absolutely necessary, in the opinion of the President, for you immediately
to detach 25,000 of your force and forward it by the nearest and quickest
route by way of Baltimore and Washington to Richmond. It is believed
that the quickest route would be by way of Columbus, Ky., and up the Ohio
River. But in detaching your force the President directs that it be done
in such a way as to enable you to hold your ground and not interfere with
the movement against Chattanooga and East Tennessee. This condition being
observed, the forces to be detached and the routes they are to be sent are
left to your own judgment.
The direction to send these forces immediately is rendered imperative by
a serious reverse suffered by General McClellan before Richmond yesterday,
the full extent of which is not yet known.
You will acknowledge the receipt of this despatch, stating the day and
hour it is received, and inform me what your action will be, so that we
may take measures to aid in river and railroad transportation.
EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
TELEGRAMS TO GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE.
WASHINGTON, June 28, 1862.
GENERAL BURNSIDE:
I think you had better go, with any reinforcements you can spare, to
General McClellan.
A. LINCOLN.
WAR DEPARTMENT, June, 28, 1862
MAJOR-GENERAL BURNSIDE, Newbern:
We have intelligence that General McClellan has been attacked in large
force and compelled to fall back toward the James River. We are not
advised of his exact condition, but the President directs that you shall
send him all the reinforcements from your command to the James River that
you can safely do without abandoning your own position. Let it be infantry
entirely, as he said yesterday that he had cavalry enough.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, June 28, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:
Save your army, at all events. Will send reinforcements as fast as we can.
Of course they cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day. I have not
said you were ungenerous for saying you needed reinforcements. I thought
you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I
could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you
feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is
the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected
Washington, and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington,
he would have been upon us before the troops could have gotten to you.
Less than a week ago you notified us that reinforcements were leaving
Richmond to come in front of us. It is the nature of the case, and neither
you nor the government is to blame. Please tell at once the present
condition and aspect of things.
A. LINCOLN
TO SECRETARY SEWARD.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, June 28, 1862
HON. W. H. SEWARD.
MY DEAR SIR:--My view of the present condition of the war is about as
follows:
The evacuation of Corinth and our delay by the flood in the Chickahominy
have enabled the enemy to concentrate too much force in Richmond
for McClellan to successfully attack. In fact there soon will be no
substantial rebel force anywhere else. But if we send all the force from
here to McClellan, the enemy will, before we can know of it, send a force
from Richmond and take Washington. Or if a large part of the western army
be brought here to McClellan, they will let us have Richmond, and retake
Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, etc. What should be done is to hold what
we have in the West, open the Mississippi, and take Chattanooga and East
Tennessee without more. A reasonable force should in every event be
kept about Washington for its protection. Then let the country give us a
hundred thousand new troops in the shortest possible time, which, added to
McClellan directly or indirectly, will take Richmond without endangering
any other place which we now hold, and will substantially end the war.
I expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or am
conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or the country forsake me; and
I would publicly appeal to the country for this new force were it not that
I fear a general panic and stampede would follow, so hard it is to have a
thing understood as it really is. I think the new force should be all, or
nearly all, infantry, principally because such can be raised most cheaply
and quickly.
Yours very truly,
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. A. DIX.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C., June 28,1862.
GENERAL DIX:
Communication with McClellan by White House is cut off. Strain every nerve
to open communication with him by James River, or any other way you can.
Report to me.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO FLAG-OFFICER L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH.
WASHINGTON, D.C., June 28, 1862.
FLAG-OFFICER GOLDS BOROUGH, Fort Monroe:
Enemy has cut McClellan's communication with White House, and is driving
Stoneman back on that point. Do what you can for him with gunboats at or
near that place. McClellan's main force is between the Chickahominy and
the James. Also do what you can to communicate with him and support him
there.
A. LINCOLN
To GOVERNOR MORTON.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C. June 28, 1862.
GOVERNOR O. P. MORTON, Indianapolis, Ind:
Your despatch of to-day is just received. I have no recollection of either
John R. Cravens or Cyrus M. Allen having been named to me for appointment
under the tax law. The latter particularly has been my friend, and I am
sorry to learn that he is not yours. No appointment has been or will be
made by me for the purpose of stabbing you.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO SECRETARY SEWARD.
WAR DEPARTMENT, June 29, 1862.6 P.M.
HON. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Astor House, New York:
Not much more than when you left. Fulton of Baltimore American is now with
us. He left White House at 11 A.M. yesterday. He conversed fully with a
paymaster who was with Porter's force during the fight of Friday and fell
back to nearer McClellan's quarters just a little sooner than Porter did,
seeing the whole of it; stayed on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy
over night, and left for White House at 5 A.M. Saturday. He says Porter
retired in perfect order under protection of the guns arranged for the
purpose, under orders and not from necessity; and with all other of our
forces, except what was left on purpose to go to White House, was safely
in pontoons over the Chickahominy before morning, and that there was heavy
firing on the Richmond side, begun at 5 and ceased at 7 A.M. Saturday. On
the whole, I think we have had the better of it up to that point of time.
What has happened since we still know not, as we have no communication
with General McClellan. A despatch from Colonel Ingalls shows that he
thinks McClellan is fighting with the enemy at Richmond to-day, and will
be to-morrow. We have no means of knowing upon what Colonel Ingalls founds
his opinion. Confirmed about saving all property. Not a single unwounded
straggler came back to White House from the field, and the number of
wounded reaching there up to 11 A.M. Saturday was not large.
A. LINCOLN.
To what the President has above stated I will only add one or two points
that may be satisfactory for you to know.
First. All the sick and wounded were safely removed
Second. A despatch from Burnside shows that he is from White House; not a
man left behind in condition to afford efficient support, and is probably
doing so.
Third. The despatch from Colonel Ingalls impresses me with the conviction
that the movement was made by General McClellan to concentrate on
Richmond, and was successful to the latest point of which we have any
information.
Fourth. Mr. Fulton says that on Friday night, between twelve and one
o'clock, General McClellan telegraphed Commodore Goldsborough that the
result of the movement was satisfactory to him.
Fifth. From these and the facts stated by the President, my inference is
that General McClellan will probably be in Richmond within two days.
EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
[Unfortunately McClellan did not do any of the things he was ordered, and
that it was very likely possible to do. It is still some mystery what he
was doing all these days other than hiding in the woods and staying out of
communication so he would not receive any more uncomfortable orders. This
was another place where the North was close to wining the war and did not.
D.W.]
TELEGRAM TO SECRETARY SEWARD. WAR DEPARTMENT, June 30, 1862.
HON. WM. H. SEWARD, New York:
We are yet without communication with General McClellan, and this absence
of news is our point of anxiety. Up to the latest point to which we are
posted he effected everything in such exact accordance with his plan,
contingently announced to us before the battle began, that we feel
justified to hope that he has not failed since. He had a severe engagement
in getting the part of his army on this side of the Chickahominy over to
the other side, in which the enemy lost certainly as much as we did. We
are not dissatisfied with this, only that the loss of enemies does not
compensate for the loss of friends. The enemy cannot come below White
House; certainly is not there now, and probably has abandoned the whole
line. Dix's pickets are at New Kent Court-House.
A. LINCOLN.
CALL FOR TROOPS. NEW YORK, June 30, 1862.
TO THE GOVERNORS OF THE SEVERAL STATES:
The capture of New Orleans, Norfolk, and Corinth by the national forces
has enabled the insurgents to concentrate a large force at and about
Richmond, which place we must take with the least possible delay; in fact,
there will soon be no formidable insurgent force except at Richmond.
With so large an army there, the enemy can threaten us on the Potomac and
elsewhere. Until we have re-established the national authority, all these
places must be held, and we must keep a respectable force in front of
WASHINGTON. But this, from the diminished strength of our army by sickness
and casualties, renders an addition to it necessary in order to close the
struggle which has been prosecuted for the last three months with energy
and success. Rather than hazard the misapprehension of our military
condition and of groundless alarm by a call for troops by proclamation, I
have deemed it best to address you in this form. To accomplish the object
stated we require without delay 150,000 men, including those recently
called for by the Secretary of War. Thus reinforced our gallant army will
be enabled to realize the hopes and expectations of the government and the
people.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. A. DIX.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, June 30, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL Dix, Fort Monroe:
Is it not probable that the enemy has abandoned the line between White
House and McClellan's rear? He could have but little object to maintain
it, and nothing to subsist upon. Would not Stoneman better move up and
see about it? I think a telegraphic communication can at once be opened to
White House from Williamsburg. The wires must be up still.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAMS TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.
WAR DEPARTMENT, JUNE 30, 1862. 3 P. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth:
Your telegram of this date just received. The Chattanooga expedition
must not on any account be given up. The President regards that and the
movement against East Tennessee as one of the most important movements
of the war, and its occupation nearly as important as the capture of
Richmond. He is not pleased with the tardiness of the movement toward
Chattanooga, and directs that no force be sent here if you cannot do it
without breaking up the operations against that point and East Tennessee.
Infantry only are needed; our cavalry and artillery are strong enough.
The first reports from Richmond were more discouraging than the truth
warranted. If the advantage is not on our side, it is balanced. General
McClellan has moved his whole force on the line of the James River, and
is supported there by our gunboats; but he must be largely strengthened
before advancing, and hence the call on you, which I am glad you answered
so promptly. Let me know to what point on the river you will send your
forces, so as to provide immediately for transportation.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
WASHINGTON, D.C., June 30, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:
Would be very glad of 25,000 infantry; no artillery or cavalry; but please
do not send a man if it endangers any place you deem important to hold,
or if it forces you to give up or weaken or delay the expedition against
Chattanooga. To take and hold the railroad at or east of Cleveland, in
East Tennessee, I think fully as important as the taking and holding of
Richmond.
A. LINCOLN.
CALL FOR 300,000 VOLUNTEERS, JULY 1, 1862.
June 28, 1861.
The undersigned, governors of States of the Union, impressed with the
belief that the citizens of the States which they respectively represent
are of one accord in the hearty desire that the recent successes of the
Federal arms may be followed up by measures which must insure the speedy
restoration of the Union, and believing that, in view of the present
state of the important military movements now in progress, and the reduced
condition of our effective forces in the field, resulting from the usual
and unavoidable casualties in the service, the time has arrived for prompt
and vigorous measures to be adopted by the people in support of the great
interests committed to your charge, respectfully request, if it meets with
your entire approval, that you at once call upon the several States
for such number of men as may be required to fill up all military
organizations now in the field, and add to the armies heretofore organized
such additional number of men as may, in your judgment, be necessary to
garrison and hold all the numerous cities and military positions that
have been captured by our armies, and to speedily crush the rebellion that
still exists in several of the Southern States, thus practically restoring
to the civilized world our great and good government. All believe that the
decisive moment is near at hand, and to that end the people of the United
States are desirous to aid promptly in furnishing all reinforcements that
you may deem needful to sustain our government.
ISRAEL WASHBURN, JR., Governor of Maine.
H. S. BERRY, Governor of New Hampshire.
FREDERICK HOLBROOK, Governor of Vermont.
WILLIAM A. BUCKINGHAM, Governor of Connecticut.
E. D. MORGAN, Governor of New York.
CHARLES S. OLDEN, Governor of New Jersey.
A. G. CURTIN, Governor of Pennsylvania.
A. W. BRADFORD, Governor of Maryland.
F. H. PIERPOINT, Governor of Virginia.
AUSTIN BLAIR, Governor of Michigan.
J. B. TEMPLE, President Military Board of Kentucky.
ANDREW JOHNSON, Governor of Tennessee.
H. R. GAMBLE, Governor of Missouri.
O. P. MORTON, Governor of Indiana.
DAVID TODD, Governor of Ohio.
ALEXANDER RAMSEY, Governor of Minnesota.
RICHARD YATES, Governor of Illinois.
EDWARD SALOMON, Governor of Wisconsin.
THE PRESIDENT
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 1, 1862
GENTLEMEN:--Fully concurring in the wisdom of the views expressed to me
in so patriotic a manner by you, in the communication of the twenty-eighth
day of June, I have decided to call into the service an additional force
of 300,000 men. I suggest and recommend that the troops should be chiefly
of infantry. The quota of your State would be ------. I trust that
they may be enrolled without delay, so as to bring this unnecessary and
injurious civil war to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion. An order
fixing the quotas of the respective States will be issued by the War
Department to-morrow.
A. LINCOLN.
PROCLAMATION CONCERNING TAXES IN REBELLIOUS STATES, JULY 1, 1862.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A Proclamation.
Whereas in and by the second section of an act of Congress passed on the
7th day of June, A. D. 1862, entitled "An act for the collection of direct
taxes in insurrectionary districts within the United States, and for other
purposes," it is made the duty of the President to declare, on or before
the first day of July then next following, by his proclamation, in what
States and parts of States insurrection exists:
Now, therefore, be it known that I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the
United States of America, do hereby declare and proclaim that the
States of South Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas,
Mississippi, Arkansas, Tennessee, North Carolina, and the State of
Virginia except the following counties-Hancock, Brooke, Ohio, Marshall,
Wetzel, Marion, Monongalia, Preston, Taylor, Pleasants, Tyler, Ritchie,
Doddridge, Harrison, Wood, Jackson, Wirt, Roane, Calhoun, Gilmer, Barbour,
Tucker, Lewis, Braxton, Upsbur, Randolph, Mason, Putnam, Kanawha, Clay,
Nicholas, Cabell, Wayne, Boone, Logan, Wyoming, Webster, Fayette, and
Raleigh-are now in insurrection and rebellion, and by reason thereof the
civil authority of the United States is obstructed so that the provisions
of the "Act to provide increased revenue from imports, to pay the interest
on the public debt, and for other purposes," approved August 5, 1861, can
not be peaceably executed; and that the taxes legally chargeable upon real
estate under the act last aforesaid lying within the States and parts
of States as aforesaid, together with a penalty of 50 per centum of said
taxes, shall be a lien upon the tracts or lots of the same, severally
charged, till paid.
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the
United States to be affixed..............
A. LINCOLN.
By the President: F. W. SEWARD, Acting Secretary of State.
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, JULY 1, 1862.
TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
I most cordially recommend that Captain Andrew H. Foote, of the United
States Navy, receive a vote of thanks of Congress for his eminent services
in Organizing the flotilla on the western Waters, and for his gallantry at
Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Island Number Ten, and at various other places,
whilst in command of the naval forces, embracing a period of nearly ten
months.
A. LINCOLN.
WASHINGTON, D. C. July 1, 1862
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL McCLELLAN.
WASHINGTON, JULY 1,1862. 3.30 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:
It is impossible to reinforce you for your present emergency. If we had a
million of men, We could not get them to you in time. We have not the men
to send. If you are not strong enough to face the enemy, you must find a
place of security, and wait, rest, and repair. Maintain your ground if
you can, but save the army at all events, even if you fall back to Fort
Monroe. We still have strength enough in the country, and will bring it
out.
A. LINCOLN.
TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C., July 2, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:
Your despatch of Tuesday morning induces me to hope your army is having
some rest. In this hope allow me to reason with you a moment. When you ask
for 50,000 men to be promptly sent you, you surely labor under some gross
mistake of fact. Recently you sent papers showing your disposal of forces
made last spring for the defense of WASHINGTON, and advising a return to
that plan. I find it included in and about WASHINGTON 75,000 men. Now,
please be assured I have not men enough to fill that very plan by 15,000.
All of Fremont's in the valley, all of Banks's, all of McDowell's not with
you, and all in WASHINGTON, taken together, do not exceed, if they reach,
60,000. With Wool and Dix added to those mentioned, I have not, outside of
your army, 75,000 men east of the mountains. Thus the idea of sending you
50,000, or any other considerable force, promptly, is simply absurd. If,
in your frequent mention of responsibility, you have the impression that
I blame you for not doing more than you can, please be relieved of
such impression. I only beg that in like manner you will not ask
impossibilities of me. If you think you are not strong enough to take
Richmond just now, I do not ask you to try just now. Save the army,
material and personal, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again
as fast as I can. The governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of
300,000, which I accept.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.
WASHINGTON, D.C. July 2, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:
Your several despatches of yesterday to Secretary of War and myself
received. I did say, and now repeat, I would be exceedingly glad for some
reinforcements from you. Still do not send a man if in your judgment it
will endanger any point you deem important to hold, or will force you to
give up or weaken or delay the Chattanooga expedition.
Please tell me could you not make me a flying visit for consultation
without endangering the Service in your department.
A. LINCOLN.
MESSAGE TO THE SENATE.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, July 2, 1862.
TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:
I herewith return to your honorable body, in which it originated, an
act entitled "An act to provide for additional medical officers of the
volunteer service," without my approval.
My reason for so doing is that I have approved an act of the same title
passed by Congress after the passage of the one first mentioned for the
express purpose of correcting errors in and superseding the same, as I am
informed.
A. LINCOLN.
CIRCULAR LETTER TO THE GOVERNORS.
(Private and Confidential.)
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 3, 1862.10.30 A.M.
GOVERNOR WASHBURN, Maine [and other governors] I should not want the half
of 300,000 new troops if I could have them now. If I had 50,000 additional
troops here now, I believe I could substantially close the war in two
weeks. But time is everything, and if I get 50,000 new men in a month, I
shall have lost 20,000 old ones during the same month, having gained only
30,000, with the difference between old and new troops still against me.
The quicker you send, the fewer you will have to send. Time is everything.
Please act in view of this. The enemy having given up Corinth, it is not
wonderful that he is thereby enabled to check us for a time at Richmond.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 3, 1862
MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:
Yours of 5.30 yesterday is just received. I am satisfied that yourself,
officers, and men have done the best you could. All accounts say better
fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it.
On the 28th we sent General Burnside an order to send all the force he
could spare to you. We then learned that you had requested him to go to
Goldsborough; upon which we said to him our order was intended for your
benefit, and we did not wish to be in conflict with your views.
We hope you will have help from him soon. Today we have ordered General
Hunter to send you all he can spare. At last advices General Halleck
thinks he cannot send reinforcements without endangering all he has
gained.
A. LINCOLN, President
TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., July 4, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:
I understand your position as stated in your letter and by General Marcy.
To reinforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a
month, or even six weeks, is impossible. In addition to that arrived and
now arriving from the Potomac (about 10,000 men, I suppose), and about
10,000 I hope you will have from Burnside very soon, and about 5000 from
Hunter a little later, I do not see how I can send you another man within
a month. Under these circumstances the defensive for the present must be
your only care. Save the army first, where you are, if you can; secondly,
by removal, if you must. You, on the ground, must be the judge as to which
you will attempt, and of the means for effecting it. I but give it as my
opinion that with the aid of the gunboats and the reinforcements mentioned
above you can hold your present position--provided, and so long as,
you can keep the James River open below you. If you are not tolerably
confident you can keep the James River open, you had better remove as soon
as possible. I do not remember that you have expressed any apprehension as
to the danger of having your communication cut on the river below you, yet
I do not suppose it can have escaped your attention.
Yours very truly,
A. LINCOLN.
P.S.--If at any time you feel able to take the offensive, you are not
restrained from doing so. A.L.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 4, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi: