CHAPTER I

Transcriber’s Notes:

Underscores “_” before and after a word or phrase indicate _italics_

in the original text.

Equal signs “=” before and after a word or phrase indicate =bold=

in the original text.

Small capitals have been converted to SOLID capitals.

Typographical and punctuation errors have been silently corrected.

EINSTEIN AND THE UNIVERSE

_A Popular Exposition of the Famous Theory_

_By_ CHARLES NORDMANN

_Astronomer to the Paris Observatory._

_Translated by_ JOSEPH McCABE

_With a Preface by the Rt. Hon._

THE VISCOUNT HALDANE, O.M.

T. FISHER UNWIN LTD.

LONDON: ADELPHI TERRACE

_First published in English April 1922_

_Second Impression June 1922_

_All rights reserved_

PREFACE

A distinguished German authority on mathematical physics, writing

recently on the theory of Relativity, declared that if his publishers

had been willing to allow him sufficient paper and print he could have

explained what he wished to convey without using a single mathematical

formula. Such success is conceivable. Mathematical methods present,

however, two advantages. Their terminology is precise and concentrated,

in a fashion which ordinary language cannot afford to adopt. Further,

the symbols which result from their employment have implications

which, when brought to light, yield new knowledge. This is deductively

reached, but it is none the less new knowledge. With greater precision

than is usual, ordinary language may be made to do some, if not a great

deal, of this work for which mathematical methods are alone quite

appropriate. If ordinary language can do part of it an advantage may

be gained. The difficulty that attends mathematical symbolism is the

accompanying tendency to take the symbol as exhaustively descriptive

of reality. Now it is not so descriptive. It always embodies an

abstraction. It accordingly leads to the use of metaphors which

are inadequate and generally untrue. It is only qualification by

descriptive language of a wider range that can keep this tendency in

check. A new school of mathematical physicists, still, however, small

in number, is beginning to appreciate this.

But for English and German writers the new task is very difficult.

Neither Anglo-Saxon nor Saxon genius lends itself readily in this

direction. Nor has the task as yet been taken in hand completely, so

far as I am aware, in France. Still, in France there is a spirit and a

gift of expression which makes the approach to it easier than either

for us or for the Germans. Lucidity in expression is an endowment which

the best French writers possess in a higher degree than we do. Some of

us have accordingly awaited with deep interest French renderings of the

difficult doctrine of Einstein.

M. Nordmann, in addition to being a highly qualified astronomer and

mathematical-physicist, possesses the gift of his race. The Latin

capacity for eliminating abstractness from the description of facts is

everywhere apparent in his writing. Individual facts take the places

of general conceptions, of _Begriffe_. The language is that of

the _Vorstellung_, in a way that would hardly be practicable in

German. Nor is our own language equal to that of France in delicacy of

distinctive description. This book could hardly have been written by an

Englishman. But the difficulty in his way would have been one as much

of spirit as of letter. It is the lucidity of the French author, in

combination with his own gift of expression, that has made it possible

for the translator to succeed so well in overcoming the obstacles

to giving the exposition in our own tongue this book contains. The

rendering seems to me, after reading the book both in French and in

English, admirable.

M. Nordmann has presented Einstein’s principle in words which lift

the average reader over many of the difficulties he must encounter in

trying to take it in. Remembering Goethe’s maxim that he who would

accomplish anything must limit himself, he has not aimed at covering

the full field to which Einstein’s teaching is directed. But he

succeeds in making many abstruse things intelligible to the layman.

Perhaps the most brilliant of his efforts in this direction are

Chapters V and VI, in which he explains with extraordinary lucidity

the new theory of gravitation and of its relation to inertia. I think

that M. Nordmann is perhaps less successful in the courageous attack he

makes in his third chapter on the obscurity which attends the notion

of the “Interval.” But that is because the four-dimensional world,

which is the basis of experience of space and time for Einstein and

Minkowski, is in itself an obscure conception. Mathematicians talk

about it gaily and throw its qualities into equations, despite the

essential exclusion from it of the measurement and shape which actual

experience always in some form involves. They lapse on that account

into unconscious metaphysics of a dubious character. This does not

destroy the practical value of their equations, but it does make them

very unreliable as guides to the character of reality in the meaning

which the plain man attaches to it. Here, accordingly, we find the

author of this little treatise to be a good man struggling with

adversity. If he could make the topic clear he would. But then no one

has made it clear excepting as an abstraction which works, but which,

despite suggestions made to the contrary, cannot be clothed for us in

images.

This, however, is the fault, not of M. Nordmann himself, but of a phase

of the subject. With the subject in its other aspects he deals with the

incomparable lucidity of a Frenchman. I know no book better adapted

than the one now translated to give the average English reader some

understanding of a principle, still in its infancy, but destined, as I

believe, to transform opinion in more regions of knowledge than those

merely of mathematical physics.

_Haldane_

CONTENTS

PREFACE BY THE RT. HON. VISCOUNT HALDANE, O.M. pp. 5-8

INTRODUCTION pp. 13-15

CHAPTER I

THE METAMORPHOSES OF SPACE AND TIME

_Removing the mathematical difficulties—The pillars

of knowledge—Absolute time and space, from

Aristotle to Newton—Relative time and space,

from Epicurus to Poincaré and Einstein—Classical

Relativity—Antinomy of stellar aberration and the

Michelson experiment_ pp. 17-31

CHAPTER II

SCIENCE IN A NO-THOROUGHFARE

_Scientific truth and mathematics—The precise function

of Einstein—Michelson’s experiment, the Gordian knot

of science—The hesitations of Poincaré—The strange,

but necessary, Fitzgerald-Lorentz hypothesis—The

contraction of moving bodies—Philosophical and

physical difficulties_ pp. 32-52

CHAPTER III

EINSTEIN’S SOLUTION

_Provisional rejection of ether—Relativist

interpretation of Michelson’s experiment—New aspect

of the speed of light—Explanation of the contraction

of moving bodies—Time and the four dimensions of

space—Einstein’s “Interval” the only material

reality_ pp. 53-72

CHAPTER IV

EINSTEIN’S MECHANICS

_The mechanical foundation of all the

sciences—Ascending the stream of time—The speed of

light an impassable limit—The addition of speeds

and Fizeau’s experiment—Variability of mass—The

ballistics of electrons—Gravitation and light as

atomic microcosms—Matter and energy—The death of

the sun_ pp. 73-100

CHAPTER V

GENERALISED RELATIVITY

_Weight and inertia—Ambiguity of the Newtonian

law—Equivalence of gravitation and accelerated

movement—Jules Verne’s projectile and the principle

of inertia—Why rays of light are subject to

gravitation—How light from the stars is weighed—An

eclipse as a source of light_ pp. 101-123

CHAPTER VI

THE NEW CONCEPTION OF GRAVITATION

_Geometry and reality—Euclid’s geometry and

others—Contingency of Poincaré’s criterion—The

real universe is not Euclidean but Riemannian—The

avatars of the number π—The point of view of the

drunken man—Straight and geodetic lines—The new

law of universal attraction—Explanation of the

anomaly of the planet Mercury—Einstein’s theory of

gravitation_ pp. 124-147

CHAPTER VII

IS THE UNIVERSE INFINITE?

_Kant and the number of the stars—Extinct stars and

dark nebulæ—Extent and aspect of the astronomical

universe—Different kinds of universes—Poincaré’s

calculation—Physical definition of the infinite—The

infinite and the unlimited—Stability and

curvature of cosmic space-time—Real and virtual

stars—Diameter of the Einsteinian universe—The

hypothesis of globes of ether_ pp. 148-159

CHAPTER VIII

SCIENCE AND REALITY

_The Einsteinian absolute—Revelation by

science—Discussion of the experimental bases of

Relativity—Other possible explanations—Arguments in

favour of Lorentz’s real contraction—Newtonian space

may be distinct from absolute space—The real is a

privileged form of the possible—Two attitudes in

face of the unknown_ pp. 160-172

CHAPTER IX

EINSTEIN OR NEWTON?

_Recent discussion of Relativism at the Academy

of Sciences—Traces of the privileged space

of Newton—The principle of causality,

the basis of science—Examination of M.

Painlevé’s objections—Newtonian arguments and

Relativist replies—M. Painlevé’s formulas of

gravitation—Fecundity of Einstein’s theory—Two

conceptions of the world—Conclusion_ pp. 173-185

INTRODUCTION

This book is not a romance. Nevertheless.... If love is, as Plato says,

a soaring toward the infinite, where shall we find more love than in

the impassioned curiosity which impels us, with bowed heads and beating

hearts, against the wall of mystery that environs our material world?

Behind that wall, we feel, there is something sublime. What is it?

Science is the outcome of the search for that mysterious something.

A giant blow has recently been struck, by a man of consummate ability,

Albert Einstein, upon this wall which conceals reality from us. A

little of the light from beyond now comes to us through the breach he

has made, and our eyes are enchanted, almost dazzled, by the rays. I

propose here to give, as simply and clearly as is possible, some faint

reflex of the impression it has made upon us.

Einstein’s theories have brought about a profound revolution in

science. In their light the world seems simpler, more co-ordinated,

more in unison. We shall henceforward realise better how grandiose and

coherent it is, how it is ruled by an inflexible harmony. A little of

the ineffable will become clearer to us.

Men, as they pass through the universe, are like those specks of dust

which dance for a moment in the golden rays of the sun, then sink into

the darkness. Is there a finer or nobler way of spending this life than

to fill one’s eyes, one’s mind, one’s heart with the immortal, yet so

elusive, rays? What higher pleasure can there be than to contemplate,

to seek, to understand, the magnificent and astounding spectacle of the

universe?

There is in reality more of the marvellous and the romantic than there

is in all our poor dreams. In the thirst for knowledge, in the mystic

impulse which urges us toward the deep heart of the Unknown, there is

more passion and more sweetness than in all the trivialities which

sustain so many literatures. I may be wrong, after all, in saying that

this book is not a romance.

I will endeavour in these pages to make the reader understand,

accurately, yet without the aid of the esoteric apparatus of the

technical writer, the revolution brought about by Einstein. I will try

also to fix its limits; to state precisely what, at the most, we can

really know to-day about the external world when we regard it through

the translucent screen of science.

Every revolution is followed by a reaction, in virtue of the rhythm

which seems to be an inherent and eternal law of the mind of man.

Einstein is at once the Sieyès, the Mirabeau, and the Danton of the

new revolution. But the revolution has already produced its fanatical

Marats, who would say to science: “Thus far and no farther.”

Hence we find some resistance to the pretensions of over-zealous

apostles of the new scientific gospel. In the Academy of Sciences M.

Paul Painlevé takes his place, with all the strength of a vigorous

mathematical genius, between Newton, who was supposed to be overthrown,

and Einstein. In my final pages I will examine the penetrating

criticisms of the great French geometrician. They will help me to fix

the precise position, in the evolution of our ideas, of Einstein’s

magnificent synthesis. But I would first expound the synthesis itself

with all the affection which one must bestow upon things that one would

understand.

Science has not completed its task with the work of Einstein. There

remains many a depth that is for us unfathomable, waiting for some

genius of to-morrow to throw light into it. It is the very essence

of the august and lofty grandeur of science that it is perpetually

advancing. It is like a torch in the sombre forest of mystery. Man

enlarges every day the circle of light which spreads round him, but

at the same time, and in virtue of his very advance, he finds himself

confronting, at an increasing number of points, the darkness of the

Unknown. Few men have borne the shaft of light so deeply into the

forest as has Einstein. In spite of the sordid cares which harass us

to-day, amid so many grave contingencies, his system reveals to us an

element of grandeur.

Our age is like the noisy and unsubstantial froth that crowns, and

hides for a moment, the gold of some generous wine. When all the

transitory murmur that now fills our ears is over, Einstein’s theory

will rise before us as the great lighthouse on the brink of this sad

and petty twentieth century of ours.

CHARLES NORDMANN.

EINSTEIN AND THE UNIVERSE

CHAPTER I

THE METAMORPHOSES OF SPACE AND TIME

_Removing the mathematical difficulties—The pillars

of knowledge—Absolute time and space, from

Aristotle to Newton—Relative time and space,

from Epicurus to Poincaré and Einstein—Classical

Relativity—Antinomy of stellar aberration and the

Michelson experiment._

“Have you read Baruch?” La Fontaine used to cry, enthusiastically.

To-day he would have troubled his friends with the question “Have you

read Einstein?”

But, whereas one needs only a little Latin to gain access to Spinoza,

frightful monsters keep guard before Einstein, and their horrible

grimaces seem to forbid us to approach him. They stand behind strange

moving bars, sometimes rectangular and sometimes curvilinear,

which are known as “co-ordinates.” They bear names as frightful as

themselves—“contravariant and covariant vectors, tensors, scalars,

determinants, orthogonal vectors, generalised symbols of three signs,”

and so on.

These strange beings, brought from the wildest depths of the

mathematical jungle, join together or part from each other with a

remarkable promiscuity, by means of some astonishing surgery which is

called _integration_ and _differentiation_.

In a word, Einstein may be a treasure, but there is a fearsome troop

of mathematical reptiles keeping inquisitive folk away from it; though

there can be no doubt that they have, like our Gothic gargoyles, a

hidden beauty of their own. Let us, however, drive them off with the

whip of simple terminology, and approach the splendour of Einstein’s

theory.

Who is this physicist Einstein? That is a question of no importance

here. It is enough to know that he refused to sign the infamous

manifesto of the professors, and thus brought upon himself persecution

from the Pan-Germanists.[1] Mathematical truths and scientific

discoveries have an intrinsic value, and this must be judged and

appreciated impartially, whoever their author may chance to be. Had

Pythagoras been the lowest of criminals, the fact would not in the

least detract from the validity of the square of the hypotenuse. A

theory is either true or false, whether the nose of its author has the

aquiline contour of the nose of the children of Sem, or the flattened

shape of that of the children of Cham, or the straightness of that of

the children of Japhet. Do we feel that humanity is perfect when we

hear it said occasionally: “Tell me what church you frequent, and I

will tell you if your geometry is sound.” Truth has no need of a civil

status. Let us get on.

[1] Albert Einstein, born in 1879, is a German Jew of Würtemberg.

He studied in Switzerland, and was an engineer there until 1909,

when he became professor at Zurich University. In 1911 he passed to

Prague University, in 1912 to the Zurich Polytechnic, and in 1914 to

the Prussian Academy of Science. He refused to give his name to the

manifesto in which ninety-three professors of Germany and Austria

defended Germany’s war-action.—Trans.

* * * * *

All our ideas, all science, and even the whole of our practical life,

are based upon the way in which we picture to ourselves the successive

aspects of things. Our mind, with the aid of our senses, chiefly

ranges these under the headings of time and space, which thus become

the two frames in which we dispose all that is apparent to us of the

material world. When we write a letter, we put at the head of it the

name of the place and the date. When we open a newspaper, we find the

same indications at the beginning of each piece of telegraphic news.

It is the same in everything and for everything. Time and space, the

situation and the period of things, are thus seen to be the twin

pillars of all knowledge, the two columns which sustain the edifice of

men’s understanding.

So felt Leconte de Lisle when, addressing himself to “divine death,” he

wrote, in his profound, philosophic way:

Free us from time, number, and space:

Grant us the rest that life hath spoiled.

He inserts the word “number” only in order to define time and space

quantitatively. What he has finely expressed in these famous and superb

lines is the fact that all that there is for us in this vast universe,

all that we know and see, all the ineffable and agitated flow of

phenomena, presents to us no definite aspect, no precise form, until it

has passed through those two filters which are interposed by the mind,

time and space.

The work of Einstein derives its importance from the fact that he has

shown, as we shall see, that we have entirely to revise our ideas

of time and space. If that is so, the whole of science, including

psychology, will have to be reconstructed. That is the first part of

Einstein’s work, but it goes further. If that were the whole of his

work it would be merely negative.

Once he had removed from the structure of human knowledge what had been

regarded as an indispensable wall of it, though it was really only a

frail scaffolding that hid the harmony of its proportions, he began to

reconstruct. He made in the structure large windows which allow us now

to see the treasures it contains. In a word, Einstein showed, on the

one hand, with astonishing acuteness and depth, that the foundation of

our knowledge seems to be different from what we had thought, and that

it needs repairing with a new kind of cement. On the other hand, he has

reconstructed the edifice on this new basis, and he has given it a bold

and remarkably beautiful and harmonious form.

I have now to show in detail, concretely, and as accurately as

possible, the meaning of these generalities. But I must first insist on

a point which is of considerable importance: if Einstein had confined

himself to the first part of his work, as I have described it, the part

which shatters the classical ideas of time and space, he would never

have attained the fame which now makes his name great in the world of

thought.

The point is important because most of those—apart from experts—who

have written on Einstein have chiefly, often exclusively, emphasised

this more or less “destructive” side of his work. But, as we shall

see, from this point of view Einstein was not the first, and he is not

alone. All that he has done is to sharpen, and press a little deeper

between the badly joined stones of classical science, a chisel which

others, especially the great Henri Poincaré, had used long before him.

My next point is to explain, if I can, the real, the immortal, title of

Einstein to the gratitude of men: to show how he has by his own powers

rebuilt the structure in a new and magnificent form after his critical

work. In this he shares his glory with none.

* * * * *

The whole of science, from the days of Aristotle until our own, has

been based upon the hypothesis—properly speaking, the hypotheses—that

there is an absolute time and an absolute space. In other words, our

ideas rested upon the supposition that an interval of time and an

interval of space between two given phenomena are always the same, for

every observer whatsoever, and whatever the conditions of observation

may be. For instance, it would never have occurred to anybody as long

as classical science was predominant, that the interval of time, the

number of seconds, which lies between two successive eclipses of the

sun, may not be the fixed and identically same number of seconds for an

observer on the earth as for an observer in Sirius (assuming that the

second is defined for both by the same chronometer). Similarly, no one

would have imagined that the distance in metres between two objects,

for instance the distance of the earth from the sun at a given moment,

measured by trigonometry, may not be the same for an observer on the

earth as for an observer in Sirius (the metre being defined for both by

the same rule).

“There is,” says Aristotle, “one single and invariable time, which

flows in two movements in an identical and simultaneous manner; and if

these two sorts of time were not simultaneous, they would nevertheless

be of the same nature.... Thus, in regard to movements which take place

simultaneously, there is one and the same time, whether or no the

movements are equal in rapidity; and this is true even if one of them is

a local movement and the other an alteration.... It follows that even

if the movements differ from each other, and arise independently, the

time is absolutely the same for both.”[2] This Aristotelic definition

of physical time is more than two thousand years old, yet it clearly

represents the idea of time which has been used in classic science,

especially in the mechanics of Galileo and Newton, until quite recent

years.

It seems, however, that in spite of Aristotle, Epicurus outlined the

position which Einstein would later adopt in antagonism to Newton. To

translate liberally the words in which Lucretius expounds the teaching

of Epicurus:

“Time has no existence of itself, but only in material objects, from

which we get the idea of past, present, and future. It is impossible

to conceive time in itself independently of the movement or rest of

things.”[3]

[2] _Physics_, bk. iv, ch. xiv.

[3] _De Natura Rerum_, bk. i, vv. 460 ff.

Both space and time have been regarded by science ever since Aristotle

as invariable, fixed, rigid, absolute data. Newton thought that he was

saying something obvious, a platitude, when he wrote in his celebrated

Scholion: “Absolute, true, and mathematical time, taken in itself and

without relation to any material object, flows uniformly of its own

nature.... Absolute space, on the other hand, independent by its own

nature of any relation to external objects, remains always unchangeable

and immovable.”

The whole of science, the whole of physics and mechanics, as they are

still taught in our colleges and in most of our universities, are based

entirely upon these propositions, these ideas of an absolute time and

space, taken by themselves and without any reference to an external

object, independent by their very nature.

In a word—if I may venture to use this figure—time in classical

science was like a river bearing phenomena as a stream bears boats,

flowing on just the same whether there were phenomena or not. Space,

similarly, was rather like the bank of the river, indifferent to the

ships that passed.

From the time of Newton, however, if not from the time of Aristotle,

any thoughtful metaphysician might have noticed that there was

something wrong in these definitions. Absolute time and absolute

space are “things in themselves,” and these the human mind has always

regarded as not directly accessible to it. The specifications of space

and time, those numbered labels which we attach to objects of the

material world, as we put labels on parcels at the station so that

they may not be lost (a precaution that does not always suffice), are

given us by our senses, whether aided by instruments or not, only when

we receive concrete impressions. Should we have any idea of them if

there were no bodies attached to them, or rather to which we attach the

labels? To answer this in the affirmative, as Aristotle, Newton, and

classical science do, is to make a very bold assumption, and one that

is not obviously justified.

The only time of which we have any idea apart from all objects is the

psychological time so luminously studied by M. Bergson: a time which

has nothing except the name in common with the time of physicists, of

science.

It is really to Henri Poincaré, the great Frenchman whose death has

left a void that will never be filled, that we must accord the merit of

having first proved, with the greatest lucidity and the most prudent

audacity, that time and space, as we know them, can only be relative. A

few quotations from his works will not be out of place. They will show

that the credit for most of the things which are currently attributed

to Einstein is, in reality, due to Poincaré. To prove this is not in

any way to detract from the merit of Einstein, for that is, as we shall

see, in other fields.

This is how Poincaré, whose ideas still dominate the minds of

thoughtful men, though his mortal frame perished years ago, expressed

himself, the triumphant sweep of his wings reaching further every day:

“One cannot form any idea of empty space.... From that follows the

undeniable relativity of space. Any man who talks of absolute space

uses words which have no meaning. I am at a particular spot in

Paris—the Place du Panthéon, let us suppose—and I say: ‘I will come

back _here_ to-morrow.’ If anyone asks me whether I mean that I

will return to the same point in space, I am tempted to reply, ‘Yes.’ I

should, however, be wrong, because between this and to-morrow the earth

will have travelled, taking the Place du Panthéon with it, so that

to-morrow the square will be more than 2,000,000 kilometres away from

where it is now. And it would be no use my attempting to use precise

language, because these 2,000,000 kilometres are part of our earth’s

journey round the sun, but the sun itself has moved in relation to the

Milky Way, and the Milky Way in turn is doubtless moving at a speed

which we cannot learn. Thus we are entirely ignorant, and always will

be ignorant, how far the Place du Panthéon shifts its position in space

in a single day. What I really meant to say was: ‘To-morrow I shall

again see the dome and façade of the Panthéon.’ If there were no

Panthéon, there would be no meaning in my words, and space would

disappear.”

Poincaré works out his idea in this way:

“Suppose all the dimensions of the universe were

increased a thousandfold in a night. The world would

remain the same, giving the word ‘same’ the meaning

it has in the third book of geometry. Nevertheless,

an object that had measured a metre in length will

henceforward be a kilometre in length; a thing that

had measured a millimetre will now measure a metre.

The bed on which I lie and the body which lies on it

will increase in size to exactly the same extent. What

sort of feelings will I have when I awake in the morning,

in face of such an amazing transformation? Well,

I shall know nothing about it. The most precise

measurements would tell me nothing about the revolution,

because the tape I use for measuring will have

changed to the same extent as the objects I wish to

measure. As a matter of fact, there would be no

revolution except in the mind of those who reason as

if space were absolute. If I have argued for a moment

as they do, it was only in order to show more clearly

that their position is contradictory.”

It would be easy to develop Poincaré’s argument. If all the objects in

the universe were to become, for instance, a thousand times taller, a

thousand times broader, we should be quite unable to detect it, because

we ourselves—our retina and our measuring rod—would be transformed

to the same extent at the same time. Indeed, if all the things in

the universe were to experience an absolutely irregular spatial

deformation—if some invisible and all-powerful spirit were to distort

the universe in any fashion, drawing it out as if it were rubber—we

should have no means of knowing the fact. There could be no better

proof that space is relative, and that we cannot conceive space apart

from the things which we use to measure it. When there is no measuring

rod, there is no space.

Poincaré pushed his reasoning on this subject so far that he came to

say that even the revolution of the earth round the sun is merely a

more convenient hypothesis than the contrary supposition, but not a

truer hypothesis, unless we imply the existence of absolute space.

It may be remembered that certain unwary controversialists have tried

to infer from Poincaré’s argument that the condemnation of Galileo was

justified. Nothing could be more amusing than the way in which the

distinguished mathematician-philosopher defended himself against this

interpretation, though one must admit that his defence was not wholly

convincing. He did not take sufficiently into account the agnostic

element.

Poincaré, in any case, is the leader of those who regard space as a

mere property which we ascribe to objects. In this view our idea of

it is only, so to say, the hereditary outcome of those efforts of our

senses by means of which we strive to embrace the material world at a

given moment.

It is the same with time. Here again the objections of philosophic

Relativists were raised long ago, but it was Poincaré who gave them

their definitive shape. His luminous demonstrations are, however, well

known, and we need not reproduce them here. It is enough to observe

that, in regard to time as well as space, it is possible to imagine

either a contraction or an enlargement of the scale which would be

completely imperceptible to us; and this seems to show that man

cannot conceive an absolute time. If some malicious spirit were to

amuse itself some night by making all the phenomena of the universe a

thousand times slower, we should not, when we awake, have any means of

detecting the change. The world would seem to us unchanged. Yet every

hour recorded by our watches would be a thousand times longer than

hours had previously been. Men would live a thousand times as long, yet

they would be unaware of the fact, as their sensations would be slower

in the same proportion.

When Lamartine appealed to time to “suspend its flight,” he said a

very charming, but perhaps meaningless, thing. If time had obeyed his

passionate appeal, neither Lamartine nor Elvire would have known and

rejoiced over the fact. The boatman who conducted the lovers on the Lac

du Bourget would not have asked payment for a single additional hour;

yet he would have dipped his oars into the pleasant waters for a far

longer time.

I venture to sum up all this in a sentence which will at first sight

seem a paradox: in the opinion of the Relativists it is the measuring

rods which create space, the clocks which create time. All this was

maintained by Poincaré and others long before the time of Einstein, and

one does injustice to truth in ascribing the discovery to him. I am

quite aware that one lends only to the rich, but one does an injustice

to the wealthy themselves in attributing to them what does not belong

to them, and what they need not in order to be rich.

There is, moreover, one point at which Galileo and Newton, for all

their belief in the existence of absolute space and time, admitted

a certain relativity. They recognised that it is impossible to

distinguish between uniform movements of translation. They thus

admitted the equivalence of all such movements, and therefore the

impossibility of proving an absolute movement of translation.

That is what is called the Principle of Classic Relativity.

* * * * *

An unexpected fact served to bring these questions upon a new plane,

and led Einstein to give a remarkable extension to the Principle

of Relativity of classic mechanics. This was the issue of a famous

experiment by Michelson, of which we must give a brief description.

It is well known that rays of light travel across empty space from

star to star, otherwise we should be unable to see the stars. From

this physicists long ago concluded that the rays travelled in a medium

that is devoid of mass and inertia, is infinitely elastic, and offers

no resistance to the movement of material bodies, into which it

penetrates. This medium has been named ether. Light travels through it

as waves spread over the surface of water at a speed of something like

186,000 miles a second: a velocity which we will express by the letter

=V=.

The earth revolves round the sun in a veritable ocean of ether, at a

speed of about 18 miles a second. In this respect the rotation of the

earth on its axis need not be noticed, as it pushes the surface of the

globe through the ether at a speed of less than two miles a second.

Now the question had often been asked: Does the earth, in its orbital

movement round the sun, take with it the ether which is in contact with

it, as a sponge thrown out of a window takes with it the water which it

has absorbed? Experiment—or rather, experiments, for many have been

tried with the same result—has shown that the question must be

answered in the negative.

This was first established by astronomical observation. There is in

astronomy a well-known phenomenon discovered by Bradley which is

called aberration. It consists in this: when we observe a star with a

telescope, the image of the star is not precisely in the direct line of

vision. The reason is that, while the luminous rays of the star which

have entered the telescope are passing down the length of the tube,

the instrument has been slightly displaced, as it shares the movement

of the earth. On the other hand, the luminous ray in the tube does

not share the earth’s motion, and this gives rise to the very slight

deviation which we call aberration. This proves that the medium in

which light travels, the ether which fills the instrument and surrounds

the earth, does not share the earth’s motion.

Many other experiments have settled beyond question that the ether,

which is the vehicle of the waves of light, is not borne along by the

earth as it travels. Now, since the earth moves through the ether as a

ship moves over a stationary lake (not like one floating on a moving

stream), it ought to be possible to detect some evidence of this speed

of the earth in relation to the ether.

One of the devices that may be imagined for the purpose is the

following. We know that the earth turns on itself from west to east,

and travels round the sun in the same way. It follows that in the

middle of the night the revolution of the earth round the sun means

that Paris will be displaced, in the direction from Auteuil toward

Charenton, at a speed of about thirty kilometres a second. During the

day, of course, it is precisely the opposite. Paris changes its place

round the sun in the direction from Charenton toward Auteuil. Well, let

us suppose that at midnight a physicist at Auteuil sends a luminous

signal. A physicist receiving this ray of light at Charenton, and

measuring its velocity, ought to find that the latter is =V= + 30

kilometres. We know that, as a result of the earth’s motion, Charenton

recedes before the ray of light. Consequently, since light travels

in a medium, the ether, which does not share the earth’s motion, the

observer at Charenton ought to find that the ray reaches him at a less

speed than it would if the earth were stationary. It is much the same

as if an observer were travelling on a bicycle in front of an express

train. If the express travels at thirty metres a second and the cyclist

at three metres a second, the speed of the train in relation to the

cyclist will be 30-3 = 27 metres a second. It would be _nil_ if

the train and the cyclist were travelling at the same rate.

On the other hand, if the cyclist were going toward the train, the

speed of the train in relation to him would be 30 + 3 = 33 metres a

second. Similarly, when the physicist at Charenton sends out a luminous

message at midnight, and the physicist of Auteuil receives it, the

latter ought to find that the ray of light has a velocity of =V= +

30 kilometres.

All this may be put in a different way. Suppose the distance between

the observer at Auteuil and the man at Charenton were exactly twelve

kilometres. While the ray of light emitted at Auteuil speeds toward

Charenton, that town is receding before it to a small extent. It

follows that the ray will have to travel a little more than twelve

kilometres before it reaches the man of science at Charenton. It will

travel a little less than that distance if we imagine it proceeding in

the opposite direction.

Now the American physicist Michelson, borrowing an ingenious idea

from the French physicist Fizeau, succeeded, with a high degree of

accuracy, in measuring distances by means of the interference-bands of

light. Every variation in the distance measured betrays itself by the

displacement of a certain number of these bands, and this may easily be

detected by a microscope.

Let us next suppose that our two physicists work in a laboratory

instead of between Charenton and Auteuil. Let us suppose that they

are, by means of the interference-bands, measuring the space traversed

by a ray of light produced in the laboratory, according as it travels

in the same direction as the earth or in the opposite direction. That

is Michelson’s famous experiment, reduced to its essential elements

and simplified for the purpose of this essay. In those circumstances

Michelson’s delicate apparatus ought to reveal a distinctly measurable

difference according as the light travels with the earth or in the

opposite direction.

But no such difference was found. Contrary to all expectation, and

to the profound astonishment of physicists, it was found that light

travels at precisely the same speed whether the man who receives it is

receding before it with the velocity of the earth or is approaching

it at the same velocity. It is an undeniable consequence of this that

_the ether shares the motion of the earth_. We have, however, seen

that other experiments, not less precise, had settled that _the ether

does not share the motion of the earth_.

Out of this contradiction, this conflict of two irreconcilable yet

indubitable facts, Einstein’s splendid synthesis, like a spark of light

issuing from the clash of flint and steel, came into being.

Einstein and the universe: A popular exposition of the famous theory · 第 1 / 9 章