RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the peace of Europe was
twice disturbed, and terrible wars occurred, over the question of the
integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Since it is still the same question
which has had most to do--directly at least--with bringing on the
general European war of 1914, it is important to consider what has
been, since the Treaty of Berlin, the very heart of the Eastern
question in relation to Europe, the rivalry of races in Macedonia.
When the European Powers, following the lead of Great Britain,
intervened after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 to annul the Treaty
of San Stefano, they frustrated the emancipation from Moslem rule of
the Christian populations in Macedonia. A Balkan territorial and
political _status quo_ was decided upon by a Congress of the Powers at
Berlin in 1878. In receiving back Macedonia, Turkey solemnly promised
to give equal rights to her Christian subjects. In taking upon
themselves the terrible responsibility of restoring Christians to
Turkish rule, the Powers assumed at the same time the obligation to
watch Turkey and _compel her to keep her promises_.
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The delegates of the Powers brought to the Congress of Berlin a
determination to solve the problems of South-eastern Europe, according
to what they believed to be the personal selfish interests of the
nations they represented. From the beginning of the Congress to the
end, there was never a single thought of serving the interests of the
people whose destinies they were presuming to decide. They compromised
with each other "to preserve the peace of Europe." This formula has
always been interpreted in diplomacy as the getting of all you can for
your country without having to fight for it!
Practically every provision of the Treaty of Berlin has been
disregarded by the contracting parties and by the Balkan States. The
policy of Turkey in this respect has not been different from that of
the Christian Powers. Great Britain and France, as their colonial
empires increased, ignored the obligations of the treaty which they had
signed, because they feared the effect upon their commercial and
colonial interests overseas, were they to press the Khalif. The only
effective pressure would have been force of arms. When popular
sympathy was stirred to the depths by the cruelty of Abdul Hamid's
oppression and massacres, successive British and French Cabinets washed
their hands of any responsibility towards the Christians in Turkey.
Pan-Islamism was their nightmare. They had an overwhelming fear of
arousing Mohammedan sentiment against them in their colonies. Germany
refused to hold Abdul Hamid to his promises, because she wanted to
curry favour with him to get a foothold in Asiatic Turkey. {163}
Russia and Austria, the Powers most vitally interested in the Ottoman
Empire, because they were its neighbours, were agreed upon preserving
the Sultan's domination in the Balkan Peninsula, no matter how great
the oppression of Christians became. Neither Power wanted to see the
other increase in influence among the Balkan nationalities.
The centres of intrigue were Bulgaria, Albania, Thrace, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and Macedonia, the portions of the Peninsula which had
been refused emancipation by the Congress of Berlin. Bulgaria worked
out her own emancipation. She refused the tutelage of Russia, annexed
Eastern Rumelia in defiance of the Powers in 1885, and proclaimed her
independence in 1908. The fortunes of Albania have been followed in
another chapter. Thrace was too near Constantinople, the forbidden
city, too unimportant economically, and too largely Moslem in
population to be coveted by the Balkan States. Bosnia and Herzegovina,
administered by Austria-Hungary since 1878, were annexed in defiance of
treaty obligations in 1908. The principal victim of the mischief done
by the Congress of Berlin was Macedonia.
The future of Macedonia has been the great source of conflict between
Austria-Hungary and Russia, and between the Balkan States. At Athens,
Sofia, Belgrade, Bukarest, and Cettinje, the diplomats of Russia,
Austria-Hungary, and Turkey, from the morrow of the Berlin Congress to
the eve of the recent Balkan Wars, played a game against each other,
endeavouring always to use the Balkan States {164} as pawns in their
sordid strife. Turkey was backed by France and England, whenever it
suited opportune diplomacy to do so. Austria-Hungary was backed by
Germany, who at the same time did not hesitate to play a hand with the
Turks. Russia has always stood more or less alone in the Balkan
question, even after the conclusion of the alliance with France.
Except at Cettinje, Italian activity in this diplomatic game has never
been particularly marked.
What has been the object of the game? This is difficult to state
categorically. Aims have changed with changing conditions. For
example, during the five years immediately following the Congress of
Berlin, British diplomacy was directed strenuously towards keeping down
emancipated Bulgaria, and towards preventing the encroachment of Servia
in the direction of the Adriatic and the Ægean. But when she saw that
Bulgaria had refused to be the tool of Russia, and when her problem of
the trade route of India had been solved by the buying up of the
majority of shares in the Suez Canal and the occupation of Egypt, Great
Britain championed Bulgaria and sustained her in the annexation of
Eastern Rumelia. British policy remained anti-Servian for thirty
years. There was more in the withdrawal of the British Legation from
Belgrade than disapproval of a dastardly regicide. But the moment
British commerce began to fear German competition, and an accord had
been made with Russia to remove causes of conflict, the British press
began to change its tone towards Servia. What a miracle has been
wrought in the decade since "an {165} immoral race of blackguards, with
no sense of national honour" has become "that brave and noble little
race, spirited defenders of the liberties of Europe!" I quote these
two sentiments from the same newspapers. If Premier Asquith is sincere
in his belief that this present war is to defend the principle of the
sanctity of treaties, will he insist, when peace is concluded, that
Servia make good her oath to Bulgaria, and Russia her international
treaty obligations in regard to the kingdom of Poland? Great Britain
is the least of the offenders when it comes to diplomatic cant and
hypocrisy. For the British electorate has a keen sense of justice, and
an intelligent determination that British influence shall be exerted
for the betterment of humanity. Cabinets must reckon with this
electorate when they decide questions of foreign policy.
But we do not want to lose ourselves in a maze of diplomatic intrigue,
which it is fruitless to follow, even if we could. We must limit
ourselves to an exposition of the ambitions of Austria-Hungary and of
the Balkan States to the possession of this coveted province.
Since the creation of modern Italy, the great German trade route to the
Mediterranean has been changed. The influence in Teutonic commercial
evolution of the passing of Lombardy and Venetia from the political
tutelage of a thousand years has been of tremendous importance, for the
connection between Germany and Italy had always been vital. It was the
first Napoleon who broke this connection. It was the third Napoleon
who nullified the effort {166} of the Congress of Vienna to
re-establish it. United Italy gave a new direction to Teutonic
expansion. United Germany gave to it a new impulsion. The _Drang nach
Osten_ was born.
By the Convention of Reichstadt in 1876, Austria-Hungary secured from
Russia the promise of the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina
in return for her neutrality in the "approaching war of liberation" of
Russia against Turkey. In order to liberate some Slavs, Russia changed
the subjection of others. The Convention of Reichstadt is really the
starting-point of the quarrel which has grown so bitterly during the
last generation between Austria and Russia over the Slavs of the Balkan
Peninsula. Russia paid dearly for a "free hand" with Turkey in 1877.
She is paying still.
In her attitude towards the Balkans, Austria has had three distinct
aims: the prevention of a Slavic outlet to the Adriatic, the
realization of a German outlet to the Ægean, and the effectual
hindrance of the growth in the Balkans of a strong independent south
Slavic state, which might prove a fatal attraction to her own provinces
of Croatia and Dalmatia. It was this triple consideration that led her
to the occupation and annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to the
policy of hostility to Servia, which is developed in another chapter.
Desiring to possess for herself the wonderful port of Salonika on the
Ægean bea, to reach which her railroads would have to cross Macedonia,
the policy of Austria-Hungary towards Macedonia has been consistently
to endeavour to uphold the semblance of Turkish {167} authority, and at
the same time to make that authority difficult to uphold through the
exciting of racial rivalry among Greece, Servia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and
Albania, in this turbulent country. Turkey and Austria met on the
common ground of "keeping the pot boiling," although with a different
aim. By keeping the pot boiling, Turkey thought that her sovereignty
was safe, while Austria hoped that when Turkey and the Balkan States
had worn themselves out, each opposing the other, she could step in and
capture the prize.
Turkey and Austria-Hungary, then, conspired together to create as many
points of conflict as possible among the Macedonians of different
races. The most devilish ingenuity was constantly exercised in
stirring up and keeping alive the hatred of each race over the other.
While frequently aroused to the point of making perfunctory protests,
the other nations of Europe, with the exception of Russia, let Austria
and Turkey do as they pleased, just as Turkey was allowed a free hand
in massacring the Armenians. The _laissez faire_ policy of the Powers
was a denial of their treaty obligations.
It was only when the Balkan States awoke to the realization of the fact
that they were regarded as mere pawns upon the chessboard of world
politics, to be sacrificed without compunction by the European Powers
whenever it was to their interest, that they buried differences for a
moment, and worked out their own salvation. If the Balkan Wars have
brought the present terrible disaster upon Europe, it is no more than
the contemptible {168} diplomacy of self interest and mutual jealousy
could expect.
Why was the Austro-Turkish policy possible, and why did it succeed for
a whole generation?
The Ottoman Empire was founded in the Balkan peninsula by rulers whose
military genius was coupled with their ability to use one Christian
population against the other. The Osmanlis never fought a battle in
which the Balkan Christians did not give valuable assistance in forging
the chains of their slavery. The Osmanlis conquered the Balkan peoples
by means of the Balkan peoples. They kept possession of the country
just as long as they could pit one chief against another, and then,
when national feeling arose, one race against another.
Gradually, in the portion of the Balkans where one race was
predominant, nationalities began to form states, which secured
independence as soon as they demonstrated the possibility of harmony.
Greece was the first, and was followed by Servia. Moldavia and
Wallachia united into the principality of Rumania. Last of all came
Bulgaria. After having gained autonomy, independence was only a matter
of form. But in the central portion of the Balkan Peninsula, from the
Black Sea to the Ægean, through Thrace, Macedonia, and Albania, the
sovereignty of Turkey, restored by the Treaty of Berlin, was able to
endure. For the people were mixed up, race living with race, and in no
place could the Christians of any one race claim that the country was
wholly theirs.
As emancipated Greeks, Servians and Bulgarians {169} formed independent
states, they looked towards Macedonia as the legitimate territory for
expansion. But here their claims, both historically and racially,
overlapped. Greece regarded Macedonia as entirely Hellenic. Had it
not always been Greek before the Osmanlis came, from the days of Philip
of Macedon to the Paleologi of the Byzantine Empire? The Servians, on
the other hand, invoked the memory of the Servian Empire of Stephen
Dushan, who in the fourteenth century, on the eve of the Ottoman
conquest, was crowned "King of Romania" at Serres. It was from the
Servians and not from the Greeks, that the Osmanlis conquered Macedonia
in the three battles of the Maritza, Tchernomen, and Kossova. The
Bulgarians invoked the memory of their mediæval domination of Macedonia
and Thrace. It was by the Bulgarians that northern Thrace was defended
against the Ottoman invasion; a Bulgarian prince was the last
independent ruler of central Macedonia; and long before the ephemeral
Servian Empire of Stephen Dushan, the Bulgarian Czars were recognized
from Tirnova to Okrida. This latter city, in fact, was the seat of the
autonomous Bulgarian patriarchate in the Middle Ages.
These historical claims, to us of western Europe, would have only a
sentimental value. They had been forgotten by the subject populations
of European Turkey for many centuries. The first revival of political
ambitions was that of Hellenism. Modern Greece, divorcing itself from
the impossible and pagan dream of a restoration of classic Greece, with
Athens as its capital, which had been woven for it {170} by western
European admirers during the first half century of its liberation,
began to take stock of its Byzantine and Christian heritage during the
latter part of the reign of Abdul Aziz. The new Hellenism, as the
prestige of the Ottoman Empire decreased, took the definite form of a
determination to succeed the Ottoman Empire, as it had preceded it,
with Constantinople as capital.
The Greeks believed themselves to be the unifying Christian race of the
Balkan Peninsula. They had a tremendous advantage over the Slavs,
because the ecclesiastical organization, to which all the Christians of
the Balkan Peninsula owed allegiance, was in their hands. When
Mohammed the Conqueror entered Constantinople, he gave to the Patriarch
of the Eastern Church the headship of the Balkan Christians. The
spirit of Moslem institutions provides for no other form of government
than a theocracy. Religion has always been to the Osmanli the test of
nationality. The Christians formed one _millet_, or nation. This
_millet_ was Greek. During all the centuries of Ottoman subjection,
the Balkan Christians owed allegiance to the Greek Patriarchate.
Whatever their native tongue, the language of the Church and _of the
schools_ was Greek.
Unfortunately for Hellenism, the new Greek aspirations came into
immediate conflict with the renaissance of the Bulgarian nation.
Russia had long been encouraging, for the purposes of Pan-Slavism, the
awakening of a sense of nationality in the south Slavs. Her agents had
been long and patiently working among the Bulgarians. But they {171}
overshot their mark. When Bulgarian priests and the few educated men
of the peasant nation turned their attention to their past and their
language, it was not the idea of their kinship with the great Slavic
Power of eastern Europe that was aroused, _but the consciousness of
their own particular race_. Bulgaria had been great when Russia was
practically unknown. Bulgaria could be great once more, when, by the
disappearance of Ottoman rule, the Bulgarian Empire of the Middle Ages
would be born again in the Balkans.
One can readily appreciate that _the first necessity of Bulgarian
renaissance was liberation from the Greek Church_. Russia strenuously
opposed this separatist agitation. What she wanted was a Slavic
movement within the bosom of the Greek Orthodox Church, which, if
bitterly persecuted by the Patriarchate, would throw the south Slavs
upon the Russian Synod for protection, or, if tolerated, would give
Russia a powerful voice in the councils of the Orthodox Church in the
Ottoman Empire. But the Bulgarians had progressed too far on the road
of religious separation from the Greeks to be arrested by their Russian
godfather. It was a prophecy of the future independent spirit of the
Bulgarian people, which Beaconsfield and Salisbury unfortunately failed
to note, that the Bulgarians determined to go the length of uniting
with Rome in order to get free from Phanar. Another Uniate sect would
have been born had Russia not yielded. With bad grace, her Ambassador
obtained from Sultan Abdul Aziz the _firman_ of March 11, 1870,
creating the Bulgarian Exarchate.
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The cleverness of the Bulgarians outwitted the manoeuvre made to have
the seat of the Exarchate at Sofia. The Greeks realized that a
formidable competitor had entered into the struggle for Macedonia.
From that moment there has been hatred between Greek and Bulgarian. In
spite of the treaty of Bukarest, the end of the struggle is not yet.
The policy and ambition of the modern state are dictated by strong
economic reasons, of which sentimental aspirations are only the outward
expression. If wars and the treaties that follow them were guided by
honest confession of the real issues at stake, how much easier the
solution of problems, and how much greater the chances of finding
durable bases for treaties! The whole effort of Bulgaria in Macedonia
may be explained by the simple statement that the Bulgarian race has
been seeking its natural, logical, and inevitable outlet to the Ægean
Sea.
During the middle of the nineteenth century, Servian national
aspirations were directed toward Croatia, Dalmatia, and
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Servians thought only in terms of the west.
It was the foundation of the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy in 1867,
followed by the Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the
_sandjak_ of Novi Bazar, that let Servia to enter into the struggle for
Macedonia.
As soon as Russia saw that she could not control Bulgaria, she began to
favour a Servian propaganda in the valley of the Vardar. Russian
intrigues at Constantinople led to the suppression of the Bulgarian
bishoprics of Okrida, Uskub, Küprülü (Veles) {173} and Nevrokop.
Bulgaria secured the restoration of these bishoprics through the
efforts of Austria-Hungary and Great Britain. The story of Macedonia
is full of instances like this of intrigue and counter intrigue by
European Powers at the Sublime Porte. Combinations of interests
changed sometimes over night. Is it any wonder that the Turks grew to
despise the European alliances, and to laugh at every "joint note" of
the Powers in relation to Macedonia?
Austria-Hungary opposed the Russian aid given to Servia by introducing
a new racial propaganda. Ever since the Roman occupation there had
been a small, but widely diffused, element in the population of
Macedonia, which retained the Roman language, just as the Wallachians
and Moldavians north of the Danube had done. Diplomatic suggestion at
Bukarest succeeded in interesting Rumania in these Kutzo-Wallachians,
as they came to be called. Rumania did not have a common boundary with
European Turkey. But her statesmen were quick to see the advantage of
having "a finger in the pie" when the Ottoman Empire disappeared from
Europe. So Rumania became protector of the Kutzo-Wallachian. The
Sublime Porte gladly agreed to recognize this protectorate. The
development of a strong Rumanian element in Macedonia would help
greatly to preserve Turkish sovereignty. For Rumania could have no
territorial aspirations there, and would look with disfavour upon
Rumania being swallowed up by Greece, Servia, or Bulgaria. Another
propaganda, well financed, and encouraged {174} by the Austro-Hungarian
and Turkish Governments was added to the rivalry of races in Macedonia.
We cannot do more than suggest these intrigues. After 1885, the
Macedonian question became gradually the peculiar care of the two "most
interested" Powers. There was little to attract again international
attention until the question of Turkey's existence as a state was
brought forward in a most startling way by the repercussion throughout
the Empire of the Armenian massacres of 1893-96. _By refusing to
intervene at that time, the Powers, who fondly thought that they were
acting in the interest of the integrity of the Empire, were really
contributing to its further decline_.
Elsewhere we have spoken of the Cretan insurrection of 1896 and the
train of events that followed it, ending in the formation of the Balkan
alliance to drive Turkey out of Europe. Here we take up the other
thread which leads us to the Balkan Wars. Bulgaria, remembering the
happy result of her own sufferings from the massacres of twenty years
before, was keen enough to see in the Asiatic holocausts of the "Red
Sultan" a sign of weakness instead of a show of strength. The
statesmen of the European Powers had not acted to stop the massacres of
the Armenians. But their indecision and impolitic irresolution was not
an expression of the sentiments of the civilized races whom they
represented. The time was ripe for an insurrection in Macedonia.
Public opinion in Europe would sustain it. The movement was launched
from Sofia.
From that moment, Turkish sovereignty was {175} doomed. Turkey did not
realize this, however. Instead of adopting the policy of treating with
Bulgaria, and giving her an economic outlet to the Ægean Sea, the
Sublime Porte was delighted with the anticipation of a new era of
racial rivalry in Macedonia. For it knew that Bulgaria's efforts to
secure Macedonian autonomy would be opposed by Servia and Greece. In
fact, the Greeks were so alarmed by the Bulgarian activity that
immediately after their unhappy war with Turkey they gave active
support to the Turks in putting down the Bulgarian rebels. The
services of the Greek Patriarchate were particularly valuable to Turkey
at this time.
Nor did Austria-Hungary and Russia appreciate the significance of the
Bulgarian movement. In 1897, they signed an accord, solemnly agreeing
that the _status quo_ be preserved in the Balkan peninsula. Russia was
anxious for this convention with Austria. For the moment all her
energies were devoted to developing the policy in the Far East that was
to end so abruptly eight years later on the battlefield of Mukden.
Austria-Hungary was delighted to have the solution of the Macedonian
problem delayed. _She felt that every year of anarchy in European
Turkey would bring her nearer to Salonika_. The _Drang nach Osten_ was
to be made possible through the strife of Servian, Bulgarian, and Greek.
The moment was favourable for the Bulgarian propaganda. Russia was too
much involved in Manchuria to help the Servians. The Greeks had lost
prestige with the Macedonians by their easy {176} and humiliating
defeat at the hands of Turkey. Gathering force with successive years,
and supported by the admirably laid foundation of the Bulgarian
ecclesiastic and scholastic organizations throughout Macedonia, the
Bulgarian bands gradually brought the _vilayets_ of Monastir, Uskub,
and Salonika into a state of civil war. In 1901 and 1902, conditions
in Macedonia were beyond description. But the Powers waited for some
new initiative on the part of Austria-Hungary and Russia.
Emperor Franz Josef and Czar Nicholas met at Mürszteg in the autumn of
1903. Russia, more and more involved in Manchuria, and on the eve of
her conflict with Japan, found no difficulty in falling in with the
suggestion of the Austrian Foreign Secretary that the two Powers
present to the signers of the Treaty of Berlin a program of "reforms"
for Macedonia. Europe received with delight this new manifestation of
harmony between Austria-Hungary and Russia.
In 1904 the "Program of Mürszteg" was imposed upon Turkey by a
comic-opera show of force on the part of the Powers. An international
_gendarmerie_ was their solution of the Macedonian problem. Different
spheres were mapped out, and allotted to officers of the different
Powers. Germany refused to participate in this farce, just as she had
refused to participate in "protecting" Crete.
The international "pacification" failed in Macedonia for the same
reasons that it had failed in Crete, and was to fail a third time ten
years later in Albania. _It was a compromise between the Powers, {177}
dictated by considerations which had nothing whatever to do with the
problem of which it was supposed to be the solution_. This is the
story of European diplomacy in the Near East.
From the very moment that Turkey found herself compelled to accept the
policing of Macedonia by European officers, she set to work to make
their task impossible. Hussein Hilmi pasha was sent to Salonika as
Governor. An accord was quickly established between him and the
Austro-Hungarian agents in Macedonia. Where the Bulgarians were weak,
the Turks and the Austrian emissaries encouraged the Bulgarian
propaganda. Where the Greeks were weak, Hellenic bands were allowed
immunity. Where the Servians were weak, the connivance of the
Government. The European _gendarmerie_ was powerless to struggle
against Turkish, Austro-Hungarian, and Balkan intrigues. The
correspondence of the European officers and consuls, and of journalists
who visited Macedonia during this period, makes interesting reading.
Their point of view is almost invariably that of their surroundings.
It depended upon just what part of Macedonia one happened to be in, or
the company in which one travelled, whether a certain nationality were
"noble heroes suffering for an ideal" or "blood-thirsty ruffians." Why
are so many writers who pretend to be impartial observers like
chameleons?
Greece, Servia, and Bulgaria were alike guilty of subsidizing bands of
armed men, who imagined that they were fulfilling a patriotic duty in
brutally {178} forcing their particular nationality upon ignorant
peasants, most of whom did not know--or care--to what nation they
belonged. There was little to choose between the methods and the
actions of the different bands. Everywhere pillage, incendiarism, and
assassination were the order of the day. When Christian propagandists
let them alone, the poor villagers had to endure the same treatment
from Moslem Albanians and from the Turkish soldiery.
In order to give the "reforms" of the Program of Mürszteg a chance,
Athens, Sofia, and Belgrade ostensibly withdrew their active support of
the bands. But the efforts of the Powers had still not only the secret
bad faith of Austria-Hungary and Turkey to contend with, but also the
determination of the Macedonians themselves not to be "reformed" _à
l'européenne_, that is to say, _à la turque_. The powerful Bulgarian
"interior organization" in Macedonia kept up the struggle in the hope
that the continuation of anarchy would bring the Powers to see that
there was no other solution possible of the Macedonian question _than
the autonomy of Macedonia under a Christian governor_. Greeks and
Servians opposed the project of autonomy, however, because they knew
that it would result eventually in the reversion of Macedonia to
Bulgaria. The history of Eastern Rumelia would be repeated. In
considering the Macedonian problem, it must never be forgotten that the
great bulk of the population of Macedonia is Bulgarian, in spite of all
the learned dissertations and imposing statistics of Greek and Servian
writers. But the difficulty is that this {179} Bulgarian population is
agricultural. In the cities _near the sea_ and all along the seacoast
from Salonika to Dedeagatch the Greek element is predominant. No
geographical division of Macedonia can be made, viable from the
economic point of view, which satisfies racial claims by following the
principle of preponderant nationality.
After her disasters in the Far East, Russia began to turn her attention
once more to the Near East. A reopening of the Macedonian question
between Austria-Hungary and Russia was imminent when the Young Turk
revolution of July, 1908, upset all calculations, and brought a new
factor into the problem of the future of European Turkey.
Austria-Hungary boldly challenged--more than that, defied--Russia by
annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this action she was backed by Germany.
Russia and France were not ready for war. Great Britain and Italy,
each involved in an internal social revolution of tremendous
importance, could not afford to risk the programs of their respective
cabinets by embarking upon uncertain foreign adventures.
The Balkan States were left to solve the Macedonian problem by
themselves. Their solution was the Treaty of Bukarest. The success of
Servia in planting herself in the valley of the Vardar, and in
occupying Monastir, is the result of the struggle of races in
Macedonia. It is the direct, immediate cause of the European War of
1914.
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