ONE who has known you so long and loved you so well as I have, cannot
fail to experience much sorrow of heart in now addressing you. But
private sorrows, and private feelings have little place in the great
crisis in which we live. I do not mean that we are required to be
stoically indifferent; but that our duties to God and God’s truth, are so
paramount over any regard to earthly ties, or private griefs, that we
must needs put them by—so far at least as that they be no hindrance or
impediment to the doing His will. Truly, in our time does the cycle of
the world’s course seem to have come round, and never perhaps since the
early days of persecution has there been so much need to remember and
apply the warning, “He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not
worthy of me.” Believe me, I acknowledge fully, and am glad to
acknowledge thus openly, that I am as much persuaded you are acting under
the constraint of this great law, as that I am desirous to be guided by
it myself. I acknowledge your trial (and have good cause to know how
severely you have felt it), and I as much believe in your sincerity as I
do in my own. I trust, therefore, that never by me at any rate shall
your anticipation be realized, when you say, “I am prepared to be judged
harshly, and the more harshly by oldest friends.” {6} Though I do not
come to the same conclusions with you, and am about to controvert the
general argument of your “Second Letter,” I know you will be the first
and readiest to do me justice as to the temper in which I write.
Whatever view the world may have taken of that letter, or however it may
regard its author, I think few will deny it is well it should have some
answer. It is a different thing to say, it were well it had not been
written, or, not written by one in this or that circumstance, from saying
that _being_ written, it does not demand a reply. Persons may and will
judge differently, as to the propriety of your having published it,
though I dare say, far the greater part of English Churchmen will be
against you in that respect, and say they know not how to reconcile your
having done so with either dutifulness or wisdom. For my own part,
however, I must say (whatever may be thought of me for saying so) I do
not condemn you for having published it; if only you will seek patience
to weigh all circumstances indicating the line of duty, before you shall
finally act upon the doubts and difficulties it discloses. I confess, to
my mind, there is but one justification for any man in the communion of
the Church of England, having written and published such a letter;
viz.—that, feeling the oppression of the difficulties it sets forth, he
is yet _no more than in doubt_, as to the matters debated in it, and the
conclusion to be drawn from them. Perhaps in ordinary times even such a
frame of mind would not be a sufficient excuse for the unsettling
tendency of that which you have written; but certainly these are _not_
ordinary times; and, I agree with you in thinking, many ordinary rules do
not apply. Enquiries therefore how far the Church of England may have
sanctioned error, or failed to teach the whole Catholic truth, pressed
even with painful nakedness and pertinacity, must, perchance, now of
necessity be instituted, in order “to do her good at her latter end.” At
any rate there is a show of reason on _his_ side, who says, “If her
‘grievous wound’ be not probed to its full depth, it will never be more
than ‘slightly healed;’” and of this argument, I, at any rate, am
disposed to allow you the full benefit. Moreover, when it cannot be
denied that practically “the trumpet” _has_ given “an uncertain sound,”
it seems far more “tolerable” to have enquiry pushed even to what some
will call the verge of disloyalty, than would be the case if the cause of
uncertainty were only in the writer’s mind, and might not, with any
plausibility or truth be charged upon the Church herself. Still, after
making all due allowance for these disturbing forces, there is, I think,
no justification at all for such statements as those in your “Second
Letter,” but in the one consideration that the writer is grievously
pressed by the difficulties of the case; (“the archers have hit him, and
he is sore wounded;”) yet, believing it would be _sin_ to let go his hold
upon the Church in which his lot has been cast without the most direct
and earnest endeavours to ascertain whether his doubts have not an
answer, and his difficulties a solution somewhere, he lays them as a
duty, and with great pain, though with all plainness, before his brethren
of the same communion, that he may rejoice in such answer and such
solution if they can be given. Take away this honest motive, and
consider the writer’s mind as already made up, and I see no escape from
the reproach of his having written as a traitor: but grant the
supposition I have made (and I know, better, I believe, than most men,
how safely it may be granted you), and there remains, to my mind, no
ground for the invective and reproach with which in some quarters you
have been met. {8}
You will not misunderstand me, if I say that I approach the task I have
undertaken with a certain disquietude, arising from the responsibility I
appear to take upon myself, and the consciousness how little qualified I
am duly to discharge it. These thoughts have made me feel at times
uncertain whether I do well to attempt it at all. Still, as I do not
think at present there is any notice of another undertaking it; and as,
if there be, my letter will be no hindrance to any one else more worthily
occupying the same ground, and as I do seem (to myself at any rate) to
have _something_ to answer as to the principle on which your difficulties
rest, perhaps I better discharge my duty by writing what I _can_, than I
should do in withholding my letter, from the knowledge my ability does
not reach to the half that I could wish. I trust, however, you will
remember, if I have not learning or skill to state the Church of
England’s argument in the way it may best be stated, that _I_ only am
responsible; and it is no fair mode of reasoning, to argue, the Church of
England can say no more in defence of her position than I may be able to
set down for her.
But I proceed to the subject before me.
The drift of your whole second letter appears to me to be summed up in
this one sentence towards its close, “I have resigned my cure of souls,
because I have no doctrines and no faith to teach, as certainly the faith
and doctrines of the English Church.” {10} Plainly this involves the
whole point at issue; for if _you_ have none, (I mean as a result not of
your own mind, but from the Church’s defect,) then of course neither have
I, nor has any one of her priests; and if so, we have all, (all, that is
to say, who are enough imbued with the spirit of Catholic antiquity to
know and feel that we _must_ teach as the Church in all ages has taught,)
no other line before us but to follow your example in resignation of our
cures. And this again is a sentence of deposition to the Church of
England altogether; for that Church which drives from her all that is
sound and Catholic, and can admit none but such as are more or less
heretics to minister at her altars, is manifestly faithless to her trust,
and has forfeited the “good deposit.” She can claim no longer to be a
living branch of the true vine; nor can any man believe that she can bear
and convey the grace of life-giving sacraments. To ascertain whether
indeed this be so with us, is the point to which I purpose presently to
direct my argument, endeavouring to show the contrary, inasmuch as I
think it may be proved, that where the faith has been directly assailed,
as on the subject of Baptism by the late decision of the Privy Council,
our business is to clear and vindicate it; and that we have _time_, and I
trust also, _means_ to do this; whilst upon all other essential subjects,
not in like manner attacked, though the Church of England may possibly
seem upon some of them more open to objection or assault than upon
Baptism, we yet have a rule of Catholic teaching which _is_ dogmatic, and
_ought_ to be received _as such_ by every one of us on the very face of
the matter, until in any like mode it may be brought into question, when
again, as such cause arises, the objection must be met, and the faith
vindicated and cleared.
Before, however, I proceed to these positions and the proofs of them, I
am anxious to say something on one or two preliminary considerations.
And first, I must make an observation on my own former letter, and on the
notice taken of it by you, (in the kindest terms, but, as I think, with
some little misapprehension of its argument,) in the appendix to your
“second letter.” I refer to this, not merely to clear up the
misapprehension, which might appear a personal matter hardly worth the
time, but also because I think the point will be found to have a further
and necessary bearing on my present subject as we proceed. After
speaking of my letter as to its tone, you say, “But as it was not
intended to be an answer to the facts stated in my first letter, so it
seemed to me to fail in meeting the real difficulty of the case.” {12}
It is quite true it was not intended to be an answer to the _facts_, viz.
the positions advanced by you as to the powers of the regal supremacy,
and the jurisdiction of the Committee of Privy Council, as a court of
appeal. Rather, it admitted the facts, for argument’s sake at any rate,
(I did not intend to commit myself, and, I think, did not commit myself
to more than this in the way of concession,) in order to show that, even
so, the conclusions you drew would not follow legitimately from them.
Its aim, therefore was, that even granting the premises to be as you had
stated them, as to the authority of the said court, and granting also the
judgment (then about to be delivered) to be heretical, still the Church
might not be thereby committed to heresy; and _would not be so_, unless
it could be reasonably made manifest that she _intended_ such heresy to
be permissible; that her _animus_ was to include the heresy in her
teaching. “Its point was,” (you continue) “that even granting such an
ambiguity to exist in our formularies, yet it might have been an
inadvertence at the time when our Prayer Book and Articles were put
forth, and that we must prove that the Church of England at the
Reformation _intended_ that there should be such an ambiguity. But this
is a line of argument which must admit that which has been so
energetically denied to bear upon the question at issue, namely, the
opinions of the reformers and divines of the sixteenth century; and it is
to be remembered that if such are to be referred to as evidence of the
animus of our Church on the subject of Baptism, so they must equally be
appealed to upon the doctrines, for example, of the Eucharist and
sacramental grace. In short, it is making use of an argument wisely and
long repudiated by the High Church party.” {13}
This statement, as I conceive, does not represent the argument of my
former letter at all, and therefore is no answer to it. And for this
reason it does not represent it; that it confounds together and then
unconsciously interchanges, two somewhat similar, but by no means
identical propositions, making me answerable for both, whereas to one
only of them am I really committed. Observe, it is one thing to say, “It
is necessary to take into account the animus of those who sanctioned
them, in order to ascertain _the true sense of the documents_:” it is
another to say, “It is necessary to do this, in order to determine _the
guilt of the Church_.” The first of these propositions I have never
maintained at all. The second was the very essence of my argument. I
never maintained we were to go to the intentions of the compilers in
order to arrive at the meaning of the formularies; but I did say, (and I
must venture still to think the argument sound, at any rate not refuted
by your remarks,) that we could not condemn our Church of heresy, without
considering whether she had ever _intended_ to sanction heresy. For (let
me say it once more) I was speaking of the animus, not to show the sense
of the documents, but to show the guilt or innocency of the Church. The
first, as I understand the matter, is the ground “so wisely and long
repudiated by the High Church party,” (and which I quite agree in
repudiating;) the second, I think is, when fully stated, almost a
self-evident truth wheresoever a moral delinquency is to be affirmed.
The first view too, would not really have agreed with my argument; for, I
said, “The only postulate I ask is, that the Church shall not, and cannot
stand committed to heresy, without proof that her _crime_ is something
not accidental but wilful and deliberate; something more than a mistake
which she is ready and willing to clear up the moment opportunity is
given her to do so. In short, that as a man is not a liar without the
intention to deceive, so a Church is not heretical, unless the animus of
heresy be proved against her.” {14a} Neither would this representation
of the drift of my argument agree with the particular illustration, of
the factory act, by which I tried at some length to make my meaning
plain: for certainly I never said, the judges were to have recourse to
the animus of the framers of that measure in order to ascertain _its
legal sense_, though I did (as I think justly) argue, they who framed or
passed it were not to be _convicted of cruelty or double-dealing_ because
an inadvertent ambiguity might for a time defeat their object. {14b}
Neither should it be forgotten that ecclesiastical history itself
furnishes plain instances of the difference of those two propositions,
and I think of the justness of that one which alone I supported. There
was a time when the Apostles’ Creed was found insufficient to protect the
one Faith, even on the most sacred subject of the true divinity of the
Son of God. Arianism crept in, in spite of its wording: and had there
been a Judicial Committee of Privy Council to hear the case of Arius, no
doubt we should have heard there too, of “charitable interpretations,”
and “qualified senses,” and the impropriety of “fixing one meaning upon
doubtful words,” and the liberal intention to include as many as possible
under an “hypothetical construction.” It might not have been deemed even
then, cogent or sufficient merely to appeal to the known sentiments of
the framers to arrive at the sense of the document in question: at any
rate to have done so, might have been the introduction of a dangerous
principle for another day: but surely then, and in all times, it would be
a maxim among the faithful, that the Church could not be condemned as
guilty of the heresy, (whether of Arius or any other,) even if there were
an ambiguity or want of strict definition in her holy words, without
considering also whether her animus in her sanction of them had been
heretical. The absence of any such suspicion, even had the East and West
been then divided, would have prevented any from withdrawing from the
communion of the Church at Constantinople at that time, even though she
might fail for a brief space to enforce the truth. And this very
consideration, as it seems to me, was sufficient to clear the Church’s
faithfulness, during the rise of Arianism, and until the great Council of
Nicea could be held. It gave her time to pass what we may call a
declaratory act of the true meaning of the Creed, without in the mean
time forfeiting her trust. {15} There can be no doubt the Nicene Creed
was such an act; and I have asked for ourselves only the patience that we
may try to procure such a vindication of ourselves and of our faith, now
in our day, as to baptism, in our somewhat parallel circumstances. I
have endeavoured to enforce only the similar claim so far as this
parallel will hold good: viz. not at all the claim to have our
formularies interpreted by the known or suspected intentions of their
compilers; but merely, not to have our branch of the Church Catholic
hastily adjudged guilty of heresy, or of forfeiting her name and place in
Christendom, without consideration had of her real guilt or innocence:
without weighing the point, whether, even granting it were true (though
_I_ cannot see it) that her formularies on Baptism are ambiguous, she has
ever had the guilty intention of permitting heresy within her. The only
claim therefore which I have made, is that she has the right to _time_ to
throw off the ambiguity, and re-affirm her faith. If she will neither
do, nor try to do this, I have all along admitted she will “become bound
by the said sentence,” forfeit her claim on our allegiance, and blot out
her name from the kingdom of Christ: but she does not appear to me to
have done this already, and _our duty_ is now to see that she do not. As
I have said, I think we have the _time_, and I trust we have the _means_,
effectually, though it may be gradually, to vindicate her.
I must cite a few lines more from the next paragraph of your appendix, in
order the more directly to mark what I feel called upon to do in this
letter more than I attempted in the last. You say (App. p. 86), “I
cannot refrain from citing one passage more from Mr. Mayow’s letter. He
says: ‘Let me be well understood. If such ambiguity of language can be
shown to be intentional on the part of the Church; if she can be proved
to have _desired_ in drawing up her articles and services to have
admitted two interpretations on baptismal regeneration; if her view and
plan be to include two such opposite parties within her as those
represented by Mr. Gorham and the Bishop of Exeter, by such ambiguous and
therefore comprehensive language; I most fully admit she stands convicted
of unpalliated heresy both in form and matter.’” On which your
observation is, “Instead of _baptismal regeneration_ in the above
sentence, put _the Eucharist_ or _justification_!” This opens new
ground, and I own involves very weighty considerations, most fairly
calling for a reply. It is the application of the whole principle of
your second letter, the want of dogmatic teaching, to an extension of the
subject of my first. You say in fact, “If the Church’s animus be sound
on baptism, consider whether it is so likewise, on justification and the
Eucharist, and then answer as to her condition.” Of course in all these
cases I conceive you exaggerate the grounds against me, rather, I should
say, against the Catholic character of the formularies of our Church, by
having imagined I appealed to the opinions of the compilers of our
services, in order to ascertain their meaning; but, as I have allowed,
nay claimed, that in one respect, i.e. in order to ascertain the Church’s
_guilt_, such reference to her animus is necessary, I do not think it is
a sufficient answer merely to have pointed out the above distinction. A
further examination and reply I think is needful, which I propose
presently to give.
Here, however, I wish merely to observe, that my former letter did not
deal with this extension of the subject; did not go into the general
principle of the dogmatic teaching, or want of dogmatic teaching, in the
Church of England, because this was not a point embraced or discussed in
your first letter; and mine of course was not an answer by anticipation
to your second, but merely a brief argument as to the one point of the
Catholic doctrine of baptism, and the way in which the (then) expected
judgment of the Committee of Privy Council, should it impugn that
doctrine, would affect our Church’s position: and I think I am justified
in saying (even upon your own showing since {18}) that _had that point
alone_ been brought in question, my argument would have been sufficient;
at any rate, so far sufficient and satisfactory, that you would have felt
with me we might one and all remain at our posts, and that the Church of
England would not be involved in the heresy of that sentence, upon the
very grounds which I enforced, namely, that her mind and heart were not
proved to be unsound, and therefore that we _have time_ to strive
earnestly to clear her from the ambiguity of her words (so considered),
and to vindicate her character for Catholic truth. But it is your
feeling, now since enunciated, that there are other points of equal
importance less clearly defined; that, in fact, baptism was the very
_best_ ground for our Church to stand upon in her conflict with the
liberalizing spirit of the day; and if she could not maintain herself
there, what chance has she elsewhere:—it is this, which supplies the fuel
to your despondency, and almost despair of her. I say again, to this
argument I propose to come in the sequel, and would only here explain,
what perhaps I ought to have stated, something more definitely, in my
former letter, (though it is a point on which I think you will make no
quarrel with me for “amending the record,”) that when I say, if “the
Church intended to include two such opposite doctrines,” I mean, of
course, “_intended to include_” and _did include_. I should not be
shaken in my persuasion of her innocency of heresy, either as to baptism,
or any other doctrine, merely by being convinced, if so it were, that
there was an evil intention of an unlawful comprehension by the Church of
England of the sixteenth century, if yet, in God’s mercy, it were
frustrated in the actual settlement of her rule of faith. I hold that
both parts must combine to place us in a dilemma now, that is to say,
both the heretical intention, (so that it is not merely an inadvertence,)
and the actual ambiguity, (so that the heresy _is_ permitted). If the
latter be not found, she will stand upon her formularies, in God’s
providence, enunciating the truth; if the former be not found, then, as I
have already said, I think she is not so hastily to be pronounced guilty,
as not to be allowed the reasonable time (so she do but begin to use it)
to vindicate or re-affirm her faith.
There is a second preliminary matter on which I must likewise ask leave
to make some remark before I proceed further. It is obvious that any
man’s view of the catholicity of our Church’s mind on baptism, will be
much affected by the force he may attribute to the argument, and his
general opinion of the soundness of the judgment, of the Privy Council in
point of fact. It is true, even one of the Judges themselves might say,
“I believe our decision to be the only correct one; the one we were
obliged to come to upon the wording of the formularies and articles
minutely scanned; but I do not believe it represents the mind of the
Church;” and if this were so, (supposing, that is, the words to have this
ambiguity really inherent in them, and the Court skilfully to have
detected it,) the judgment might be called in this sense “able,” or
“probably correct,” as you have called it, {20} and yet the whole
argument of my former letter still remain intact. But if anywhere it be
thought that the late judgment is sound or probably correct as a true
representation of the Church’s mind, then in so far is the force of my
letter and its argument diminished or destroyed. Of course, just in so
much on the other hand, if it be thought or proved that it is not “an
able judgment,” or “a probably correct” one, the position I have
maintained is strengthened, because it is, a priori, to a certain extent
probable that the _intention_ is, as _the sound interpretation_ of the
words is; and consequently that if the words cannot, without straining
them, or an ignorance of their subject-matter be made to include heresy,
then the animus of the Church must not be supposed to be heretical.
Therefore, although, if upon mere technical grounds of legal
construction, the late judgment be “able,” and “probably correct,” my
argument remains still, as I think, tenable and sound; yet much more
weighty and conclusive is it, if that judgment can be shown to be neither
able nor acute, neither well considered, nor fairly apprehensive of the
points at issue. On this subject therefore I will ask you to bear with
me for a few words.
I am persuaded that such is the case:—that the judgment is not sound; nor
able; nor probably right; regarded merely as an exposition of the
documents which the court had before it, independently of all
consideration of the abstract truth or falsehood of the theology
involved. I do not indeed mean to go into this subject at large, or to
test the decision throughout in its several parts, but I do desire to
direct your attention to two or three particulars, in the hope even these
may make you re-consider your verdict as to its being “probably a right
decision.” If in that expression you meant “probably right,” not merely
on the technical ground of verbal criticism, but as I certainly imagine
you mean us to understand, “_right_” according to your present view of
the likely aim and intention of those who put forth our articles and
formularies, and of the Church of England of the sixteenth century which
sanctioned them; “_right_” therefore as to a real intention of leaving
baptismal regeneration an open question, then it becomes all the more
important to subject some few points of the judgment to a careful
scrutiny, that we may see on what foundation such an opinion rests.
In the first place then, we find the following declaration of the judges,
presenting their own view of their powers. “The Court,” they tell us,
“has no jurisdiction or authority to settle matters of faith:” {21} that
is, they give us to understand it was by no means its province, and as
little its desire, to invade the precincts of the Church’s sanctuary and
“determine what ought in any particular to be the doctrine of the Church
of England.” {22a} Of course the latter part of this sentence is true.
Their duty was to declare, (so far as any jurisdiction they had might
enable them to declare,) not what _ought_ to be, but what _was_ the
doctrine of the English Church. If they only meant therefore to say, it
was not their business or their wish to enact any new canon on baptism,
one is almost tempted to smile at their simplicity in thinking it
necessary so solemnly to enunciate such a truism, or thus to magnify
themselves upon such moderation and forbearance; but if they thought or
meant to disclaim settling any thing concerning doctrine by the powers of
interpretation, which they could not avoid exercising, one is tempted
again to smile, only more bitterly, to think of any persons, and
especially judges in so solemn a cause, entertaining so chimerical a
notion as this disclaimer evinces. What! did they imagine they could
escape “settling doctrine” by the judgment they gave, merely by leaving
every man to teach what he pleased? Did they forget that interpretation
itself _is_ a power that settles what it interprets? {22b} Did they
suppose a translator assigns no sense to the book which he translates?
Did they, or could they for a single moment lose sight of the fact, that
they _must_ “settle” whether Mr. Gorham were to be instituted to the
living of Bramford Speke or not; and in so doing must determine that “the
doctrine held by him” was, or “was not, contrary or repugnant to the
declared doctrine of the Church of England?” One can hardly believe they
could lose sight of or misunderstand such a point, and therefore we seem
driven rather to let them take refuge in the truism, than chase them into
the paradox, however the latter may be the more natural suggestion of
their words. But even so, it must I think be allowed that the diction of
what ought to have been a most carefully considered document is very
clumsily obscure; as is evident from the number of persons since its
publication who keep continually quoting upon us those words of the
judgment, and assuring us that by the showing and declaration of the
Committee of Privy Council itself, “doctrine is not affected.” And this
obscurity is darkened even more by the aid of the published comment upon,
or perhaps I should say reiteration of, the same view, given since by an
eminent member of the court. Lord Campbell in one of his letters to Miss
Sellon says, “I assure you we have given no opinion contrary to yours
upon the doctrine of baptismal regeneration. _We had no jurisdiction to
decide any doctrinal question_, and we studiously abstained from doing
so. We were _only called upon to construe the articles and formularies
of the Church_, (!) and to say whether they be so framed as to condemn
certain opinions expressed by Mr. Gorham.” {23} If Lord Campbell
individually, or the judges generally, mean merely that their own
personal faith being in agreement or disagreement with Mr. Gorham’s
opinions, is not a point decided by their sentence, I most entirely allow
this; but if they mean, as certainly a large portion of the world has
understood them to mean, that to admit Mr. Gorham to a benefice with cure
of souls, and to say the doctrine held and published by him is “not
contrary or repugnant to the declared doctrine of the Church of England,”
does not “settle doctrine,” so far as that Church’s teaching is
concerned, (and so far as they have authority,) this certainly strikes me
as a most marvellous inaccuracy, bespeaking any thing rather than ability
or judicial clearness. Yet if they did not mean this, (though to speak
of a matter of personal faith might be in point, as far merely as
regarded Lord Campbell’s clearing himself with Miss Sellon,) how should
their judgment tend, as they seem to have hoped it would, to peace:—“to
heal,” as Lord Campbell expresses it, {24} “the wounds from which the
Church of England has lately suffered?” “What hast thou to do with
peace,” surely we may demand of the judgment itself, unless something
real is to be made of this profession of not settling doctrine? By such
a mode of writing, the judges appear to have thought peace could be
preserved; nothing being settled, but the latitude of interpretation
which might, as they supposed, include all, and let every man do “that
which was right in his own eyes:”—a scheme that might possibly have
answered if the points in question had been mere matters of human
opinion, or if there had been none in the Church who believed them to be
God’s truth which they had no right to give away: none also who were
sharp-sighted enough to see that to make any doctrine an open question,
_is_ to rule that there is no dogmatic teaching upon it at all. Not to
have observed these things more distinctly, and not more distinctly to
have expressed themselves as to what they really thought their office
was, appears to me, in the very outset, to be _not_ indicative of ability
or acuteness in the Court.
Secondly, I see no marks of an able view of the subject in the Court’s
extraction and representation of the peculiarities of Mr. Gorham’s
opinions. On the contrary, the Committee of Council appear to me (I
trust I shall stand excused in speaking very plainly; the matter is of
too much importance to permit soft words merely for fashion’s sake;) to
have been absolutely unable to master the sense of what he wrote. It is
so _manifest_ they have not accurately represented it, in their summary,
that if I _did_ think they really understood his book, I should be
_compelled_ to believe they knowingly softened down, and _mis_represented
his doctrine, to be able the more easily to pronounce _for_ his
institution, without daring absolutely to say the Church did not condemn
his heresy; that they made his doctrine into something which it is _not_,
something, at any rate, less glaringly heretical than it is, in order to
satisfy his partizans, by giving judgment in his and their favour, at the
same time that they trusted to escape the direct assertion of his real
opinions being admissible in the Church of England, by altering them
knowingly themselves. But I certainly do not make any such charge
against the Committee; only, I have no alternative but to believe they
did not rightly apprehend his book at all. They took it, in fact, with
many (perhaps not unnatural) complaints, that they should be expected to
find out its meaning; {27a} and then, even with all the help of counsel,
and all the advantage of the really able judgment of the Court below,
(which, however, as has been pointed out by the Bishop of Exeter, they
appear wholly to have ignored, and thought unworthy of consideration,)
they set down sundry propositions as those maintained by him, which not
only are _not_ in his book, but which do not even represent what _is_ in
it. Thus they say, “The doctrine held by Mr. Gorham appears to us to be
this: . . . that the grace of regeneration does not so necessarily
accompany the act of baptism that regeneration invariably takes place in
baptism: that the grace may be granted before, in, or after baptism: . . .
that infants baptized, and dying before actual sin, are undoubtedly
saved, but that in no case is regeneration in baptism unconditional;”
{27b} statements not found in his answers, though perhaps he may hold
some of them; while some of them are actually inconsistent with what he
does maintain. Thus, the Committee of Privy Council say, Mr. Gorham
holds the grace of regeneration may be granted “before, in, or after
baptism,” apparently never having perceived at all his own words, which
exclude, as the Bishop of Exeter has most justly pointed out, the
possibility, in his (Mr. Gorham’s) real view, of justification _in_
baptism, except by a miracle; the miracle of one coming to baptism
hypocritically, but being converted at the very moment, and so receiving
the benefit concomitantly with the Sacrament. {28a} But the Privy
Council appear never to have seen, or seeing, not to have weighed, those
passages in Mr. Gorham’s answers in which he positively asserts that all
the benefits which we ascribe to baptism, through God’s gift and mercy,
are given neither _in_ nor _by_ baptism, but in all cases _before_ it,
where baptism is rightly received at all. Thus he says, “That they (i.e.
infants) must have been regenerated by an act of grace prevenient to
baptism, in order to make them worthy recipients of that Sacrament.”
{28b} Again, “The new nature must have been possessed by those who
receive baptism rightly, and therefore possessed before the seal was
affixed.” {28c} Again, “As the stipulation of faith goes before baptism,
and as the condition of being ‘the child of God’ is a blessing conferred
by faith, hence the blessing of adoption also precedes baptism in its
essence.” {28d} Again, “The blessing is, ‘adoption to be the sons of
God;’ that blessing is undoubtedly to be ‘ascribed to God.’ For faith is
‘not of ourselves: it is the gift of God:’ and to such as possess faith,
to them giveth He (Jesus Christ) power to become the sons of God. But
that faith and that filial state, though clearly to be ‘ascribed to God,’
was given to the worthy recipient (for we are all along assuming this
worthiness) _before_ baptism, and not _in_ baptism” {28e} (sic). Again,
“As faith must precede beneficial baptism, and as justification is
invariably consequent on faith, therefore justification also precedes
beneficial baptism, and cannot be equivalent to it.” {29} Thus Mr.
Gorham, when heard for himself, plainly declares that the gifts of
regeneration, adoption, remission of sins, and justification, so far from
being ever given to any one _in_ baptism, must have been possessed before
it, if it be not hurtful; and so far from being ever given _by_ baptism,
are always given, if given at all, by prevenient grace. I cite these
passages here, however, not in the least to argue upon the amount of
their error or heresy; but merely to show how very superficially the
Committee of Privy Council have regarded them; how very inadequately they
have represented them in their summary of Mr. Gorham’s opinions. And I
must own here again, I am unable to discover any marks of ability or
acumen; of discrimination or accuracy. This unreadiness and slowness to
throw their minds into abstruse points of theology, may be very
explainable, by considerations of the want of previous training; by the
naturally untheological character of their mental habits; and by a
certain very imaginable ignorance of the subjects with which they were
compelled to deal. These things may be their personal excuse; may show
it was, in great measure, their misfortune, and not their fault to err;
but yet must necessarily be taken into consideration in determining the
moral weight and importance of their judgment.
Thirdly, I am unable to find any acuteness or probable approximation to a
right decision in the manner in which the Committee of Council examine,
compare, and draw conclusions from the various services of the Church.
And first, as to the burial service:—They say {30a}—“In every case in the
burial service, as the earth is cast upon the dead body, the priest is
directed to say, and doth say, ‘Forasmuch as it hath pleased Almighty God
of his great mercy to take unto himself the soul of our dear brother here
departed; we therefore commit his body to the ground, earth to earth,
ashes to ashes, dust to dust, in sure and certain hope of the
resurrection to eternal life;’ and thanks are afterwards given—‘for that
it hath pleased Almighty God to deliver this our brother out of the
miseries of this sinful world;’ and this is followed by a collect in
which it is prayed that ‘when we shall depart this life, we may rest in
God, as our hope is that this our brother doth.’ The hope here
expressed,” (continues the judgment) “is the same ‘sure and certain hope
of the resurrection to eternal life,’ which is stated immediately after
the expression—‘it hath pleased Almighty God of his great mercy to take
to himself the soul of our brother here departed.’ In this service,
therefore, there are absolute expressions implying positive assertions,
which must” (the Court tells us) “be construed in a qualified or
charitable sense.” {30b} Thus it will be seen, not only is “_a hope_”
declared to be “an absolute expression implying a positive assertion;” (I
thought there was good authority to say that hope, however confident or
well founded, is always to be distinguished from, not made identical
with, certainty: “Hope that is seen is not hope:”) but even beyond this,
the Court seems never to have entertained the notion at all; never to
have weighed the matter; never to have grasped the idea; never to have
had it occur to their minds, that any one else thought or could think
otherwise than they did; never to have supposed it possible, that there
_could_ be any difference in the _object_ of the hope mentioned in these
two places; that “the sure and certain hope of the resurrection,” might
perhaps mean, the _general resurrection_ (a topic not unsuitable to be
introduced one would think) whilst the hope of the other passage might be
the hope of the individual’s welfare. However, in each place, the
Committee of Privy Council unhesitatingly assure us, the hope _is the
same_, and _that_, the hope of the individual’s resurrection to eternal
life. They are dogmatic enough in their own teaching, in the
construction of the service to suit the conclusion to which they are
coming (this hope _is_ the same as the one before-mentioned); but, alas!
all this, only in order to make away with dogmatic teaching, of a higher
prestige surely than theirs;—to evolve a charitable hypothesis out of the
most definite expressions! and these used in a most solemn religious
office! Again, I say, and know not how to avoid saying, I cannot see
herein the mark of ability or acumen. {31}
Further, it seems as if the judges had never even heard of any other
meaning being given to the “thanks, that it hath pleased Almighty God to
deliver this our brother out of the miseries of this sinful world,” than
that thereby a thanksgiving must be intended that the dead person is
taken to heaven. They appear never even for a moment to have entertained
the thought that there might be a cause for thankfulness, even in the
cutting off of a soul unprepared, if this were the cutting off a life of
longer and deeper sin, so that by a further time, the man would only have
plunged himself deeper in misery, and have “received greater damnation.”
They perhaps had never contemplated such things as possible in the depths
of the counsels and mercies of God; never thought of any as being
possibly so past salvation, that the only remaining mercy which could be
shown them was to cut short a life whose daily continuance was an
increase of crime; whose daily walk a progress, farther and farther into
the wrath of God. Yet had Lord Campbell been as well read in another
great poet, as he seems to have been in Milton, he might perhaps have
been reminded of these things:—
“The longer life, I wot, the greater sin;
The greater sin, the greater punishment:
All those great battles which thou boast’st to win,
Through strife and bloodshed and avengëment,
Now prais’d, hereafter dear thou shalt repent:
For life must life, and blood must blood repay.
Is not enough thy evil life forespent?
For he that once hath missed the right way,
The further he doth go, the further he doth stray!” {33}
God forbid, indeed, that we should say this of a man, because he “once
hath missed the right way;” (nor is Spenser answerable as implying that
doctrine, as the context will show:) but at least the thought is
suggested which might have assisted the Committee of Council in
considering whether there may not be a time when it will be lawful and
reasonable to give thanks to God, if the removal of a man unprepared, has
yet removed him from only fresh sins, and saved a soul from greater
punishment. Neither, let it be observed, is it in the least necessary to
this view to suppose that we are either called upon, or able, to
determine _who_ among the departed have so fallen past grace, that an
immediate death was the only mercy left for them. It is sufficient that
such an explanation can be given, if perplexity should appear to be
involved in the fact that for every one for whom our burial service is
used, thanks are given “that it hath pleased Almighty God to take unto
himself,” or “to deliver, this our brother out of the miseries of this
sinful world.” {34a}
Again: there is the treatment of the service for private baptism. In one
or two respects this service is unquestionably stronger in its wording
than the office for public baptism, as to regeneration being the gift of
baptism, which made a careful examination of it very important. Let us
therefore see how the Committee of Privy Council have dealt with it.
In the certificate of the due baptism of children privately baptized,
when brought to be received into the Church, (and Sir H. J. Fust has very
properly pointed out that “this is not the certificate of the minister,”
(who had baptized the child,) “but the certificate of the Church” (to the
congregation) “founded upon the answers given as to what had been done;”
{34b} in this certificate,) it is stated that the child, having been
“born in original sin, and in the wrath of God, is now, BY THE LAVER OF
REGENERATION IN BAPTISM, received into the number of the children of God,
and heirs of everlasting life; for our Lord Jesus Christ doth not deny
his grace and mercy unto such infants, but most lovingly doth call them
unto Him;” {34c} and in the further part of his office, where the priest
is directed to declare what benefits that child hath received, and how
received them, the words are, “Seeing now, dearly beloved brethren, that
this _child is by_ BAPTISM _regenerate_, _and grafted into the body of
Christ’s Church_;” {35a} where, in the corresponding place in the public
office, the two words, “_by baptism_” do not occur. Mr. Badeley had
drawn especial attention to this point; and had most aptly explained why
they are introduced in the private office, and omitted in the public.
“Omitted, (he says) not being necessary there, where the rite was being
administered.” {35b} The Church does not seem to have contemplated any
judicial-committee-hypothesis to separate the benefits mentioned, from
the whole service in which their mention occurs; nor to have provided any
safeguard against eyes prying curiously into the point, whether, though
all these benefits are declared to be given in the very office for the
ministration of public baptism, yet, perhaps, it might not be “_by
baptism_” after all. But in the office for private baptism, the very
words, “_by baptism_,” do occur; “important here, (as Mr. Badeley
continued,) that the regeneration might be exclusively referred to the
_previous administration in private_;” that no one might be under any
possible doubt that it was by no rite or ceremony of admission into the
congregation, by nothing else but by baptism itself, before administered,
that the child became partaker of all the privileges of a Christian.
I wish to draw out this point a little further, because it seems to me to
bear much upon the ability of the judgment. That judgment acknowledges
(as it cannot help doing) that the office for private baptism provides
for “a baptism which may have taken place without any prayer for grace,
or any sponsors,” {36a} but it deals with it “as exceptional,” as
“intended only for cases of emergency;” and seems to put by the argument
to be drawn from it as nothing worth upon that ground. But is it
intended by this that the benefits of baptism, whatever they be, are not
given in cases of emergency, as well as in cases of leisure? Is it meant
by the judicial committee that the effects are different, the blessings
less full, the statements less to be relied upon, as to what is given the
child and _how_ given, in one case than in the other? It almost seems as
if they thought so. “The private baptism of infants (they tell us) is an
exceptional case provided for an emergency, and for which, if the
emergency passes away, although there is to be no repetition of the
baptism, a full service is provided.” {36b} I do believe, if the rubric
had not been absolutely too strong for them, (“Let them not doubt but
that the child so baptized is lawfully and sufficiently baptized, and
ought not to be baptized again;”) that they would have wished well to the
idea of some further baptism than this “exceptional” proceeding, and (I
say, _but_ for this rubric,) would have tried to make out there _was_
some completion of the sacrament in the latter part of the office used
when the child is brought into the Church, that the congregation may be
certified respecting the baptism. Nay, one almost wonders they have not
done so as it is: for surely there might have been found as much
implication, that there is ground for doubt in the words, “Let them _not_
doubt;” as there can be for the “amazing” assertion in another place,
that the very earnestness of the prayers of the Church afford an argument
“for thinking that they are not uniformly granted.” Why should we pray
(is the argument of the judges, {37a}) “for that which God has promised
to give unconditionally.” “Those who are strongly impressed with the
earnest prayers which are offered for the divine blessing and the grace
of God, may not unreasonably suppose that the grace is not necessarily
tied to the rite, but that it ought to be earnestly and devoutly prayed
for, in order _that it may_ THEN, or WHEN GOD PLEASES, be present to make
the rite beneficial.” {37b} Such is absolutely a part of the actual
judgment delivered by this court, sitting as a solemn court of appeal, to
weigh and determine the force of words, and to draw necessary
consequences from them. Surely they might equally have argued, “Those
who need to be instructed ‘_not to doubt_,’ may not unreasonably suppose
that there must be _some_ ground for _doubt_, or else why should they be
thus cautioned;” and so make a reason out of the very rubric in question
for supposing a child baptized with this “exceptional” baptism, is _not_
thereby “lawfully and sufficiently baptized.”
And in truth the Judicial Committee do seem to come very near to
believing, if they do not actually believe, that something more _is_
essential to baptism than the form appointed in the private office,
provides, for they tell us, “Any other conclusion” (than that the
promises of the sureties are implied,) “would be an argument to prove
that none but the imperfect and incomplete ceremony allowed in the
exceptional _case would be necessary in any case_” (sic.) This looks as
if they had no notion of what are the essentials of baptism at all, and
then it appears they use their ignorance as _an argument_, _a fortiori_,
to establish their heretical conclusion. They are ignorant that “nothing
more is necessary in any case,” and therefore they deem the benefits do
not come to the child in and by baptism. I cannot call this able or
acute; quite independently of all view as to the truth or falsehood of
the conclusion they arrive at.
But still further on this very point; consider how sharp-sighted they
have been to see that the words “by baptism,” do not occur in another
place. “It is certain by God’s word, that children which are baptized,
dying before they commit actual sin, are undoubtedly saved.” Yes! (says
the Court) saved no doubt—Mr. Gorham does not deny it—by prevenient
grace; (which their death, he thinks, proves them to have had; though
this too seems rather a charitable construction than anything else;
founded, so far as I see, “upon no sure warranty” of either “Scripture,”
or the Church’s teaching;) _saved_, however, again says the Court, but
not _by_ baptism. “This Rubric does not, like the article of 1536, say
that such children are saved _by baptism_.” {38} Thus sharp-sighted are
they to see what makes for the side they advocate (no one can feel it to
be too strong a word); whilst all notice of the very same words occurring
where they might be difficult to construe in the same sense is entirely
omitted. “Seeing, dearly beloved brethren” (says the office for private
baptism), “that this child _is by baptism_ regenerate.” Here there is
surely a plain statement how, and when it is, the regeneration takes
place. But the words do not occur in the public office; and so they are
ignored apparently as being “exceptional,” as if they could mean nothing.
Let us see, carefully, what this amounts to, if pursued and followed out.
Instead of taking Mr. Badeley’s most reasonable argument into
consideration, that the thing intended is exactly the same in each case,
only it was too plain to require to be stated that the regeneration was
_by baptism_ in the public office, when the declaration “seeing this
child is regenerate” is made in the very midst of the celebration,
immediately upon the administration of the sacrament; but that it _was_
stated in the other service to prevent all doubtfulness as to _when_, and
_by what means_, the regeneration was given to the child;—instead,
therefore, of interpreting the one office by the other; instead of saying
we must suppose regeneration, and grafting into the body of Christ to be
the same, and attained by the same means in each case, the Court appears
to have said simply, we will ignore the office which is most express, as
an “exceptional case,” and proceed upon the wording of the other only.
But see, yet again, what this amounts to; it is declaring that there is a
difference of the gift in these different baptisms. Take ten children
baptized privately, who have lived to be brought to church, and ten
baptized publicly, and of the first ten you will have it said by the
Church that they are “_by baptism regenerate_:” of the others that they
are regenerate—but, according to the Gorham phraseology—by prevenient
grace, and _not_ by baptism; or, by the Privy Council’s exposition of
this (not exactly a correct one, however), “taking place either before,
in, or after baptism.” Is any man in his senses expected to believe such
a mode of interpretation to be sound and true; or the way to make the
Church’s services agree together; or that it is a due application of the
principle to let the services explain each other, as would be the case in
any and all ordinary legal documents. Why! according to this rule, the
right and blessed thing for parents to do, would be, _not_ to bring their
children to church to be baptized as soon as they _can_; _not_ to give
any heed to the exhortation of “the curate of every parish, often
admonishing the people that they defer not the baptism of their children
longer than the first or second Sunday next after their birth, or other
holy-day falling between unless upon a great and reasonable cause;” {40}
but in every possible case TO _defer_ the baptism, till the children may
be sick, and then procure them to be baptized privately. _Then_ will
they have the Church’s assurance that “their infants are _by baptism
regenerate_, and grafted into the body of Christ;”—then will they make
the exception the rule, and take all advantage of the “exceptional
case;”—then may they feel that knowing _when_ the regeneration took
place, they may be sure it _has_ taken place;—but if they be obedient and
faithful to the Church’s exhortation; and bring their infants soon to
church to be baptised, then indeed, according to the Gorham theology, and
the Privy Council’s judgment upon it, then will they have no knowledge
whether “remission of their sins by spiritual regeneration” hath come to
their babes at all, every thing being dependent upon the prevenient
grace, which no one pretends is given to all infants; and though, (it is
said,) to some, yet no one can pretend to say, to which!
The Privy Council, although this point of the force of the words
“_regenerate by baptism_” in the office for private ministration, was
pressed upon them by Mr. Badeley, take no notice at all of it I think in
their judgment; merging all they had to say on the subject of that office
in “its being exceptional,” and “intended for an emergency.” I cannot
deem this clear-sighted and acute. If I thought it so, I could not by
any compulsion think it honest. I do not impugn their honesty; but they
must (and will _find_ they must in time) take the world’s verdict as to
the ability of such reasoning.
One other passage I must briefly notice: “The whole Catechism” (the court
tells us) “requires a charitable construction, _such as must be given_ to
the expression, ‘God the Holy Ghost who sanctifieth me, and all the elect
people of God.’” Thus it is evident the Judicial Committee have lived so
out of all theological training and the commonest catechetical
instruction, that it has never occurred to them this passage can have a
literal meaning. They seem never to have heard or dreamed of such a
thing as “the elect people of God” being, _the baptized_; never to have
supposed that the words “GOD THE HOLY GHOST _who sanctifieth_,” might be
descriptive of the _office_ of the HOLY SPIRIT, and mean (surely an easy
and natural sense enough) who _is the Sanctifier of_; never,
consequently, to have considered the possibility that the intention of
the whole passage might be (and be thus literally true), that it is _God
the Holy Ghost who is the Sanctifier of the baptized_, at their baptism
at any rate, although such persons may no doubt afterwards fall away,
grieve or quench him, and drive him from them. {42} Again I say, they
use their own ignorance on a point upon which any catechumen might have
taught them better, as a cumulative argument to explain the whole
Catechism in an hypothetical and unreal sense, such as they tell us
_must_ be given to these words. Truly, if, like the boy in the tale, the
Court had expressed their thankfulness for their ignorance, (and it is, I
fear, their best friend as to many parts of this decision’s merits,) one
would be tempted to agree with the response there given, that they “have
a great deal undoubtedly for which to be thankful.”
I do not think, then, I could call this document, put forth to the world
after so long a preparation, and known by the court itself to be of so
much importance, a clever paper, even if looked upon merely as the
exercise of an advocate, desired to make up a judgment upon a “foregone
conclusion.” But assuredly this is _one thing_; to be an able judicial
document is _another_:—another and so different a thing, that I presume
there will be little dispute, whether among lawyers, or any men of sense,
that for a judicial document to be (_if_ it be) _but_ the subtil,
ingenious effort of a partisan, is so far from even faint praise, that it
is the most disastrous imputation which could rest upon a judge’s
character, to have been a party in any such transaction as the framing
it. I cannot either call it talent of any high character, to see all
that makes _for_ one view, and nothing that makes _against_ it. I cannot
praise _that_ discrimination which is only great at finding a solution to
one-sided difficulties. I cannot consider these as the marks of an able
judge, however they may be the natural characteristics or proceedings of
an advocate or partizan. Yet let me explain;—even so, I do not say a
partizan is by any means necessarily a dishonest man. The habit of being
biassed by what we much wish, is as natural as, in some cases, to
forecast what we much fear. It works even unconsciously to ourselves,
and is not inconsistent with the most upright intention, nay, sometimes,
not with the most earnest endeavour after truth. But certainly _he_ only
is to be called a great judge who can master this habit; whose mental
discipline is such, that he can abstract himself from these circumstances
of his wishes, and in spite of all the promptings of his heart, preserve
the coolness of his head; who can divest himself, when he takes his place
on his judicial throne, almost of his personal existence, and pass
judgment as if the world would end to-morrow. The calculation of
consequences; the being guided by what shall make most for peace, or any
other desiderated end, is one of the snares to be most carefully shunned
by any man who would occupy a distinguished place in the temple of
justice. _He_ has no pretence to stand upon the roll of fame, as eminent
in his calling as a judge, whose eyes wander into the future, whose mind
is pondering the consequences which may ensue. Such an one shows
manifestly that he is unable to separate his judgment from his advocacy;
his judicial character from the wishes and bias of his mind; and
therefore, though a very honest man it may be, still that he is deficient
in the first of all the qualities necessary to form a great judicial
character, or secure a lasting judicial name.
I do not say, in saying these things, that Lords Campbell and Langdale,
Mr. Pemberton Leigh, Dr. Lushington, and Mr. Baron Parke were consciously
one-sided in the judgment they delivered: but I do say, it appears to me,
and I believe it will appear to posterity, when all these things shall be
matters of unimpassioned historic reference, that whatever their judgment
in the case of Gorham v. the Bishop of Exeter may be as to its
uprightness, they lose caste as to ability, by its delivery. They lose,
and will lose caste, if only from the fact that they were not able to
see, to remember, to combine, to take count of various matters (some of
which I have just noticed) bearing upon the very documents, (the great
things as they themselves allow by which they were to be guided,) and
essential to a fair decision; and this moreover when those very points
had been distinctly pressed upon their attention. They deviated
likewise, I believe, from all the ordinary rules of courts of appeal, in
ignoring, instead of examining, the judgment of the court from which the
appeal came up, the decision of which they were about to reverse. Many
will be the hearts that will grieve over these things as time goes on,
first, generally, on the ground of the dissatisfaction and distrust which
such proceedings cast upon the character of the administration of our
law; but next also, on the narrower though hardly less painful ground, of
seeing men who might have stood so high, losing their position in the
world’s history, by the too sensitive desire to do the things which, as
they imagine, make for peace, rather than boldly daring to adopt the
divine motto, “Be just, and fear not.”
To say nothing of others, how many will think remorsefully of the deed
done which cannot now be undone, when they find (as find I am sure they
will) that this judgment has struck down from the pedestal of honour
where he might perchance have stood with few equal and none superior to
him, one, whose name as a lawyer was promising to fill the world. That
learned Baron’s name might perhaps have descended to posterity, coupled
with the very greatest of the judicial names this country has ever
boasted; but now, (sorrowfully will many hearts attest it,) in spite of
all the blind flattery of party feeling, and all attempts to patch the
matter up or smooth it over by party declamation; now;—_for_ and _by_
this Gorham judgment, will he fall from that pre-eminence, and be found,
to those highest honours, to have forfeited his claim.
Before I leave this part of my subject there is one further remark I must
needs make. This is not the first time that the people of this country
have had cause to look with suspicion upon the administration of the law,
where the interests of the Church have been affected. There is, I think,
a growing feeling in the world, that, (it may be unadvisedly and
unconsciously in those concerned, still really and practically,) the
Church does not meet with exactly the same measure which would be dealt
out in mere legal construction of documents to a railway company or a
merchant’s clerk. When in the year 1848, in the Hampden case, the Lord
Chief Justice of the Queen’s Bench of that day reversed the unvarying
practice of his court for 250 years: {46} (if I am mistaken in the fact,
no doubt I shall be corrected,) when Lord Denman nullified in that case
(and expressly from a _regard to consequences_;—his own reason, as stated
by himself in his judgment;—) so general and so just a practice as that
when the judges are divided equally in opinion, “the writ should go,” to
give opportunity for further argument, and consideration by a higher
court (that a writ of error, I believe it is termed, may lie), he did a
thing so pernicious, that Englishmen may well be grieved he should ever
have held so high an office. To throw suspicion on the fountains of
justice is among the greatest wrongs any man can inflict upon his
country. It is high treason against the majesty of law. It is a
teaching of rebellion to all who have the wit to understand what has been
done. It substitutes distrust even in the rightfully condemned, for the
general and generous confidence even of him who may think or know, in his
own case, the law has erred. Let such a persuasion grow but a little,
and we shall find no more instances of the spirit of him who said
I had my trial
And must needs say a noble one: . . .
The law I bear no malice for my death,
It has done, upon the premises, but justice;
whilst “every puny whipster” who thinks himself aggrieved, will only
proclaim “with outstretched throat,” the impossibility of obtaining equal
justice, and the corruption of the law. No man can doubt it is the
paramount duty of those concerned in its administration to “abstain from
all appearance” of this “evil,” and give no possible colour to its
existence. In truth, so sacred is the subject I have here handled, that
nothing but the most weighty considerations should induce us to mention
at all the circumstance of so just a rule having ever been disregarded.
These however do exist in reference to the present matter; and where the
question at issue is the preservation of the true faith in our branch of
the Church of Christ, we dare not omit the notice of any of the dangers
which beset it. We dare not, for peace’ sake, or for the sake of a
worldly expediency, “keep silence.” We dare not, for fear of casting an
imputation (not, observe, a vague one, but supported by fact and
testimony) on the administration of human law, run the risk of its being
cast upon the truth of God, and the Church of Christ. Much have these
things pressed upon me, in reference to our present state, and future
prospects: and many times have I weighed them before venturing thus to
bring my thoughts to light. “My heart was hot within me, and while I was
thus musing, the fire kindled, and at the last I spake with my tongue.”
{48}
But it is more than time that I turn from these, however very important,
yet somewhat preliminary considerations, to the more direct purport of
your letter, and to the answer I may be able to give to the charge
contained in it. What this is, your title-page sufficiently declares:
“The want of dogmatic teaching in the reformed Church of England:” and my
answer is plain and simple: such as you will not quarrel with for want of
distinctness and pertinency, if only I sustain it. I join issue as to
the fact. I maintain we _have_ a rule of dogmatic teaching in our
Church’s constitution on all those points on which it is essential a
Church should have it. I think, in and by God’s good providence over us,
(and if it be so, you will yourself allow it is a most singular mark of
his gracious favour towards us,) this has been preserved as to what we
_ought_ to teach, though I acknowledge in practice and in fact, we fall
lamentably short of teaching, and our people of believing according to
it. I imagine, however, you will not charge it as any conclusive
argument against the catholicity of either ourselves, or any branch of
the Church of Christ, that gross and frequent cases of practical
short-comings may be adduced, if it can nevertheless be shown, that the
Church’s rule requires what is right, and, rightly understood,
dogmatically inculcates it.
You may be curious to learn upon what basis I think myself able to
sustain so direct a challenge to the whole principle and bearing of your
second letter; and, strange to say, I know no one, whose words so aptly
enunciate, and give expression to my argument as your own. You will
think, I doubt not you have disarmed the quotation I am about to make,
(which by this time you anticipate,) by having already brought it forward
yourself, and stated you can no longer rely upon it. But you must excuse
me for not so easily parting with it, and for endeavouring to prove you
right in your earlier view, even against your own subsequent change of
mind. “It is a miserable matter,” (you say, after having given various
authorities among our ritualists to confirm your view of absolution,) “it
is a miserable matter merely to be able to escape from condemnation. I
am not content to think the interpretation which I insist upon is but one
of many which _may_ or _may not_, according to individual caprice or
individual ignorance be held without rebuke by our people, and taught by
our clergy. If any one of the above theories is the true one, all the
rest are false. And are we for ever to remain disputing? Is there no
voice by which we may learn the truth? I believe that there is a voice,
long neglected and long forgotten, the voice of the Church of England.
Let us listen to her teaching, and we shall find that now, as of old, by
the great grace of God, she does not speak with a doubting or hesitating
tongue.” {50}
This was your opinion at the close of the year 1848, and this is what I
still claim. I am prepared, even against yourself, to maintain, and I
believe I can shew, its soundness. Do not suppose that I dream of
quoting this or a further passage which I shall have occasion to extract
presently, merely in order to show a discrepancy between what you
asserted then, and what you hold now. I do not desire to cavil with your
right to be inconsistent in search of truth, if that were all; and I must
allow besides such things have “come to pass in these our days,” between
then and now, as may much diminish our surprise at inconsistency or
change of mind in any one. At any rate, it would be, I am well aware, a
most idle task to endeavour to prove _my_ position in favour of the
dogmatic teaching of the Church of England, merely by convicting you or
any man of inconsistency, and showing that what you think and say now is
different from what you thought and said a year and a half ago. In all
truth this is not my object; but I cite these passages, because I know
not how better, nay, not how so well to express my own meaning; that I
may also comment a little upon the passages I cite, and your reasons for
thinking the position they take up no longer tenable; and that in so
doing I may add a few words beyond what you said even in 1848, for
believing in their soundness. Let me turn to your words. You say, “Here
though open to the charge of repetition, I must again lay down the
principle upon which alone we can possibly decide what the judgment of
the Church of England really is; and to which principle we are bound to
bring for proof as to a test every doctrine which we assert or deny.”