A.D. 1811.

The Peninsular sieges in which the English were concerned are

principally useful as lessons to statesmen, and consequently to the

people who support these statesmen. The siege of Badajos failed,

although a Wellington superintended it; but, as Sir William Napier

justly says, “it was not strange that it did fail; for the British

government sent an engineer corps into the field so ill-provided, that

all the officers’ bravery and zeal could not render it efficient.

The very tools used, especially those from the storekeeper-general’s

department, were unfit for work; the captured French cutting

instruments were eagerly sought for in preference; and when the

soldiers’ lives and the honour of England’s arms were at stake, English

cutlery would not bear comparison with French.” This account has been

published many years; all whose business it was to read it and profit

by the lesson have had ample time; and yet, in what respect does it

differ from the same culpable error--we were going to say, but must

substitute criminal jobbery--with regard to the war munitions of the

Crimea?

Though ardently wishing for the capture of Badajos, Wellington knew

he had not that great necessary in all sieges, time, to effect it

regularly. If he laid siege to it in form, the French would be able

to bring assistance that would render his endeavours nugatory; he

could not command more than twenty days; with bad guns, deficient

stores, and no regular corps of sappers and miners; as General Picton

wittily and keenly observed, “Lord Wellington sued Badajos _in formâ

pauperis_.” Reckoning all the deficiencies, regular approaches could

not be ventured upon, and attacks upon the castle and Fort Cristoval

were adopted instead; and these were to take place at the same time.

A battering-train was very quickly got ready, consisting of thirty

twenty-four-pounders, four sixteen-pounders, and twelve eight and

ten-inch howitzers converted into mortars by being placed on trucks;

these, with six iron Portuguese guns, made fifty-two pieces; and of

British and Portuguese gunners there were collected six hundred. But

even these were inefficient; for many of the guns were nearly useless

from age; the gunners were inexperienced, and there was no time to

teach them their craft.

On the 24th of May, Haston’s division, consisting of five thousand men,

invested San Cristoval.

Phillipon, who, under the direction of Soult, governed in the town,

took every precaution necessary; and the townsmen joined their efforts

to those of the garrison to forward the works of defence.

Ground being broken for a false attack upon Pardileras on the 29th,

the next night a parallel of eleven hundred yards was sunk against the

castle, without the workmen being observed by the enemy; the same night

another parallel, of four hundred and fifty yards from San Cristoval,

and seven hundred from the bridge-head, was opened; one breaching and

two counter mines were raised on this line, to prevent sallies by the

bridge from the fort.

The attack against the castle proceeded favourably, but the soil and

the situation rendered that of Cristoval slow and attended with loss:

it was not finished before the night of the 1st of June. It was much

impeded by some well-directed mortars from the garrison, which, strange

to say, were stopped by Phillipon, from the mistaken idea that he was

throwing their fire away.

On the night of the 2nd, however, the battery against San Cristoval

began, and after the guns and men had got into practice, much mischief

was done to the castle. On the 4th, the garrison added the fire of

several guns to their artillery, and some of the besiegers’ were

silenced.

The contest was kept up with tolerable spirit till two breaches were

made in San Cristoval; and one of them appearing practicable, an

assault was ordered, assisted by a diversion in another quarter.

The stormers reached the glacis and descended the ditch without

being discovered; but they found the obstacles insurmountable, and

the forlorn hope was about to retire before committing themselves

to serious injury, when the main body, annoyed by a flank fire from

the town, followed them into the ditch with their ladders. But the

ladders proved too short, and the defence from within was so firm, that

immediate retreat was necessary, and that attended with considerable

loss.

The errors in this attack are subjects of military discussion; but

we have not space to enter into them. The French acted with great

skill and activity in clearing away ruins, presenting every obstacle

that could be thought of, natural as well as scientific, and by the

judicious disposition of well-armed men. Succours being at hand, a

second attack was thought advisable, if any hopes could be entertained

of the capture of the place. This time, things were better managed; but

on the other side, Phillipon made adequate preparations to meet them.

But this attack proved no more fortunate than the former. It was led

with infinite spirit by Major M’Geechy, who fell early. The French

seem to have laughed at the affair, as they jeeringly called to the

men in the ditch to come on. But barrels of powder rolled down among

them, with the addition of shells and musketry, proved worse than

their jeers. All went wrong: the troops quarrelled for the ladders,

though not many of them could be reared; confusion ensued; and the

enemy naturally took advantage of it: those who ascended the ladders

were met with the bayonet; the ladders themselves were overturned; and

a murderous fire was poured upon the unfortunate mass in the ditch.

Soult’s approach rendered further attempts impossible; and the siege

was converted into a blockade.

Sir William Napier’s remarks are very severe upon this siege. In

addition to what we have before quoted, he says: “This siege, in which

four hundred men and officers fell, violated all rules. The working

parties were too weak, the guns and stores too few, the points of

attack ill-chosen; the defences were untouched by counter-fire, and

the breaching-batteries were too distant for the bad guns; howitzers

on trucks were poor substitutes for mortars, and the sap was not

practised. Lastly, the assaults were made before the glacis had been

crowned and a musketry-fire established against the breach.”

The Great Sieges of History · 第 330 / 353 题