EXPRESSION. PART I.--THE IDEAL
The human being is the only sign in the arts capable of idealization,
because, while its parts are fixed and invariable, it is the only sign
as to which there is a universal agreement in respect of the value of
abstract qualities connected with it. There can be no ideal of the human
form separately, because this implies expression which results from
abstract qualities. Nor can there be an ideal combination of these
qualities, except a general expression covering all the virtues and
eliminating all the passions, which expression cannot be disassociated
from form. The ideal human being is therefore a perfect generalization
of the highest conceivable qualities of form and expression.
Necessarily in matters of art, when we use the term "Ideal," we mean a
general ideal, that is to say, an ideal that would be accepted as such
by the general body of men and women. From the fact that the sensorial
nerves in all persons are alike in form and character, and that they act
in the same way under like conditions, it follows that there must be a
general agreement as to degrees of beauty, and thus a common conception
of the ideal human being. Experience has demonstrated this at all
times, both in respect of the general ideal we are now discussing, and
of particular ideals involving special types and characters; and so
invariable is this experience that the progression towards similar
ideals has all the force of law.[36] This general agreement is subject
to certain restrictions. The first is in regard to form in which the
imagination cannot proceed beyond experience. The component parts of an
ideal form cannot include any which are higher in quality than those
which have come within the experience of the person compounding the
ideal. Secondly, in regard to abstract qualities, the estimation of
these depends upon intelligence and education, and the accumulated
experience of these things, which we measure in terms of degrees of
civilization. Consequently, different interpretations would be placed
upon the phrase "the highest conceivable qualities of form and
expression," by the various races of mankind. According as the
experience was greater, so would the ideal form be higher in type; and
as the civilization was more advanced, so would the abstract qualities
exhibited be more perfect in character. But among civilized peoples what
is, within our understanding, the ultimate form of the ideal, would not
change in respect of abstract qualities, and as to form would only vary
in comparatively insignificant details with the width of experience.
It is obvious that there can be only one general ideal covering
perfection of form and mind, and this being beyond human experience, can
only be associated with a spiritual personage, and necessarily with the
highest conceivable spiritual personage--the Supreme Being. In its
absolute perfection it may be significant of the Supreme Being of any
religion of civilized peoples, but not of other spiritual personages to
whom such perfection may also be attributed, because absolute power can
only be implied in one such personage. This power cannot be indicated in
an ideal expression, and hence there is no alternative but to leave the
one general ideal to the Supreme Being.
There are only two religions in which an ideal human form has been used
in art to typify the Supreme Being, and these are the ancient Grecian
and the Christian; but the one general ideal referred to has only been
used by the Greeks. The Christian conception of the Deity is far nobler
than that which the Greeks had of Zeus, but in art nothing greater than
the Grecian ideal has been executed. As a type of an Almighty Power the
best Christian representation is distinctly inferior, and it must
necessarily be so because convention requires that a particular feature
of expression must be indicated therein which is not compulsory in the
Grecian ideal. Forgiveness of sins is a cardinal principle in the
Christian doctrine, and consequently whatever the character of
expression given to the Deity, a certain gentleness has to be exhibited
which materially limits the comprehensive nature of the expression. The
Grecian ideal, as sculptured, strictly denied any particular
characteristic, while covering every good quality, and hence for the
Christian it is not so suitable as the accepted modification.
Among the Greeks, ideal types of the gods and goddesses other than
Zeus varied considerably. Those representations that have come down
to us are usually deviations from the Zeus type with certain special
characteristics, though often they can only be distinguished from
each other by symbols. They are above human life and so cannot be
appropriately associated with human surroundings. Ideals appertaining to
Christianity are practically fixed by convention, or are interchangeable
with ideals in allegorical and symbolical art.
Art is not concerned with what are termed ideal physical qualities
because beauty is its first consideration. A form with powerful limbs
and muscles may be generally accepted as an ideal form of strength, but
these very limbs and muscles would detract from the beauty of the
figure, and so separately such a form would be inferior art.
An ideal can only be applied to excellence. In art, moral or physical
deformity cannot be exaggerated for the purpose of emphasis or contrast
without lessening the deformity or injuring the art. In the work of the
greater artists the former result follows; in that of less skilful
artists, the latter. Homer could not deal with evil characters without
exciting a certain sympathy with them, thus diminishing the deformity in
the minds of his readers. There is a measure of nobility about
Shakespeare's bad men, and Milton distinctly ennobled Satan in
portraying his evil powers and influence. In painting and sculpture
there is no place for hideous forms of any description, for they either
revolt the imagination and so neutralize the appreciation of the
beautiful figures present in the composition, or they verge upon the
ridiculous and disturb the mind with counteracting influences. With rare
exceptions the greater artists have not failed to recognize this
truth,[37] and in respect of the very greatest men, no really hideous
figure is to be found in any of their works, if we except certain
instances where the artist had to comply with fixed rules and
conditions, as for example in Michelangelo's Last Judgment where evil
beings had perforce to be presented, and could only be shown as
deformities.
Attempts to emphasize ugliness by artists of inferior rank result in the
fantastic or the ludicrous, as in the representation of evil spirits on
the old Etruscan tombs, and the whimsical imps of the Breughels and the
younger Teniers.