CHAPTER LXXI.

“You may remember,” said Julius Faber, “Sir Humphry Davy’s eloquent description of the effect produced on him by the inhalation of nitrous oxide. He states that he began to lose the perception of external things; trains of vivid visible images rapidly passed through his mind, and were connected with words in such a manner as to produce perceptions perfectly novel. ‘I existed,’ he said, ‘in a world of newly-connected and newly-modified ideas.’ When he recovered, he exclaimed: ‘Nothing exists but thoughts; the universe is composed of impressions, ideas, pleasures, and pains!’

“Now observe, that thus a cultivator of positive science, endowed with

one of the healthiest of human brains, is, by the inhalation of a gas,

abstracted from all external life,--enters into a new world, which

consists of images he himself creates and animates so vividly that, on

waking, he resolves the universe itself into thoughts.”

“Well,” said I, “but what inference do you draw from that voluntary

experiment, applicable to the malady of which you bid me hope the cure?”

“Simply this: that the effect produced on a healthful brain by the

nitrous oxide may be produced also by moral causes operating on the

blood, or on the nerves. There is a degree of mental excitement in which

ideas are more vivid than sensations, and then the world of external

things gives way to the world within the brain.(1) But this, though a

suspension of that reason which comprehends accuracy of judgment, is

no more a permanent aberration of reason than were Sir Humphry Davy’s

visionary ecstasies under the influence of the gas. The difference

between the two states of suspension is that of time, and it is but an

affair of time with our beloved patient. Yet prepare yourself. I fear

that the mind will not recover without some critical malady of the

body!”

“Critical! but not dangerous?--say not dangerous! I can endure the pause

of her reason; I could not endure the void in the universe if her life

were to fade from the earth.”

“Poor friend! would not you yourself rather lose life than reason?”

“I--yes! But we men are taught to set cheap value on our own lives; we

do not estimate at the same rate the lives of those we love. Did we do

so, Humanity would lose its virtues.”

“What, then! Love teaches that there is something of nobler value than

mere mind? Yet surely it cannot be the mere body? What is it, if

not that continuance of being which your philosophy declines to

acknowledge,--namely, soul? If you fear so painfully that your Lilian

should die, is it not that you fear to lose her forever?”

“Oh, cease, cease!” I cried impatiently. “I cannot now argue on

metaphysics. What is it that you anticipate of harm to her life? Her

health has been stronger ever since her affliction. She never seems to

know ailment now. Do you not perceive that her cheek has a more hardy

bloom, her frame a more rounded symmetry, than when you saw her in

England?”

“Unquestionably. Her physical forces have been silently recruiting

themselves in the dreams which half lull, half amuse her imagination.

Imagination! that faculty, the most glorious which is bestowed on the

human mind, because it is the faculty which enables thought to create,

is of all others the most exhausting to life when unduly stimulated and

consciously reasoning on its own creations. I think it probable that

had this sorrow not befallen you, you would have known a sorrow yet

graver,--you would have long survived your Lilian. As it is now, when

she recovers, her whole organization, physical and mental, will have

undergone a beneficent change. But, I repeat my prediction,--some severe

malady of the body will precede the restoration of the mind; and it

is my hope that the present suspense or aberration of the more wearing

powers of the mind may fit the body to endure and surmount the physical

crisis. I remember a case, within my own professional experience,

in many respects similar to this, but in other respects it was less

hopeful. I was consulted by a young student of a very delicate physical

frame, of great mental energies, and consumed by an intense ambition.

He was reading for university honours. He would not listen to me when I

entreated him to rest his mind. I thought that he was certain to obtain

the distinction for which he toiled, and equally certain to die a few

months after obtaining it. He falsified both my prognostics. He so

overworked himself that, on the day of examination, his nerves were

agitated, his memory failed him; he passed, not without a certain

credit, but fell far short of the rank amongst his fellow competitors

to which he aspired. Here, then, the irritated mind acted on the

disappointed heart, and raised a new train of emotions. He was first

visited by spectral illusions; then he sank into a state in which the

external world seemed quite blotted out. He heeded nothing that was said

to him; seemed to see nothing that was placed before his eyes,--in a

word, sensations became dormant, ideas preconceived usurped their place,

and those ideas gave him pleasure. He believed that his genius was

recognized, and lived amongst its supposed creations enjoying an

imaginary fame. So it went on for two years, during which suspense of

his reason, his frail form became robust and vigorous. At the end of

that time he was seized with a fever, which would have swept him in

three days to the grave had it occurred when I was first called in to

attend him. He conquered the fever, and, in recovering, acquired the

full possession of the intellectual faculties so long suspended. When I

last saw him, many years afterwards, he was in perfect health, and the

object of his young ambition was realized; the body had supported the

mind,--he had achieved distinction. Now what had so, for a time, laid

this strong intellect into visionary sleep? The most agonizing of human

emotions in a noble spirit,--shame! What has so stricken down your

Lilian? You have told me the story: shame!--the shame of a nature

pre-eminently pure. But observe that, in his case as in hers, the shock

inflicted does not produce a succession of painful illusions: on

the contrary, in both, the illusions are generally pleasing. Had the

illusions been painful, the body would have suffered, the patient died.

Why did a painful shock produce pleasing illusions? Because, no matter

how a shock on the nerves may originate, if it affects the reason, it

does but make more vivid than impressions from actual external objects

the ideas previously most cherished. Such ideas in the young student

were ideas of earthly fame; such ideas in the young maiden are ideas

of angel comforters and heavenly Edens. You miss her mind on the earth,

and, while we speak, it is in paradise.”

“Much that you say, my friend, is authorized by the speculations of

great writers, with whom I am not unfamiliar; but in none of those

writers, nor in your encouraging words, do I find a solution for

much that has no precedents in my experience,--much, indeed, that has

analogies in my reading, but analogies which I have hitherto despised

as old wives’ fables. I have bared to your searching eye the weird

mysteries of my life. How do you account for facts which you cannot

resolve into illusions,--for the influence which that strange being,

Margrave, exercised over Lilian’s mind or fancy, so that for a time her

love for me was as dormant as is her reason now; so that he could draw

her--her whose nature you admit to be singularly pure and modest--from

her mother’s home? The magic wand; the trance into which that wand threw

Margrave himself; the apparition which it conjured up in my own

quiet chamber when my mind was without a care and my health without

a flaw,--how account for all this: as you endeavoured, and perhaps

successfully, to account for all my impressions of the Vision in the

Museum, of the luminous, haunting shadow in its earlier apparitions,

when my fancy was heated, my heart tormented, and, it might be, even the

physical forces of this strong frame disordered?”

“Allen,” said the old pathologist, “here we approach a ground which few

physicians have dared to examine. Honour to those who, like our bold

contemporary, Elliotson, have braved scoff and sacrificed dross in

seeking to extract what is practical in uses, what can be tested by

experiment, from those exceptional phenomena on which magic sought to

found a philosophy, and to which philosophy tracks the origin of magic.”

“What! do I understand you? Is it you, Julius Faber, who attach faith

to the wonders attributed to animal magnetism and electro-biology, or

subscribe to the doctrines which their practitioners teach?”

“I have not examined into those doctrines, nor seen with my own eyes the

wonders recorded, upon evidence too respectable, nevertheless, to permit

me peremptorily to deny what I have not witnessed.(2) But wherever I

look through the History of Mankind in all ages and all races, I find a

concurrence in certain beliefs which seem to countenance the theory that

there is in some peculiar and rare temperaments a power over forms of

animated organization, with which they establish some unaccountable

affinity; and even, though much more rarely, a power over inanimate

matter. You are familiar with the theory of Descartes, ‘that those

particles of the blood which penetrate to the brain do not only serve to

nourish and sustain its substance, but to produce there a certain very

subtle Aura, or rather a flame very vivid and pure, that obtains the

name of the Animal Spirits;’ (3) and at the close of his great fragment

upon Man, he asserts that ‘this flame is of no other nature than all the

fires which are in inanimate bodies.’(4) This notion does but forestall

the more recent doctrine that electricity is more or less in all, or

nearly all, known matter. Now, whether in the electric fluid or some

other fluid akin to it of which we know still less, thus equally

pervading all matter, there may be a certain magnetic property more

active, more operative upon sympathy in some human constitutions than in

others, and which can account for the mysterious power I have spoken of,

is a query I might suggest, but not an opinion I would hazard. For an

opinion I must have that basis of experience or authority which I do not

need when I submit a query to the experience and authority of others.

Still, the supposition conveyed in the query is so far worthy of

notice, that the ecstatic temperament (in which phrase I comprehend all

constitutional mystics) is peculiarly sensitive to electric atmospheric

influences. This is a fact which most medical observers will have

remarked in the range of their practice. Accordingly, I was prepared

to find Mr. Hare Townshend, in his interesting work,(5) state that he

himself was of ‘the electric temperament,’ sparks flying from his hair

when combed in the dark, etc. That accomplished writer, whose veracity

no one would impugn, affirms that between this electrical endowment and

whatever mesmeric properties he might possess, there is a remarkable

relationship and parallelism. Whatever state of the atmosphere tends to

accumulate and insulate electricity in the body, promotes equally’ (says

Mr. Townshend) ‘the power and facility with which I influence others

mesmerically.’ What Mr. Townshend thus observes in himself, American

physicians and professors of chemistry depose to have observed in those

modern magicians, the mediums of (so-called) ‘spirit manifestation.’

They state that all such mediums are of the electric temperament, thus

everywhere found allied with the ecstatic, and their power varies in

proportion as the state of the atmosphere serves to depress or augment

the electricity stored in themselves. Here, then, in the midst of

vagrant phenomena, either too hastily dismissed as altogether the tricks

of fraudful imposture, or too credulously accepted as supernatural

portents--here, at least, in one generalized fact, we may, perhaps, find

a starting point, from which inductive experiment may arrive, soon

or late, at a rational theory. But however the power of which we are

speaking (a power accorded to special physical temperament) may or may

not be accounted for by some patient student of nature, I am persuaded

that it is in that power we are to seek for whatever is not wholly

imposture, in the attributes assigned to magic or witchcraft. It is well

said, by a writer who has gone into the depth of these subjects with the

research of a scholar and the science of a pathologist, ‘that if magic

had exclusively reposed on credulity and falsehood, its reign would

never have endured so long; but that its art took its origin in singular

phenomena, proper to certain affections of the nerves, or manifested in

the conditions of sleep. These phenomena, the principle of which was

at first unknown, served to root faith in magic, and often abused even

enlightened minds. The enchanters and magicians arrived, by divers

practices, at the faculty of provoking in other brains a determined

order of dreams, of engendering hallucinations of all kinds, of inducing

fits of hypnotism, trance, mania, during which the persons so affected

imagined that they saw, heard, touched, supernatural beings, conversed

with them, proved their influences, assisted at prodigies of which magic

proclaimed itself to possess the secret. The public, the enchanters,

and the enchanted were equally dupes.’(6) Accepting this explanation,

unintelligible to no physician of a practice so lengthened as mine

has been, I draw from it the corollary, that as these phenomena are

exhibited only by certain special affections, to which only certain

special constitutions are susceptible, so not in any superior faculties

of intellect, or of spiritual endowment, but in peculiar physical

temperaments, often strangely disordered, the power of the sorcerer

in affecting the imagination of others is to be sought. In the native

tribes of Australasia the elders are instructed in the arts of this

so-called sorcery, but only in a very few constitutions does instruction

avail to produce effects in which the savages recognize the powers of a

sorcerer: it is so with the Obi of the negroes. The fascination of Obi

is an unquestionable fact, but the Obi man cannot be trained by formal

lessons; he is born a fascinator, as a poet is born a poet. It is so

with the Laplanders, of whom Tornoeus reports that of those instructed

in the magical art ‘only a few are capable of it.’ ‘Some,’ he says, ‘are

naturally magicians.’ And this fact is emphatically insisted upon by

the mystics of our own middle ages, who state that a man must be born

a magician; in other words, that the gift is constitutional, though

developed by practice and art. Now, that this gift and its practice

should principally obtain in imperfect states of civilization, and fade

into insignificance in the busy social enlightenment of cities, may be

accounted for by reference to the known influences of imagination. In

the cruder states of social life not only is imagination more frequently

predominant over all other faculties, but it has not the healthful vents

which the intellectual competition of cities and civilization affords.

The man who in a savage tribe, or in the dark feudal ages, would be a

magician, is in our century a poet, an orator, a daring speculator,

an inventive philosopher. In other words, his imagination is drawn to

pursuits congenial to those amongst whom it works. It is the tendency

of all intellect to follow the directions of the public opinion amidst

which it is trained. Where a magician is held in reverence or awe, there

will be more practitioners of magic than where a magician is despised

as an impostor or shut up as a lunatic. In Scandinavia, before the

introduction of Christianity, all tradition records the wonderful

powers of the Vala, or witch, who was then held in reverence and honour.

Christianity was introduced, and the early Church denounced the Vala as

the instrument of Satan, and from that moment down dropped the majestic

prophetess into a miserable and execrated old hag!”

“The ideas you broach,” said I, musingly, “have at moments crossed me,

though I have shrunk from reducing them to a theory which is but one of

pure hypothesis. But this magic, after all, then, you would place in the

imagination of the operator, acting on the imagination of those whom it

affects? Here, at least, I can follow you, to a certain extent, for here

we get back into the legitimate realm of physiology.”

“And possibly,” said Faber, “we may find hints to guide us to useful

examination, if not to complete solution of problems that, once

demonstrated, may lead to discoveries of infinite value,--hints, I say,

in two writers of widely opposite genius, Van Helmont and Bacon.

Van Helmont, of all the mediaeval mystics, is, in spite of his many

extravagant whims, the one whose intellect is the most suggestive to the

disciplined reasoners of our day. He supposed that the faculty which he

calls Fantasy, and which we familiarly call Imagination,--is invested

with the power of creating for itself ideas independent of the senses,

each idea clothed in a form fabricated by the imagination, and

becoming an operative entity. This notion is so far favoured by modern

physiologists, that Lincke reports a case where the eye itself was

extirpated; yet the extirpation was followed by the appearance of

luminous figures before the orbit. And again, a woman, stone-blind,

complained of ‘luminous images, with pale colours, before her eyes.’

Abercrombie mentions the case ‘of a lady quite blind, her eyes being

also disorganized and sunk, who never walked out without seeing a

little old woman in a red cloak, who seemed to walk before her.’(7)

Your favourite authority, the illustrious Miller, who was himself in

the habit of ‘seeing different images in the field of vision when he

lay quietly down to sleep, asserts that these images are not merely

presented to the fancy, but that even the images of dreams are really

seen,’ and that ‘any one may satisfy himself of this by accustoming

himself regularly to open his eyes when waking after a dream,--the

images seen in the dream are then sometimes visible, and can be observed

to disappear gradually.’ He confirms this statement not only by the

result of his own experience, but by the observations made by Spinoza,

and the yet higher authority of Aristotle, who accounts for spectral

appearance as the internal action of the sense of vision.(8) And this

opinion is favoured by Sir David Brewster, whose experience leads him

to suggest ‘that the objects of mental contemplation may be seen as

distinctly as external objects, and will occupy the same local position

in the axis of vision as if they had been formed by the agency of

light.’ Be this as it may, one fact remains,--that images can be seen

even by the blind as distinctly and vividly as you and I now see the

stream below our feet and the opossums at play upon yonder boughs.

Let us come next to some remarkable suggestions of Lord Bacon. In his

Natural History, treating of the force of the imagination, and the help

it receives ‘by one man working by another,’ he cites an instance he

had witnessed of a kind of juggler, who could tell a person what card

he thought of. He mentioned this ‘to a pretended learned man, curious in

such things,’ and this sage said to him, ‘It is not the knowledge of the

man’s thought, for that is proper to God, but the enforcing of a thought

upon him, and binding his imagination by a stronger, so that he could

think of no other card.’ You see this sage anticipated our modern

electro-biologists! And the learned man then shrewdly asked Lord Bacon,

‘Did the juggler tell the card to the man himself who had thought of it,

or bid another tell it?’ ‘He bade another tell it,’ answered Lord Bacon.

‘I thought so,’ returned his learned acquaintance, ‘for the juggler

himself could not have put on so strong an imagination; but by telling

the card to the other, who believed the juggler was some strange man who

could do strange things, that other man caught a strong imagination.’(9)

The whole story is worth reading, because Lord Bacon evidently thinks

it conveys a guess worth examining. And Lord Bacon, were he now living,

would be the man to solve the mysteries that branch out of mesmerism or

(so-called) spiritual manifestation, for he would not pretend to despise

their phenomena for fear of hurting his reputation for good sense.

Bacon then goes on to state that there are three ways to fortify the

imagination. ‘First, authority derived from belief in an art and in the

man who exercises it; secondly, means to quicken and corroborate the

imagination; thirdly, means to repeat and refresh it.’ For the second

and the third he refers to the practices of magic, and proceeds

afterwards to state on what things imagination has most force,--‘upon

things that have the lightest and easiest motions, and, therefore, above

all, upon the spirits of men, and, in them, on such affections as

move lightest,--in love, in fear, in irresolution. And,’ adds Bacon,

earnestly, in a very different spirit from that which dictates to the

sages of our time the philosophy of rejecting without trial that which

belongs to the Marvellous,--‘and whatsoever is of this kind, should be

thoroughly inquired into.’ And this great founder or renovator of the

sober inductive system of investigation even so far leaves it a matter

of speculative inquiry, whether imagination may not be so powerful

that it can actually operate upon a plant, that he says: ‘This likewise

should be made upon plants, and that diligently; as if you should tell

a man that such a tree would die this year, and will him, at these and

these times, to go unto it and see how it thriveth.’ I presume that

no philosopher has followed such recommendations: had some great

philosopher done so, possibly we should by this time know all the

secrets of what is popularly called witchcraft.”

And as Faber here paused, there came a strange laugh from the fantastic

she-oak-tree overhanging the stream,--a wild, impish laugh.

“Pooh! it is but the great kingfisher, the laughing-bird of the

Australian bush,” said Julius Faber, amused at my start of superstitious

alarm.

We walked on for some minutes in musing silence, and the rude log-hut in

which my wise companion had his home came in view,--the flocks grazing

on undulous pastures, the lone drinking at a watercourse fringed by the

slender gum-trees, and a few fields, laboriously won from the luxuriant

grassland, rippling with the wave of corn.

I halted, and said, “Rest here for a few moments, till I gather up the

conclusions to which your speculative reasoning seems to invite me.”

We sat down on a rocky crag, half mantled by luxuriant creepers with

vermilion buds.

“From the guesses,” said I, “which you have drawn from the erudition of

others and your own ingenious and reflective inductions, I collect this

solution of the mysteries, by which the experience I gain from my

senses confounds all the dogmas approved by my judgment. To the rational

conjectures by which, when we first conversed on the marvels that

perplexed me, you ascribe to my imagination, predisposed by mental

excitement, physical fatigue or derangement, and a concurrence

of singular events tending to strengthen such predisposition, the

phantasmal impressions produced on my senses,--to these conjectures

you now add a new one, more startling and less admitted by sober

physiologists. You conceive it possible that persons endowed with a rare

and peculiar temperament can so operate on imagination, and, through

the imagination, on the senses of others, as to exceed even the powers

ascribed to the practitioners of mesmerism and electro-biology, and give

a certain foundation of truth to the old tales of magic and witchcraft.

You imply that Margrave may be a person thus gifted, and hence the

influence he unquestionably exercised over Lilian, and over, perhaps,

less innocent agents, charmed or impelled by his will. And not

discarding, as I own I should have been originally induced to do,

the queries or suggestions adventured by Bacon in his discursive

speculations on Nature, to wit, ‘that there be many things, some of them

inanimate, that operate upon the spirits of men by secret sympathy and

antipathy,’ and to which Bacon gave the quaint name of ‘imaginants,’ so

even that wand, of which I have described to you the magic-like effects,

may have had properties communicated to it by which it performs the work

of the magician, as mesmerists pretend that some substance mesmerized

by them can act on the patient as sensibly as if it were the mesmerizer

himself. Do I state your suppositions correctly?”

“Yes; always remembering that they are only suppositions, and

volunteered with the utmost diffidence. But since, thus seated in the

early wilderness, we permit ourselves the indulgence of childlike guess,

may it not be possible, apart from the doubtful question whether a man

can communicate to an inanimate material substance a power to act upon

the mind or imagination of another man--may it not, I say, be possible

that such a substance may contain in itself such a virtue or property

potent over certain constitutions, though not over all. For instance, it

is in my experience that the common hazel-wood will strongly affect some

nervous temperaments, though wholly without effect on others. I remember

a young girl, who having taken up a hazel-stick freshly cut, could not

relax her hold of it; and when it was wrenched away from her by force,

was irresistibly attracted towards it, repossessed herself of it, and,

after holding it a few minutes, was cast into a kind of trance, in which

she beheld phantasmal visions. Mentioning this curious case, which I

supposed unique, to a learned brother of our profession, he told me that

he had known other instances of the effect of the hazel upon nervous

temperaments in persons of both sexes. Possibly it was some such

peculiar property in the hazel that made it the wood selected for the

old divining-rod. Again, we know that the bay-tree, or laurel, was

dedicated to the oracular Pythian Apollo. Now wherever, in the old

world, we find that the learning of the priests enabled them to exhibit

exceptional phenomena, which imposed upon popular credulity, there was a

something or other which is worth a philosopher’s while to explore;

and, accordingly, I always suspected that there was in the laurel

some property favourable to ecstatic vision in highly impressionable

temperaments. My suspicion, a few years ago, was justified by the

experience of a German physician, who had under his care a cataleptic

or ecstatic patient, and who assured me that he found nothing in this

patient so stimulated the state of ‘sleep-waking,’ or so disposed that

state to indulge in the hallucinations of prevision, as the berry of

the laurel.(10) Well, we do not know what this wand that produced a

seemingly magical effect upon you was really composed of. You did not

notice the metal employed in the wire, which you say communicated a

thrill to the sensitive nerves in the palm of the hand. You cannot tell

how far it might have been the vehicle of some fluid force in nature. Or

still more probably, whether the pores of your hand insensibly imbibed,

and communicated to the brain, some of those powerful narcotics from

which the Buddhists and the Arabs make unguents that induce visionary

hallucinations, and in which substances undetected in the hollow of the

wand, or the handle of the wand itself, might be steeped.(11) One thing

we do know, namely, that amongst the ancients, and especially in the

East, the construction of wands for magical purposes was no commonplace

mechanical craft, but a special and secret art appropriated to men who

cultivated with assiduity all that was then known of natural science

in order to extract from it agencies that might appear supernatural.

Possibly, then, the rods or wands of the East, of which Scripture makes

mention, were framed upon some principles of which we in our day are

very naturally ignorant, since we do not ransack science for the same

secrets; and thus, in the selection or preparation of the material

employed, mainly consisted whatever may be referrible to natural

philosophical causes in the antique science of Rhabdomancy, or

divination and enchantment by wands. The staff, or wand, of which you

tell me, was, you say, made of iron or steel and tipped with crystal.

Possibly iron and crystal do really contain some properties not hitherto

scientifically analyzed, and only, indeed, potential over exceptional

temperaments, which may account for the fact that iron and crystal have

been favourites with all professed mystics, ancient and modern. The

Delphic Pythoness had her iron tripod, Mesmer his iron bed; and many

persons, indisputably honest, cannot gaze long upon a ball of crystal

but what they begin to see visions. I suspect that a philosophical cause

for such seemingly preternatural effects of crystal and iron will be

found in connection with the extreme impressionability to changes in

temperatures which is the characteristic both of crystal and iron.

But if these materials do contain certain powers over exceptional

constitutions, we do not arrive at a supernatural but at a natural

phenomenon.”

“Still,” said I, “even granting that your explanatory hypotheses hit

or approach the truth;--still what a terrible power you would assign to

man’s will over men’s reason and deeds!”

“Man’s will,” answered Faber, “has over men’s deeds and reason, habitual

and daily, power infinitely greater and, when uncounterbalanced,

infinitely more dangerous than that which superstition exaggerates in

magic. Man’s will moves a war that decimates a race, and leaves behind

it calamities little less dire than slaughter. Man’s will frames, but it

also corrupts laws; exalts, but also demoralizes opinion; sets the world

mad with fanaticism, as often as it curbs the heart’s fierce instincts

by the wisdom of brother-like mercy. You revolt at the exceptional,

limited sway over some two or three individuals which the arts of a

sorcerer (if sorcerer there be) can effect; and yet, at the very moment

in which you were perplexed and appalled by such sway, or by your

reluctant belief in it, your will was devising an engine to unsettle the

reason and wither the hopes of millions!”

“My will! What engine?”

“A book conceived by your intellect, adorned by your learning, and

directed by your will, to steal from the minds of other men their

persuasion of the soul’s everlasting Hereafter.”

I bowed my head, and felt myself grow pale.

“And if we accept Bacon’s theory of ‘secret sympathy,’ or the plainer

physiological maxim that there must be in the imagination, morbidly

impressed by the will of another, some trains of idea in affinity with

such influence and preinclined to receive it, no magician could warp you

to evil, except through thoughts that themselves went astray. Grant

that the Margrave who still haunts your mind did really, by some occult,

sinister magnetism, guide the madman to murder, did influence the

servant-woman’s vulgar desire to pry into the secrets of her ill-fated

master, or the old maid’s covetous wish and envious malignity: what

could this awful magician do more than any commonplace guilty adviser,

to a mind predisposed to accept the advice?”

“You forget one example which destroys your argument,--the spell which

this mysterious fascinator could cast upon a creature so pure from all

guilt as Lilian!”

“Will you forgive me if I answer frankly?”

“Speak.”

“Your Lilian is spotless and pure as you deem her, and the fascination,

therefore, attempts no lure through a sinful desire; it blends with

its attraction no sentiment of affection untrue to yourself. Nay, it is

justice to your Lilian, and may be melancholy comfort to you, to state

my conviction, based on the answers my questions have drawn from her,

that you were never more cherished by her love than when that love

seemed to forsake you. Her imagination impressed her with the illusion

that through your love for her you were threatened with a great

peril. What seemed the levity of her desertion was the devotion of

self-sacrifice. And, in her strange, dream-led wanderings, do not think

that she was conscious of the fascination you impute to this mysterious

Margrave: in her belief it was your own guardian angel that guided her

steps, and her pilgrimage was ordained to disarm the foe that menaced

you, and dissolve the spell that divided her life from yours! But had

she not, long before this, willingly prepared herself to be so deceived?

Had not her fancies been deliberately encouraged to dwell remote from

the duties we are placed on the earth to perform? The loftiest faculties

in our nature are those that demand the finest poise, not to fall from

their height and crush all the walls that they crown. With exquisite

beauty of illustration, Hume says of the dreamers of ‘bright fancies,’

‘that they may be compared to those angels whom the Scriptures represent

as covering their eyes with their wings.’ Had you been, like my nephew,

a wrestler for bread with the wilderness, what helpmate would your

Lilian have been to you? How often would you have cried out in

justifiable anger, ‘I, son of Adam, am on earth, not in Paradise! Oh,

that my Eve were at home on my hearth, and not in the skies with the

seraphs!’ No Margrave, I venture to say, could have suspended the

healthful affections, or charmed into danger the wide-awake soul of my

Amy. When she rocks in its cradle the babe the young parents intrust to

her heed; when she calls the kine to the milking, the chicks to their

corn; when she but flits through my room to renew the flowers on the

stand, or range in neat order the books that I read, no spell on her

fancy could lead her a step from the range of her provident cares! At

day she is contented to be on the commonplace earth; at evening she and

I knock together at the one door of heaven, which opes to thanksgiving

and prayer; and thanksgiving and prayer send us back, calm and hopeful,

to the task that each morrow renews.”

I looked up as the old man paused, and in the limpid clearness of the

Australian atmosphere, I saw the child he thus praised standing by the

garden-gate, looking towards us, and though still distant she seemed

near. I felt wroth with her. My heart so cherished my harmless,

defenceless Lilian, that I was jealous of the praise taken from her to

be bestowed on another.

“Each of us,” said I, coldly, “has his or her own nature, and the uses

harmonious to that nature’s idiosyncrasy. The world, I grant, would get

on very ill if women were not more or less actively useful and quietly

good, like your Amy. But the world would lose standards that exalt and

refine, if no woman were permitted to gain, through the indulgence of

fancy, thoughts exquisite as those which my Lilian conceived, while

thought, alas! flowed out of fancy. I do not wound you by citing your

Amy as a type of the mediocre; I do not claim for Lilian the rank we

accord to the type of genius. But both are alike to such types in this:

namely, that the uses of mediocrity are for every-day life, and the uses

of genius, amidst a thousand mistakes which mediocrity never commits,

are to suggest and perpetuate ideas which raise the standard of the

mediocre to a nobler level. There would be fewer Amys in life if there

were no Lilian! as there would be far fewer good men of sense if there

were no erring dreamer of genius!”

“You say well, Allen Fenwick. And who should be so indulgent to the

vagaries of the imagination as the philosophers who taught your youth

to doubt everything in the Maker’s plan of creation which could not

be mathematically proved? ‘The human mind,’ said Luther, ‘is like a

drunkard on horseback; prop it on one side, and it falls on the other.’

So the man who is much too enlightened to believe in a peasant’s

religion, is always sure to set up some insane superstition of his own.

Open biographical volumes wherever you please, and the man who has no

faith in religion is a man who has faith in a nightmare. See that type

of the elegant sceptics,--Lord Herbert of Cherbury. He is writing a book

against Revelation; he asks a sign from heaven to tell him if his book

is approved by his Maker, and the man who cannot believe in the miracles

performed by his Saviour gravely tells us of a miracle vouchsafed to

himself. Take the hardest and strongest intellect which the hardest

and strongest race of mankind ever schooled and accomplished. See the

greatest of great men, the great Julius Caesar! Publicly he asserts

in the Senate that the immortality of the soul is a vain chimera. He

professes the creed which Roman voluptuaries deduced from Epicurus,

and denies all Divine interference in the affairs of the earth. A great

authority for the Materialists--they have none greater! They can show

on their side no intellect equal to Caesar’s! And yet this magnificent

freethinker, rejecting a soul and a Deity, habitually entered his

chariot muttering a charm; crawled on his knees up the steps of a temple

to propitiate the abstraction called ‘Nemesis;’ and did not cross the

Rubicon till he had consulted the omens. What does all this prove?--a

very simple truth. Man has some instincts with the brutes; for instance,

hunger and sexual love. Man has one instinct peculiar to himself, found

universally (or with alleged exceptions in savage States so rare, that

they do not affect the general law(12)),--an instinct of an invisible

power without this earth, and of a life beyond the grave, which that

power vouchsafes to his spirit. But the best of us cannot violate an

instinct with impunity. Resist hunger as long as you can, and, rather

than die of starvation, your instinct will make you a cannibal; resist

love when youth and nature impel to it, and what pathologist does not

track one broad path into madness or crime? So with the noblest instinct

of all. Reject the internal conviction by which the grandest thinkers

have sanctioned the hope of the humblest Christian, and you are

servile at once to some faith inconceivably more hard to believe. The

imagination will not be withheld from its yearnings for vistas beyond

the walls of the flesh, and the span of the present hour. Philosophy

itself, in rejecting the healthful creeds by which man finds his

safeguards in sober prayer and his guide through the wilderness of

visionary doubt, invents systems compared to which the mysteries of

theology are simple. Suppose any man of strong, plain understanding had

never heard of a Deity like Him whom we Christians adore, then ask this

man which he can the better comprehend in his mind, and accept as a

natural faith,--namely, the simple Christianity of his shepherd or the

Pantheism of Spinoza? Place before an accomplished critic (who comes

with a perfectly unprejudiced mind to either inquiry), first, the

arguments of David Hume against the gospel miracles, and then the

metaphysical crotchets of David Hume himself. This subtle philosopher,

not content, with Berkeley, to get rid of matter,--not content, with

Condillac, to get rid of spirit or mind,--proceeds to a miracle greater

than any his Maker has yet vouchsafed to reveal. He, being then alive

and in the act of writing, gets rid of himself altogether. Nay, he

confesses he cannot reason with any one who is stupid enough to think he

has a self. His words are: ‘What we call a mind is nothing but a heap

or collection of different perceptions or objects united together by

certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with

perfect simplicity and identity. If any one, upon serious and candid

reflection, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess

I can reason with him no longer.’ Certainly I would rather believe all

the ghost stories upon record than believe that I am not even a ghost,

distinct and apart from the perceptions conveyed to me, no matter

how,--just as I am distinct and apart from the furniture in my room,

no matter whether I found it there or whether I bought it. If some old

cosmogonist asked you to believe that the primitive cause of the

solar system was not to ‘be traced to a Divine Intelligence, but to

a nebulosity, originally so diffused that its existence can with

difficulty be conceived, and that the origin of the present system of

organized beings equally dispensed with the agency of a creative mind,

and could be referred to molecules formed in the water by the power

of attraction, till by modifications of cellular tissue in the gradual

lapse of ages, one monad became an oyster and another a Man,--would you

not say this cosmogony could scarce have misled the human understanding

even in the earliest dawn of speculative inquiry? Yet such are the

hypotheses to which the desire to philosophize away that simple

proposition of a Divine First Cause, which every child can comprehend,

led two of the greatest geniuses and profoundest reasoners of modern

times,--La Place and La Marck.(13) Certainly, the more you examine those

arch phantasmagorists, the philosophers who would leave nothing in the

universe but their own delusions, the more your intellectual pride may

be humbled. The wildest phenomena which have startled you are not more

extravagant than the grave explanations which intellectual presumption

adventures on the elements of our own organism and the relations between

the world of matter and the world of ideas.”

Here our conversation stopped, for Amy had now joined us, and, looking

up to reply, I saw the child’s innocent face between me and the furrowed

brow of the old man.

(1) See, on the theory elaborated from this principle, Dr. Hibbert’s

interesting and valuable work on the “Philosophy of Apparitions.”

(2) What Faber here says is expressed with more authority by one of the

most accomplished metaphysicians of our time (Sir W. Hamilton):

“Somnambulism is a phenomenon still more astonishing (than dreaming).

In this singular state a person performs a regular series of rational

actions, and those frequently of the most difficult and delicate nature;

and what is still more marvellous, with a talent to which he could make

no pretension when awake. (Cr. Ancillon, Essais Philos. ii. 161.) His

memory and reminiscence supply him with recollections of words and

things which, perhaps, never were at his disposal in the ordinary

state,--he speaks more fluently a more refined language. And if we

are to credit what the evidence on which it rests hardly allows us to

disbelieve, he has not only perception of things through other channels

than the common organs of sense, but the sphere of his cognition

is amplified to an extent far beyond the limits to which sensible

perception is confined. This subject is one of the most perplexing in

the whole compass of philosophy; for, on the one hand, the phenomena are

so remarkable that they cannot be believed, and yet, on the other, they

are of so unambiguous and palpable a character, and the witnesses to

their reality are so numerous, so intelligent, and so high above every

suspicion of deceit, that it is equally impossible to deny credit to

what is attested by such ample and un exceptionable evidence.”--Sir W.

Hamilton: Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, vol. ii. p. 274.

This perplexity, in which the distinguished philosopher leaves the

judgment so equally balanced that it finds it impossible to believe, and

yet impossible to disbelieve, forms the right state of mind in which

a candid thinker should come to the examination of those more

extraordinary phenomena which he has not himself yet witnessed, but

the fair inquiry into which may be tendered to him by persons above

the imputation of quackery and fraud. Muffler, who is not the

least determined, as he is certainly one of the most distinguished,

disbelievers of mesmeric phenomena, does not appear to have witnessed,

or at least to have carefully examined, them, or he would, perhaps, have

seen that even the more extraordinary of those phenomena confirm, rather

than contradict, his own general theories, and may be explained by the

sympathies one sense has with another,--“the laws of reflection through

the medium of the brain.” (Physiology of the Senses, p. 1311.) And

again by the maxim “that the mental principle, or cause of the mental

phenomena, cannot be confined to the brain, but that it exists in a

latent state in every part of the organism.” (Ibid., p. 1355.) The

“nerve power,” contended for by Mr. Bain, also may suggest a rational

solution of much that has seemed incredible to those physiologists who

have not condescended to sift the genuine phenomena of mesmerism from

the imposture to which, in all ages, the phenomena exhibited by what may

be called the ecstatic temperament have been applied.

(3) Descartes, L’Homme, vol. iv. p. 345. Cousin’s Edition.

(4) Ibid., p. 428.

(5) Facts in Mesmerism.

(6) La Magic et l’Astrologie dans l’Antiquitd et an Moyen-Age. Par L. F.

Alfred Maury, Membre de Institut. p. 225.

(7) “She had no illusions when within doors.”--Abercrombie, On the

Intellectual Powers, p. 277. (15th Edition.)

(8) Muller, Physiology of the Senses, Baley’s translation, pp.

1068-1395, and elsewhere. Mr. Bain, in his thoughtful and suggestive

work on the “Senses and Intellect,” makes very powerful use of these

statements in support of his proposition, which Faber advances in other

words, namely, “the return of the nervous currents exactly on their old

track in revived sensations.”

(9) Perhaps it is for the reason suggested in the text, namely, that the

magician requires the interposition of a third imagination between

his own and that of the consulting believer, that any learned adept in

(so-called) magic will invariably refuse to exhibit without the presence

of a third person. Hence the author of “Dogme et Rituel de la Haute

Magic,” printed at Parisy 1852-53--a book less remarkable for its

learning than for the earnest belief of a scholar of our own day in the

reality of the art of which he records the history--insists much on the

necessity of rigidly observing Le Ternaire, in the number of persons who

assist in an enchanter’s experiments.

(10) I may add that Dr. Kerner instances the effect of laurel-berries

on the Seeress of Prevorst, corresponding with that asserted by Julius

Faber in the text.

(11) See for these unguents the work of M. Maury, before quoted, “La

Magic et l’Astrologie,” etc., p. 417.

(12) It seems extremely doubtful whether the very few instances in

which it has been asserted that a savage race has been found without

recognition of a Deity and a future state would bear searching

examination. It is set forth, for example, in most of the popular works

on Australia, that the Australian savages have no notion of a Deity or

a Hereafter, that they only worship a devil, or evil spirit. This

assumption, though made more peremptorily, and by a greater number of

writers than any similar one regarding other savages, is altogether

erroneous, and has no other foundation than the ignorance of the

writers. The Australian savages recognize a Deity, but He is too august

for a name in their own language; in English they call Him the Great

Master,--an expression synonymous with “The Great Lord.” They believe

in a hereafter of eternal joy, and place it amongst the stars.--See

Strzelecki’s Physical Description of New South Wales.

(13) See the observations on La Place and La Marck in the Introduction

to Kirby’s “Bridgewater Treatise.”

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