This is a small fortress, but an important siege, filled with incident
and instruction.
On the morning of the 18th of September, the army was in front of
Burgos, and may be said to have commenced a siege, in which the
historians of the different nations, without any just imputation upon
their truth, may each claim for their country the palm of active
courage and patient firmness. The town was as bravely defended as it
was bravely assailed, and the ardent and persevering enterprise of the
attack was met by corresponding vigour and vigilance in the defence.
Burgos is the capital of Old Castile, and was the cradle of the
Castilian kings and monarchy. It is memorable for the noble stand
which it repeatedly made against the Saracens. After the retreat of
Massena, it was considered a critical and dangerous point, and its
fortifications were repaired. The ruins of the castle were very strong,
being stone, and of deep foundation, situated, besides, on the brow
of a hill, commanding the river Arlanzon, on which the town stands,
and the roads on both sides of it. These ruins were repaired, and
strengthened by additional earthworks. Beyond the hill on which the
castle is situated is another eminence, called St. Michael’s Hill,
on which a hornwork was erected. Adjoining the castle was a church,
which was converted into a fort. The above works were included within
three distinct lines of circumvallation, which were so carried and
connected as to form an oblong square, and each to defend and support
without endangering (in the event of being itself lost) the others. The
garrison consisted of more than two thousand men.
As Burgos is on the north side of the Arlanzon, whilst the allied army
was on the south, and as the castle commanded both the river and the
roads, Wellington had some difficulty in preparing the passage, and the
remainder of the day of the 18th was employed in making the necessary
arrangements. On the following day this operation was effected. The
outworks of the hill of St. Michael were immediately seized, and the
troops posted close to the hornwork. At night the hornwork was itself
attacked and carried, and thus the whole of St. Michael’s Hill was
obtained. This hill was, however, a mere outwork to the main fortress,
inasmuch as the possession of it only brought the allies in front of
the outermost of the three lines, behind which were the castle and body
of the work.
The possession of this eminence afforded the allies a better knowledge
of the defences of the fort, with a commanding view of some of the
works. The besieged evinced neither tardiness nor want of skill;
they had demolished, in an incredibly short time, the houses which
interfered with their line of defence. They had raised ramparts of
earth and biscuit-barrels, and constructed fleches and redans to cover
the batteries and sally-gates. These works, considering the materials
and the pressure of the time, were so solid and accurate as to command
the general praise of the British engineers, whilst the Portuguese
regarded them with astonishment: a proof of the value of the knowledge
of field-work, as it then existed in the French army, when almost every
soldier could assist the artillery, and take his share in the work of
attack and defence in sieges. It is observed by a writer of the time,
“We must confess that the patience of the English privates was more
exemplary than their dexterity.”
From the 19th to the 22nd of September, the allies were employed in
raising their own works upon St. Michael’s Hill, in front of the
exterior line of the enemy, and more particularly in fortifying and
completing the hornwork, of which they had possessed themselves.
Everything being ready on the evening of the 22nd, it was resolved to
give the first regular assault. Accordingly, at the hour of eleven at
night, the storming body was moved forward in two columns: the one,
consisting of Portuguese, to the south-west flank of the castle; and
the other of British, under Major Laurie, to the front. The plan of the
attack was, that the Portuguese should engage and occupy the eminence
on the above-mentioned flank, while Major Laurie’s party should
escalade the parapet in front.
The Portuguese, who were to begin the attack, commenced with much
spirit. They were opposed to a deep ditch and a lofty parapet on
the opposite side, and therefore had to descend into the one and
fight their way up the other. It may be necessary to state to the
uninitiated, that the shelving side of the ditch which adjoins the
parapet is technically termed the scarp, and the opposite side of the
ditch (the side nearest an advancing enemy) the counterscarp. They were
stopped at the very edge of the descent into this ditch; their attack,
therefore, as a diversion, became nugatory, and failed in the first
instance.
In the meanwhile, the party in front, under Major Laurie, having seen
the Portuguese commence, advanced with the most determined bravery to
the escalade, and having the same works in opposition to them as the
Portuguese, in an instant reached the head of the counterscarp, and in
another instant descended it, cleared the palisades at the bottom, and
planted their ladders to the parapet. The first assailants penetrated
to the top of the parapet, and a fierce contest took place both there
and in the bottom of the ditch. The assault was repelled with as much
spirit as it was made and the ditch and scarp were covered with dead
of both parties. Amongst these was the gallant leader himself, Major
Laurie.
This gallantry, however, was rendered useless by the total failure of
the Portuguese division. After much severe fighting, therefore, and a
great consequent loss, the party was withdrawn,--an affair in itself
of great peril and difficulty, as their ardour had carried them nearly
into the lines. It was a matter of congratulation that the whole party
had escaped being made prisoners. The total British and Portuguese loss
on this occasion was not short of four hundred killed and wounded.
It would be of little professional instruction, and of less general
interest, to follow the details of an irregular, and therefore
inartificial siege, from day to day; we shall therefore confine
ourselves to the attacks. Of those, during the whole siege, there were
five; two we have already described.
After the failure of the storm on the 22nd, a mine was directed under
the same exterior line. It was exploded in the midnight of the 29th,
and a breach, erroneously deemed practicable, effected in the parapet.
A storming party was immediately advanced, and at the same moment, for
the purpose of diversion, a strong column was directed in front of the
town. The storming party unluckily missed its way, and thereby the
affair failed.
Between the following day and the 4th of October, another mine was
conducted near to the same point, and the former breach was improved by
fire from the batteries. This mine was exploded in the afternoon of the
4th, and the result was a second practicable breach. These two breaches
were immediately stormed by the second battalion of the twenty-fourth,
divided into two parties, under Captain Hedderwick and Lieutenants
Holmes and Fraser. This assault was completely successful, and the
allies were thus established within the exterior line of the castle.
The loss was severe, but not beyond the value of the service.
The enemy, however, did not leave the allies in tranquil possession of
this position: they made two vigorous sallies to interrupt the works
against the second line, and continued their operations for the same
purpose with very little intermission. A breach was effected, and a
mine was in progress; but from want of siege materials, particularly
of a battering-train, the advances were slow, and it became obvious
that success was doubtful. There were only three eighteen-pounders, and
no materials or instruments but what were made upon the spot. We must
in candour admit that no blame could be justly attached to any one,
as these privations were necessary circumstances of the enterprise.
The siege of Burgos was an expeditionary operation, and at no point,
either of the march of the army towards it or during the time occupied
in the siege, could the marquis of Wellington have taken a train with
him, or have sent for it and waited for its arrival. There were in fact
two trains on the Spanish frontier,--the one at Ciudad Rodrigo, and
another at Badajos; but the nature of the operations, the distance,
and the roads, rendered them totally immoveable. A question has here
been put--why, then, did the marquis undertake this siege; and did
not the result disappoint his calculations? To this there are several
answers. First. Upon the forward march and assembling of the enemy on
the Douro, it became necessary for him to repel them; and his march
and pursuit for this purpose brought him in front of Burgos. Second.
There was nothing in the external character of the castle and works
of Burgos to justify the expectation of a long defence: the body of
the castle, as reported by the engineers, was a repaired ruin, and
the outworks were fieldworks of earth. If the apparatus of attack
was incomplete, so likewise was that of defence. In a word, both the
attack and defence were of the same expeditionary character and means.
Third. The language of the private correspondence of the army was
substantially as follows, and contains a full answer to this and all
similar objections:--That the value of the place and the army being
there, rendered it indispensable to make an effort to acquire it; that
the marquis had hopes of effecting this acquisition, but certainly no
assured expectation; that the event might therefore disappoint his
wishes, but not deceive him; that the very character of the defence,
gallant as it was, was such as to encourage the continuance of the
attack; such advantage being so _nearly_ gained and so narrowly eluded,
as if gained, would have been necessarily followed by the capture of
the place. The garrison, moreover, were without water, and suffered
great severities by having to bivouac in narrow quarters.[20]
On the morning of the 18th of October, a breach having been effected
and a mine having been prepared under the church of St. Roman, it was
resolved that the mine should be exploded the same evening, and that
upon such explosion, the breach should be stormed and the line (the
second line) escaladed. Accordingly, at the appointed time in the
evening, the attacking party was divided into three columns: the one
under Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, composed of Spanish and Portuguese,
were to attack the church; the second party, composed of a detachment
of the German legion, under Major Wurmb, were to storm the breach;
whilst the third party, composed of the guards, were to escalade the
line. At this moment the mine blew up, and, being the appointed signal,
the parties at once rushed forward to their assigned points.
The explosion of the mine carried away the whole of the wall which
defended that point, and Lieutenant-Colonel Browne succeeded in lodging
his party on the ruins and outworks. The enemy retreated to a second
parapet behind the church, over the heads of the advancing assailants.
This occasioned much loss and confusion; and a flank fire of the enemy
coming in aid, compelled the lieutenant-colonel to suffer the retreat
of his men, and to content himself with saving them from disorder.
In the mean time, Major Wurmb had directed his party against the
breach. The distinguished gallantry of this assault merited a more
successful result. The breach was carried in an instant, and a
considerable number of the party in the same moment got into the body
of the place. But here began the conflict. The enemy opened upon them
such a destructive fire, both from the third line and the body of the
castle, and brought down upon them such superior numbers, that, after
the loss of their gallant leader and a great proportion of their force,
they were compelled to retire, and almost in the moment of victory to
evacuate what they had so bravely gained.
The third party, the guards, experienced a similar success in the
commencement, and a similar disappointment in the result. They
succeeded in escalading the line, but were compelled to retire before
the superiority of numbers and the fire of the enemy. In his official
despatch, dated Cabeçon, 26th of October, 1812, the marquis of
Wellington thus writes:--
“It is impossible to represent in adequate terms my sense of the
conduct of the guards and German legion upon this occasion; and I am
quite satisfied, that if it had been possible to maintain the posts
which they had gained with so much gallantry, these troops would have
maintained them. Some of the men stormed even the third line, and even
one of them was killed in one of the embrasures of the parapet.”
The army of Portugal and the army of the North, for they were so near
each other as to constitute one army, had not suffered this siege to
go on without some attempts to interrupt it; they had now, however,
attained a strength and importance that demand our attention.
These two armies were stationed on the high road from Burgos to Miranda
on the Ebro, a continuance of the great French road from Madrid,
through Burgos to Bayonne. From Burgos to Miranda on the Ebro is forty
English miles. Above the village of Monasterio, on that side of it
furthest from Burgos, was a range of hills, which was the position of
the British outposts. The army of Portugal was in the neighbourhood of
Bribiesca; and the army of the North, under General Cafferilli, had its
head-quarters at Pancorvo.
The principal attempts of these armies were on the 13th and 18th of
October. On the former of these days, General Macune, who was in
command of the French at Bribiesca, moved forward a considerable body
of infantry and cavalry against the posts of the allies at Monasterio,
but was repulsed as well by the posts themselves as by a detachment of
the German legion.
On the 18th, the army of Portugal, having been previously strongly
reinforced by the arrival of levies from France, re-advanced against
the said posts, and possessed themselves of the hills and town. It
now, therefore, became necessary to lead the army against them, and
accordingly, with the exception of that portion of it required for the
siege, the marquis assembled the troops, and placed the allied army on
some heights between Burgos and Quentana. This movement was made on
the 19th of October. The enemy assembled their army at Monasterio on
the same day. On the following evening, the 20th, they moved a force
of nearly ten thousand men to drive in the outposts at Quentana, and
which, according to order, withdrew as they approached. The marquis had
now recourse to a flank movement; the result gave him an advantage;
upon seeing which, the enemy again fell back upon Monasterio.
And this manœuvre, indeed, was the last operation of the siege of
Burgos, for on the following day, the 21st, a letter from Sir R. Hill
reported such a state of affairs upon the Tagus, that the marquis found
it to be an act of necessity immediately to raise the siege, and to
fall back upon the Douro. Accordingly, the siege was raised the same
night, and the army was in march on the following morning.