Then again, July 14th, the same organ insisted,--

“Let not Congress adjourn without passing the One-Term Amendment to

the Constitution. There has never been so favorable an opportunity.

All parties are in favor of it.… _General Grant is in favor of it._

The party which supports General Grant demands it; and above all

else public morality calls for it.”

Considering that these pledges were made by an organ of the party, and

in his very presence, they may be accepted as proceeding from him.

His name must be added to the list with Andrew Jackson, William Henry

Harrison, Henry Clay, and Benjamin F. Wade, all of whom are enrolled

against the reëligibility of a President.

But his example as President is more than his testimony in showing

the necessity of this limitation. Andrew Jackson did not hesitate

to say that it was required in order to place the President “beyond

the reach of any improper influences,” and “uncommitted to any other

course than the strict line of constitutional duty.”[164] William Henry

Harrison followed in declaring that with the adoption of this principle

“the incumbent would devote all his time to the public interest, and

there would be no cause to misrule the country.”[165] Henry Clay was

satisfied, after much observation and reflection, “that too much of the

time, the thoughts, and the exertions of the incumbent are occupied

during his first term in securing his reëlection.”[166] Benjamin F.

Wade, after denouncing the reëligibility of the President, said:

“There are defects in the Constitution, and this is among the most

glaring.”[167]

And now our President by his example, besides his testimony,

vindicates all these authorities. He makes us see how all that has

been predicted of Presidents seeking reëlection is fulfilled: how

this desire dominates official conduct; how naturally the resources

of the Government are employed to serve a personal purpose; how the

national interests are subordinate to individual advancement; how

all questions, foreign or domestic, whether of treaties or laws, are

handled with a view to electoral votes; how the appointing power lends

itself to a selfish will, acting now by the temptation of office

and then by the menace of removal; and, since every office-holder

and every office-seeker has a brevet commission in the predominant

political party, how the President, desiring reëlection, becomes the

active head of three coöperating armies,--the army of office-holders,

eighty thousand strong, the larger army of office-seekers, and the

army of the political party, the whole constituting a consolidated

power which no candidate can possess without peril to his country.

Of these vast coöperating armies the President is commander-in-chief

and generalissimo. Through these he holds in submission even

Representatives and Senators, and makes the country his vassal with a

condition not unlike that of martial law, where the disobedient are

shot, while the various rings help secure the prize. That this is not

too strong appears from testimony before a Senate Committee, where a

Presidential lieutenant boldly denounced an eminent New York citizen,

who was a prominent candidate for Governor, as “obnoxious to General

Grant,”--and then, with an effrontery like the Presidential pretension,

announced that “President Grant was the representative and head of the

Republican Party, and all good Republicans should support him in all

his measures and appointments, and any one who did not do it should be

_crushed out_.”[168] Such things teach how wise were those statesmen

who would not subject the President to the temptation or even the

suspicion of using his vast powers in promoting personal ends.

Unquestionably the One-Man Power has increased latterly beyond

example,--owing partly to the greater facilities of intercourse,

especially by telegraph, so that the whole country is easily

reached,--partly to improvements in organization, by which distant

places are brought into unity,--and partly through the protracted

prevalence of the military spirit created by the war. There was a

time in English history when the House of Commons, on the motion of

the famous lawyer Mr. Dunning, adopted the resolution, “That the

influence of the Crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be

diminished.”[169] The same declaration is needed with regard to the

President; and the very words of the Parliamentary patriot may be

repeated. In his memorable speech, Mr. Dunning, after saying that he

did not rest “upon proof idle to require,” declared that the question

“must be decided by the consciences of those who as a jury were called

upon to determine what was or was not within their own knowledge.”[170]

It was on ground of notoriety cognizable to all that he acted. And

precisely on this ground, but also with specific proofs, do I insist

that the influence of the President has increased, is increasing, and

ought to be diminished. But in this excellent work, well worthy the

best efforts of all, nothing is more important than the limitation to

one term.

There is a demand for reform in the civil service, and the President

formally adopts this demand; but he neglects the first step, which

depends only on himself. From this we may judge his little earnestness

in the cause. Beyond all question Civil-Service Reform must begin by a

limitation of the President to one term, so that the temptation to use

the appointing power for personal ends may disappear from our system,

and this great disturbing force cease to exist. If the President is

sincere for reform, it will be easy for him to set the example by

declaring again his adhesion to the One-Term principle. But even if he

fails, we must do our duty.

Therefore, in opposing the prolonged power of the present incumbent,

I begin by insisting, that, for the good of the country, and without

reference to any personal failure, no President should be a candidate

for reëlection; and it is our duty now to set an example worthy of

republican institutions. In the name of the One-Term principle, once

recognized by him, and which needs no other evidence of its necessity

than his own Presidency, I protest against his attempt to obtain

another lease of power. But this protest is on the threshold.

Charles Sumner: his complete works, volume 20 (of 20) · 第 90 / 242 题