln President was carried

into effect upon February 13, 1861, when the Congress of the United

States met in joint session and declared him duly elected.

Mr. Seward and other Republican leaders had urged Lincoln to come to

Washington early in February, but the latter, with his usual judgment

and common sense, declined to depart from ordinary usage, and politely

explained his own feeling that he ought not to appear in Washington

until he had been formally declared President. When that formality had

been completed, he bade his old friends good-by and began a memorable

journey, taking a circuitous route in order to gratify the people of

the Northern States, who wished to see the President-elect, and gathered

at every station through which he passed, hoping to hear his voice

or catch a glimpse of his face. He made about thirty speeches on the

journey, and every time he spoke it was to stimulate the patriotism

and the determination of the people to preserve the Union. The address

delivered in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, was perhaps the most

notable, as it was the longest, because he was deeply moved by the date

and the place, for it was Washington's birthday. Among other things, he

said,--

"All the political sentiments I entertain have been drawn, so far as I

have been able to draw them, from the sentiments which originated in

and were given to the world from this hall. I have never had a feeling,

politically, that did not spring from the sentiments embodied in the

Declaration of Independence. It was that which gave promise that in

due time the weight would be lifted from the shoulders of all men and

that all should have an equal chance. Now, my friends, can this country

be saved on that basis? If it can, I will consider myself one of the

happiest men in the world if I can help to save it. If it cannot be

saved upon that principle, it will be truly awful. But if this country

cannot be saved without giving up that principle, I was about to say I

would rather be assassinated on this spot than surrender it. Now, in my

view of the present aspect of affairs, there is no need of bloodshed and

war. There is no necessity for it. I am not in favor of such a course;

and I may say in advance that there will be no bloodshed unless it be

forced upon the government. The government will not use force unless

force is used against it.

"My friends, this is wholly an unprepared speech. I did not expect to

be called upon to say a word when I came here. I supposed it was merely

to do something towards raising a flag--I may, therefore, have said

something indiscreet. [Cries of 'No! no!'] But I have said nothing but

what I am willing to live by, and, if it be the pleasure of Almighty

God, to die by."

The manner in which Lincoln came into Washington has been the subject

of abundant discussion and criticism, but long ago the public mind

settled down to a mature opinion that he did exactly right, and that a

President-elect of the United States, particularly at such a critical

juncture, should not take any risks or omit any precautions for his

personal safety. Lincoln himself, long after, declared that he did not

then and never did believe that he would have been assassinated, but

always thought it wise to run no risk when no risk was necessary. Wisdom

justifies such a rule, while the tragic experience of the American

people has left no doubt of it. The facts were that an Italian barber

named Ferrandini, an outspoken secessionist working at a Baltimore

hotel, had submitted to an organization of Southern sympathizers a

wild plan for intimidating the Union people of Maryland and the North,

which included the blowing up of all the bridges around Washington, the

kidnapping of several prominent Republicans, and the assassination of

Lincoln, General Scott, and Hamlin, the President and Vice-President

elect. This would leave the capital open to the Southern leaders, throw

the entire government into confusion, and prevent interference from

the North with any revolutionary plans which Jefferson Davis might be

contemplating.

[Illustration: Copyright, 1900, by McClure, Phillips & Co.

For Mrs. Lucy G. Speed, from whose pious hand I accepted the

present of an Oxford Bible twenty years ago. Washington, D.C.

October 3, 1861

A. Lincoln.

From a photograph by Klauber, Louisville, Kentucky. Reproduced by

special permission of James B. Speed, Esq.]

Just how much encouragement Ferrandini received from the Southern

sympathizers in Baltimore and Washington is not known, but he was the

captain of a military company whose members were pledged to prevent

the inauguration of Lincoln or any abolitionist President. When Allan

Pinkerton learned of his suggestions, he reported the matter at once

to Mr. Felton, President of the railroad that connected Baltimore

with Philadelphia. Mr. Pinkerton's disclosures were confirmed by

detectives employed by Governor Hicks, of Maryland, and the military

authorities at Washington, although neither knew that the others were at

work on the case. After consultation with his friends, Lincoln decided

not to take any chances, and it was arranged that, after the ceremonies

at Harrisburg were concluded, he should return to Philadelphia with a

single companion and take the regular midnight train to Washington,

leaving the rest of his party to continue in the special train according

to the original itinerary. Lincoln wore no disguise, no deception was

practised upon any one, and the only unusual occurrence that night was

the disconnection of the telegraph wires just outside of Philadelphia

and Harrisburg, so that, in case the change of plan was discovered, the

news could not reach Baltimore until Lincoln had passed through that

city. Mr. Seward and Mr. Washburne were the only persons to meet the

President-elect at the station, and they had been advised of his coming

only a few hours before by Mr. Seward's son, who had come by a previous

train from Harrisburg.

The week before the inauguration was a busy one for the President-elect.

A great deal of his time was occupied by visits of ceremony and

consultations with Republican leaders about the composition of his

Cabinet, the terms of his inaugural, and the policy to be pursued by

the new administration. March 4 Mr. Buchanan escorted him from the

Executive Mansion to the Capitol, where the oath was administered to

him by Chief-Justice Taney, and, standing upon a platform at the east

portico of the unfinished Capitol, he was introduced to the multitude by

his old friend, Edward D. Baker, while Stephen A. Douglas, his opponent

for the Presidency, stood at his left hand and held his hat. The public

curiosity to see the President-elect reached its climax as he made his

appearance. All sorts of stories had been told and believed about his

personal appearance. His character had been grossly misrepresented and

maligned in both sections of the Union, and the hysterical condition

of the country naturally whetted the appetite of men of all parties to

see and hear the man who was now the central figure of the republic. The

tone of moderation, tenderness, and good-will which breathed through

his inaugural speech made a profound impression in his favor, while

his voice rang out over the acres of people before him with surprising

distinctness, and was heard in the remotest parts of his audience.

No inaugural address before or since has been awaited with so much

anxiety and interest. It was expected that in this, his first

official utterance, the new President would outline the policy of his

administration and determine whether the country should have war or

peace. Thousands of men were eager for an intimation of what he intended

to say, and an accurate forecast was worth millions of dollars to the

stock market; but not a word nor a thought leaked out. The document was

written with Lincoln's own hand upon the backs of envelopes and other

scraps of paper from time to time as ideas suggested themselves and he

determined what to say, and finally, as the time of his departure from

Springfield approached, he put them together in a little bare room in

a business block over the store of his brother-in-law, where he was

accustomed to retire when he wanted to be alone or had to do writing of

importance. Only two persons knew of this retreat.

When the manuscript was finished it was intrusted to Mr. William H.

Bailhache, editor of the _Illinois State Journal_, who put it in type

himself, assisted by a veteran compositor, also an old friend of

Lincoln. After taking a dozen proof-slips, the type was distributed.

Judge David Davis and one or two other friends read it in Springfield.

Orville H. Browning read it on the journey to Washington, and upon

the morning of his arrival at the capital, a copy was handed to Mr.

Seward, who spent an entire Sunday revising it. His amendments and

suggestions were almost as voluminous as the original document. Lincoln

adopted either in whole or in part nearly all of them, except where they

affected the style or changed the policy indicated. The most important

changes made were to modify the declaration of his intentions to recover

and hold the fortifications and property which had been seized by the

secessionists and to speak of the exercise of power in that direction

with some ambiguity and a hint at forbearance.

During all his life at the White House Lincoln took an active part

in political affairs. He never forgot that he was the President of

the whole country; but at the same time he considered it necessary

to its salvation to establish the Republican party upon a firm and

permanent basis, and for that purpose a more complete and thorough

organization was necessary. He knew the value of an organization of

trained politicians and of political discipline as well as any man in

public life. He was thoroughly a practical politician and as skilful

in execution as he was in planning. He knew how to manipulate men and

direct movements as well as Thurlow Weed, and no man in the Cabinet

or in either House of Congress was more adroit in accomplishing his

purposes. He never failed to carry through Congress any measure that

he considered important; he never failed to obtain the confirmation

of a nominee. He used the patronage of his office to strengthen the

Republican party because he believed it essential to the salvation of

his country. He possessed a political tact so subtle and masterful that

it enabled him to reconcile rivalries and enemies, to unite conflicting

purposes, and to bring to his support men of implacable hostility, who

never realized his purpose until his object was accomplished, and then

it was such as they almost invariably approved. He was candid when

candor was necessary, he was mysterious when he believed it wise to

excite curiosity, and he was determined and often arbitrary with men

whom he thought would be most impressed that way. His greatest quality,

the most valuable talent he possessed, was his ability to fathom the

human heart, to understand its weakness and its strength, so that he

could measure the influence that must be exerted and the methods by

which it could be induced to assist him in his direction of affairs.

His lowly birth and early experience were of great advantage to him in

understanding human nature, and he looked to the great masses of "the

plain people" as well as to the Almighty for guidance, and had full

faith in their honesty and capacity. Before he acted upon any important

question he felt the public pulse, and when he thought the people were

ready he acted, and not before. While he was a great leader, a shrewd

and deep manipulator of public opinion, he often said, in his quaint

way, that it was possible to fool a part of the people all the time,

and all of the people part of the time; but no man could fool all the

people all the time. With his great common sense, he endeavored to

discover what was in the public mind and how the public conscience

would regard certain measures proposed, and waited for it to point out

his path of duty. The atmosphere of Washington never affected him; he

was self-contained and indifferent to social and other influences that

usually exercise much force upon public men.

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