The greatest captains have often been reproached with avoiding
engagements. Their firmness in despising the railleries of the
multitude and the scoffing opinions of their rivals, have in almost
all cases placed the seal upon their reputations. Francis, duke of
Guise, at the head of a French army and some troops furnished by Pope
Paul IV., undertook the conquest of Naples. This general, too skilful
not to be certain that the expedition could not succeed if it were not
begun with some complete advantage, did all in his power to bring
the Spaniards to a general action: he offered them so many favourable
opportunities, that their officers could not pardon their leader, the
duke of Alva, for neglecting them. The duke called a council of war,
in which he said, in an animated yet haughty tone,--“I have always
prayed God, gentlemen, to inspire my soldiers with a determined
firmness and a fiery courage, so that, without fearing or reasoning,
they would rush headlong to meet death, and expose themselves to any
dangers when commanded to do so. But I ask other qualities of officers:
much prudence and great phlegm, to moderate the impetuosity of the
soldiers--that is the way by which they attain the rank of great
captains. I will not conceal from you that I have been displeased
with your ardour, because I have thought it immoderate and opposed to
reason. To point out to you the occasions on which a great general
should give battle, I will tell you it is when his object is to succour
a strong place reduced to extremity, which may form the security of a
province; when he knows that the enemy must receive succours which will
render them his superior, or even his equal; when, at the beginning of
a war, it is desirable to give reputation to his arms, to strengthen
the fidelity of wavering subjects, retain allies, and prevent covert
enemies from declaring themselves; when fortune not discontinuing to
favour us, our enemies are in such consternation that they dare not
stand before us; and lastly, when, pressed by famine and disease, and
hemmed in on all sides, we must either conquer or die.
“A great captain will never hazard a considerable action if he is not
sure of drawing great advantages from it, or unless he is forced into
it: tell us what the dangers are which surround us, or what fruit our
country can derive from the loss of our lives or of our blood? Suppose
we are victorious over the duke of Guise, and the French are cut to
pieces, what shall we be the better for it? Is it that the cities of
the dominions of the Pope will be united to those of Philip? Is it
that the baggage of the French will enrich us? If, on the contrary,
the always uncertain fate of arms should prove to be against us, what
misfortunes would not our rashness bring upon us? Do not, then, let
us trouble ourselves about conquering Guise; he is flying before
us. Could a murderous battle procure us anything more solid or more
glorious? We gain a complete victory, without shedding a drop of blood.
Our name alone serves as a defence and a rampart to all Italy.
“If this manner of making war did not appear to me suited to
circumstances, I should remember what I did in Saxony; I would cross
the greatest rivers, I would not shrink from wetting my feet with
the sea: but whilst I find victory in the retreat of my enemy, I
will remain faithful to my maxims, and will endeavour to combat your
audacity and rashness. In a word, I will not risk a kingdom against a
cassock of cloth of gold, which is all Guise can lose.”
The conjectures of the Spanish general were all verified. The French
expedition had the most fatal issue.
It may be said that this speech contains the history of no siege; but
Fabius Maximus was no less admirable than Scipio; and he who consumes
his enemy in vain enterprises, is not a less able general than he who
annihilates him in a battle. Military men will find more instruction
in the motives which determined the duke of Alva not to risk a battle,
than they would by the description of a siege.
Since the commencement of the French revolution, Naples has been the
scene of several important political events, and has more than once
succumbed to the power of the French; but as there has been no regular
siege, these do not come within the scope of our plan.