Two of the most illustrious generals, not only of France but of the
world, were opposed to each other before Arras. The great Condé had
allowed party feeling so far to prevail over his sense of duty as
to lead him not only to deprive his country of his services, but to
turn them against it. It is rather a remarkable fact, that one of the
generals of whom France has most to boast, earned his brightest laurels
when in arms against her. When his son was desirous of having the
history of his father painted in the gallery of Chantilly, he found
himself at a loss on account of the above-mentioned circumstance. In
order to avoid being quite silent on these subjects, he ordered the
muse of history to be portrayed holding a book, upon the back of which
was written, _Life of the Prince de Condé_. This muse was tearing
leaves from the book and throwing them on the ground, and on the leaves
appeared,--“Succour of Cambrai,” “Succour of Valenciennes,” “Retreat
from before Arras;” in short, all the great actions of Condé during his
sojourn in the Low Countries,--actions which would have been worthy of
the highest praise, if the hero who performed them had worn another
scarf.
Condé proposed to the Spanish court to besiege Arras, to avenge itself
for the siege of Stenay. Arras contained a garrison of little more
than two thousand men; the army of the archduke Leopold consisted of
thirty-two thousand men, Italians, Lorrains, Flemings, Spaniards,
and discontented Frenchmen. Alarmed at this enterprise, Mazarin had
recourse to Turenne, and an army of fourteen thousand men was sent
under his command to succour Arras. Six hundred determined Frenchmen
broke through the enemy’s lines, and threw themselves into the place
before the Spaniards had completed their intrenchments. The army of
Turenne, too weak to venture to contend with the superior forces of
the enemy in an open country, awaited some time at Peronne for the
necessary provisions. Turenne’s first object was to starve his enemy,
and to occupy a position, the strength of which might render his army
respectable. His camp was at first at Monchi-le-Preux, upon a height
which commanded a valley, watered on one side by the Scarpe, and on
the other by the Cogel. From this point he intercepted the enemy’s
communication with Douai, Bouchain, and Valenciennes; the marquis de
Beauvais, sent to Bapaume, prevented their receiving anything from
Cambrai. Two thousand men, posted towards Lens, intercepted the passage
of Lille, whilst Lilleboane, with fifteen hundred men, was to scour
the country and block up the roads of Aire and Saint-Omer. The Spanish
army, thus inclosed, might have been forced by famine to raise the
siege, if it had been possible to stop up the road of Saint-Pol; but
that could not be accomplished. The Spaniards opened their trenches
on the 14th of July; the besieged defended their ground so completely
foot by foot, that they had only lost a single hornwork at the end of
a month; still more, they had cost the besiegers two thousand men.
Marshal d’Hocquincourt, having entered Stenay, came to reinforce the
viscount before Arras. On his route he took Saint-Pol, and carried
off a detachment of five hundred men from the abbey of Saint-Eloi.
Turenne, who had been to meet him with fifteen squadrons, made on
his return a reconnaissance upon all the enemy’s lines to the north:
they were of two toises in width, and ten feet in depth; in front
was a fosse, nine feet wide and six feet deep. Twelve rows of _trous
de loup_, placed chequerwise, were between the intrenchments and the
_avant-fossé_; little palisades of a foot and a half high were planted
in the intervals of these, to prevent the approach of cavalry. The
Spaniards, commanded by the count de Fuensaldagne, occupied the north
of these long lines, on the road to Lens; the prince de Condé was on
the opposite side with the French. The archduke, with the Germans and
the Flemings, extended to the east, from the road of Cambrai to the
Scarpe; Don Ferdinand de Solis completed the investment from the west
to the south, with Italians and Lorrains. In a second reconnaissance,
the marshal went so close to the quarters of Fuensaldagne, that some
of his officers represented to him that he would expose himself to
an almost certain defeat if the Spaniards availed themselves of the
opportunity offered. “Oh! there is nothing to fear,” said Turenne;
“they will employ more time in consulting and holding council than it
will take me to examine their lines.” He was right: the Spaniards did
not put themselves in motion till he was out of sight. Terrified by
these formidable lines, none of the French generals dared attempt to
succour Arras; Turenne alone maintained that certainly some weak point
would be found if they were attacked by night; he often conversed with
his officers on the conduct to be observed on entering intrenchments,
and upon the means of overcoming all the obstacles that art can oppose
to valour. The court were of the opinion of Turenne, and gave orders
for an attack on the 24th of August.
The principal effort was to be made against the quarter of Don
Ferdinand de Solis, and on the part nearest to that of Fuensaldagne:
these points had been considered as the weakest or the most remote
from the prince de Condé, whose activity and talents they dreaded,
and from the French, whose vivacity and vigilance were likewise
formidable. To divert the attention of the enemy and divide their
forces, false attacks were to be made at the same time: one on the
quarter of the prince de Condé, another upon the most distant part of
the camp of Fuensaldagne, and the third upon the lines of the prince of
Lorraine. At sunset, the armies crossed the Scarpe upon four bridges,
the soldiers being provided with hurdles and fascines. The march was
conducted with good order and in profound silence; its precision
was such, that the troops arrived exactly at the time appointed for
forming a junction with Marshal d’Hocquincourt. Without waiting for
him, marshals Turenne and De la Ferté marched directly to the lines,
from which they were distant half a league: favoured by a dark night,
in which the moon only appeared at intervals, and lighted only by the
fires of the matches of the musketeers, they marched till within a
hundred paces of their works, without the enemy’s having the least
suspicion of the enterprise. Here the report of three cannon gave
the alarm, and a row of cresset-lights appeared all along the lines
of circumvallation. The Italians were still preparing for fight, when
the foot of Turenne’s first line had already passed the _avant-fossé_,
covered the _puits_[16] or wells, and pulled up the palisades. Meeting
with little resistance, the French easily gained the second fosse,
some troops even leaped over it before it was entirely filled up with
the fascines. Fiscia, a captain of the regiment of Turenne, planted
the colour of his company upon the parapet; so much courage and good
fortune were requisite to keep up the spirits of the rest of the
troops. In the darkness they were afraid to advance; but at the cry of
“Vive Turenne!” all were animated with equal ardour. Five battalions
broke in at several points at the same time, and cleared the way for
the cavalry. Marshal de la Ferté had not been so fortunate on the
quarter of the Spaniards; his soldiers, repulsed, only penetrated
the lines by favour of the large gaps made by Turenne’s troops. As
for Marshal d’Hocquincourt, arriving towards the end of the night
in the midst of the enemy’s consternation, he easily made himself a
passage. Forced in almost all directions, the Italians and the Lorrains
abandoned their posts, and, flying into the other quarters, carried
disorder and terror wherever they went.
At daybreak the prince de Condé, crossing the quarter of the archduke,
advised him to retreat. To protect this movement, Condé marched with
the cavalry to meet the French, and check their victorious impetuosity.
He at first gained a not very difficult advantage over those engaged
in pillage, and then beat the Marshal de la Ferté, who had imprudently
descended from a height; but he did not dare to pursue him. The marshal
had been replaced upon that height by a considerable body of troops. At
seeing this, Condé took possession of a neighbouring elevation, to wait
for his infantry. His intention was then to attack the column which
appeared upon the height. Marshal Turenne had there fortified himself.
Some artillery and fresh troops had joined him at this respectable
post. Condé led his troops to the attack, but his soldiers were stopped
by the fire of Turenne’s cannon: in spite of all his efforts, the
prince was obliged to fall back. A sortie of the garrison of Arras made
him hasten his retrograde movement the more; Condé and Turenne, in face
of each other, divined who their opponent was by his manœuvres. The
prudent Turenne did not pursue Condé; the marquis de Bellefonds, not
so wise, attacked his rear-guard at the passage of the Scarpe, and was
repulsed with loss. Still formidable in the midst of a reverse, Condé
left his intrenchments, like a general quitting a camp he is tired
of occupying, rallied his scattered troops, and retired to Cambrai,
always presenting a bold and redoubtable front to his enemies. His fine
retreat, in which he covered the conquered Spaniards, formed a striking
contrast with the shameful flight of the archduke and the count de
Fuensaldagne, who escaped with a few squadrons through some French
baggage-waggons. Turenne lost but few men, but he was wounded; the loss
of the Spaniards amounted to three thousand men, sixty-three cannon,
two thousand horses, two thousand waggons, and all the equipages of the
army. To recompense the eminent services rendered to the Spaniards by
the prince de Condé, the king of Spain wrote to him in the following
words:--“My cousin, I was told that all was lost, but your highness has
saved everything.” The glory of Turenne was at its height; nevertheless
a priest, intoxicated with power, dared for a time to rob him of the
honours of his triumph: Mazarin caused all the success of this day to
be attributed to himself by an infant monarch, whom he led by the hand.
At that time people feigned to believe him, but now posterity avenges
Turenne, and he enjoys the glory due to him.
Buonaparte had no faith in retreats; he said a general’s only business
was to conquer. His error, as a great captain, is proved by his
history; he never knew how to retreat, and the consequence was St.
Helena. In this siege we behold Condé’s retreat very little inferior in
glory to Turenne’s victory.