of the judges thereof, on the constitutionality of the draft law. In
fact, I should be willing to facilitate the obtaining of it. But I cannot
consent to lose the time while it is being obtained. We are contending
with an enemy who, as I understand, drives every able-bodied man he can
reach into his ranks, very much as a butcher drives bullocks into the
slaughter-pen. No time is wasted, no argument is used. This produces an
army which will soon turn upon our now victorious soldiers already in the
field, if they shall not be sustained by recruits as they should be. It
produces an army with a rapidity not to be matched on our side if we first
waste time to re-experiment with the volunteer system, already deemed by
Congress, and palpably, in fact, so far exhausted as to be inadequate;
and then more time to obtain a court decision as to whether a law is
constitutional, which requires a part of those not now in the service
to go to the aid of those who are already in it; and still more time to
determine with absolute certainty that we get those who are to go in the
precisely legal proportion to those who are not to go. My purpose is to be
in my action just and constitutional, and yet practical, in performing the
important duty with which I am charged, of maintaining the unity and the
free principles of our common country.
Your obedient servant,
A. LINCOLN.
TO GENERAL U.S. GRANT.
EXECUTIVE MANSION WASHINGTON, August 9, 1863.
MY DEAR GENERAL GRANT:
I see by a despatch of yours that you incline quite strongly toward an
expedition against Mobile. This would appear tempting to me also, were it
not that in view of recent events in Mexico I am greatly impressed with
the importance of re-establishing the national authority in western Texas
as soon as possible. I am not making an order, however; that I leave, for
the present at least, to the general-in-chief.
A word upon another subject: General Thomas has gone again to the
Mississippi Valley, with the view of raising colored troops. I have no
reason to doubt that you are doing what you reasonably can upon the same
subject. I believe it is a resource which if vigorously applied now
will soon close the contest. It works doubly, weakening the enemy and
strengthening us. We were not fully ripe for it until the river was
opened. Now, I think at least one hundred thousand can and ought to be
rapidly organized along its shores, relieving all white troops to serve
elsewhere. Mr. Dana understands you as believing that the Emancipation
Proclamation has helped some in your military operations. I am very glad
if this is so.
Did you receive a short letter from me dated the 13th of July?
Yours very truly,
A. LINCOLN.
TO GENERAL W. S. ROSECRANS.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, August 10, 1863.
MY DEAR GENERAL ROSECRANS:
Yours of the 1st was received two days ago. I think you must have inferred
more than General Halleck has intended, as to any dissatisfaction of mine
with you. I am sure you, as a reasonable man, would not have been wounded
could you have heard all my words and seen all my thoughts in regard to
you. I have not abated in my kind feeling for and confidence in you. I
have seen most of your despatches to General Halleck--probably all of
them. After Grant invested Vicksburg I was very anxious lest Johnston
should overwhelm him from the outside, and when it appeared certain that
part of Bragg's force had gone and was going to Johnston, it did seem to
me it was exactly the proper time for you to attack Bragg with what force
he had left. In all kindness let me say it so seems to me yet. Finding
from your despatches to General Halleck that your judgment was different,
and being very anxious for Grant, I, on one occasion, told General Halleck
I thought he should direct you to decide at once to immediately attack
Bragg or to stand on the defensive and send part of your force to Grant.
He replied he had already so directed in substance. Soon after, despatches
from Grant abated my anxiety for him, and in proportion abated my anxiety
about any movement of yours. When afterward, however, I saw a despatch of
yours arguing that the right time for you to attack Bragg was not before,
but would be after, the fall of Vicksburg, it impressed me very strangely,
and I think I so stated to the Secretary of War and General Halleck. It
seemed no other than the proposition that you could better fight Bragg
when Johnston should be at liberty to return and assist him than you could
before he could so return to his assistance.
Since Grant has been entirely relieved by the fall of Vicksburg, by which
Johnston is also relieved, it has seemed to me that your chance for a
stroke has been considerably diminished, and I have not been pressing you
directly or indirectly. True, I am very anxious for East Tennessee to be
occupied by us; but I see and appreciate the difficulties you mention. The
question occurs, Can the thing be done at all? Does preparation advance at
all? Do you not consume supplies as fast as you get them forward? Have you
more animals to-day than you had at the battle of Stone's River? And
yet have not more been furnished you since then than your entire present
stock? I ask the same questions as to your mounted force.
Do not misunderstand: I am not casting blame upon you; I rather think
by great exertion you can get to East Tennessee; but a very important
question is, Can you stay there? I make no order in the case--that I leave
to General Halleck and yourself.
And now be assured once more that I think of you in all kindness and
confidence, and that I am not watching you with an evil eye.
Yours very truly,
A. LINCOLN.
TO GOVERNOR SEYMOUR.
EXECUTIVE MANSION WASHINGTON, August 11.1863.
HIS EXCELLENCY HORATIO SEYMOUR, Governor of New York:
Yours of the 8th, with Judge-Advocate-General Waterbury's report, was
received to-day.
Asking you to remember that I consider time as being very important, both
to the general cause of the country and to the soldiers in the field, I
beg to remind you that I waited, at your request, from the 1st until the
6th inst., to receive your communication dated the 3d. In view of
its great length, and the known time and apparent care taken in its
preparation, I did not doubt that it contained your full case as you
desired to present it. It contained the figures for twelve districts,
omitting the other nineteen, as I suppose, because you found nothing to
complain of as to them. I answered accordingly. In doing so I laid down
the principle to which I purpose adhering, which is to proceed with the
draft, at the same time employing infallible means to avoid any great
wrong. With the communication received to-day you send figures for
twenty-eight districts, including the twelve sent before, and still
omitting three, for which I suppose the enrolments are not yet received.
In looking over the fuller list of twenty-eight districts, I find that the
quotas for sixteen of them are above 2000 and below 2700, while, of the
rest, six are above 2700 and six are below 2000. Applying the principle to
these new facts, the Fifth and Seventh districts must be added to the four
in which the quotas have already been reduced to 2200 for the first draft;
and with these four others just be added to those to be re-enrolled. The
correct case will then stand: the quotas of the Second, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth districts fixed at 2200 for the first draft.
The Provost-Marshal-General informs me that the drawing is already
completed in the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, Twenty-second,
Twenty-fourth, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-seventh, Twenty-eighth, Twenty-ninth,
and Thirtieth districts. In the others, except the three outstanding, the
drawing will be made upon the quotas as now fixed. After the first draft,
the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Sixteenth, Seventeenth,
Twenty-first, Twenty-fifth, Twenty-ninth, and Thirty-first will be
enrolled for the purpose and in the manner stated in my letter of the 7th
inst. The same principle will be applied to the now outstanding districts
when they shall come in. No part of my former letter is repudiated by
reason of not being restated in this, or for any other cause.
Your obedient servant,
A. LINCOLN.
TO GENERAL J. A. McCLERNAND.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, August 12, 1863.
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLERNAND.
MY DEAR SIR:--Our friend William G. Greene has just presented a kind
letter in regard to yourself, addressed to me by our other friends Yates,
Hatch, and Dubois.
I doubt whether your present position is more painful to you than to
myself. Grateful for the patriotic stand so early taken by you in this
life-and-death struggle of the nation, I have done whatever has appeared
practicable to advance you and the public interest together. No charges,
with a view to a trial, have been preferred against you by any one; nor do
I suppose any will be. All there is, so far as I have heard, is General
Grant's statement of his reasons for relieving you. And even this I have
not seen or sought to see; because it is a case, as appears to me, in
which I could do nothing without doing harm. General Grant and yourself
have been conspicuous in our most important successes; and for me to
interfere and thus magnify a breach between you could not but be of evil
effect. Better leave it where the law of the case has placed it. For me to
force you back upon General Grant would be forcing him to resign. I cannot
give you a new command, because we have no forces except such as already
have commanders.
I am constantly pressed by those who scold before they think, or without
thinking at all, to give commands respectively to Fremont, McClellan,
Butler, Sigel, Curtis, Hunter, Hooker, and perhaps others, when, all else
out of the way, I have no commands to give them. This is now your case;
which, as I have said, pains me not less than it does you. My belief is
that the permanent estimate of what a general does in the field is fixed
by the "cloud of witnesses" who have been with him in the field, and that,
relying on these, he who has the right needs not to fear.
Your friend as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR SEYMOUR.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, AUGUST 16, 1863.
GOVERNOR SEYMOUR, New York:
Your despatch of this morning is just received, and I fear I do not
perfectly understand it.
My view of the principle is that every soldier obtained voluntarily leaves
one less to be obtained by draft. The only difficulty is in applying the
principle properly. Looking to time, as heretofore, I am unwilling to
give up a drafted man now, even for the certainty, much less for the mere
chance, of getting a volunteer hereafter. Again, after the draft in any
district, would it not make trouble to take any drafted man out and put a
volunteer in--for how shall it be determined which drafted man is to have
the privilege of thus going out, to the exclusion of all the others? And
even before the draft in any district the quota must be fixed; and the
draft must be postponed indefinitely if every time a volunteer is offered
the officers must stop and reconstruct the quota. At least I fear there
might be this difficulty; but, at all events, let credits for volunteers
be given up to the last moment which will not produce confusion or delay.
That the principle of giving credits for volunteers shall be applied by
districts seems fair and proper, though I do not know how far by present
statistics it is practicable. When for any cause a fair credit is not
given at one time, it should be given as soon thereafter as practicable.
My purpose is to be just and fair, and yet to not lose time.
A. LINCOLN
To J. H. HACKETT.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON August 17, 1863.
JAMES H. HACKETT, Esq.
MY DEAR SIR:--Months ago I should have acknowledged the receipt of your
book and accompanying kind note; and I now have to beg your pardon for not
having done so.
For one of my age I have seen very little of the drama. The first
presentation of Falstaff I ever saw was yours here, last winter or spring.
Perhaps the best compliment I can pay is to say, as I truly can, I am very
anxious to see it again. Some of Shakespeare's plays I have never read,
while others I have gone over perhaps as frequently as any un-professional
reader. Among the latter are Lear, Richard III., Henry VIII., Hamlet, and
especially Macbeth. I think nothing equals Macbeth. It is wonderful.
Unlike you gentlemen of the profession, I think the soliloquy in Hamlet
commencing "Oh, my offense is rank," surpasses that commencing "To be or
not to be." But pardon this small attempt at criticism. I should like to
hear you pronounce the opening speech of Richard III. Will you not soon
visit Washington again? If you do, please call and let me make your
personal acquaintance.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN
TO F. F. LOWE.
WASHINGTON, D. C., August 17, 1863.
HON. P. F. LOWE, San Francisco, Cal.:
There seems to be considerable misunderstanding about the recent movement
to take possession of the "New Almaden" mine. It has no reference to any
other mine or mines.
In regard to mines and miners generally, no change of policy by the
Government has been decided on, or even thought of, so far as I know.
The "New Almaden" mine was peculiar in this: that its occupants claimed to
be the legal owners of it on a Mexican grant, and went into court on that
claim. The case found its way into the Supreme Court of the United States,
and last term, in and by that court, the claim of the occupants was
decided to be utterly fraudulent. Thereupon it was considered the duty of
the Government by the Secretary of the Interior, the Attorney-General,
and myself to take possession of the premises; and the Attorney-General
carefully made out the writ and I signed it. It was not obtained
surreptitiously, although I suppose General Halleck thought it had been,
when he telegraphed, simply because he thought possession was about being
taken by a military order, while he knew no such order had passed through
his hands as general-in-chief.
The writ was suspended, upon urgent representations from California,
simply to keep the peace. It never had any direct or indirect reference to
any mine, place, or person, except the "New Almaden" mine and the persons
connected with it.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL MEADE.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, August 21, 1863.
MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Warrenton, Va.:
At this late moment I am appealed to in behalf of William Thompson of
Company K, Third Maryland Volunteers, in Twelfth Army Corps, said to be
at Kelly's Ford, under sentence to be shot to-day as a deserter. He is
represented to me to be very young, with symptoms of insanity. Please
postpone the execution till further order.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL SCHOFIELD.
WASHINGTON, D. C., August 22, 1863.
GENERAL SCHOFIELD, Saint Louis, Mo.:
Please send me if you can a transcript of the record in the case of McQuin
and Bell, convicted of murder by a military commission. I telegraphed
General Strong for it, but he does not answer.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO MRS. GRIMSLEY.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C., August 24, 1863.
MRS. ELIZABETH J. GRIMSLEY, Springfield, Ill.:
I mail the papers to you to-day appointing Johnny to the Naval school.
A. LINCOLN
TO CRITICS OF EMANCIPATION
To J. C. CONKLING.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, August 26, 1863.
HON. JAMES C. CONKLING.
MY DEAR SIR:--Your letter inviting me to attend a mass meeting of
unconditional Union men, to be held at the capital of Illinois, on the
3d day of September, has been received. It would be very agreeable for
me thus to meet my old friends at my own home, but I cannot just now be
absent from here so long as a visit there would require.
The meeting is to be of all those who maintain unconditional devotion to
the Union, and I am sure that my old political friends will thank me for
tendering, as I do, the nation's gratitude to those other noble men whom
no partisan malice or partisan hope can make false to the nation's life.
There are those who are dissatisfied with me. To such I would say: You
desire peace, and you blame me that we do not have it. But how can we
obtain it? There are but three conceivable ways:
First--to suppress the rebellion by force of arms. This I am trying to do.
Are you for it? If you are, so far we are agreed. If you are not for it, a
second way is to give up the Union. I am against this. Are you for it? If
you are you should say so plainly. If you are not for force nor yet for
dissolution, there only remains some imaginable compromise.
I do not believe that any compromise embracing the maintenance of the
Union is now possible. All that I learn leads to a directly opposite
belief. The strength of the rebellion is its military, its army. That army
dominates all the country and all the people within its range. Any offer
of terms made by any man or men within that range, in opposition to that
army, is simply nothing for the present; because such man or men have no
power whatever to enforce their side of a compromise, if one were made
with them.
To illustrate: Suppose refugees from the South and peace men of the North
get together in convention, and frame and proclaim a compromise embracing
a restoration of the Union. In what way can that compromise be used to
keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania? Meade's army can keep Lee's army out
of Pennsylvania, and, I think, can ultimately drive it out of existence.
But no paper compromise to which the controllers of Lee's army are not
agreed can at all affect that army. In an effort at such compromise we
would waste time, which the enemy would improve to our disadvantage; and
that would be all.
A compromise, to be effective, must be made either with those who control
the rebel army, or with the people, first liberated from the domination of
that army by the success of our own army. Now allow me to assure you
that no word or intimation from that rebel army, or from any of the men
controlling it, in relation to any peace compromise, has ever come to
my knowledge or belief. All charges and insinuations to the contrary are
deceptive and groundless. And I promise you that if any such proposition
shall hereafter come, it shall not be rejected and kept a secret from you.
I freely acknowledge myself to be the servant of the people, according to
the bond of service, the United States Constitution, and that, as such, I
am responsible to them.
But, to be plain: You are dissatisfied with me about the negro. Quite
likely there is a difference of opinion between you and myself upon
that subject. I certainly wish that all men could be free, while you,
I suppose, do not. Yet, I have neither adopted nor proposed any measure
which is not consistent with even your view, provided you are for the
Union. I suggested compensated emancipation; to which you replied you
wished not to be taxed to buy negroes. But I had not asked you to be taxed
to buy negroes, except in such way as to save you from greater taxation to
save the Union exclusively by other means.
You dislike the Emancipation Proclamation, and perhaps would have it
retracted. You say it is unconstitutional. I think differently. I think
the Constitution invests its commander-in-chief with the law of war in
time of war. The most that can be said, if so much, is, that slaves are
property. Is there, has there ever been, any question that by the law of
war, property, both of enemies and friends, may be taken when needed? And
is it not needed whenever it helps us and hurts the enemy? Armies, the
world over, destroy enemies' property when they cannot use it, and even
destroy their own to keep it from the enemy. Civilized belligerents do all
in their power to help themselves or hurt the enemy, except a few things
regarded as barbarous or cruel. Among the exceptions are the massacre of
vanquished foes and non-combatants, male and female.
But the proclamation, as law, either is valid or is not valid. If it is
not valid it needs no retraction. If it is valid it cannot be retracted,
any more than the dead can be brought to life. Some of you profess to
think its retraction would operate favorably for the Union, why better
after the retraction than before the issue? There was more than a year
and a half of trial to suppress the rebellion before the proclamation was
issued, the last one hundred days of which passed under an explicit notice
that it was coming, unless averted by those in revolt returning to their
allegiance. The war has certainly progressed as favorably for us since the
issue of the proclamation as before.
I know, as fully as one can know the opinions of others, that some of
the commanders of our armies in the field, who have given us our most
important victories, believe the emancipation policy and the use of
colored troops constitute the heaviest blows yet dealt to the rebellion,
and that at least one of those important successes could not have been
achieved when it was but for the aid of black soldiers.
Among the commanders who hold these views are some who have never had any
affinity with what is called "Abolitionism," or with "Republican Party
politics," but who hold them purely as military opinions. I submit their
opinions are entitled to some weight against the objections often urged
that emancipation and arming the blacks are unwise as military measures,
and were not adopted as such in good faith.
You say that you will not fight to free negroes. Some of them seem willing
to fight for you; but no matter. Fight you, then, exclusively, to save
the Union. I issued the proclamation on purpose to aid you in saving the
Union. Whenever you shall have conquered all resistance to the Union, if
I shall urge you to continue fighting, it will be an apt time then for
you to declare you will not fight to free negroes. I thought that in
your struggle for the Union, to whatever extent the negroes should cease
helping the enemy, to that extent it weakened the enemy in his resistance
to you. Do you think differently? I thought that whatever negroes can be
got to do as soldiers, leaves just so much less for white soldiers to do
in saving the Union. Does it appear otherwise to you? But negroes, like
other people, act upon motives. Why should they do anything for us if we
will do nothing for them? If they stake their lives for us they must be
prompted by the strongest motive, even the promise of freedom. And the
promise, being made, must be kept.
The signs look better. The Father of Waters again goes unvexed to the
sea. Thanks to the great Northwest for it; nor yet wholly to them. Three
hundred miles up they met New England, Empire, Keystone, and Jersey,
hewing their way right and left. The sunny South, too, in more colors than
one, also lent a helping hand. On the spot, their part of the history was
jotted down in black and white. The job was a great national one, and let
none be slighted who bore an honorable part in it And while those who have
cleared the great river may well be proud, even that is not all. It is
hard to say that anything has been more bravely and well done than at
Antietam, Murfreesboro, Gettysburg, and on many fields of less note. Nor
must Uncle Sam's web-feet be forgotten. At all the watery margins they
have been present; not only on the deep sea, the broad bay, and the rapid
river, but also up the narrow, muddy bayou, and wherever the ground was a
little damp, they have been and made their tracks. Thanks to all. For the
great Republic--for the principle it lives by and keeps alive--for man's
vast future--thanks to all.
Peace does not appear so distant as it did. I hope it will come soon, and
come to stay, and so come as to be worth the keeping in all future
time. It will then have been proved that among freemen there can be no
successful appeal from the ballot to the bullet, and that they who take
such appeal are sure to lose their case and pay the cost. And there will
be some black men who can remember that with silent tongue, and clinched
teeth, and steady eye, and well-poised bayonet, they have helped mankind
on to this great consummation; while I fear there will be some white ones
unable to forget that with malignant heart and deceitful speech they have
striven to hinder it.