but he was quite unpractical in the affairs of everyday life. Had he
enjoyed a regular income throughout life, he would probably have
attained his end even without the help of Engels. On the other hand,
Engels was an exceedingly able, energetic, and highly-cultured man,
eminently practical and successful in everything he undertook, but not
endowed with that speculative temperament which surmounts intellectual
crises and opens out new horizons. But for his intellectual
association with Marx he would, in all probability, have remained
little more than a Moses Hess. Marx was never a Utopian; the complete
saturation of his mind with Hegelian dialectics made him immune to all
eternal truths and final social forms. On the contrary, up to 1844
Engels was a Utopian--until Marx explained to him the meaning of
political and social conflicts, the basis and the motive force, the
statics and dynamics of the history of civilised mankind. Engels'
"Criticism of Political Economy" is a very noteworthy performance for
a youth of twenty-three engaged in commerce, but it does not rise
above the level of the writings of Owen, Fourier, and Proudhon.
Engels' contributions to Owen's "New Moral World" (1843-44) are indeed
more philosophical than the other articles by Owenites, but as far as
matter goes, there is no perceptible difference between them. "The
System of Economic Contradictions," on which Proudhon was working when
Engels published his "Outlines," is couched, as far as the critical
side is concerned, in the same strain of thought as we find in Engels.
Both sought to expose the contradictions of the middle-class economic
system, not in order to discover in them the source of the progress of
society, but to condemn them in the name of justice. Whereas the
Owenites considered their system as perfect, Proudhon and Engels had,
independently of one another, striven to free themselves from the
Socialist Utopias. Proudhon became a peaceful Anarchist and found
salvation in the scheme of autonomous economic groups, which should
carry on an exchange of labour equivalents with one another. Engels,
on the other hand, found a solution of his difficulties in Marx, whom
he rewarded with a lifelong friendship and devotion, which proved to
be Marx's salvation. Without Engels' literary and financial help,
Marx, with his unpractical, helpless, and, at the same time, proud and
uncompromising disposition, would most probably have perished in
exile.
III. CONTROVERSIES WITH BAUER AND RUGE.
After the Franco-German Year Books had been discontinued, Marx,
recognising the importance of economics, studied English and French
systems of political economy with still greater zeal than before, and
continued his studies in Socialism and history with remarkable
steadiness of purpose. No longer now did he show signs of hesitation
or wavering; he knew exactly what he wanted. He had left behind him
that period of ideological speculation when he was still a disciple of
Hegel, and he was impelled, as in the autumn of 1837, to envisage,
from his new standpoint, the past and the future. He takes such a
survey in "The Holy Family," which had its genesis in the autumn of
1844, and to which Engels also furnished a slight contribution. It is
a settling of accounts with his former friend and master, Bruno Bauer,
and his brother Edgar, who had not been able to break away from Hegel.
The aim of the book was to force the Young Hegelians into the path of
social criticism, to urge them forward and prevent them from falling
into stereotyped and abstract ways of thinking. It is not easy
reading. In it Marx has compressed the knowledge he then had of
philosophy, history, economics, and Socialism in concentrated and
sharply-cut form. Besides the excellent sketch of English and French
materialism, which among other things discloses in a few short but
pregnant sentences the connection between this and English and French
Socialism, "The Holy Family" contains the germs of the materialistic
conception of history as well as the first attempt to give a social
revolutionary interpretation to the class struggle between Capital and
Labour. In the Introduction to the present book a quotation from "The
Holy Family" has been given. Speaking against Bauer's conception of
history, Marx says: "Or can he believe that he has arrived even at the
beginning of a knowledge of historical reality so long as he excludes
science and industry from the historical movements? Or does he really
think that he can understand any period without having studied, for
example, the industries of that period, the immediate means of
production of life itself?... In the same way as he separated thought
from the senses, the soul from the body, and himself from the world,
so he separates history from science and industry, and he does not see
the birthplace of history in coarse, material production upon earth
but in the nebulous constructions in the heavens."--("Posthumous
Works," Vol. II., pp. 259-60.)
Bruno Bauer, who believed in the world-swaying might of the idea, but
would not concede that the masses had any power whatever, wrote: "All
the great movements of history up to this time were therefore doomed
to failure and could not have lasting success, because the masses had
taken an interest in them and inspired them--or they must come to a
lamentable conclusion because the underlying idea was of such a nature
that a superficial apprehension of it must suffice, that is to say, it
must reckon on the approval of the masses."
Marx's answer to this was that "the great historical movements had
been always determined by mass interests, and only in so far as they
represented these interests could the ideas prevail in these
movements; otherwise the ideas might indeed stir up enthusiasm, but
they could not achieve any results. The idea always fell into
disrepute in so far as it differed from the interest. On the other
hand, it is easy to understand that, when it makes its first
appearance on the world-stage, every mass interest working itself out
in history far exceeds, as an idea or in its presentation, its actual
limits and identifies itself purely and simply with the interest of
humanity. Thus the idea of the French Revolution not only took hold of
the middle classes, in whose interest it manifested itself in great
movements, but it also aroused enthusiasm in the labouring masses, for
whose conditions of existence it could do nothing. As history has
shown, then, ideas have only had effective results in so far as they
corresponded to class interests. The enthusiasm, to which such ideas
gave birth, arose from the illusion that these ideas signified the
liberation of mankind in general."--("Posthumous Works," Vol. II., pp.
181-3.)
In August, 1844, Marx published under the title "Marginal Notes" in
the Paris _Vorwaerts_ a lengthy polemic against Ruge, which is a
defence of Socialism and revolution and takes the part of the German
proletariat against Ruge. "As regards the stage of culture or the
capacity for culture of the German workers, let me refer to Weitling's
clever writings, which in their theoretical aspect often surpass those
of Proudhon, however much they may fall behind them in execution.
Where would the middle classes, their scholars and philosophers
included, be able to show a work like Weitling's 'Guarantees of Peace
and Concord' bearing on the question of emancipation? If one compares
the insipid, spiritless mediocrity of German political literature with
this unconstrained and brilliant literary debut of the German workers,
if one compares these gigantic baby shoes of the proletariat with the
dwarfishness of the worn-out political shoes of the German middle
classes, one can only prophesy an athletic stature for the German
Cinderella. One must admit that the German proletariat is the
philosopher of the European proletariat, just as the English
proletariat is its political economist and the French proletariat its
politician. One must admit that Germany is destined to play just as
classic a role in the social revolution as it is incompetent to play
one in the political. For, as the impotence of the German middle
classes is the political impotence of Germany, so the capacity of the
German proletariat--even leaving out of account German philosophy--is
the social capacity of Germany."
At that time (1844) Marx had already begun to mix among the German
working classes resident in Paris, who clung to the various Socialist
and Anarchist doctrines which then held sway, and he sought to
influence them according to his own ideas. With Heine, too, who at
that time was coquetting with Communism, he carried on a sprightly and
not unfruitful intercourse. He likewise came into frequent contact
with Proudhon, whom he endeavoured to make familiar with Hegelian
philosophy. Already in his first work, "What is Property?" (1840)
Proudhon had played with Hegelian formulae, and Marx probably believed
that he could win him over to Socialism. Proudhon, who, like the
German Weitling, sprang from the proletariat, ushered in his activity
as a social theorist with the above-mentioned work, which had a
stimulating effect on Marx and on German Socialists in general, all
the more so as Proudhon manifested some acquaintance with classical
German philosophy. In this book ("What is Property?" German edition,
1844, p. 289) he sums up the whole matter as follows: "Expressing this
according to the Hegelian formula, I should say that Communism, the
first kind, the first determination of social life, is the first link
in social evolution, the _thesis_; property is the antagonistic
principle, the _antithesis_; if only we can get the third factor, the
_synthesis_, the question is solved. This synthesis comes about only
through the cancelling of the thesis by the antithesis; one must
therefore in the last instance examine its characteristics, discard
what is anti-social, and in the union of the remaining two is then
seen the real kind of human social life."
That was indeed a superficial conception of Hegelian dialectics, for
what Proudhon wanted to find was not a synthesis but a combination;
still for a French working man it was a smart performance to have
manipulated German philosophical formulae, and would justify the most
sanguine hopes. Marx did not want to let this opportunity slip, and in
"debates both late and long" he discussed Hegelian philosophy with
Proudhon.--(Marx: "The Poverty of Philosophy," German edition,
Stuttgart, 1885, p. 29.)
In the midst of this activity, however, Marx and other German
contributors to the Paris _Vorwaerts_ were expelled from France in
January, 1845, at the instigation of the Prussian Government. Marx
packed up his traps and left for Brussels, where he lived, with short
interruptions, until the outbreak of the European Revolution in
February, 1848. During his sojourn in Brussels his time was occupied
mainly with economic studies, for which Engels placed his library of
works on political economy at his disposal. Marx embodied the result
of these studies in the criticism directed against Proudhon in his
"Misere de la Philosophie" (Poverty of Philosophy), published in 1847.
IV. CONTROVERSY WITH PROUDHON.
Marx's "Misere de la Philosophie" indicates the culmination of the
fist phase of his creative work. In this critical review he makes his
position clear with respect not only to Proudhon but to Utopian
Socialism in general. It marks also the turning point in the studies
of Marx: English political economy occupied henceforth the place which
German philosophy had held. The anti-Proudhon controversy is therefore
worthy of a fuller treatment.
Pierre Joseph Proudhon (b. 1809 in Besancon, d. 1865 in Paris) was one
of the most gifted and most distinguished of social philosophers which
the modern proletariat has produced. He was originally a compositor,
like his similarly minded English contemporary, John Francis Bray, the
author of "Labour's Wrongs," published in 1839, but he had a much
greater inclination for study and a more fruitful literary talent. He
managed to acquire, self-taught, a knowledge of the classical
languages, of mathematics and of science, read assiduously but
indiscriminately works on economics, philosophy, and history, and
applied himself to social criticism. It is rare for a working man in
the West of Europe to feel impelled to make an acquaintance with Kant,
Hegel, and Feuerbach as Proudhon did through French translations and
through intercourse with German scholars in Paris. He possessed the
noble ambition of blending French sprightliness with German
thoroughness. But self-instruction failed to give him that
intellectual training which is more valuable than knowledge, and which
alone gives the power to order and to utilise the information
acquired, as well as to submit one's own work to self-criticism. The
value of a systematic education does not consist in the main in the
acquisition of knowledge but in the training of our intellectual
faculties as instruments of inquiry and apprehension, of methodical
thinking and of sound judgment, to enable us to find our bearings more
easily in the chaos of phenomena, experiences, and ideas. A
self-taught man may no doubt attain to this degree of culture, but
only if his first attempts at independent creative work are submitted
to a strict but kindly criticism, which makes him discipline his
thoughts. This was not the case with Proudhon; he lacked mental
self-discipline. His first work, "What is Property?" (1840) brought
him immediate recognition and strengthened him in his high opinion of
his knowledge and his powers, even to the point of making him
conceited. When, for example, the French historian, Michelet,
disapproved of his dictum, "Property is robbery," Proudhon replied,
"Not twice in a thousand years does one come across a pronouncement
like that."--("Economic Contradictions," Leipzig, 1847. Vol. II., p.
301.) And yet the idea is as old as Communism itself. Besides all
this, the vivacity and exuberance of language for which Proudhon was
noted easily blinded him to the shortcomings of his intellectual
culture. Thus it often happened that he rediscovered ideas of his
predecessors and published them to the world with naive pride. Through
page after page of argument he holds the reader in expectation of the
explanation, which he is about to give, of the nature of value, which
he rightly characterises as the "corner-stone of political economy."
At last he will disclose the secret: "It is time to make ourselves
acquainted with this power. This power ... is _labour_." His main
work, "The System of Economic Contradictions," swarms with
philosophical formulae and expressions like thesis, antithesis,
antinomies, synthesis, dialectics, induction, syllogisms, etc., as
also with Latin, Greek, and Hebrew etymologies; it often wanders into
irrelevant theological and philosophical digressions and side issues,
not so much with the intention of parading the author's knowledge as
from his lack of intellectual discipline and insufficient command of
his material. The work in question was to combine German philosophy
with French and English political economy, and its author believed
that it would secure for him before everything else the admiration of
the German Socialists, especially of Marx. He drew the latter's
attention to it by letter, and awaited his "rigorous criticism." The
criticism came in "Misere de la Philosophie" (Brussels, 1847), but it
could no longer fulfil its purpose, as the fundamental difference
between the two men had already widened to a gulf that could not be
bridged. Marx had almost completed his materialistic, logical, and
revolutionary Socialism, Proudhon had laid the foundations of his
peaceful Anarchism with its federative economic basis. With his
searching analysis, his systematised knowledge, and his great
indignation at the presumptuous attacks on every Socialist school and
leader, Marx sat in judgment upon Proudhon, exposing him as a
dilettante in philosophy and economics, and at the same time
sketching in outline his own conception of history and economics.
Marx's verdict is damning, yet one cannot but acknowledge that
Proudhon, in spite of his obvious insufficiency, had endeavoured,
honestly and zealously, to extricate himself from Capitalism as well
as from Utopianism, and to outline a scheme for an economic order, in
which men, such as he had found them, might lead a free, industrious,
and righteous life. The task which Proudhon had set himself was the
same as that which engaged the attention of Marx, the criticism of
political economy and of the sentimental Utopian Socialism. That is
the key-note of Proudhon's system, and it is sounded in almost every
chapter. He lacked, however, the requisite knowledge and the
historical sense which alone could have made him equal to his task.
The whole of his criticism consists virtually in the complaint that
riches and poverty accumulate side by side, and that the economic
categories--use value, exchange value, division of labour,
competition, monopoly, machinery, property, ground rent, credit, tax,
etc.--manifest contradictions. Proudhon's special problem was the
following: "The workers of any country produce yearly goods to the
value, let us say, of 20 milliards. But if the workers, as consumers,
wish to buy back these goods they have to pay 25 milliards. The
workers are thus cheated out of a fifth. That is a terrible
contradiction."--("What is Property?" Chap. IV.; "Economic
Contradictions," Vol. I., pp. 292-93.) This statement of the problem
shows that Proudhon had no inkling of the essential features of the
question of value, in spite of the fact that he cites Adam Smith,
David Ricardo, etc., whom he must therefore have read. Had he really
understood these economists and taken up his critical attitude towards
them from the standpoint of justice, he would have stated the problem
somewhat as follows: "The workers of any country produce yearly goods
to the value, say, of 20 milliards. For their work, however, they
receive as wages a quantity of goods of the value of only 10 or 12
milliards. Is that just?" Only this way of stating the question could
possibly have revealed to him the nature of wages, of value, of
profit, of capital and its contradictions. Proudhon sees the
perpetration of fraud or robbery in the sphere of exchange and not in
that of production, and he does not ask himself how, if labour
produces goods to the value of only 20 milliards, they can be
exchanged at a value of 25 milliards, and what is responsible for the
increase of five milliards. The other contradictions which he brings
forward are not indeed new, but they are ingeniously treated. For
example: the essence of exchange-value is labour, which creates
wealth; but the more the wealth produced, the less becomes its
exchange-value. Or this: the division of labour is, according to
Smith, one of the most effective means of increasing wealth, but the
further the division of labour proceeds the lower sinks the workman,
being reduced to the level of an unintelligent automaton engaged in
the performance of a fractional operation. The same thing holds good
for machinery. So, too, competition stimulates effort, but brings much
misery in its train by leading to adulteration, sharp practices, and
strife between man and man. Further, taxation should be proportional
to riches, in reality it is proportional to poverty. Or again, private
ownership of land ought to increase productivity; in practice it
deprives the farmer of the land. In this way he runs to earth the
contradictions in political economy, and so we find everywhere the
words thesis and anti-thesis or antinomies (contradictions between two
well-established propositions). And out of this contradiction springs
poverty. The solution or the synthesis is the creation of an economic
order which shall preserve the good elements in this category and
eliminate the bad ones, and so satisfy the demands of justice. And
that is what Socialism cannot do. "For the economic order is based
upon calculations of an inexorable justice and not upon those angelic
sentiments of brotherhood, sacrifice, and love which so many
well-meaning Socialists of the present time are endeavouring to awake
in the people. It is useless for them to preach, after the example of
Jesus Christ, the necessity for sacrifice, and to set an example of it
in their own lives: selfishness is stronger than they and can only be
restrained by rigid justice and immutable economic law. Humanitarian
enthusiasm may cause upheavals which are conducive to the progress of
civilisation, but such emotional crises, like the fluctuations in
value, simply result in the establishing of law and order on a more
rigid and more restricted basis. Nature or the Deity planted mistrust
in our hearts, having no faith in the love of man for his fellow men;
and though I say it to the shame of the human conscience (for our
hypocrisy must be confronted with it sooner or later), every
disclosure which science has made to us concerning the designs of
providence with respect to the progress of society points to a deeply
rooted hatred of mankind on God's part."--("System of Economic
Contradictions or the Philosophy of Poverty," Vol. I., p. 107.) Just
as severely does he denounce the institution of Trade Unionism and
its methods of warfare, together with State politics, as indeed the
working of class organisation and of the State generally. The only way
to realise social justice is to create a society of producers who
exchange their goods among one another according to their equivalents
in labour and carry on work in adequate relationship to the production
of wealth, or, to put it clearly, to establish an order where supply
and demand balance one another.
Marx's answer to the "Philosophy of Poverty" is indicated at once by
the title "The Poverty of Philosophy." He deals first of all with the
economic details of Proudhon's work, and proves with documentary
evidence that the theses and antitheses it contains partly spring from
a half-understood reading of English and French political economists,
and in part have been taken direct from the English Communists. Marx
already displays in this section an extensive knowledge of economic
literature. Then he confronts Proudhon's philosophical and social
theories with his own deductions and gives many positive results.
Marx's main object was to induce the Socialists to give up their
Utopianism and think in terms of realism, and to regard social and
economic _categories_ in their historical setting:
"Economic _categories_ are only the theoretical expressions, ideal
conceptions of the conditions of production obtaining in society....
Proudhon has grasped well enough that men manufacture cloth, linen,
etc., under certain conditions of production. But what he has not
grasped is that these social conditions themselves are just as much
human products as cloth, linen, etc. Social conditions are intimately
bound up with productive power. With the acquisition of new productive
power men change their methods of production, and with the change in
the methods of production, in the manner of obtaining a livelihood,
they change their social conditions. The hand-mill gives rise to a
society with feudal lords, the steam-mill to a society with industrial
capitalists. But the same men who shape the social conditions in
conformity with the material means of production, shape also the
principles, the ideas, the _categories_ in conformity with their
social conditions. Consequently these ideas, these _categories_, are
just as little eternal as are the conditions to which they give
expression. They are the transitory and changing products of history.
We are living in the midst of a continuous movement of growth in
productive power, of destruction of existing social conditions, of
formation of ideas."--("Poverty of Philosophy," Stuttgart, 1885, pp.
100-101.)
Here it should, above all, be noticed that Marx ascribes to
industrialism a powerful revolutionary effect, and that he
characterises the different forms of society by their different
methods of labour. Or, as he says later in "Capital," "not _what_ is
produced, but _how_ it is produced distinguishes the various forms of
society." What he means to say, then, is that ideas and systems are
limited by their time, that they are conditioned by the prevailing
means of production. To understand them one must study the times which
have preceded them, as well as investigate the ideas and systems
themselves, and find out whether new forms have not arisen which stand
in contradiction or in contrast to the old one. Or, as Marx says: