Louis XIV. having recalled the duke of Vendôme from Italy, to place him
at the head of the troops in Flanders, substituted for him the duke de
la Feuillade, the son of the famous marshal who erected a statue to
his king in the Place des Victoires. Some few attacks had been already
made upon Turin. La Feuillade continued them with an army of forty-six
squadrons and a hundred battalions. He hoped to take this city, and, as
his reward, looked for a marshal’s baton. The minister Chamillard, his
father-in-law, who was very partial to him, spared no means to assure
him the victory. “The imagination,” says Voltaire, “is terrified at the
preparations for this siege. Readers not accustomed to enter into these
matters, will perhaps be glad to find here of what these immense and
useless preparations consisted.
“A hundred and forty pieces of cannon were brought up, and it is to be
observed that each mounted cannon costs about two thousand crowns.[15]
There were a hundred and ten thousand cannon-balls, a hundred and six
thousand cartridges of one fashion, and three hundred thousand of
another, twenty-one thousand bombs, twenty-seven thousand seven hundred
grenades, fifteen thousand sacks of earth, thirty thousand pioneering
instruments, and twelve hundred thousand pounds of powder. Add to these
munitions lead, iron, and tin, cordage, everything required by miners,
such as sulphur, saltpetre, and tools of all kinds. It is certain that
the cost of all these preparations for destruction would suffice for
the foundation and the prosperity of a numerous colony. Every siege of
a great city requires equally enormous expenses, and yet when a ruined
village at home stands in need of repair, it is neglected.
“The duke de la Feuillade, full of ardour and activity, more capable
than most persons of enterprises which only demand courage, but
incapable of such as require skill, thought, and time, pressed on the
siege against all rules. The Marshal de Vauban, the only general,
perhaps, who loved the state better than himself, had proposed to the
duke de la Feuillade to come and direct the siege as an engineer, and
to serve in his army as a volunteer; but the haughty De la Feuillade
took the offers of Vauban for pride concealed under the mask of
modesty. He was weak enough to be piqued because the best engineer in
Europe offered to give him advice. He wrote, in a letter which I have
seen: ‘I hope to take Turin à la Cohorn.’
“This Cohorn was the Vauban of the allies--a good engineer, a good
general, who had more than once taken places fortified by Vauban.
After writing such a letter, Turin ought to have been taken. But,
having attacked it by the citadel, which was the strongest side, and
not having surrounded the whole city, succours and provisions had free
entrance. The duke of Savoy could come out when he pleased; and the
more impetuosity the duke de la Feuillade exhibited in his reiterated
and fruitless attacks, the longer the siege seemed protracted. The duke
of Savoy left the city with some troops of cavalry, for the purpose of
deceiving De la Feuillade. The latter abandoned the siege to run after
the prince, who, being better acquainted with the country, escaped the
pursuit. La Feuillade missed the duke of Savoy, and the siege stood
still during his absence.
“In the mean time, after the departure of the duke de Vendôme, the duke
of Orleans, nephew to the king, came to take the command of the troops
of observation. He could not prevent Prince Eugene from joining the
duke of Savoy near Asti. This junction compelled him to unite with the
duke de la Feuillade, and to enter the camp before Turin. There were
but two parts to take; that of waiting for Prince Eugene in the lines
of circumvallation, or that of going to meet him while he was still in
the neighbourhood of Vegliana. The duke of Orleans called a council of
war, composed of Marsin, who lost the battle of Hochstet, La Feuillade,
Albergotti, St. Frémont, and other lieutenant-generals. ‘Gentlemen,’
said the prince to them, ‘if we remain in our lines, we shall lose
the battle. Our circumvallation is five leagues in extent; we are not
able to line all our intrenchments. You see here the regiment of the
marine, which is not more than two men’s height: there you may see
places entirely unmanned. The Dora, which passes through our camp,
will prevent our troops from rendering each other prompt assistance.
When Frenchmen wait to be attacked, they lose the greatest of their
advantages,--that impetuosity and those first moments of ardour which
so often decide the fate of battles. Take my word, we must march to
meet the enemy.’ The resolution was agreed to, when Marsin drew from
his pocket an order of the king’s, by which it was commanded that, in
the event of action being proposed, his opinion was to be deferred to;
and his opinion was, that they should remain in the lines. The duke of
Orleans saw that he had only been sent to the army as a prince of the
blood, and not as a general; and, forced to follow the counsel of the
marshal, he made all necessary preparations for the battle, which was
fought on the 7th of September.
“The enemy appeared to wish to form several attacks at once. Their
movements threw the whole French camp into a state of uncertainty. The
duke of Orleans desired one thing; Marsin and Feuillade another: they
disputed and argued, but they decided upon nothing. At length they
allowed the enemy to cross the Dora. They advanced with eight columns
of twenty-five men deep: they must instantly be opposed by battalions
equally deep. Albergotti, placed far from the army, upon the mountain
of the Capuchins, had with him twenty thousand men, and had in face
nothing but some militia, who did not dare attack him. He was asked
for twelve thousand men: he replied that he could not spare them, and
gave specious reasons for his refusal. He was listened to, and time
was lost. Prince Eugene attacked the intrenchments, and, at the end
of two hours, forced them. The duke of Orleans, who exposed himself
with all the bravery of the heroes of his blood, having received a
dangerous wound in the arm, had retired to have it dressed. He was
scarcely in the hands of the surgeon, when he was informed that all
was lost, that the enemy were masters of the camp, and that the rout
was general. Immediate flight was necessary. The lines, the trenches,
were abandoned, and the army dispersed. All the baggage, provisions,
munitions, and the military chest fell into the hands of the conqueror.
Marshal de Marsin, wounded in the thigh, was made prisoner. A surgeon
in the service of the duke of Savoy amputated the limb, and he died a
few minutes after the operation. The Chevalier Methuen, the English
ambassador to the duke of Savoy, the most frank, generous, and brave
man his country ever employed in an embassy, had upon all occasions
fought at the side of that prince: he saw the Marshal de Marsin taken,
and was a witness of his last moments. He told me that Marsin said
these very words, ‘At least believe, monsieur, that it was against
my advice that we remained in our lines.’ These words appeared to
contradict formally what had passed in the council of war; and
they were nevertheless true: Marshal de Marsin, on taking leave at
Versailles, had represented to the king that the enemy must be met, in
case they appeared for the purpose of succouring Turin; but Chamillard,
intimidated by preceding defeats, had caused it to be decided that
they ought to wait and not offer battle; and this order, given at
Versailles, was the cause of sixty thousand men being defeated and
dispersed.”
This defeat, which cost nine or ten thousand men killed or made
prisoners, was still more fatal to France by its consequences; for it
brought on the loss of Modena, Mantua, Milan, Piedmont, and in the end,
of the kingdom of Naples.