The allied army under Lord Wellington remained in cantonments till the
7th of January, waiting for the arrival of the artillery; the light
divisions being advanced in front, observing the enemy’s movements.
The battering-train having reached Almeida on the 8th, Lord Wellington
commenced the investment of Ciudad Rodrigo. Before this place could
be even approached, it was necessary to take or destroy a palisadoed
redoubt, which had been erected on the hill of St. Francisco, as also
three fortified convents connected with that work. This operation was
given to Major-General Crawford, who, as soon as it was dark, sent
Colonel Colborne, of the 52nd, with a detachment of the light division,
to take the fort. The attack was ably conducted by Colonel Colborne; it
was stormed in gallant style, two captains and forty-seven men being
made prisoners. Captain Mein, of the 52nd, who led the storming party,
was severely wounded, but the British loss was trifling. In consequence
of this success, the army broke ground the same night, within six
hundred yards of the city, notwithstanding that the enemy held the
fortified convents.
On the 14th of January, Lord Wellington opened his fire from twenty-two
pieces of ordnance, which formed three batteries in the first parallel.
On the night of that day, likewise, the approach was opened with the
second parallel, and the besiegers were established in it, within a
hundred and fifty yards of the walls of the place. This operation was
rendered secure on the right, by General Sir Thomas Graham having
surprised the enemy’s detachment in the convent of Santa Cruz, and
General Colville equally secured it on the left by getting possession
of the convent of St. Francisco.
January 15th, 16th, and 17th were spent in completing the second
parallel and the approaches to it, and in erecting a battery in the
neighbourhood of the convent of St. Francisco, which opened on the
18th. By the 19th the breaches in the _fausse-braie_ wall, and in the
body of the place, effected by the batteries in the first parallel,
were considered practicable, as was also a breach in the suburbs of St.
Francisco, which had been made by the batteries opened on the 15th.
Marmont was now, to all appearance, advancing with a powerful force
from Salamanca, for the purpose of raising the siege; Lord Wellington
therefore saw that no time was to be lost, and accordingly determined
to make an instant attempt on the city by storm.
The third and light divisions were fixed upon for this important
service, as they happened to be the troops on duty that day, the army
taking the duties of the trenches by divisions during the siege.
They were formed into five columns. The two right, conducted by
Lieutenant-Colonel C. Toole, of the 2nd Portuguese Caçadores, and Major
Ridge, of the 5th regiment, were destined to protect the advance of the
third column, which was composed of General M’Kinnon’s brigade, to the
top of the breach in the _fausse-braie_ wall. The fourth column was
composed of the 43rd and 52nd, and part of the 95th regiments, and was
directed by General Crawford. This was destined to attack the breach
on the left, in the suburbs of St. Francisco, and to cover the left of
the attack at the principal breach by the troops of the third division,
under General Picton. General Pack’s Portuguese brigade, which formed
the fifth column, was directed to make a false attack upon the south
face of the fort. Besides these columns, the 94th regiment, under the
command of Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, was ordered to descend into
the ditch on the right of General M’Kinnon’s column, for the purpose
of protecting it against the obstacles which it was supposed the enemy
would construct to oppose its progress to the principal breach in the
_fausse-braie_ wall.
The assault was made according to these arrangements. Major Ridge with
his column escaladed the _fausse-braie_ wall, and stormed the principal
breach in the main body of the place, together with the 94th regiment,
which had moved along the ditch, and had stormed the breach of the
_fausse-braie_ wall in the front of General M’Kinnon’s brigade, so
that it not only covered the advance of that brigade, but even preceded
it in the attack. Generals Crawford and Vandeleur, with the troops on
the left, were equally forward in their movements, and in less than
half an hour from the commencement of the attack, the city was in
possession of the allies. General Pack converted his false attack into
a real one. The Portuguese troops scaled the walls in every direction;
and the advanced-guard, under Major Lynch, followed the enemy’s troops
from the advanced works into the _fausse-braie_, where they made
prisoners of all that opposed them.
Major-General M’Kinnon was blown up by the explosion of one of the
enemy’s mines near the breach. General Crawford received a mortal wound
while leading on his division; and Major Napier, one of the bravest
men in the army, lost an arm. M’Kinnon had been a schoolfellow of
Buonaparte.
The value of this capture of Ciudad Rodrigo was very great. 1st. It
erected a wall, and a very strong one, against any new invasion of
the Portuguese frontier. 2nd. It was so much gained towards clearing
the country between the Douro and the Tagus. 3rd. It intercepted the
communication of the enemy between the north and south of Spain, and
thereby rendered the operations of their armies in the north, and their
army in the south, two distinct lines, having the allied army between
them. 4th. It paved the way for the siege of Badajos. 5th. It greatly
raised the credit and popularity of the allied cause.
This siege only lasted twelve days. The allies lost twelve hundred men
and ninety officers; among the latter of whom was one who appears to
have been a general favourite, for it was said, “Three generals and
seventy other officers had fallen, yet the soldiers fresh from the
strife only talked of Hardyman:” he was a captain of the 45th.
It is lamentable to hear the historian of the Peninsular war attach
the same blame to the allied troops in this siege as we have mentioned
in that of Badajos. “Disgraceful,” he says, “were the excesses of the
allied troops: the Spanish people were allies and friends, unarmed and
helpless, yet all these claims were disregarded. ‘The soldiers were
not to be controlled.’ That excuse will not suffice. Colonel Macleod,
of the 43rd, a young man of most energetic spirit, placed guards at
the breach, and constrained his regiment to keep its ranks for a long
time after the disorder commenced; but as no previous general measures
had been taken, and no organized efforts made by higher authorities,
the men were finally carried away in the increasing tumult.” This is
a severe but just censure upon “the higher authorities.” We know that
the British common soldier is taken from the lowest ranks of society,
but we cannot agree that cold-blooded cruelty is a distinguishing
characteristic even of these classes; we believe the British people to
be averse to cruel triumph over a fallen enemy, and we should rather
attribute the excesses complained of to the partisan portion of the
army: civil warfare is generally the most inveterate. The Spaniards
were most likely to be cruel towards their compatriots; few people are
more inveterate when their passions are roused.
For this achievement Lord Wellington was created duke of Ciudad Rodrigo
by the Spaniards, earl of Wellington by the English, and marquis of
Torres Vedras by the Portuguese.