CHAPTER II

WHAT CHINA MEANS TO THE WORLD

The day is past when any one in Europe, whether Christian or

non-Christian, can be indifferent to what is happening in China. The

Christian has indeed been for a long time alive to the importance of

these developments, but the ordinary citizen with no strong religious

views has usually neither displayed nor felt any interest in a country

separated from us by so many miles and by such an untraversable gulf in

thought and language. If the Christian has urged the importance of

Chinese missions, his neighbours have answered by asking him why he

cannot leave the Chinese to themselves and to their own religion.

Whatever justice the opponent of missions in times past may have

thought he had for this view, he cannot now maintain that the Chinese

question is one which may be put on one side by any thoughtful man.

The movements of this vast mass of humanity, amounting to a quarter of

the population of the world, cannot but fail to have a very real and

vital effect on the whole civilised world.

The revolution that is affecting China brings Europe and America into

close contact with a {21} country equal to Europe in size, and not far

inferior in productive power. A few years ago China was so far away

that except as an outlet for trade it had little interest for people

here. The voyage occupied many months and was esteemed a hazardous

journey, owing to the dangerous coasts and typhoons of the China seas.

Now a train-de-luxe conveys the traveller in a fortnight across Asia to

Peking, and if the accommodation on the Chinese part of the railway is

not altogether luxurious, the traveller remembers that it is far

superior to that on the first railways opened in our own land. The

journey is of course tedious, but the fact that business men in the

north of China are talking of always spending their summer holidays in

England, will show how close China is now to Europe. It is no

exaggeration to say that in reckoning distance by the time it takes to

complete the journey, China is nearer to England than London was to

Scotland in the days of Dr. Johnson, while in point of comfort and

convenience there is no comparison. The journey from London to Peking

is far easier at the present day than the journey from London to

Edinburgh in the days of Johnson's famous trip to the Hebrides.

If in this way we are getting closer to China, we are still more

growing closer in thought. No longer can we speak of a gulf that

separates us from China. Every year English is becoming more and more

the language of educated men in {22} East; even though we cannot read

their books, they are reading ours either in translations or in the

original. Japan has set the example of having English taught

universally in her high schools, and now China is following her

example. A foreigner, talking about Esperanto, remarked: "What would

be the use of making an universal language? English, at any rate in

the East, is the universal language." That barbarous patois, "pidgin"

or business English, lives still in China. It consists of English

roots, enlarged by the addition of Portuguese words, put into Chinese

idiom and pronounced Chinese fashion. But "pidgin" English is fast

giving way to pure English, spoken most commonly with a marked American

accent.

If this growing proximity of China compels the attention of the

civilised world, the virgin wealth of her mineral resources and the

cheapness of her labour have excited the cupidity of the Western

capitalist, and it is daily more obvious that China must become the

centre of international politics, therefore the extent to which she

will affect the rest of the world should be a matter for careful

consideration. India, it will be urged, has long been in contact with

Europe, and the effect on Europe is small. Why should there be any

difference when another Oriental race comes in close proximity with

Europe? Putting on one side the fact that India has, both in trade and

in politics, had a very great effect on England, it can be answered

that there is an essential difference between the {23} brown

inhabitants of India and the yellow race. The former are, through

religion or custom, unable to accommodate themselves to the conditions

of Western civilisation; the latter have shown themselves such adepts

at accepting Western life that they have excelled the white man, to his

great annoyance, in his own civilisation. The Chinaman, who is

forbidden to enter America, Australia, and South Africa, is refused

admittance, not because he has been untried or because he has been

tried and found wanting, but because he has been tried in the three

continents and found by all who have tried him eminently efficient--so

efficient that if he were allowed to continue in those countries, he

would soon render the presence of the white settler unnecessary. He

has been tried in three just balances and been found of such value that

the white voter is unanimous in demanding his exclusion. But even the

most aggressive Chinese exclusionist can scarcely hope to exclude him

from his own country, and the Chinaman who stays at home is probably a

better man than the Chinaman who goes abroad.

Western civilisation may be expected to grow with equal rapidity in

China as it has in Japan. Obviously Japan is the precedent that China

will follow rather than India, whether Hindu or Mohammedan.

A few years ago a man would have been classed as an eccentric who dared

foretell that Russia would be defeated by Japan. When Japan talked

about going to war with Russia, Russia laughed. Who {24} can tell how

we shall speak of China a few years hence? For Japan after all is only

the same size in population as Great Britain, but China is eight times

as large.

There are three ways in which China may affect Europe. Militarily, she

may menace her by her enormous armies enlisted from her vast

population. Commercially, she may afford an outlet for our trade far

greater than we possess at the present time, and perhaps be a

competitor in trade and a place where the capital of Europe will be

invested. Morally, she may either depress or elevate our social

morals. Perhaps the reader may be inclined to smile at the idea of

China being in a higher moral condition than Europe, so as to be able

to react on her beneficially, but stranger things have happened; and if

Europe follows the example of France in deterioration, and China

continues to advance with the same rapidity, China might easily excel

Europe in morals.

Let us first deal with the question from the military point of view.

The military authorities who know the Chinese seem to be equally

divided in opinion; many are confident that they are an unwarlike race,

others maintain and bring evidence to prove that under competent

officers they have great military qualities.

A few years ago, for instance, the development of the military power of

China was regarded as a possible danger to the world, and especially to

England or Russia. It was pointed out that China might easily {25}

descend with a huge army on to India in the distant future, or she

might turn her arms northward and conquer the wide districts of

Siberia. Now the popular view is the reverse, and the military power

of China is regarded as a thing incapable of great development. A

Japanese diplomatist with whom we discussed the question ridiculed the

idea of the yellow peril and smiled at the suggestion that China could

ever be a nation great in war. Certainly her present military power

can be safely ignored except in Manchuria; whether that power is

capable of development is a moot point. Believers in the war-like

possibilities of China point out that as a matter of fact China is by

right of conquest suzerain to such warlike races as the Tibetans and

the Ghurkas, and that her empire reaches as far as Turkestan. In

answer it is urged that the victors were not the Chinese, but the

conquerors and present rulers of the Chinese, the northern Manchus;

who, till they were absorbed by Chinese civilisation, spoke a different

language and wrote a different character.

The Manchus are far from being extinct, though through years of sensual

indulgence they have lost their virility; but the discipline of

religion or the call of a national emergency might restore the war-like

qualities of the race. It was only in 1792 that the Chinese, under

Sund Fo, defeated the Ghurkas, and we must allow that a race who could

defeat these gallant soldiers must be skilled and brave in war. On the

other hand I was assured that the Manchus, {26} so far from showing any

courage in the war with Japan, were the first to flee, and that they

differ in nothing from the Chinese except that they are pensioners and

ride horses. Those who disbelieve in the courage of the Chinese say

the Chinese never had any courage except of a passive order; that they

would endure suffering against any race on earth, and that their whole

history tells that tale; that they have been subject in turn to the

Mongols, the Kins, and the Manchus; and that the period of the Ming

dynasty when they were free, was only because the Mongols had reduced

every nation within many thousands of miles to subjection, and then

they themselves had fallen a prey, not to the Chinese arms directly,

but to the enervating and destructive effects of Chinese civilisation

which rendered them absolutely unable to fight.

Those who argue in this way point to that great feature of Chinese

scenery, the fortified wall. That Great Wall of China, climbing hill

and dale, was built to keep the northern and warlike tribes from

harrying the peace-loving and industrious Chinaman. Behind that wall

lie nothing but fortress after fortress; every city is walled, and

those walls tell their own tale. A warlike race never dwells in walled

cities. When the traveller enters Japan after visiting China, the

first thing which strikes him is the absence of walled cities. The

villages and towns lie along the roads as they do in our own country

instead of clustering behind the tall and gloomy walls of China. {27}

Again, those who say the Chinese will never fight, point out that they

have never been able to reduce two savage races right in their midst,

the Maios and Lolos. One devoted missionary who had spent many years

of his life in the thankless task of attempting to approach these

savage Lolos, gave us an interesting account of the relation between

the Lolos and the Chinese which certainly does not show that the

Chinese have much military skill. The Lolos are a sort of Highland

caterans who live in the mountains in the west of China, and from time

to time raid the peace-loving Chinese villages. The Chinese then

retaliate by organising a large force, who advance on the Lolo country

and burn their villages. The Lolos rarely offer any direct resistance,

as they realise they are hopelessly outnumbered, but take an

opportunity to raid another village and to slaughter hundreds of

defenceless Chinese. If the forces are anything like equal, the Lolos

will fight, and even sometimes when the forces are wholly unequal. On

one occasion seven Lolos and two women put to flight three hundred

Chinese soldiers, killing forty and wounding many more. The Chinese

consequently live in considerable fear of those Highland barbarians,

whose fierce yells and savage onslaught produce absolute panic in their

troops.

Officers who have commanded Chinese troops seem generally to believe in

their capabilities. Gordon, for instance, spoke in the highest terms

of the soldiers who formed his "ever victorious army," and the {28}

English officers who commanded the Weihaiwei regiment and those who

commanded the Chinese volunteers at the siege of Peking spoke equally

well of their men. It is reported that the Chinese soldiers at the

siege of Tientsin would carry the wounded back out of the range of fire

when no European soldiers could be found ready to perform this

dangerous task, but of this story I could find no first-hand

confirmation. But whether the Chinese in times to come will develop an

efficient army or whether they do not, the most competent judges affirm

that Chinese military greatness will always make for peace; that they

will never wage a war of aggression; and that, so far from being a

menace to the world, they will prove to be a security for the world's

peace in the Far East. In fact it is the continuance of China's

military weakness rather than the growth of her military power which is

most likely to disturb the political atmosphere. China is far too rich

a prize to be safe if unguarded, and the acquisition of her wealth will

always prove a temptation to her needy neighbours.

The integrity of the Chinese empire is for many reasons a most

desirable thing, and that integrity can best be maintained by an

increase of China's military power.

One of the reasons why this is so much to be desired is from the

commercial effect which China may have on the rest of the world. If

the vast masses of her singularly excellent workmen are to be exploited

by powers who have no thought for either {29} hers or the world's

welfare; if the sweated den of the alien is a menace to the healthy

conditions of the working man in London; if the policy of such

philanthropists as Lord Shaftesbury has been at all beneficial to the

world at large, the sudden introduction of hundreds of thousands of

ill-paid but efficient working men to the great Western market will

have a deleterious effect on the social conditions of the civilised

world. It is obviously far more simple to bring the factories to China

than to bring the Chinaman to the factories, and this will be freely

done if ever the flag of the foreigner waves over China. The great

advantages that China can offer of cheap labour, cheap coal and cheap

carriage, coupled with the security of a European flag, will have the

effect of attracting to China a very large number of the world's

industries. If this is done gradually, so that the internal market in

China increases proportionally, this will not result in any evil to

other nations. China will share in the wealth of the world, and will

be at once a large producer and a large consumer; but if before Western

civilisation has been assimilated by the working classes Western

factories are extensively started in China the result will be one of

those dislocations of social conditions which we include under the name

of sweating.

Western conditions of labour in Western countries may be deemed by some

to be hard, but no one can doubt that if Western conditions of labour

were forced on a population which did not understand them, they {30}

would have a tendency to become definitely oppressive. The Chinese

coolie will, I fear, be as little able to maintain his ground against

the foreign contractor supported by the arms of a foreign power, as the

Congo native is to maintain his rights against his Belgian oppressor;

and unless Western powers have the humanity and wisdom to resist those

of their own nations who will clamour to make money out of Chinese

labour, Western dominance in China is not to be desired by Western

wage-earners.

[Illustration: HANKOW, THE CHICAGO OF CHINA. RIVER AT LOW WATER, 600

MILES FROM THE SEA. HAN-YANG IRONWORKS]

One of the most impressive sights in China is the Han-yang Ironworks.

They employ three thousand men, and are owned by a body of Chinese

capitalists. They have found it worth while to triple their plant

within the last two or three years, and one can hardly wonder when one

realises that, though the labourers are paid a very high rate according

to Chinese scale, they only get sixpence a day, and even allowing that

it requires three Chinamen to do the work of one Englishman, which is a

higher proportion than is generally claimed, obviously there is a very

large margin of profit to be made by the owners of the works. It is

worthy of note that the Chinese have been unable at present to produce

any native engineers; sixteen Europeans of various nationalities manage

and control the works, though they are owned by Chinese, but the

skilled work is all done by Chinese. For instance, we saw a man

straightening the rails with a steam hammer; it was very skilled work,

and I was told he was making 7d. or {31} 8d. a day. If any social

reformer, if any one interested in the condition of the working

classes, has time to consider this question and to escape from that

parochial mind which so distorts the importance of things, he will see

that the conditions of the working classes in Europe will depend to a

greater degree on the proper development of the social conditions of

China than on any factor at home. To put it briefly, if the fourth of

the labour of this world is living under sweating conditions, the other

three-fourths may consider themselves lucky if their income is not cut

down by 25 per cent.

On the other hand, if the development of China is allowed to pursue its

normal course, and education and enlightenment are encouraged to

proceed by equal steps with material well-being, the commercial

conditions of China, so far from being injurious, will prove beneficial

to the world at large. The internal market, for one thing, will tend

to keep pace with China's productions. If China exports, she will also

import; the volume of trade will no doubt be enormously increased, and

that trade will bring prosperity to China and to those other countries

who are trading with her. Her people will gradually grow accustomed to

Western conditions, and, if China maintains her independence, those

conditions will not be allowed to become too onerous to the poorer

classes. The wealth of another country does not injure her neighbours;

it is rather her poverty which injures them. There is always the

danger that the poorer country {32} will drain the capital from the

richer country, and that a rich country becomes harsh to a poor country

in the same way that the creditor is harsh to the debtor; certainly it

would be most undesirable if a sudden industrial expansion in China

paralysed many industrial undertakings in England by depriving them of

the capital they needed for enlargement, and it would be equally

undesirable to have any industrial undertaking in China controlled by a

Board of Directors in London, whose one object was to increase their

dividends, and who were ignorant of and therefore indifferent to the

injury that might be incidentally done to the welfare of thousands of

Chinese who fell under their power.

And this brings me to the third point of how China may affect the rest

of the world. She may, and most probably will, degrade the moral tone

of Europe. On the other hand, it will be quite possible that she may

act as a moral tonic. We scarcely realise the nature of the chains

that bind one part of our civilisation to another. To hear men talk,

one would suppose that the great factors in the government of mankind

are the laws and regulations made by kings and popular assemblies; but

a deeper inquiry must show that it is only the smaller part of a man's

life that is controlled by law, the greater part is controlled by

custom or fashion which is enforced, to use the technical term, by the

sanction of public opinion. Consider, for instance, the customs of

dress, or of manners, or the hours we keep, or the way we {33} refer to

things, or even our very thoughts--they are all subject to this power;

the State does not generally command any particular dress, yet there is

a large and increasing measure of uniformity in dress. You may go from

Asia to America, from Vancouver to Vladivostock, and you will see

uniformity in the rules of dress. This uniformity is all the more

remarkable, because its laws, instead of being fixed and stationary,

are constantly altered; indeed, in comparison with the power of

fashion, the powers of the greatest autocrat or of the most efficient

public office are as nothing. The autocrat may give an order; the

public office, with its endless clerks and forms, with its miles of

red-tape, may try to see that order carried out; but may quite possibly

fail. But fashion, issuing her capricious orders, has no office, no

clerks, no printed forms that have to be filled up to secure obedience,

yet her subjects yield such willing service that they seek for

information from every quarter as to the nature of her commands, and

when they know them, they count neither money nor comfort to be of

importance compared with obedience to their mistress. The world, while

it wonders at its own submission, enlarges or reduces its clothes,

alters its head-gear, and further, will even change its manners, its

speech, and its thoughts. The latest fashion-book is but the

exaggeration of a world-power; the same power that compels women to

tighten their skirts and widen their hats, makes their husbands talk

about socialism and observe Empire Day. The power of fashion lies in

{34} this, that while every one obeys, no one is conscious of any

difficulty in obeying; the chains with which fashion binds this world

may be so strong that the strongest nature cannot break them, yet they

are so light that the most sensitive natures are not conscious of their

restraint.

But this great power of fashion has its limits, and those are the

limits of our civilisation. The mandate of the dressmaker may reach

from Siberia to Peru, but it has no power in Mohammedan, Hindu, or

Confucian lands; the Turkish lady still veils her face, the Hindu still

adheres to his caste, the Confucian up to this moment still preserves

his queue and his blue robe, but if China accepts our civilisation this

must change. The modern Chinaman dresses in Western fashion; the loose

flowing garment of China acts as a sort of barometer by which the

extent of European pressure can be tested; up-country they are as loose

as ever, but in Shanghai, wherever Chinese dress is still preserved, it

has grown tight. A change typical of what may happen if the union

between the civilisations takes place without any guidance may now be

seen in the streets of Shanghai; the dress of the women is shaped in

the Chinese fashion, they wear the traditional coat and trousers, but

the cut of those garments offends both East and West alike by their

great exiguity.

Every one would allow that Western fashions, or, at any rate, men's

fashions, must to a great extent affect China, but there is a deeper

thought beyond; {35} Western fashions will not merely affect Chinese

dress, but they will also affect Chinese thought, and when they have

incorporated Chinese thought into Western civilisation, when the

conquest is complete and China and the West are one, a reaction will

take place, and that which has subdued China to the yoke of Western

fashion will give in its turn power to China to control the Western

world. Without suggesting for a moment that Peking fashions will take

the place of Paris fashions, or that the Englishman will grow a queue,

I do suggest that there are many precedents in history for expecting

that such a moral force as the Chinese reverence for parents, or such

an immoral position as the Chinese contempt for the working-man, will

not be without its effect on the Western world. Again and again it has

been pointed out by both missionary and Government official, that so

great is the power of China, that she brings into subjugation to her

thought any one who is long resident in her country. If it should

happen that the Western world should neglect the Chinaman when it has

the opportunity of teaching and directing him, longing as he is to

learn about Western civilisation, the punishment of the West will be

that she will, in years to come, be influenced for evil by the power of

the great Celestial Empire. If, on the other hand, the East should

turn towards Christianity, and, taught by Christianity, should learn to

live a higher life, the example of her faith and of her morality will

in years to come react beneficially on the Western world.

{36}

Changing China · 第 2 / 27 章