On the retreat of the French army after its defeat at Vittoria, Marshal
Jourdan threw a garrison into St. Sebastian of between three and four
thousand men, and the place was immediately afterwards invested by
the Spaniards. In the beginning of July, the fifth division of the
army, with two Portuguese brigades, making a force of from 9,000 to
10,000 men, arrived before it to form the siege, which was intrusted to
Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Graham.
A proportion of artillery, consisting of twenty-four pounders,
with 1,500 rounds of ammunition per gun, six eight-inch howitzers,
with 1,000, and four ten-inch mortars, with 500 rounds, and four
sixty-eight-pounders, with a proportion of shells, were in ships at
Los Passages; and with the army there were six eighteen-pounders: this
quantity of artillery was deemed adequate to the attack of the place.
The town of St. Sebastian is built on a peninsula running nearly
east and west; the northern side being washed by the river Urumea,
the southern by the sea. The front defences, which cross the
isthmus towards the land, are a double line of works, with the usual
counterscarp, covered way, and glacis; but the works running lengthwise
of the peninsula are only a single line, and, trusting to the water
in their front to render them inaccessible, they are built without
any cover; and the northern line is quite exposed, from the top to
the bottom, to a range of hills on the right bank of the river, at
a distance of six or seven hundred yards from it. These walls being
uncovered, appears an unaccountable oversight, as the Urumea, for some
hours before and after low water, is fordable, and the tide recedes so
much, that for the same period there is a considerable dry space along
the left bank of the river, by which troops can march to the foot of
the wall.
Marshal Berwick, when he attacked St. Sebastian in 1719, aware of this
circumstance, threw up batteries on those hills to break the town
wall, and, whilst that was being effected, he pushed on approaches
along the isthmus, and established himself on the covered way of the
land front: as is but too frequently the case, as soon as the breach
was practicable, the governor capitulated for the town, and the duke
obliged him and the garrison to retire into the castle. It was now
proposed to follow the same mode of attack, and as a preliminary,
the garrison were to be driven from a post they occupied about seven
or eight hundred yards in advance of the town, formed by the convent
of St. Bartolomeo and a redoubt then in progress; and from a small
circular work, which they made with casks on the causeway, four
eighteen-pounders and two howitzers were put in battery for that
purpose.
The operations against the town were commenced by the erection
of batteries on the hills to the north of the Urumea, for twenty
twenty-four-pounders, four eight-inch howitzers, four ten-inch mortars,
and four sixty-eight-pounder carronades; the guns to breach the
sea-wall between the two towers, the carronades to be used with shells
only, and the mortars to be directed against the land front and castle.
On the 14th of July, the first two batteries opened on the convent of
St. Bartolomeo.
15th of July.--A false attack was made on the convent of St.
Bartolomeo, to ascertain if the enemy intended obstinately to defend
it, which the troops carrying farther than was ordered, they were
obliged to retire with some loss.
17th of July.--The end of the convent having been entirely beaten down,
the ninth regiment and a Portuguese brigade assaulted and carried it
with little difficulty.
Two more batteries for the eighteen-pounders and the two howitzers were
thrown up in the night, in a situation to enfilade and take in reverse
the defences of the town.
On the night of the 18th of July the suburbs of St. Martin, which the
enemy had burned, were occupied: they, however, continued to hold the
circular redoubt.
Night between the 19th and 20th of July.--Approaches were struck out to
the right and left of St. Martin.
On the 20th of July all the batteries opened.
In the night between the 20th and 21st of July, early in the evening,
the enemy abandoned the circular redoubt: a working party of seven
hundred men had been prepared to open a parallel across the isthmus,
but the night proving extremely dark, tempestuous, and rainy, the men
dispersed among the ruined buildings of St. Martin, and not more than
two hundred could be collected together; therefore only about one-third
of the parallel and the right approach to it were opened.
On the 21st of July, Sir Thomas Graham sent a flag of truce with a
summons to the governor, but he would not receive it.
In the night between the 21st and 22nd of July, the left communication
and the remainder of the parallel across the isthmus were opened; the
parallel near its left crossed a drain level with the ground, four feet
high and three feet wide, through which ran a pipe to convey water into
the town. Lieutenant Reid ventured to explore it, and at the end of 230
yards, he found it closed by a door in the counterscarp, opposite to
the face of the right demi-bastion of the hornwork; as the ditch was
narrow, it was thought that by forming a mine at this extremity of the
drain, the explosion would throw earth sufficient against the escarpe,
only twenty-four feet high, to form a road over it; eight feet at the
end of the aqueduct was therefore stopped with filled sand-bags, and
thirty barrels of powder, of ninety pounds each, were lodged against
it, and a _saucisson_ led to the mouth of the drain.
On the 23rd of July the breach between the two towers, about one
hundred feet in length, being considered practicable, the fire of all
the guns was concentrated on a part of the wall to its left to effect a
second breach, and by evening, that also was considered practicable on
a front of thirty feet. At the same time, the four ten-inch mortars and
the sixty-eight-pounder carronades were turned on the defences and on
the houses in rear of the breach, to prevent the enemy working to form
an obstacle to them.
The breaches were to have been stormed at daylight on the 24th, at
which time the tide was out, and the troops were formed in readiness;
but the houses at the back of the breach being on fire, it was supposed
they would prevent the advance of the troops when they had gained the
summit, and in consequence the order was countermanded.
The next night a trench was opened in advance of the parallel, to
contain a firing party on the hornwork, during the assault.
The assault was ordered to take place at daylight on the 25th; the
storming party, about 2,000 men, were to assemble in the trenches, and
the explosion of the mine was to be the signal to advance.
The distance of the uncovered approach, from the trenches to the
breach, was about three hundred yards, in face of an extensive front
of works, over very difficult ground, consisting of rocks covered with
sea-weed, and intermediate pools of water; the fire of the place was
yet entire, and the breach was flanked by two towers, which, though
considerably injured, were still occupied.
At five A.M. the mine was sprung, and destroyed a considerable length
of the counterscarp and glacis, and created so much astonishment in
the enemy posted on the works near to it, that they abandoned them for
the moment, and the advance of the storming party reached the breach
before any great fire was brought to bear on them: on their attempting
to ascend the breach, the enemy opened so heavy a fire, and threw down
such a number of shells, &c., from the towers on the flanks, and from
the summit of the breaches, that the men began to waver, and in a short
time the assaulting party had returned into the trenches, with the
loss of nearly one hundred killed and four hundred wounded.
The advanced guard, with Lieutenant Jones, who led them, were made
prisoners on the breach; of the other engineers, Captain Lewis was
severely wounded, and Lieutenant Machell was killed. Lieutenant-Colonel
Sir R. Fletcher was wounded at the same time in the trenches.
This assault does not appear to have failed from want of exertion,
but from the fire of the place being left entire, and from the great
distance at which the covered approaches were from the breach; the
troops were stated in the _Gazette_ to have done their duty, but that
it was beyond the power of gallantry to overcome the difficulties
opposed to them.
On this failure being reported to Lord Wellington, he came over from
Lesaca, and decided upon renewing the same mode of attack, but on a
much more extended scale, as soon as sufficient guns and ammunition
should arrive from England; the augmentation to the attack was to
extend the breach on the left to the salient angle of the demi-bastion
of the main front, and from batteries to be established on the left of
the attack, to continue it round the whole of its face, and to the end
of the high curtain above it.
On the 27th of July, at seven A.M., the enemy made a sortie, to feel
the guard of the trenches; they surprised it, and entering the parallel
at the left, swept it to the right, carrying into the place two hundred
prisoners. In consequence of this loss, the guard was concentrated
in a small portion of the left of the parallel, and the right of the
trenches was only occasionally patrolled.
On the 28th of July, Marshal Soult attacked Lord Wellington, in the
hope of relieving Pampeluna, and the result of the action not being
known to Sir Thomas Graham, he, on the 29th, embarked all the artillery
and stores at Los Passages, and sent the transports to sea; the siege
was therefore converted into a blockade, the guard continuing to hold
the trenches.
August 3rd, the enemy surprised a patrol in the parallel, and made it
prisoners.
On the 6th the guns and stores were re-landed at Los Passages, and on
the 18th the additional artillery and ammunition arrived from England.
On the 24th the entire of the trenches was again occupied, and the
siege recommenced.
On the left, two additional batteries for thirteen guns, to breach
the face of the left demi-bastion and the curtain above it, at seven
hundred yards’ distance, were commenced, and on the right, cover
was begun for seven additional howitzers, four sixty-eight-pounder
carronades, twenty-one twenty-four-pounders, and sixteen mortars, being
forty-eight pieces of ordnance, in addition to the thirty-two put in
battery for the previous operation.
At midnight the enemy made a sortie, entered the advanced part of the
trenches, and carried confusion into the parallel; in attempting,
however, to sweep along its right, they were checked by a part of the
guard of the trenches, and obliged to retire, carrying off with them
about twelve prisoners.
At eight A.M. of the 26th of August, the batteries opened. On
the isthmus, the thirteen guns were directed to breach the left
demi-bastion of the main front, and the end of the curtain in
continuation of the old breach, and the face of the left demi-bastion
of the hornwork, which were all seen in a line, one above the other.
The fire of the batteries on the right was directed to breach the two
towers, one on each flank of the old breach, and to continue that
breach to the salient angle of the demi-bastion, and to breach the end
of the curtain above it.
Two shafts were sunk to form galleries, to prevent the enemy mining
under the advanced part of the trenches. In the night between the 26th
and the 27th, the two last-erected batteries being at a long distance
to breach, and not seeing the foot of the escarpes, cover was made for
four of the guns in a preferable situation.
A party of two hundred men was landed this night on the high rocky
island of Sta Clara, and made prisoners of the enemy’s guard on it,
consisting of an officer and twenty-four men.
In the night between the 27th and 28th of August, the enemy made a
sortie; but, profiting by past experience, such precautions had been
taken of posting sentinels, &c., and the men were so prepared to stand
to their arms, that they were immediately repulsed, without effecting
the slightest mischief.
On the 29th of August a battery opened on the face of the demi-bastion
of the main front; the eighteen-pounders and the howitzers were turned
on the enemy’s batteries, and several mortars and the carronades at the
right attack were directed to the same object, and in the course of the
day the enemy’s fire was nearly subdued. It was afterwards ascertained
that they lost many men, particularly by the spherical case-shot, which
they endeavoured to imitate, by firing common shells filled with small
balls, and bursting them over the heads of the troops, but without any
effect.
The breaches appearing good and practicable on the 30th, it was deemed
time to prepare the necessary debouches for the troops: at the advanced
sap on the right, to break through the sea-wall, which was of masonry,
four feet thick and ten feet above the level of high water, three
shafts were commenced, the first close at the back of the wall, the
second twenty-five feet from the wall, and the third forty feet from
the second: they were sunk eight feet below the surface of the ground,
and a small return made to contain the powder; they were then each
loaded with five hundred and forty pounds of powder.
At two A.M. the next morning, the three mines were sprung, and blew
the wall completely down. The diameters of the entonnoirs were about
thirty feet; they were immediately connected, and by ten A.M. formed a
good passage out for troops, and accomplished the original object of
securing all the works in their rear from the effects of any galleries
the enemy might have run out to form mines in that direction. At the
time of low water, about eleven A.M., the columns for the assault moved
out of the trenches by the openings in front of the battery, and in a
few minutes after the advance of the forlorn hope, the enemy exploded
two mines, which blew down part of the sea-line wall; but as the troops
were not in very close order, nor very near the wall, their loss was
not great.
From the Mirador and Battery del Principe, on the castle, a fire of
grape and shells was opened on the column, and continued during the
time they were disputing the breach. The main curtain, even to the
end breached, was strongly occupied by grenadiers, and the left branch
of the hornwork was well manned, and from thence a heavy fire was
maintained on the breach, a great part of which was exposed to it; but
the tower of Amozquita, on the left of the breach, fortunately for the
besieged, was not manned.
Up the end of the curtain, the breach was accessible quite to the
_terreplein_; but the enemy’s situation there was commanding, and the
ascent was much exposed to the fire of the hornwork.
At the back of the whole of the rest of the breach was a perpendicular
fall, from fifteen to twenty-five feet in depth, under which were the
ruins of the houses which joined on to the back of the breach; and here
and there was left an end wall of the houses, by which alone it was
possible to descend. A line of retrenchment carried along the nearest
standing parallel walls, was strongly occupied by the enemy, and which
entirely swept the confined summit of the breach.
The storming parties advanced to the breach, and there remained on the
side of it without being able to crown the top, from the heavy fire
from the intrenched ruins within. Many desperate efforts were made to
gain it, without effect, particularly up to the curtain; but the enemy
maintained that post firmly. Fresh troops were sent on successively,
as fast as they could be filed out of the trenches, with laudable
perseverance; and the Portuguese, in two detachments, forded the river
Urumea, near its mouth, in a very handsome style, under a heavy fire of
grape and musketry.
The breach was now covered with troops remaining in the same
unfavourable situation, and unable to gain the summit. Upwards of two
hours of continued exertion had elapsed, when, by a happy chance, a
quantity of combustibles exploded within the breach, and the French
began to waver; the assailants made fresh efforts; the ravelin and left
branch of the hornwork were abandoned by the enemy; the retrenchment
within the breach was soon after deserted by them; and the men by
degrees got over the ruins and gained the curtain.
The troops, being now assembled in great numbers on the breach,
pushed into the town; the garrison, dispirited at its great loss,
and intimidated at the perseverance shown in sending fresh men, was
quickly driven from all its entrenchments, except the convent of St.
Teresa, into the castle.
From the superior height of the curtain, the artillery in the batteries
on the right of the Urumea were able to keep up a fire on that part
during the assault, without injury to the troops at the foot of the
breach, and being extremely well served, it occasioned a severe loss
to the enemy, and probably caused the explosion which led to the final
success of the assault.
The assailants had upwards of five hundred killed and fifteen hundred
wounded; of the garrison, besides the actual killed and wounded during
the assault, seven hundred were made prisoners in the town. Of the
engineers, Lieutenant-colonel Sir R. Fletcher, Captains Rhodes and
Collyer, were killed; and Lieutenant-colonel Burgoyne, and Lieutenants
Barry and Marshall, were wounded.
As soon as the town was carried, a communication was made from the
left of the parallel to the salient angle of the ditch of the ravelin,
through the counterscarp, which was blown in, and so into the town by
the great gate; and preparations were made to reduce the castle.
The plan for the attack was to erect batteries on the works of the
town, and breach some of the main points of the castle defences, as the
battery de la Reyna, the Mirador, and the keep, as well as the thin
loop-holed walls connecting them.
On the 2nd of September, a new battery for seventeen guns was
commenced, occupying the whole terreplein of the hornwork, and another
for three guns on the left of the cask redoubt.
A discussion for surrender was entered into with General Rey, but he
broke it off.
By the 4th of September, the town, which caught fire soon after the
assault, from the quantity of ammunition and combustibles of all sorts
scattered about, was nearly consumed, and the fire became a great
impediment to carrying the approaches forward.
Up to the 7th, the enemy had fired but very little since the assault;
and by this evening, the roofs of the unburnt houses and steeples had
been prepared for musketry, to open at the time of the assault on the
castle.
On the 8th, at ten A.M., all the batteries opened on the castle;
viz.,--from the left of the attack:--No. 7, with three twenty-four
pounders, against the Mirador; No. 8, with three eighteen-pounders,
against the lower defences; No. 9, with seventeen twenty-four pounders,
against the Mirador and battery de la Reyna; island, with two
twenty-four pounders and one eight-inch howitzer, to sweep the back
of the castle. From the right of the attack, thirty-three pieces of
ordnance against the castle generally. The fire was extremely powerful
and well-directed, ploughing up every part of the confined space of the
castle. The enemy kept concealed chiefly in little narrow trenches,
which they had made along the front of the heights, but they evidently
lost many men. About twelve, a white flag was hoisted, and the garrison
surrendered prisoners of war. Their numbers had been reduced to 80
officers and 1,756 men, of whom, 23 officers and 512 men were in the
hospital.
The loss of the besiegers during the attack was,--53 officers and 898
men killed; 150 officers and 2,340 men wounded; 7 officers and 332 men
missing.
There were used at this siege 2,726 gabions, 1,476 eighteen-feet
fascines, and 20,000 sand-bags.