_The Life of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan of Kabul._ By MOHAN LAL,
Esq., Knight of the Persian order of the Lion and Sun, lately
attached to the Mission at Kabul, &c. &c. London: 1846.
We have arrived at an age when striking contrasts and seeming
incongruities cease to startle and offend. If we have not yet attained
the promised era when the lion shall lie down with the lamb--and even of
that day a VAN AMBURGH and a CARTER have given us significant
intimations--we have certainly reached an epoch quite as extraordinary,
and behold things as opposite conciliated, as hostile reconciled. We
need not go far for illustrations: in the columns of newspapers, in the
public market-place, at each street-corner, they force themselves upon
us. The EAST and the WEST are brought together--the desert and the
drawing-room are but a pace apart--European refinements intrude
themselves into the haunts of barbarism--and bigoted Oriental potentates
learn tolerance from the liberality of the Giaour. An article upon
contrasts would fill a magazine. Ibrahim Pasha and religious liberty,
the Red Sea and the Peninsular Steam Company, the Great Desert and the
Narrow Gauge, are but one or two of a thousand that suggest themselves.
On all sides Europe thrusts out the giant arms of innovation, spanning
the globe, encompassing the world. England, especially, ever foremost in
the race, by enterprise and ingenuity achieves seeming miracles. With
steam for her active and potent agent, she drives highways across the
wilderness, covers remote seas with smoky shipping, replaces dromedaries
by locomotives, runs rails through the Arab village and the lion's lair.
From his carpet and coffee, his pipe and _farniente_, the astonished
Mussulman is roused by the rush and rattle of the train. On the sudden,
by no gradual transition or slow approach, is this semi-savage brought
in contact with the latest refinements and most astounding discoveries
of civilisation. He is bewildered by sights and sounds of which
yesterday he had not the remotest conception. Couriers traverse the
desert with the regularity of a London and Edinburgh mail; caravans of
well-dressed ladies and gentlemen ramble leisurely over the sands, and
brave the simoon on a trip of pleasure to the far East; omnibuses, after
the fashion of Paddington, have their stations on the Isthmus of Suez.
Every where the hat is in juxtaposition with the turban, and the boot of
the active Christian galls the slippered heel of Mahomet's indolent
follower, spurring him to progress and improvement.
As strange as any of the incongruous associations already hinted at, is
one that we are about to notice. That an Oriental should write a book,
is in no way wonderful; that he should write it in English, more or less
correct, may also be conceived, since abundant opportunities are
afforded to our Eastern fellow-subjects for the acquirement of that
language; but that he should write it, not out of the fulness of his
knowledge, or to convey the results of long study and profound
meditation, but merely, as the razors were made, to sell, does seem
strangely out of character, sadly derogatory to the gravity and dignity
of a Wise Man of the East. We have really much difficulty in portraying
upon our mental speculum so anomalous an animal as an Oriental
bookmaker. We cannot fancy a Knight of the very Persian order of the
Lion and Sun transformed into a publisher's hack, driving bargains with
printers, delivered over to devils, straining each nerve, resorting to
every stale device to swell his volumes to a presentable size, as if
bulk would atone for dulness, and wordiness for lack of interest. Such,
nevertheless, is the painful picture now forced upon us by a Kashmirian
gentleman of Delhi, Mohan Lal by name. Encouraged by the indulgent
reception accorded to an earlier, less pretending, and more worthy
literary attempt--allured also, perhaps, by visions of a shining river
of rupees pleasantly flowing into his purse, the aforesaid Lal,
Esquire--so does his title-page style him--has committed himself by the
fabrication of two heavy volumes, whose interesting portions are, for
the most part stale, and whose novelties are of little interest. Neither
the fulsome dedication, nor the humility of the preface, nor the
indifferent lithographs, purporting to represent notable Asiatics and
Europeans, can be admitted in palliation of this Kashmirian scribbler's
literary misdemeanour. It is impossible to feel touched or mollified
even by the plaintive tone in which he informs us that he has disbursed
three hundred pounds for payment of copyists, paper, and portraits. The
latter, by the bye, will hardly afford much gratification to their
originals, at least if they be all as imperfect and unflattering in
their resemblance as some two or three which we have had opportunities
of comparing. But that is a minor matter. Illustration is a mania of the
day--a crotchet of a public whose reading appetite, it is to be feared,
is in no very healthy state. From penny tracts to quarto volumes, every
thing must have pictures--the more the better--bad ones rather than
none. Turning from the graphic embellishments of the books before us, we
revert to the letterpress, and to the endeavour to sift something of
interest or value out of the nine hundred pages through which, in
conscientious fulfilment of our critical duties, we have wearisomely
toiled.
The work in question purports to be a life of Dost Mohammed Khan, the
well-known Amir of Kabul. It is what it professes to be, but it is also
a great deal more; the whole has been named from a part. A history of
the affairs of Sindh occupies nearly half a volume, and consists chiefly
of copious extracts from works already published--such as _Pottinger's
Bilochistan_, _Dr Burnes' Visit to the Court of Sindh_, _Sir A. Burnes'
Travels in Bokhara_, _Thornton's British India_--from which sources the
unscrupulous Lal helps himself unsparingly, and with scarce a word of
apology either to reader or writer. We have long accounts of Russian
intrigues, and of those alarming plots and combinations which frightened
Lords Auckland and Palmerston from their propriety, and led to our
interference and reverses in Afghanistan--interference so impotently
followed up, reverses which neither have been nor ever can be fully
redeemed. The mismanagement or incapacity of our political agents during
the short time that we maintained the unfortunate Shah Shuja on the
throne of Kabul, is another fertile topic for the verbose Kashmirian;
but this, it must be observed, is one of the best portions of his book,
although it has no very direct reference to Dost Mohammed, "the lion of
my subject and hero of my tale," as his historian styles him. Numerous
copies of despatches, treaties and diplomatic correspondence, sundry
testimonies of Mr. Lal's abilities and services, and various extraneous
matters, complete the volumes. To give the barest outline of so
voluminous a work would lead us far beyond our allotted limits. We
should even be puzzled to effect the analysis of the first half volume,
which sketches the history of Afghanistan from the period when Payandah
Khan, chief of the powerful Barakzai tribe and father of Dost Mohammed,
was the prime favourite and triumphant general of Taimur Shah, up to the
date when the Dost himself, after a long series of bloody wars, sat upon
the throne, was in the zenith of his prosperity, and when British
diplomatists first began to make and meddle in the affairs of his
kingdom. The perpetually recurring changes, the revolts, revolutions,
and usurpations of which Afghanistan was the scene with little
intermission during the whole of that period, the absence of dates,
which Mohan Lal accounts for by the loss of his manuscripts during the
Kabul insurrection, and the host of proper names introduced, render this
part of the work most perplexingly confused. The reader, however
attentive to his task, becomes fairly bewildered amidst the multitude of
Khans, Shahs, Vazirs, Sardars, and other personages, who pass in hurried
review before his eyes, and utterly puzzled by the strange manoeuvres
and seemingly unaccountable treasons of the actors in this great
Eastern melodrama. In glancing at the book, we shall confine ourselves
more strictly than Mohan Lal has done, to the personal exploits and
history of Dost Mohammed.
On the death of Taimur Shah, leaving several sons, there was much
difference of opinion amongst the nobles as to who should succeed him.
Payandah Khan, who had received from the sovereign he had so faithfully
served, the title of Sarfraz, or, the Lofty, and whose position and
influence in the country enabled him in some sort to play the part of
king-maker, solved the difficulty by placing Prince Zaman upon the
throne. For a time Zaman was all gratitude, until evil advisers poisoned
his mind, and accused Payandah and other chiefs of plotting to transfer
the crown to Shah Shuja, another son of Taimur. Without trial or
investigation, the persons accused were put to death; and the sons and
nephews of Payandah became fugitives, and suffered great misery. Some
were taken prisoners, others begged their bread, or took shelter in the
mausoleum of Ahmad Shah, in order to receive a share of the food there
doled out for charity's sake. Fatah Khan, the eldest son of Payandah,
fled to Persia; Dost Mohammed, the twentieth son of the same father,
found protection in a fortress belonging to the husband of his mother,
who, in conformity with an Afghan custom, had been claimed by and
compelled to marry one of the nearest relatives of her deceased lord.
This occurred when Dost was a child of seven or eight years old. After a
while, Fatah Khan returned from Persia with an army, and accompanied by
Mahmud Shah, another of Taimur's sons who pretended to the crown of
Afghanistan. His first encounter with the troops of Shah Zaman was a
triumph; and now, says the figurative Lal, the stars of the descendants
of the Sarfraz began to shine. Fatah sought out his young brother, Dost
Mohammed, gave him in charge to a trusty adherent, fixed an income for
his support, and marched away to besiege Qandhar, which he took by
escalade. This was the commencement of a war of succession, or rather of
a series of wars, in which the two sons of Payandah played important
parts. The elder met his death, the younger gained a crown. At first the
contest was amongst the sons and grandsons of Taimur; to several of whom
in turn Fatah and Dost gave their powerful support. It was not till
after many years of civil strife that the last-named chief, prompted by
ambition, and presuming on his popularity and high military reputation,
set up on his own account, and bore away the prize from the more
legitimate competitors.
When only in his twelfth year, Dost Mohammed Khan was attached to the
retinue of his brother as _abdar_, or water-bearer. He soon acquired
Fatah's confidence, and was admitted to share his secrets. Before he was
fourteen years old, he displayed great energy and intrepidity, which
qualities, added to his remarkable personal beauty, rendered him
exceedingly popular in the country and a vast favourite with Fatah, but
excited the jealousy of his other brothers--men of little more than
ordinary capacity, totally unable to compete with him in any respect.
Whilst still a mere lad, Dost, by his courage and sagacity, delivered
Fatah from more than one imminent peril. At last Shah Zaman, who had
been deposed and blinded, and his son Shah Zadah, laid a snare for Fatah
in the palace-gardens at Qandhar. Ambushed men suddenly seized him,
hurled him to the ground with such violence as to break his teeth, and
kept him prisoner. Dost Mohammed made a dashing attempt at a rescue; but
he had only five hundred followers, the palace was strongly garrisoned,
and a heavy fire of matchlocks repelled him. Meanwhile large bodies of
troops marched to occupy the city gates; and, for his own safety's sake,
he was compelled to leave his brother in captivity, and cut his way out.
Retreating to his stronghold of Giriskh, he awaited the passage of a
rich caravan from Persia. This he plundered, thereby becoming possessed
of about four lakhs of rupees, which he employed in raising troops. With
these he invested Qandhar. After a three months' siege, the garrison had
exhausted its provisions and ammunition; and Zadah, to get rid of the
terrible Dost, released Fatah Khan. The prisoner's liberation was also
partly owing to the intercession of Shah Shuja; notwithstanding which,
Fatah and Dost, with an utter contempt of gratitude and loyalty, soon
afterwards turned their arms against that prince. A great cavalry fight
took place, in which the brave but unprincipled brothers were
victorious. Dost Mohammed was made a field-marshal, and marched against
an army commanded by Shah Shuja in person; a desperate battle ensued,
terminated by negotiation, and once more Dost and the Shah were allies.
But no sooner had poor Shuja gained over his enemies, than his friends
revolted against him, and set up his nephew Zadah as king of
Afghanistan; and very soon his new allies, with unparalleled treachery,
and despite of the titles and presents he had showered upon them, once
more abandoned him. Friend Lal, we are sorry to perceive, seems struck
rather with admiration than horror of these double-dyed traitors, and
talks of the brave heart and wise head of Dost Mohammed, and of the
noble and independent notions which nature had cultivated in him; thus
betraying a certain Oriental laxity of principle which European
education and society might have been expected to eradicate. But he is
perhaps dazzled and blinded by the brilliant military prowess of Dost,
who, at the head of only three thousand men, fell upon the
advanced-guard of the Shah's army, ten thousand strong, and, after a
terrible slaughter, completely routed it. The news of this reverse
greatly incensed and alarmed Shuja, who said confidentially to his
minister, that whilst Dost Mohammed was alive and at large, he (Shuja)
could never expect victory or the enjoyment of his crown. A wonderful
and true prophecy, observes Mohan Lal. Shortly afterwards, the remainder
of the Shah's troops were defeated by Dost, and the Shah himself was
once more a fugitive.
Shah Mahmud was now placed upon the throne; Vazir Fatah Khan was his
prime minister, and Dost received the title of Sardar, or chief. It was
about this time that the "Sardar of my tale," as the worthy Lal
affectionately styles his hero, committed the first of a series of
murders which, were there no other infamous deeds recorded of him, would
stamp him as vile, and destroy any sympathy that his bravery in the
field and notable talents might otherwise excite in his favour. A
Persian secretary, one Mirza Ali Khan, by his skill and conduct as a
politician, and by his kindly disposition, gained a popularity and
influence which offended the ambitious brothers, and Fatah desired Dost
to make away with him.
"On receiving the orders of the Vazir, Dost Mohammed armed himself
cap-a-pie, and taking six men with him, went and remained waiting on the
road between the house of Mohammed Azim Khan and the Mirza. It was about
midnight when the Mirza passed by Dost Mohammed Khan, whom he saw, and
said, 'What has brought your highness here at this late hour? I hope all
is good.' He also added, that Dost Mohammed should freely command his
services if he could be of any use to him. He replied to the Mirza that
he had got a secret communication for him, and would tell him if he
moved aside from the servants. He stopped his horse, whereupon Dost
Mohammed, holding the mane of the horse with his left hand, and taking
his dagger in his right, asked the Mirza to bend his head to hear him.
While Dost Mohammed pretended to tell him something of his own
invention, and found that the Mirza was hearing him without any
suspicion, he stabbed him between the shoulders, and throwing him off
his horse, cut him in many places. This was the commencement of the
murders which Dost Mohammed Khan afterwards frequently committed."
Notwithstanding his high military rank and great services, Dost was very
submissive to Fatah, who was greatly his senior. He acted as his
cup-bearer, and was a constant attendant at his nocturnal carouses,
carrying a golden goblet, and helping him to wine. The morals of both
brothers were as exceptionable in private as in public life. Their
biographer gives details of an intrigue between Dost and the favourite
wife of Fatah; and even hints a doubt whether the Vazir was not
cognizant of the intercourse, which he took no steps to check or punish.
Both brothers were fond of wine, and indulged in it to excess. Dost,
especially, was at one time a most unmitigated sot, although his
bibulous propensities had apparently no permanent effect upon his
intellects and energies. His capacity for liquor, if Lal's account be
authentic, was extraordinary. "It is said that he has emptied several
dozens of bottles in one night, and did not cease from drinking until he
was quite intoxicated, and could not drink a drop more. He has often
become senseless from drinking, and has, on that account, kept himself
confined in bed during many days. He has been often seen in a state of
stupidity on horseback, and having no turban, but a skull-cap, on his
head." At a later period of his life, Dost Mohammed, being abroad one
evening, met two of his sons, Afzal Khan, and the well-known Akhbar
Khan, in an intoxicated state. Less tolerant for his children than for
himself, he gave them a sound thrashing, and, not satisfied with that,
took them up to the roof of a house, and threw them down on stony
ground, to the risk of their lives. The mother of Akhbar heard of this,
and reproached her husband with punishing others for a vice he himself
was prone to. Dost hung his head, and swore to drink wine no more. We
are not told whether he kept the vow, but subsequently, when he was made
Amirul-Momnim, or Commander of the Faithful, he did forsake his drunken
habits. On his reinstatement at Kabul, after its final abandonment by
the British, he relapsed into his old courses, saying, that whilst he
was an enemy to wine, he was always unlucky; but that since he had
resumed drinking, his prosperity had returned, and he had gained his
liberty after being in "Qaid i Frang," which, being interpreted, means
an English prison. When sitting over his bottle, he can sing a good
song, and play upon the _rabab_, a sort of Afghan fiddle, with very
considerable skill. Altogether, and setting aside his throat-cuttings,
and a few other peculiarities, Dost Mohammed must be considered as
rather a jovial and good-humoured barbarian.
Although a fervent admirer of the fair sex, the valiant Sardar
occasionally, in the hurry and excitement of war and victory, forgot the
respect to which it is entitled. A blunder of this description was
productive of fatal consequences to his brother the Vazir. A breach of
decorum overthrew a dynasty: a lady's girdle changed the destinies of a
kingdom. The circumstances were as follows:--By a well-executed
stratagem, Dost Mohammed surprised the city of Hirat, seized Shah Zadah
Firoz, who ruled there, and plundered the palace. Not content with
appropriating the rich store of jewels, gold, and silver, found in the
treasury, he despoiled the inmates of the harem, and committed an
offence unpardonable in Eastern eyes, by taking off the jewelled band
which fastened the trowsers of the daughter-in-law of Shah Zadah. The
insulted fair one sent her profaned inexpressibles to her brother, a son
of Mahmud Shah, known by the euphonious appellation of Kam Ran. Kam
swore to be revenged. Even Fatah Khan was so shocked at the unparalleled
impropriety of his brother's conduct, that he threatened to punish him;
whereupon Dost, with habitual prudence, avoided the coming storm, and
took refuge with another of his brothers, then governor of Kashmir. Kam
Ran came to Hirat, found that Dost had given him the slip, and consoled
himself by planning, in conjunction with some other chiefs, the
destruction of Fatah Khan. They seized him, put out his eyes, and
brought him pinioned before Mahmud Shah, whom he himself had set upon
the throne. The Shah desired him to write to his rebellious brothers to
submit: he steadily refused, and Mahmud then ordered his death. "The
Vazir was cruelly and deliberately butchered by the courtiers, who cut
him limb from limb, and joint from joint, as was reported, after his
nose, ears, fingers, and lips, had been chopped off. His fortitude was
so extraordinary, that he neither showed a sign of the pain he suffered,
nor asked the perpetrators to diminish their cruelties; and his head was
at last sliced from his lacerated body. Such was the shocking result of
the misconduct of his brother, the Sardar Dost Mohammed Khan, towards
the royal female in Hirat. However, the end of the Vazir, Fatah Khan,
was the end of the Sadozai reign, and an omen for the accession of the
new dynasty of the Barakzais, or his brothers, in Afghanistan."
It would be tiresome to trace in detail the events that followed the
Vazir's death,--the numerous battles--the treaties concluded and
violated--the reverses and triumphs of the various chiefs who contended
for the supremacy. To revenge their brother, and gratify their own
ambition, the Barakzais united together, expelled Mahmud, and divided
the country amongst themselves. Mohammed Azim, the eldest brother, took
Kabul, Sultan Mohammed had Peshavar, Purdil Khan received Qandhar, and
to the Sardar Dost Mohammed Ghazni was allotted. Apparently all were
content with this arrangement; but, in secret, Dost was far from
satisfied, and plotted to improve his share. With this view, he entered
into negotiations with Ranjit Singh and the Lahore chiefs; and at last,
by intrigue and treachery, rather than by force of arms, he reduced
Mohammed Azim to such extremities and despair, that he retired to Kabul,
and there died broken-hearted. His son, Habib-Ullah, who succeeded him,
fared no better. He was turned out of Kabul, and exposed to want and
misery, which broke his spirit, and rendered him insane. He left the
country with his wives and children, whom he murdered on the banks of
the Indus, and threw into the river.
Whilst Dost was in full career of success and aggrandisement, achieved
by the most treacherous and sanguinary means, Shah Shuja raised an army
in Sindh, intending to invade Qandhar and recover his dominions. A
report was spread by certain discontented chiefs in Dost Mohammed's and
the Qandhar camps that the English favoured Shuja's attempt. To
ascertain the truth of this, Dost Mohammed addressed a letter to Sir
Claude Wade, then political agent at Loodianah, requesting to know
whether the Shah was supported by the English. If so, he said, he would
take the state of affairs into his deliberate consideration; but if the
contrary was the case, he was ready to fight the Shah. Sir Claude Wade
replied, that the British government took no share in the king's
expedition against the Barakzai chief, but that it wished him well.
Thereupon Dost and his son Akhbar Khan marched to meet the Shah. A
battle was fought in front of Qandhar, and at first victory seemed to
incline to Shuja; but by the exertions and valour of the Sardar and his
son, the tide was turned, and the threatened defeat converted into a
signal victory. "All the tents, guns, and camp equipage of the
ever-fugitive Shah Shuja fell into the hands of the Lion of Afghanistan,
and a large bundle of the papers and correspondence of various chiefs in
his country with the Shah. Among these he found many letters under the
real or forged seal of Sir Claude Wade, to the address of certain
chiefs, stating that any assistance given to Shah Shuja should be
appreciated by the British government."
Whilst Mohammed thus successfully assisted his brothers, the Qandhar
chiefs, against their common foe, Shah Shuja, his other brothers, the
Peshavar chiefs, were dispossessed by the Sikhs, and compelled to take
refuge at Jellalabad. There, expecting that Dost would be beaten by the
Shah, they planned to seize upon Kabul. Their measures were taken, and
in some districts they had actually appointed governors, when they
learned Shuja's defeat, and their brother's triumphant return. This was
the destruction of their ambitious projects; but with true Afghan craft
and hypocrisy, they put a good face upon the matter, fired salutes in
honour of the victory, disavowed the proceedings of those officers who,
by their express order, had taken possession of the Sardar's villages,
and went out to meet him with every appearance of cordiality and joy.
Although not the dupe of this seeming friendship, Dost Mohammed received
them well, and declared his intention of undertaking a religious war
against the Sikhs to revenge their aggressions at Peshavar, and to
punish them for having dared, as infidels, to make an inroad into a
Mahomedan land. In acting thus, the cunning Sardar had two objects in
view. One was to obtain recruits by appealing to the fanaticism of the
people, for his funds were low, and the Afghans were weary of war; the
other, which he at once attained, was to get himself made king, on the
ground that religious wars, fought under the name and flag of any other
than a crowned head, do not entitle those who fall in them to the glory
of martyrdom. The priests, chiefs, and counsellors, consulted together,
and agreed that Dost Mohammed ought to assume the royal title. The
Sardar, without any preparation or feast, went out of the Bala Hisar
with some of his courtiers; and in Idgah, Mir Vaiz, the head-priest of
Kabul, put a few blades of grass on his head, and called him
"Amirul-Momnin," or, "Commander of the Faithful." Thus did the wily and
unscrupulous Dost at last possess the crown he so long had coveted.
Instead, however, of being inflated by his dignity, the new Amir became
still plainer in dress and habits, and more easy of access than before.
Finding himself in want of money for his projected war, and unable to
obtain it by fair means, he now commenced a system of extortion, which
he carried to frightful lengths, pillaging bankers and merchants,
confiscating property, and torturing those who refused to acquiesce in
his unreasonable demands. One poor wretch, a trader of the name of Sabz
Ali, was thrown into prison, branded and tormented in various ways,
until he expired in agony. His relatives were compelled to pay the
thirty thousand rupees which it had been the object of this barbarous
treatment to extort. At last five lakhs of rupees were raised, wherewith
to commence the religious war. Its result was disastrous and
discreditable to the Amir. Without having fought a single battle, he was
outwitted and outmanoeuvred, and returned crestfallen to Kabul--his
brothers, the Peshavar chiefs, who were jealous of his recent elevation,
having aided in his discomfiture.
Although the Amir had many enemies both at home and abroad--the most
inveterate amongst the former being some of his own brothers--and
although he was often threatened by great dangers, he gradually
succeeded in consolidating his power, and fixing himself firmly upon the
throne he had usurped. Himself faithless and treacherous, he distrusted
all men; and gradually removing the governors of various districts, he
replaced them by his sons, who feared him, scrupulously obeyed his
orders, and followed his system of government. In time his power became
so well established that the intrigues of his dissatisfied brethren no
longer alarmed him. The Sikhs gave him some uneasiness, but in a battle
at Jam Road, near the entrance of the Khaibar Pass, his two sons, Afzal
and Akhbar, defeated them and killed their general, Hari Singh. The
victory was chiefly due to Afzal, but Akhbar got the credit, through the
management of his mother, the Amir's favourite wife. This unjust
partiality, to which we shall again have occasion to refer when touching
upon the future prospects of Afghanistan, greatly disheartened Afzal and
his brothers, and indisposed them towards their father.
The brief and imperfect outline which we have been enabled to give of
the career of Dost Mohammed, and of his arrival at the supreme power in
Kabul, is entirely deficient in dates. The Afghans have no records, but
preserve their history solely by tradition and memory. Mohan Lal having,
as before mentioned, lost his manuscripts, containing information
supplied by the Amir's relations and courtiers, was afterwards unable to
place the circumstances of his history in chronological order. The
deficiency is not very important, since it naturally ceases to exist
from the time that British India became mixed up in the affairs of
Afghanistan. The fight of Jam Road, in which the Afghans were the
aggressors, and which was occasioned by the Amir's cravings after the
province of Peshavar, brings us up to the latter part of the year 1836.
Previously and subsequently to that battle, Dost Mohammed wrote several
letters to the Governor-general of India, Lord Auckland, expressing his
fear of the Sikhs, and asking advice and countenance. Lord Auckland
resolved to accord him both, and dispatched Sir Alexander Burnes to
Kabul to negotiate the opening of the Indus navigation. The presence of
the British mission at the Amir's court, and the proposals made by the
Governor-general to the Maharajah to mediate between him and Dost
Mohammed, sufficed to check the advance of a powerful Sikh army which
Ranjit Singh had assembled to revenge the reverse of Jam Road. The Amir
was not satisfied with this protection; but urged Sir Alexander Burnes
to make the Sikhs give up Peshavar to him. The reply was, that Peshavar
had never belonged to the Amir, but to his brothers; that Ranjit Singh
was a faithful ally of the English government, which could not use its
authority directly in the case; but that endeavours should be made to
induce the Maharajah amicably to yield Peshavar to its former chief,
Sultan Mohammed Khan. This mode of viewing the question by no means met
the wishes of the ambitious Amir; for he coveted the territory for
himself, and would rather have seen it remain in the hands of the Sikhs
than restored to Sultan Mohammed, who was his deadly enemy.[45] He
expressed his dissatisfaction in very plain terms to Sir Alexander
Burnes; and perceiving that the English were not disposed to aid him in
his unjustifiable projects of aggrandisement, he threw himself into the
arms of Russia and Persia, to which countries he had, with
characteristic duplicity, communicated his grievances and made offers of
alliance, at the same time that he professed, in his letters to Lord
Auckland, to rely entirely upon British counsels and friendship.
And now commenced those intrigues and machinations of Russia, of which
so great a bugbear was made both in India and England. Mohan Lal
maintains that the apprehensions occasioned by these manoeuvres were
legitimate and well-founded; that the views of Russia were encroaching
and dangerous; and that her name and influence were already seriously
injurious to British interests, as far even as the eastern bank of the
Indus. Vague rumours of Russian power and valour had spread through
British India; had been exaggerated by Eastern hyperbole, and during
their passage through many mouths; and had rendered numerous chiefs,
Rajput as well as Mahomedan, restless and eager for a fray. Throughout
the country there was a growing belief that English power was on the eve
of a reverse. We are told of the mission of Captain Vikovich, of
Muscovite ducats poured into Afghan pockets, of an extension of
influence sought by Russia in Turkistan and Kabul, of arms to be
supplied by Persia, and of a Persian army to be marched into Afghanistan
to seize upon the disputed province of Peshavar. As the companion and
friend of Sir Alexander Burnes during his mission to Kabul, Mohan Lal
coincides in the opinions of that officer with respect to the necessity
of taking vigorous and immediate steps to counteract the united
intrigues of the Shah of Persia and Count Simonich, the Russian
ambassador at Tehran. This necessity was pressed upon Lord Auckland in
numerous and alarming despatches from Sir A. Burnes and other
Anglo-Indian diplomatists.
With such opinions and prognostications daily ringing in his ears, Lord
Auckland, who at first, we are told, did not attach much importance to
the Vikovich mission and the Russian intrigues, at last took fright, and
prepared to adopt the decisive measures so plausibly and perseveringly
urged by the alarmists. The well-known and notable plan to be resorted
to, was the expulsion of the Amir Dost Mohammed and of the other
Barakzai chiefs inimical to the British, and the establishment of a
friendly prince upon the throne of Kabul. Who was to be chosen? Two
candidates alone appeared eligible--Sultan Mohammed Khan, chief of
Peshavar, brother and bitter foe of the Amir, and Shah Shuja, the
deposed but legitimate sovereign of Afghanistan. The Shah, who had long
lived inactive and retired at Loodianah, was believed, not without
reason, to have lost any ability or talent for reigning which he had
ever possessed; nevertheless, his name and hereditary right caused him
to be preferred by Lord Auckland, whose advisers also were unanimous in
their recommendation of Shuja. "As for Shah Shuja," wrote Sir Alexander
Burnes, who had now left Kabul, in his letter to the Governor-general,
dated 3d June 1838, "the British government have only to send him to
Peshavar with an agent, one or two of its own regiments as an honorary
escort, and an avowal to the Afghans that we have taken up his cause, to
ensure his being fixed _for ever_ on his throne."
"The British government," said one of those on whose information that
government acted, (Mr Masson,) "could employ interference without
offending half-a-dozen individuals. Shah Shuja, under their auspices,
would not even encounter opposition," &c.--(_Thornton's British India_,
vol. vi. p. 150.)
"Annoyed at Dost Mohammed's reception of Vikovich, the Russian emissary,
and disquieted by the departure of the British agent, they (the
Afghans)" says Lieutenant Wood, "looked to the Amir as the sole cause of
their troubles, and thought of Shah Shuja and redress."
Sir C. Wade, Mr Lord, and other authorities supposed to be well versed
in the politics of the land where mischief was imagined to be brewing,
expressed opinions similar in substance to those just cited. It was
decided that Shuja was the man; and Sir William M'Naghten started for
the court of Lahore to negotiate a tripartite treaty between the
Maharajah, the Shah, and the British government. Wade and Burnes were to
co-operate with the envoy. The treaty was concluded and signed, advices
from Lord Palmerston strengthened and confirmed Lord Auckland in his
predilection for "vigorous measures," and a declaration of war was
proclaimed and circulated throughout India and Afghanistan.
Lord Auckland is, we dare to say, a very well-meaning man--albeit not
exactly of the stuff of which viceroys of vast empires ought to be made;
and we willingly believe that he acted to the best of his judgment in
undertaking the Afghan war. Unfortunately, that is not saying much. His
lordship's advisers may have been right in supposing that the people of
Kabul were weary of the Amir's extortionate and tyrannical rule, and
desired the milder government of Shah Shuja; but if so, it is the more
to be regretted that, when we had established Shuja on the throne, the
mismanagement and want of unity of British agents--amongst whom were
some of those very advisers--should so rapidly have changed the
partiality of the Afghans for the Shah into contempt, their friendly
dispositions towards the British into aversion and fierce hatred. Mohan
Lal strenuously insists upon the blamelessness of Lord Auckland in the
whole of the unfortunate affairs of Afghanistan; lauds his judicious
measures, and maintains that had they not been adopted, "disasters and
outbreaks would soon have appeared in the very heart of India. The
object of the governor-general was to annihilate the Russian and Persian
influence and intrigues in Afghanistan, both at that time, and for all
time to come, unless they adopt open measures; and this object he
fortunately and completely attained, in a manner worthy of the British
name, and laudable to himself as a statesman." We could say a word or
two on this head, but refrain, not wishing to rake up old grievances, or
discuss so uninteresting a subject as Lord Auckland's merits and
abilities. Mr Lal admits that his lordship made two enormous blunders:
one "in appointing two such talented men as Sir William M'Naghten and
Sir Alexander Burnes, to act at the same time, in one field of honour;
the second was, that on hearing of the outbreak at Kabul, he delayed in
insisting upon the commander-in-chief to order an immediate despatch of
the troops towards Peshavar." "He being the superior head of the
government," continues this long-winded Kashmirian, "he ought not to
allow hesitation to approach and to embarrass his sound judgement, at
the crisis when immediate and energetic attention was required." _De
mortuis nil_, &c.; and therefore, of the two unfortunate gentlemen above
referred to, we will merely say, that many have considered their talents
far less remarkable than their blunders. As to the Earl of
Auckland--"Save me from my friends!" his lordship might well exclaim.
Indecision and lack of discrimination compose a nice character for a
governor-general. One great criterion of ability to rule is a judicious
choice of subordinate agents. Lord Auckland's reason for not sending the
reinforcements so terribly required by our troops in Kabul, is thus
curiously rendered by his Eastern advocate:--"His lordship had already
made every arrangement to retire from the Indian government, and
therefore did not wish to prolong the time for his departure by
embarking in other and new operations." Truly a most ingenious defence!
So, because the governor-general was in haste to be off, an army must be
consigned to destruction. Most sapient Lal! his lordship is obliged to
you. "Call you that backing your friends?" May our worst enemy have you
for his apologist.
We return to Dost Mohammed and his fortunes. Shah Shuja was publicly
installed upon the throne; numerous chiefs tendered him their
allegiance; Kalat, Qandhar, and Ghazni fell into the hands of his
British allies, before the Amir himself gave sign of life. This he did
by sending his brother, Navab Jabbar Khan, who was considered a stanch
friend of Europeans, and especially of the English, to treat with Sir
William M'Naghten. The Navab stated that the Amir was desirous to
surrender, on condition that he should be made Vazir or Prime Minister
of the Shah, to which post he had an hereditary claim. The condition was
refused; as was also the Navab's request that his niece, the wife of
Haidar Khan, the captured governor of Ghazni, should be given up to him.
Altogether, the poor Navab was treated in no very friendly manner; and
he returned to Kabul with his affection for the English considerably
weakened. As he had long been suspected of intriguing against the Amir,
he took this opportunity to wipe off the imputation, by encouraging the
people to rise and oppose his brother's enemies. "The Amir called an
assembly in the garden which surrounds the tomb of Taimur Shah, and made
a speech, petitioning his subjects to support him in maintaining his
power, and in driving off the infidels from the Mahomedan country. Many
people who were present stated to me that his words were most touching
and moving, but they gained no friends." He also invented various
stories to frighten the lower orders into resistance, saying that during
their march from Sindh to Ghazni, the English had ill-treated the women,
and boiled and eaten the young children. Arguments and lies--all were in
vain. The Kohistanis, his own subjects, who had been induced to rise
against him, descended from their valley, and threatened to attack the
Kabulis, if they allowed the Amir to remain amongst them. The army of
the Indus drew near, and at last Dost Mohammed abandoned the city, and
fled to Bamian, leaving his artillery and heavy baggage at Maidan. There
it was taken possession of by the British, and given up to Shah Shuja;
and on the 7th of August 1839, that prince, after an exile of thirty
years, re-entered the capital of his kingdom.
Hard upon the track of the fugitive Amir, followed Colonel Outram, with
several other officers, and some Afghans under Haji Khan Kaker, in all
about eight hundred foot and horse. Dost Mohammed had with him a handful
of followers, including the Navab Jabbar Khan and Akhbar Khan, the
latter of whom was sick and travelled in a litter. On the 21st August,
Colonel Outram was informed that he was within a day's march of the
object of his pursuit, whose escape, on that occasion, he attributes to
the treachery of Haji Khan. One night the Hazarahs stole twenty of the
Amir's horses, which greatly reduced the numbers of his little escort.
At last, however, he found himself in safety amongst the Uzbegs, and
thence wished to proceed to Persia; but the difficulties of the road,
already nearly impassible on account of the snow, decided him to accept
the proferred protection of the Amir of Bokhara. By this half-mad
monarch he was very queerly treated; at one time his life was in
peril--a treacherous attempt being made to drown him, his sons, and
relations, whilst crossing the river Oxus in a boat. At last he was
forbidden to leave his house, even to make his prayers at the mosque,
and was in fact a prisoner. His two sons, Afzal and Akhbar, shared his
captivity.
For the easy conquest of Afghanistan, and for the popularity of the
English during the early days of its occupation, a long string of
reasons is given by Mohan Lal. By various parts of his conduct,
especially by his injustice and extortions, the Amir had made himself
unpopular with the Afghans, who, on the other hand, remembered the
liberality displayed by the Honourable Montstuart Elphinstone in the
days of his mission to Kabul, and being by nature exceedingly
avaricious, hoped to derive immense profit and advantage from British
occupation of their country. The recent intercourse and friendship of
the Amir with the Shah of Persia had also excited the indignation of his
subjects, who, being Sunnies by sect, were deadly enemies of the Persian
Shias. The English, in short, were as popular as the Barakzais were
detested. Nevertheless it behoved the Shah Shuja and his European
supporters to be circumspect and conciliatory; for Dost Mohammed was
still at large, and lingering on the frontier, and any offence given to
the Kabulis might be the signal for his recall. "Notwithstanding," says
Mohan Lal, "all these points of grave concern, we sent a large portion
of the army back, with Lord Keane, to India; and yet we interfered in
the administration of the country, and introduced such reforms amongst
the obstinate Afghans just on our arrival, as even in India, the
quietest part of the world, Lords Clive and Wellesley had hesitated to
do but slowly." The administration of the principal frontier towns was
now confided to the Shah's officers; but these were not suffered to rule
undisturbed, for Sir W. MacNaghten's political assistants every where
watched their conduct and interfered in their jurisdictions. The occult
nature of this interference prevented benefit to the people, whilst it
caused a disregard for the local authorities. An undecided course was
the bane of our Afghanistan policy. The government was neither entirely
taken into the hands of the British, nor wholly left in those of the
Shah. Outwardly, we were neutral; in reality, we constantly interfered:
thus annoying the king and disappointing the people. Shah Shuja grew
jealous of British influence, and began to suspect that he was but the
shadow of a sovereign, a puppet whose strings were pulled for foreign
advantage. Sir A. Burnes introduced reductions in the duties on all
articles of commerce. Trade improved, but the Shah's servants frequently
deviated from the new tariff, and extorted more than the legal imposts.
When complaints were made to the English, they were referred to the
Shah's Vazir, Mulla Shakur, who, instead of giving redress, beat and
imprisoned the aggrieved parties for having appealed against the king's
authority. Persons known to be favoured by the English were vexed and
annoyed by the Shah's government; and it soon became evident that Mulla
Shakur was striving to form a party for Shuja, in order to make him
independent of British support. The people began to look upon the Shah
as the unwilling slave of the Europeans; the priests omitted the
"Khutbah," or prayer for the king, saying that it could only be recited
for an independent sovereign. Soon the high price of provisions gave
rise to grave dissensions. The purchases of grain made by the English
commissariat raised the market, and placed that description of food out
of reach of the poorer classes. Forage, meat, and vegetables, all rose
in proportion, and a cry of famine was set up. Both in town and country,
the landlords and dealers kept back the produce, or sent the whole of
it to the English camp. A proclamation made by Mulla Shakur, forbidding
the hoarding of provisions, or their sale above a fixed price, was
disregarded. The poor assembled in throngs before the house of Sir A.
Burnes, who was compelled to make gratuitous distributions of bread. At
last the Shah's government adopted the course usual in Afghanistan in
such emergencies; the store-keepers were seized, and compelled to sell
their grain at a moderate price. They complained to the English agents,
who unwisely interfered. Mohan Lal was ordered to wait upon Mulla
Shakur, and to request him to release the traders. The result of this
was a universal cry throughout the kingdom, that the English were
killing the people by starvation. What wretched work was this? what
miserable mismanagement? and how deluded must those men have been who
thought it possible, by pursuing such a course, to conciliate an
ignorant and barbarous people, and secure the permanence of Shah Shuja's
reign? "After the outbreak of Kabul," says Mohan Lal, whose evidence on
these matters must have weight, as that of an eyewitness, and of one
who, from his position as servant of the East India Company, would not
venture to distort the truth, "when I was concealed in the Persian
quarters, I heard both the men and the women saying that the English
enriched the grain and the grass-sellers, &c., whilst they reduced the
chiefs to poverty and killed the poor by starvation."
It is a well-known English foible to think nothing good unless the price
be high. This was strikingly exemplified in Afghanistan, where every
thing was done virtually to lower the value of money. The labourers
employed by our engineer officers were paid at so high a rate that there
was a general strike, and agriculture was brought to a stand-still. The
king's gardens were to be put in order, but not a workman was to be had
except for English pay. The treasury could not afford to satisfy such
exorbitant demands, and the people were made to work, receiving the
regular wages of the country. Clamour and complaint were the
consequence, and the English authorities informed Mullah Shakur, that if
he did not satisfy the grumblers, they would pay them for the Shah, thus
constituting him their debtor. Shuja's jealousy increased, and he showed
his irritation by various petty attempts at annoyance. Discontent was
rife in Afghanistan, even when the general impression amongst the
English officers there, was, that the country was quiet and the people
satisfied. Colonel Herring was murdered near Ghazni; a chief named Sayad
Hassim rebelled, but was subdued, and his fort taken, by Colonel Orchard
and the gallant Major Macgregor.
It was at this critical period that news came to Kabul of Dost
Mohammed's escape from Bokhara. The Shah of Persia had rebuked the
Bokhara ambassador for his master's harsh treatment of the Amir,
whereupon the latter was allowed more liberty, of which he took
advantage to escape. On the road his horse knocked up, but he luckily
fell in with a caravan, and obtained a place in a camel-basket. The
caravan was searched by the emissaries of the King of Bokhara, but the
Amir had coloured his white beard with ink, and thus avoided detection.
He was received with open arms by the Mir of Shahar Sabz and the Vali of
Khulam, and held counsel with those two chiefs and some other adherents
as to the course he should adopt. It was resolved to make an attempt to
recover Kabul, and measures were taken to collect money, men, and
horses. The moment appeared favourable for the enterprise; the Afghan
chiefs and people were discontented, and there were disturbances in
Kohistan. Sir William MacNaghten knew not whom to trust; and a vast
number of arrests were made on suspicion, some without the slightest
cause, which increased the disaffection and want of confidence. On the
30th of August hostilities commenced with an attack by Afzal Khan on the
British post at Bajgah. It was repulsed, and on the 18th of September
the Amir and the Vali of Khulam were routed by Colonel Dennie. Dost
Mohammed fled to Kohistan, many of whose chief inhabitants rallied round
his standard, until he found himself at the head of five thousand men.
He might have augmented this number, but for the exertions of Sir A.
Burnes and Mohan Lal, who sent agents into the revolted country with
money to buy up the inhabitants. This became known amongst the Amir's
followers, and rendered him distrustful of them; for he feared they
would be unable to withstand the temptations held out, and would betray
him, in hopes of a large reward. On the 2d of November occurred a
skirmish between the Amir's forces and the troops under General Sale and
Shah Zadah, in which the 2d cavalry were routed, and several English
officers killed, or severely wounded. Notwithstanding this slight
advantage, and a retrograde movement effected the same night by the
united British and Afghan division, the Amir felt himself so insecure,
fearing even assassination at the hand of the Kohistanis, that, on the
evening of the 30th November, he gave himself up to Sir William
MacNaghten at Kabul. He was delighted with the kind and generous
reception he met, and wrote to Afzal Khan and his other sons to join
him. After a few days, the necessary arrangements being completed, he
was sent to India.
The Amir a prisoner, the chief apparent obstacle to the tranquillity of
Afghanistan was removed, and it was not unreasonable to suppose that
Shah Shuja would thenceforward sit undisturbed upon the throne of his
ancestors. Unfortunately such anticipations were erroneous. Had Dost
Mohammed remained at large, any harm he could have done would have been
inferior to that occasioned by the injudicious measures of the British
agents. These measures, as Mohan Lal asserts, with, we fear, too much
truth, were the very worst that could be devised for the attainment of
the ends proposed. The Afghan character was misunderstood, Afghan
customs and institutions were interfered with, and Afghan prejudices
shocked. Certain things there were, which it would have been good policy
to wink at, or appear ignorant of. The contrary course was adopted. On
the field of Parvan, where the combat of the 2d November took place, a
bag of letters was found, compromising a large number of chiefs and
influential Kabulis. The Amir having surrendered, and as it was not
intended to punish these persons, the wisest plan would have been to
suppress the letters entirely; but this was not done, and the disclosure
caused a vast deal of mistrust on the part of the suspected chiefs
towards the English. It also gave a stimulus to a practice then very
prevalent in Kabul, that of forging letters from persons of note, with a
view to compromise the supposed writers, and to procure for the forgers
money and English friendship. Much mischief was done by these letters,
some of which were fabricated by Afghans enjoying the favour and
confidency of Sir A. Burnes and Sir W. MacNaghten.
On the repeated solicitations of the English, the Vazir Mulla Shakur was
dismissed. His successor, Nizam-ul-Daulah, was almost forced upon the
Shah, whose power was thus rendered contemptible in the eyes of the
Afghans. The new minister took his orders rather from the British agents
than from his nominal master--going every day to the former to report
what he had done, caring nothing for the good or bad opinion of the
nation, or for the will of the Shah, whose mandates he openly disobeyed.
Having committed an oppressive act, by depriving a Sayad of his land,
Shuja repeatedly enjoined him to restore the property to its rightful
owner. He paid no attention to these injunctions; and at last the Shah
told the suppliant, when he again came to him for redress, "that he had
no power over the Vazir, and therefore that the Sayad should curse him,
and not trouble the Shah any more, because he was no more a king but a
slave." By bribes to the newswriters of the envoy and Sir A. Burnes,
Nizam-ul-Daulah endeavoured to keep his misdeeds from the ears of those
officers. Nevertheless, they became known to them through Mohan Lal and
others; but Sir A. Burnes "felt himself in an awkward position, and
considered it impossible to cause the dismissal of one whose nomination
he had with great pains so recently recommended."
A reform in the military department, recommended by Sir A. Burnes,
caused immense bitterness and ill-blood amongst the chiefs, whose
retinues were compulsorily diminished, the men who were to be retained,
and those who were to be dismissed, being selected by a British officer.
This was looked upon as an outrageous insult and grievous humiliation.
The reduction was effected, also, in a harsh and arbitary manner,
without consideration for the pride of the chiefs and warriors, by whom
all these offences were treasured up, to be one day bloodily revenged.
Other innovations speedily followed and increased their discontent;
until at last they were reduced to so deplorable a position that they
waited in a body upon Shah Shuja to complain of it. The Shah imprudently
replied, that he was king by title only, not by power, and that the
chiefs were cowards, and could do nothing. These words Mohan Lal
believes were not spoken to stimulate the chiefs to open rebellion, but
merely to induce them to such acts as might convince the English of the
bad policy of their reforms and other measures. But the Shah had
miscalculated the effect of his dangerous hint. After the interview with
him, at the end of September 1841, the chiefs assembled, and sealed an
engagement, written on the leaves of the Koran, binding themselves to
rebel against the existing government, as the sole way to annihilate
British influence in Kabul. Mohan Lal was informed of this plot, and
reported it to Sir A. Burnes, who attached little importance to it, and
refused to permit the seizure of the Koran, whence the names of the
conspirators might have been learned. It has been frequently stated,
that neither Burnes nor MacNaghten had timely information of the
discontent and conspiracy of the chiefs. Mohan Lal affirms the contrary,
and supports his assertion by extracts from letters written by those
gentlemen. Pride of power, he says, and an unfortunate spirit of
rivalry, prevented them from taking the necessary measures to meet the
outbreak. Sir A. Burnes thought that to be on the alert would show
timidity, whilst carelessness of the alarming reports then afloat would
prove intrepidity, and produce favourable results. But it was not the
moment for such speculations. A circular letter was secretly sent round
to all the Durrani and Persian chiefs in Kabul and the suburbs, falsely
stating that a plan was on foot to seize them and send them to India,
whither Sir W. MacNaghten was about to proceed as governor of Bombay.
The authors of this atrocious forgery were afterwards discovered. They
were three Afghans of bad character and considerable cunning, who had
been employed by the Vazir, by the envoy, and by Sir A. Burnes. Their
object was to produce a revolt, in which they might make themselves
conspicuous as friends of the English, and so obtain reward and
distinction. They had been wont to derive advantage from revolutions and
outbreaks, and were eager for another opportunity of making money. Their
selfish and abominable device was the spark to the train. It caused a
prompt explosion. The chiefs again assembled, resolved upon instant
action, and fixed upon its plan. It was decided to begin by an attack
upon the houses of Sir A. Burnes and the other English officers resident
in the city. For fear of discovery, not a moment was to be lost. The
following day, the 2d of November, was to witness the outbreak.
And now, at the eleventh hour, fresh intimations of the approaching
danger were conveyed to those whom it threatened. Two persons informed
Sir A. Burnes of it; and one of the conspirators more than hinted it to
Mohan Lal, who had boasted to him that the Ghilzais were pacified by
Major Macgregor, and that Sir Robert Sale was on his victorious march to
Jellalabad. The conspirator laughed. "To-morrow morning," he said, "the
very door you now sit at will be in flames of fire; and yet still you
pride yourselves in saying that you are safe!"
"I told all this," says Mohan Lal, "to Sir Alexander Burnes, whose reply
was, that we must not let the people suppose we were frightened, and
that he will see what he can do in the cantonment, whither he started
immediately. Whilst I was talking with Sir A. Burnes, an anonymous note
reached him in Persian, confirming what he had heard from me and from
other sources, on which he said, 'The time is arrived that we must leave
this country.'" The time for that was already past.
The disastrous occurrences in Afghanistan, on and subsequently to the 2d
of November 1841, are so recent, so well-known, and have been so much
written about, that any thing beyond a passing reference to them is here
unnecessary. Mohan Lal's account of the deaths of Sir A. Burnes, Charles
Burnes, Sir W. MacNaghten, and Shah Shuja, is interesting, as are also
some details of his own escapes and adventures during the insurrection.
From the roof of his house he witnessed the attack upon that of Sir A.
Burnes, and the death of Lieutenant H. Burnes, who slew six Afghans
before he himself was cut to pieces. Sir Alexander was murdered without
resistance, having previously tied his cravat over his eyes, in order
not to see the blows that put an end to his existence. Mohan Lal himself
narrowly escaped death at the hands of the man who subsequently murdered
Shah Shuja; but he was rescued by an Afghan friend, and concealed in a
harem. Afterwards, whilst prisoner to Akhbar Khan, he did good service
in sending information to the English generals and political agents, and
finally in negotiating the release of the Kabul captives. For all these
matters we refer our readers to the closing chapters of his book, and
return to Dost Mohammed.
On his arrival at Calcutta, the Amir was treated by Lord Auckland with
great attention and respect, an income of three lakhs of rupees was
allotted to him, and he was taken to see the curiosities of the city,
the naval and military stores, &c. All these things greatly struck him,
and he was heard to say, that had he known the extraordinary power and
resources of the English, he would never have opposed them. After a
while, his health sufferred from the Calcutta climate; he became greatly
alarmed about himself, and begged to be allowed to join his family at
Loodianah. He was sent to the upper provinces, and afterwards to the
hills, where the temperature was cool and somewhat similar to that of
his own country. During the Kabul insurrection he managed to keep up a
communication with his son Akhbar, whom he strongly advised to destroy
the English by every means in his power.
When the British forces re-entered Afghanistan to punish its inhabitants
for the Kabul massacres, Prince Fatah Jang, son of the murdered Shah
Shuja, was placed upon the throne. But when he found that his European
supporters, after accomplishing the work of chastisement, were about to
evacuate the country with a precipitation which, it has been said,
"resembled almost as much the retreat of an army defeated as the march
of a body of conquerors,"[46] he hastened to abdicate his short-lived
authority. He was too good a judge of the chances, to await the
departure of the British and the arrival of Akhbar Khan, and preferred
taking off his crown himself to having it taken off by somebody else,
with his head in it. His brother, Prince Shahpur, a mere boy, was then
seated upon the throne, and left at the mercy of his enemies. His reign
was very brief. As the English marched from Kabul, Akhbar Khan
approached it, and the son of Shuja had to run away, with loss of
property and risk of life. "By such a precipitate withdrawal from
Afghanistan," says Mohan Lal, "we did not show an honourable sentiment
of courage, but we disgracefully placed many friendly chiefs in a
serious dilemma. There were certain chiefs whom we detached from Akhbar
Khan, pledging our honour and word to reward and protect them; and I
could hardly show my face to them at the time of our departure, when
they came full of tears, saying, that 'we deceived and punished our
friends, causing them to stand against their own countrymen, and then
leaving them in the mouths of lions.' As soon as Mohammed Akhbar
occupied Kabul, he tortured, imprisoned, extorted money from, and
disgraced, all those who had taken our side. I shall consider it indeed
a great miracle and a divine favour, if hereafter any trust ever be
placed in the word and promise of the authorities of the British
government throughout Afghanistan and Turkistan."
When it at last became evident that the feeble and talentless Sadozais
were unable to hold the reins of power in Afghanistan, or to contend,
with any chance of success, against the energy and influence of the
Barakzai chiefs, Dost Mohammed was released, and allowed to return to
his own country. On his way he concluded a secret treaty of alliance
with Sher Singh, the Maharajah of the Punjaub, and from Lahore was
escorted by the Sikhs to the Khaibar pass, where Akhbar Khan and other
Afghan chiefs received him. The Amir's exultation at again ascending his
throne knew no bounds. Unschooled by adversity, he very soon recommenced
his old system of extortion, and made himself so unpopular, that he was
once fired at, but escaped. He now enjoys his authority and the
superiority of his family, fearless of invasion from West or East.
Although Akhbar Khan, of all the Amir's sons, has the greatest influence
in Afghanistan, and renown out of it, his elder brother, Afzal Khan, is,
we are informed, greatly his superior in judgment and nobility of
character. Mohan Lal predicts a general commotion in Kabul when Dost
Mohammed dies. If any one of his brothers, the chiefs of Qandhar, or
Sultan Mohammed Khan, the ex-chief of Peshavar, be then alive, he will
attempt to seize Kabul, and many of the Afghan nobles, some even of the
Amir's sons, will lend him their support against Akhbar Khan. The
popular candidate, however, the favourite of the people, of the chiefs,
and of his relations, the Barakzais, is Afzal Khan. Akhbar will be
supported by his brothers--the sons, that is to say, of his own mother
as well as of the Amir. Perhaps the whole territory of Kabul will be
divided into small independent principalities, governed by the different
sons of Dost Mohammed. At any rate, there can be little doubt that at
his death wars and intrigues, plunderings and assassinations, will again
distract the country. The crown that was won by the crimes of the
father, will, in all probability, be shattered and pulled to pieces by
the dissensions and rivalry of the children.