WAGES OF SEAMEN IN CASE OF WRECK.

SPEECH IN THE SENATE, ON INTRODUCING A BILL TO SECURE WAGES TO

SEAMEN IN CASE OF WRECK, FEBRUARY 12, 1855.

On the 26th of December, 1854, Mr. Sumner introduced the following

resolution:--

"_Resolved_, That the Committee on Commerce be directed to consider

if any legislation be needed in order to secure the wages of

merchant seamen in the case of wreck."

On the 12th of February, 1855, Mr. Sumner followed up this resolution

by introducing a bill, which was read twice and referred to the

Committee on Commerce, as follows:--

"_A Bill to secure Wages to Seamen in case of Wreck._

"_Be it enacted_, &c., That, in case of wreck or loss of any ship

or vessel of the United States, every seaman belonging thereto

shall be entitled to his wages up to the period of such wreck

or loss, whether such ship or vessel shall or shall not have

previously earned freight, provided such seaman shall have exerted

himself to the utmost to save the ship, cargo, and stores; and in

any trial of the question of services, the master, although a party

to the suit, shall be a competent witness on this question.

"SEC. 2. _And be it further enacted_, That every stipulation, by

which any seaman shall consent to abandon his wages, in case of

wreck or loss of the ship or vessel, or in case of the failure to

earn freight, shall be wholly void."

On this bill Mr. Sumner spoke as follows.

Mr. President,--In introducing this bill, I desire to make a brief

explanation, which shall, at least, be a record of my views with regard

to it.

The bill proposes an amelioration of the existing Maritime Law in

respect to the wages of merchant seamen, which, so far as England is

concerned, has been made already by Act of Parliament, and in our

country can be accomplished only by Act of Congress.

By existing Maritime Law, the seaman's wages depend upon a technical

rule, which sometimes occasions hardship. Freight is compendiously said

to be the mother of wages. In conformity with this fanciful idea, wages

are made to depend upon the earning of freight, unless the freight is

waived by agreement of the owner, or the voyage or freight is lost by

negligence, fraud, or misconduct of the owner or master, or voluntarily

abandoned. In case of wreck, the sailor has simply the chance of

something under the name of salvage, if the fragments saved happen to

be of any value; but if the loss be total, then he is without remedy.

In wrecks, which occur with melancholy frequency, on our churlish

winter coast, this hardship adds even to the sorrows of disaster. Thus,

as in a case which has actually arisen, a crew may commence service at

Calcutta, may navigate the Indian Ocean, double the Cape of Good Hope,

and bring their ship safely within sight of land, and then, by total

loss of ship and cargo, from acknowledged perils of the sea, they may

lose everything, even their right to wages, and may find themselves

in a strange port, the prey of poverty. Nor can any merit, either

throughout the protracted voyage or in the hour of peril and shipwreck,

prevent the operation of this technical rule.

There is also another circumstance which constrains the poor sailor.

The owner may insure his ship, and also his freight, so that he may

lose nothing but the premium he pays; but the sailor is not allowed to

protect himself by insurance from loss of wages: his loss is literally

total.

Now this technical rule, which fastens the wages of the sailor to the

fortunes of the vessel, or, in other words, makes the right dependent

on the successful issue of the enterprise for which he is hired, must

be considered an offshoot of Mediæval Maritime Law. It is not found

in the Roman Law, nor in the maritime legislation of the Eastern

Empire, nor in that early compilation which goes under the name of

the Rhodian Laws. An eminent American judge, who sheds great light

upon maritime jurisprudence,--I refer to the learned and able Judge

Ware, of the District Court of Maine,--says, in a judicial opinion,

that "it owes its origin to the necessities and peculiar hazards which

maritime commerce had to encounter in the Middle Ages, when to the

dangers of the winds and waves were added the more formidable perils

of piracy and robbery."[170] The rule, having been thus established,

was preserved in the maritime jurisprudence of Europe, when the special

exigencies in which it had its birth ceased to exist. It has outlived

the circumstances and excuses of its origin, and now survives to vex,

oppress, and disappoint the most needy, if not the most meritorious, of

all concerned in the business of the seas.

[170] _The Dawn_, Daveis, 133.

This hard rule survives with us, but not everywhere. The greatest

commercial nation of the world has led the way in its abolition, and

set an example to the United States. The Act of Parliament, of 7th and

8th Victoria, ch. 112, sec. 17 (at the close),--called "The Merchant

Seamen's Act,"--provides that

"In all cases of wreck or loss of the ship, every surviving seaman

shall be entitled to his wages up to the period of the wreck or

loss of the ship, whether such ship _shall or shall not have

previously earned freight_: provided the seaman shall produce a

certificate from the master or chief surviving officer of the ship,

to the effect that he had exerted himself to the utmost to save the

ship, cargo, and stores."

But the sailor was not completely protected by this provision.

Experience in England showed that the cunning of agents was able to

introduce into the shipping articles an agreement waiving the right

to wages in case of loss, which the unthrifty sailor signed, ignorant

or careless of its import. To remedy this abuse, a further Act of

Parliament, of 13th and 14th Victoria, ch. 93, sec. 53,--known as "The

Mercantile Marine Act,"--

"No seaman shall, by reason of any agreement, forfeit his lien

upon the ship, or be deprived of any remedy for the recovery of

his wages, to which he would otherwise have been entitled; and

every stipulation which is inconsistent with any provision of this

Act, or of any other Act relating to merchant seamen, and every

stipulation by which any seaman consents _to abandon his right to

wages in the case of the loss of the ship_, or to abandon any right

which he may have or obtain in the nature of salvage, _shall be

wholly inoperative_."

The bill which I now introduce is grounded on the provisions quoted

from the two Acts of the British Parliament, and contains two

principles: _first_, that seamen shall be paid their wages down to the

time of the loss of the ship, in case they serve faithfully to the

last; and, _secondly_, that they shall not be permitted to lose their

wages through any agreement in the shipping articles.

In some details I have departed from the British Act. It does not

seem advisable to make the wages dependent on "a certificate from

the master or chief surviving officer of the ship," but to leave the

question of services open to proof in any way, according to received

rules of evidence. Therefore I have said that the wages shall be paid,

"_provided_ the seaman shall have exerted himself to the utmost to

save the ship, cargo, and stores." The reasons for this course are

clear. Masters are often part owners of American ships, and thus have

a personal interest adverse to the sailor. In a mood of selfishness

or recklessness, they might refuse the certificate, even though well

earned. Now, in constructing a protection to the sailor, it does

not seem prudent to make his wages dependent upon any such quarter.

Indeed, it is hardly just to take from him the right to establish

his claim before the Admiralty Court, merely because an interested

master refuses a certificate, when, perhaps, plenary proof might be

furnished _aliunde_. Moreover, if the question were put in control of

the master, he might obtain an improper influence over the minds of the

crew, inducing them even to sacrifice truth in the event of litigation

between owners and underwriters.

There can be no harm in leaving the question of fact to be proved by

competent witnesses, like every other question of fact: and the seamen

should be competent witnesses for each other. A sagacious court will

know how to weigh their testimony, should it come in conflict with that

of the officers. It seems proper that the master, too, though a party

to the suit,--as in the case of a libel against him _in personam_, or

in a suit at Common Law,--should be competent to testify to the conduct

of the libellant or plaintiff,--in other words, whether he has "exerted

himself to the utmost"; and I have introduced into the bill a provision

accordingly.

The British Act of 7th and 8th Victoria contains another defect. It

limits the wages to "every surviving seaman." I can see no good

reason why the wife and children of the sailor who has perished in the

forlorn hope perhaps, in the cause of all, should be deprived of the

humble wages so dearly earned by their natural protector, and thus be

compelled to feel a new deprivation added to their bereavement. In the

proposed bill there is no such limitation.

Beyond this brief statement, I need not on this occasion add another

word. Already Congress has shown a disposition to modify the rigorous

Maritime Law in some of its provisions. In 1851 it made a change in the

liability of ship-owners as common carriers. But this very liability

originated, to a certain extent, in the same principles from which is

derived the liability of the seamen, if they fail to bring the ship and

cargo to port. Ship-owners and sailors were both treated as insurers.

This was in the age of force, before the contract of insurance had

spread its broad protection over commerce in every sea. The seaman

should share this protection. He should be treated as not necessarily

either pirate or coward.

In the discussions of the Senate on the proposed change in the

liability of ship-owners, it was effectively urged by my immediate

predecessor, a distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, the late

Robert Rantoul, Jr., that, if the United States failed to adopt that

measure, the other maritime nations would have an advantage in the

carrying trade. It is equally true, that, unless we adopt the measure

now proposed, Great Britain will have the advantage of us in the rate

of seamen's wages; for, under her existing laws, the seaman can afford

to work cheaper on board a British ship than under the American flag.

The measure now proposed is of direct importance to the hundred and

fifty thousand seamen constituting the mercantile marine of the United

States. It also concerns the million of men constituting the mercantile

marine of the civilized world, any of whom, in the vicissitudes of the

sea, may find themselves in American bottoms. I commend it as a measure

of enlightened philanthropy, and also of simple justice.

I ask that the bill, having been read twice, be referred to the

Committee on Commerce.

The motion was agreed to.

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