THE PLAN OF GENERAL LEE
In order to understand more clearly the predicament in which the two
young soldiers found themselves at the close of the preceding chapter,
it is necessary for us to review briefly the events which led up to that
time after the second battle of Bull Run when the Union forces again
were defeated. The failure of General Jackson to strike the troops of
General Pope on their line of retreat had enabled the latter with his
men to regain the shelter of the fortifications at Washington.
Meanwhile the Confederate commander, Lee, gave his troops rest only for
a day. As has been said, he was aware that it was impossible for him at
this time either to invest or to attack the lines of Washington. In
spite of his success he was convinced that only two courses of action
were open to him. One of these was to remain in Virginia and try to
defend the capital of the Confederate States from possible attacks by
his enemies, and the other plan was to cross the Potomac and enter
Maryland. There he might strike, or at least threaten to strike, some of
the Northern cities that were not far from the border, and prevent
General McClellan from carrying out his cherished desire to attack
Richmond.
Besides, General Lee was aware that, if he merely tried to defend the
capital of the rebellion, it would leave his enemy with full power to
assume the offensive and make attacks wherever it was decided, after the
spirits of his army had been restored and the ranks once more had been
filled.
There were many who believed that General Lee displayed great keenness
of vision when he decided to enter Maryland with his army. Such an act
on his part would enable the distressed farmers of the South to gather
their crops and harvests. Especially was this true in the beautiful and
fertile Valley of the Shenandoah.
In addition to these advantages, the presence of the Confederate army in
Maryland would bring many recruits, it was believed, and at the same
time would confuse the Northern army by the possibility of the trouble
that might be created there. And every day of delay was of especial
advantage to the Confederates, who were working zealously to erect and
complete the fortifications of their capital.
Another thought that is said to have been in the mind of Lee was that
the people of the North, if the war should be transferred to their
territory, would thus obtain a more intimate knowledge of its horrors,
and this personal experience would arouse a desire to bring the contest
to a close. Indeed, it is said that General Lee was confident at this
time that he could accomplish the end of the struggle, which now had
been fiercely fought for nearly a year and a half.
General Lee's first plan was to move rapidly into southern Pennsylvania,
and by compelling his enemies to follow him, as he was confident they
would do, he would draw them so far away from any defenses such as Pope
had recently secured in Washington after the second battle of Bull Run,
that if he should then plan for a battle it would be impossible for
McClellan's troops to escape surrender as well as defeat. So confident
were the Southern leaders now that they were filled with the thought
that if the desire for peace could be strengthened in the North by a
battle fought on Northern soil, and at the same time if the powers of
Europe should agree to secure their cotton from the Southland, the
results at the same time would put added pressure upon the Government at
Washington and terminate the bloody struggle.
Keen as was the plan of General Lee, he was aware that his army was in
no condition for an enlarged or energetic campaign. No small part of his
men, as they marched over the sandy soil, were leaving bloody marks of
their bare feet. It had been impossible to provide many of his soldiers
with shoes. The provisions, too, were not sufficient, and in the days
that had followed the battle many had been suffering from disease. As a
consequence it is said, by those who are competent to judge, that not
more than fifty-five thousand men were in the army of the brilliant
Southern general when he crossed the Potomac River.
Much as the men were suffering, the animals of the camp were in no
better condition. The horses were weakened by lack of food and by the
hardships of the recent days. As if these facts were not sufficient to
make the general hesitate, it is said that his supplies of ammunition
also were deficient, and that he was as seriously troubled by this last
fact as by both of the others combined.
But, like every successful man, General Lee decided not to think so
much of what he did not have as of what he did have. Whatever might
befall his attempt, he was confident that he would be able to make the
Northern armies remain so long and so far from the protection of their
defenses that he could draw out the campaign and there would be no fresh
attempt to take Richmond before the following spring. This opportunity,
as we know, would be seized by the defenders of Richmond to strengthen
their defenses.
At this time Lee was not expecting to receive any reinforcements, as the
campaigns in Tennessee and Kentucky demanded all the men that could be
spared.
Between the 4th and 7th of September (1862) the Confederate troops were
crossing the Potomac. On the last-named day General Jackson occupied
Frederick city and speedily was followed by another division. Then the
dashing cavalry of Stuart spread out in the State in such a manner that
most of the attempts of the Union generals to gain information
concerning the plans of their enemies were frustrated.
Meanwhile, as we know, the Federal soldiers were holding three fortified
places in or near the Shenandoah Valley which was the chief reliance of
General Lee for his supplies. About eight thousand men had been
stationed at Harper's Ferry, and there also were small garrisons at
Martinsburg and at Winchester.
As has been said, General McClellan urged General Halleck to recall
these men and attach them to the Army of the Potomac. This is exactly
what General Lee believed would be done, because it was what he himself
would have decided upon if he had been in his opponent's position.
When General Halleck decided to leave these garrisons in the Valley, Lee
instantly decided that they must be taken, and he believed also that
they could be captured easily.
It was essential for the plans he had formed that his own communications
with his base of supplies should not be threatened by such a large
garrison as had been placed in Harper's Ferry.
Acting promptly, as he usually did, General Lee now decided to divide
his army and reunite the divisions west of the mountains before a
decisive battle could be fought.
With this purpose in his mind the commander of the Confederate troops
issued his orders on the 9th of September, and on the following day
General Jackson, in command of three divisions, after he had crossed
the mountains, was to ford the Potomac at some place west of Harper's
Ferry and then move upon the little garrison at Martinsburg.
His companion, General McLaws, with two divisions was to take possession
of the heights which overlooked Harper's Ferry and the Potomac, while
another division under General Walker was to cross the Potomac east of
Harper's Ferry, and secure the Loudon Heights. This last-named position
would enable the Confederate soldiers to command Harper's Ferry from the
east bank of the Shenandoah. By this plan the little body of troops in
Harper's Ferry would be surrounded and absolutely cut off from every
hope of escape because General Jackson, just as soon as he had obtained
possession of Martinsburg, was to march swiftly toward Harper's Ferry
and block every road that led westward.