Although, like the most trivial accident of life, every small siege
which occurred in the memorable Peninsular war had, doubtless, its
bearing upon the general result, we can afford room only for the
most prominent. The siege of every place remains, to all time, an
interesting epoch in its own annals, but the student of history only
pauses at such conflicts of the kind as have been distinguished by
the presence of great captains, have been brought about by remarkable
circumstances or revolutions, or have led to consequences important to
nations or to mankind in general. We have another cause, likewise, for
not dwelling upon the Spanish sieges; they have been laid before the
public so admirably, that to go into their details after Sir William
Napier, would not only be a work of supererogation, but would lead to a
comparison in which we could but suffer.
After glancing over the vast number of sieges that have been the
subjects of our attention, we cannot but consider that of Saragossa
to be one of the most anomalous. A strongly-fortified city, admirably
placed, was filled to overflowing with a population enthusiastic in the
cause, and with thirty thousand cannoniers, and a body of peasants,
sappers, miners, and navigators from the canal-works, contained a
mass of fifty thousand combatants. In addition to this, many, if not
most of the houses were fire-proof; and there were innumerable large
buildings, such as convents and churches, that were all capable of
being fortified, and supplying defences in detail against an enemy who
might penetrate into the interior. They had abundance of provisions,
and all the munitions of war,--even its sinews, money,--that could
be required in a long protracted siege. But above all this was the
_cause_; every man might be said to be a volunteer, fighting for all he
held dearest in life. “Doors and windows were built up, house-fronts
loop-holed, internal communication opened, streets trenched and crossed
by earthen ramparts mounted with cannon, and every strong building was
a fortification: there was no weak point, there could be none, in a
city which was all fortress, where the space covered by houses was the
measure of the ramparts.” So, and admirably, says Sir William Napier;
but in one so well read in the history of sieges as he must be, this is
saying a great deal. For our part, we think there is no fortification
in which genius equal to that of the constructor, backed by courage,
vigilance, and enterprise, cannot find a weak point. Look back at the
impregnable Valenciennes, taken by a _coup-de-main_ in a few hours,
from the discovery of an imprudently-constructed door.
But what marks the siege of Saragossa so distinctly from all others,
is the small number of the besieging army. To invest a large city, so
garrisoned and provided, the French had but thirty-five thousand men,
and were only able to complete their investment in a thin indefensible
manner. In addition to the siege, they were compelled to be perpetually
on the watch, as the whole country around was against them, and
Palafox’s brother, Lazan, hovered about with a body of troops, to throw
in when occasion offered.
In reading the details of the siege, we meet with little or no
defection, because defection was punished with the utmost severity;
the garrison having only the “choice of the enemy in front of their
dwellings, and the gibbet behind them.” The public enthusiasm was kept
up by processions, sham miracles, false manifestoes, indeed everything
that could work upon a superstitious, excited people; and yet from the
beginning the progress of the French was steady, and almost unbroken.
They had certainly vicissitudes; in such a conflict how could it be
otherwise? They even became dispirited for a moment, by fatigue and the
prospect of the obstacles before them; but we do not think that Lasnes
had ever a doubt of ultimately obeying Napoleon’s commands, by taking
the city. It certainly was a great triumph of seasoned disciplined
soldiery, conducted by courage and skill in their commanders, over a
much superior force, surrounded by all the defences art and nature
could furnish. As soldiers, we think the taking of Saragossa highly to
the honour of the French.
Napoleon was very desirous of the capture of Saragossa, which is
looked upon as the bulwark of the eastern provinces of Spain; and his
preparations for effecting it were those of a general and a politician.
But Lasnes, to whom he had assigned the command, fell sick; Moncey and
Ney committed strategic errors, and his purpose was at least delayed.
This gave the Spanish leaders time to prepare likewise, and they did
not neglect it. In the sieges of cities, when people are earnest in
their defence, they do not confine themselves to the operations of
art, or even the weapons of war; they think everything a legitimate
instrument that can protect themselves or annoy the enemy: thus we
see in one the citizens hurling their beehives, with their swarms of
stinging insects, upon their invaders; and in another, one of the
greatest, but at the same time the most senseless of the world’s
disturbers, killed by a tile thrown by an old woman. So with the
inhabitants of Saragossa: while paying due attention to their military
works, they took advantage of everything that could be converted to the
one great purpose in hand.
The only unpardonable error was that of Palafox; although zealous in
all ways at the commencement of the contest, when the French had made
serious way into the heart of the city, he seems to have abandoned his
post, and to have passed his time in intemperance and debauchery.
Like men made wise by practice in their cruel trade, the French
generals did not move till they were quite prepared with not only
magazines but hospitals; they knew such a game could not be played
without losses and accidents; and there is no greater encouragement to
the soldier marching into battle than an undoubting conviction that if
wounded he shall be taken care of;--the sight of the hospital is as
cheering to him as that of the provision-store.
On the 20th of December they advanced, and on the 21st attacked Monte
Terrore, deluding the besieged by the show of one column, while another
crossed the canal, under the aqueduct, and passing beneath the city
and the fort, entered the latter in the rear. With a third column they
attacked the grand sluice. The Spaniards were forced to retreat; which
so exasperated the populace and their leaders, that the captain, who
had been thus the first to retreat, was with difficulty saved from the
effects of their indignation.
While this assault was being made, General Gazan made a simultaneous
attempt upon the suburb, in which he put from three to four hundred men
_hors de combat_. He, however, did not do all he might have done, which
cheered the Spaniards.
By the 24th the city was invested, and every French general was at
his post; Lacoste directing the operations, as chief engineer. He
instituted one false and two real attacks; and on the 29th the trenches
were opened. According to custom, the place was summoned, and the
terms previously offered by Napoleon were repeated; it being added
that Madrid had surrendered. To this Palafox haughtily replied, “If
Madrid has surrendered, Madrid has been sold. Saragossa will neither be
sold nor surrender.” This was accepting the challenge, and the French
ordered three attacks to be made.
On the 31st the besieged made a sally, which would have been a complete
failure but for a small advantage gained by a body of their cavalry.
Palafox, perhaps justifiably, magnified this into a victory in his
manifesto: he had not only to lead his compatriots, but to keep up
their enthusiasm: his great opponent, Buonaparte, was a past master in
this part of his craft.
On the 1st of January the besieged made a serious assault upon Gazan,
whom they seemed to consider weak, and, to mask their design, sent
out skirmishing parties: the great affair was a failure, while the
skirmishers gathered a few laurels.
A change took place in the French generals; Moncey went to Madrid, and
Junot succeeded him. The very thin investment was completed by a line
of circumvallation, to supply the want of numbers.
The Spaniards had looked for the destruction of their enemies to the
diseases usually produced by the wet period; but it this year proved
a very dry season, and the French were enabled to proceed with their
works in comparative secrecy, by the prevalence of dense morning
fogs. On the 10th the city was bombarded with so much effect that the
Spaniards withdrew their guns from the convent of San Joseph. The
latter attempted a sally at midnight, but, though bravely executed,
it proved unsuccessful: they lost one hundred men out of two hundred
engaged.
The batteries having made a practicable breach, the French resolved
upon an attack on the 11th. After much hard fighting, the convent
of San Joseph was stormed, and some of the _élite_, as in the door
at Valenciennes, finding a bridge, entered by the rear, while their
comrades were storming the front. The French lost but few men, and made
a considerable advance.
The operations on the 15th were still in favour of the French; the
Spaniards cut the bridge of Santa Engracia, and sprung a mine, but it
proved harmless. The progress of the French was steady and scientific,
and the inhabitants were confined to the city.
In this aspect of affairs the Spanish leaders published a flaming
account of the emperor being defeated; and, amidst music and shouts,
named the marshals who had fallen in the battle. They likewise asserted
that Palafox’s brother was devastating France: “but,” says Sir William
Napier, “however improbable, this all met with credence; the invention
of the leaders being scarcely able to keep pace with the credulity of
their followers.” The French were not without their difficulties; all
the country was in a state of insurrection against the king they wished
to impose upon the Spanish nation, and they began to be sensible of the
want of provisions. The generals were also said not to accord in their
views; discipline was relaxed, and the soldiers were reported to feel
their zeal diminished. But we can scarcely imagine that there were any
serious obstacles, when we look to the result.
Another strange circumstance is, that while the Spaniards obtained
supplies of troops, the French could not bring up a division without
its being harassed by the insurgents. Lazan, Palafox’s brother, was
very active in his annoyances.
Lasnes, now recovered from his illness, resumed the command, and soon
made it appear that the French had a captain at their head. In an
attempt to silence a battery, Mariano Galendo gained much honour but
no advantage, for he missed his object, lost his men, and was himself
taken prisoner.
The operations continued to be all gradually in favour of the French;
the walls began to fall, and the breaches were many and wide. On the
29th, a formidable body marched from the trenches to the walls; and
though driven back by a heavy fire from the inner intrenchments, they
kept their lodgment and connected it with the trenches.
A division of Poles in the French army now made a most successful
assault, which stimulated the men in the trenches to make a wild effort
to get into the city; but they were stopped by grape and a severe fire
from the houses. The French lost six hundred men; but they never seemed
to move without advance.
Thus the walls of Saragossa were brought to the ground; “but,” as Sir
William Napier eloquently says, “Saragossa remained erect, and as the
broken girdle fell from the heroic city, the besiegers started at the
aspect of her naked strength.” The defences of art had failed and were
gone, but the people and the spirit that animated them were still in
full vitality. As if to denote that science was not the principle to be
now relied on, the chief engineers on both sides were simultaneously
slain.
When we revert to the manner in which the town was internally
fortified, we may suppose the nature of the warfare carried on, when
besieged and besiegers were mingled in the desperate conflicts of house
and street fighting: all the confusion and all the horrors that the
most powerful imagination can conceive, were to be found in this doomed
city; and, as yet, neither side blenched; the Spaniards fought as
desperately for their hearths and their homes, as the French contended
bravely for victory and honour.
The people seemed animated by the very frenzy of despair; and Lasnes,
convinced that his comparatively small army could not expect success
against such numbers, and so excited, resolved to depend upon the slow
but certain process of the mine.
Each day now is nothing but a repetition of fighting for every house,
and sweeping the great thoroughfares with artillery. We endeavour to
follow the contests, and account for the results, but we cannot; all
seem struggling, and that bravely: the French are little more than
half the number of the Spaniards; the latter are in their own place,
of which they know every nook and corner; they are seconded by their
women, and are stimulated by everything that can act upon the generous
part of the nature of man;--and yet, at every nightfall, the French
have made progress.
The French found that by the usual allowance of powder for their mines
they destroyed the buildings, and left no walls to shelter their own
soldiers; they therefore lessened the quantity. Their adversaries
perceiving this, saturated the timbers of their buildings with resin
and pitch, and setting fire to those that could not be maintained,
raised a burning barrier to their progress.
And now came on the horrors of devastation; the city was crumbling
before the French fire and above their mines in all parts; the noises
of artillery, crashing houses, shouts, shrieks, and groans of anguish,
were mingled in awful sublimity. The Cosso, or great public walk, was
the principal object of attack and defence for several days; by immense
mines and constant firing, the French at length succeeded in obtaining
this; and they then continued their underground ramifications in the
most surprising manner. It was at this point of the siege the spirit
of the French began to flag: fifty days’ incessant labour and fighting
had exhausted, for a moment, their boiling courage; they were dying
ingloriously, like rats, in subterraneous trenches. This is not the
scene for the French soldier:--he likes broad day, the eyes of man upon
him, and an obstacle that can be overcome by one brave effort. They
began to reflect upon the disparity of numbers, and to ask each other
who ever heard of thirty-five thousand men besieging fifty thousand?
But Lasnes knew the stimulant that was wanted. A harvest of glory in
promise was sufficient; and whilst excited by the prospect, he led them
on the 18th of February to a grand assault.
During this assault, mines containing three thousand pounds of powder
were sprung, and amidst the crash of falling buildings, fifty guns
thundered upon the suburb and the bridge over the Ebro, and made a
large practicable breach in the convent of St. Lazar. This was taken,
the passage of the bridge was intercepted, and awful havoc was made
among the troops. Gazan forced two thousand men to surrender, and took
possession of the Spanish works.
This being followed by another attack and by the devastating explosion
of sixteen hundred pounds of powder, the besieged began to tremble.
Palafox sent an aide-de-camp to demand, in addition to certain terms
before offered by the French commander, that the garrison should be
allowed to join the Spanish armies, with a fixed number of covered
carriages. As might have been expected, Lasnes rejected these
proposals, and the firing continued; but the hour of surrender was
come. A little more sharp firing and the explosion of another mine or
two, together with the dread of others, completed the consternation.
But to increase the horrors of the situation of the people, pestilence
of a fearful kind arose from the manner in which the women, children,
and aged inhabitants were crowded into cellars lighted by oil. The
closeness of the atmosphere, with bad and unusual diet, produced
diseases that assailed both the strong and the weak; the daily deaths
were from four to five hundred. Sixteen thousand shells were thrown
during the siege, and forty-five thousand pounds of powder had been
exploded in the mines; forty thousand persons had perished!
Palafox was sick, and most of the other leaders were either dead
or disabled. According to French writers, the place surrendered at
discretion; but the Spanish authors assert that Lasnes granted the
following terms, the name of Ferdinand VII. being omitted from the
instrument:--“The garrison to march out with the honours of war, to be
considered prisoners, and sent to France; the officers to retain their
swords, baggage, and horses, the men their knapsacks. Persons of either
class willing to serve under Joseph, to be immediately enrolled in the
ranks; the peasants to be sent to their homes; property and religion to
be guaranteed.”
There was much dissension in the city about these terms; but the Junta
took prompt measures to give up the walls near the castle, and, in the
words of Sir William Napier, “on the 21st of February, from twelve to
fifteen thousand sickly beings, having laid down their arms, which they
could now scarcely handle, this cruel and memorable siege terminated.”
In this siege we have had recourse principally to Sir William Napier;
indeed, to what other source could we look with so much confidence?
We only regret that we did not feel at liberty to copy his account
literally. His is the graphic description of a man who not only
conscientiously relates the history of the events, but proves that
he professionally understands all he speaks of. He is like Xenophon
describing the immortal retreat of the ten thousand. There is only
one thing in which we cannot agree with him. Being a soldier, he
perhaps has a leaning to all who have distinguished themselves in his
profession, and on that account, gives frequent and strong praise to
Buonaparte. Now we cannot join him to anything like the extent of his
admiration for that extraordinary adventurer. When the wings of victory
fanned his standard, he was glorious and triumphant; but in reverses,
he showed himself deficient in what has been the pride of the greatest
generals. Condé’s retreat from Arras was one of the proudest feats of
his military career. As a piece of generalship, Moreau’s famous retreat
is equal to any one of Buonaparte’s victories.