the crocodile; he is for the negro. Well, I don't know that there is any
struggle between the negro and the crocodile, either. I suppose that if a
crocodile (or, as we old Ohio River boatmen used to call them, alligators)
should come across a white man, he would kill him if he could; and so he
would a negro. But what, at last, is this proposition? I believe it is a
sort of proposition in proportion, which may be stated thus: "As the negro
is to the white man, so is the crocodile to the negro; and as the negro
may rightfully treat the crocodile as a beast or reptile, so the white man
may rightfully treat the negro as a beast or a reptile." That is really
the "knip" of all that argument of his.
Now, my brother Kentuckians, who believe in this, you ought to thank
Judge Douglas for having put that in a much more taking way than any of
yourselves have done.
Again, Douglas's great principle, "popular sovereignty," as he calls it,
gives you, by natural consequence, the revival of the slave trade whenever
you want it. If you question this, listen awhile, consider awhile what I
shall advance in support of that proposition.
He says that it is the sacred right of the man who goes into the
Territories to have slavery if he wants it. Grant that for argument's
sake. Is it not the sacred right of the man who don't go there equally to
buy slaves in Africa, if he wants them? Can you point out the difference?
The man who goes into the Territories of Kansas and Nebraska, or any other
new Territory, with the sacred right of taking a slave there which belongs
to him, would certainly have no more right to take one there than I would,
who own no slave, but who would desire to buy one and take him there. You
will not say you, the friends of Judge Douglas but that the man who
does not own a slave has an equal right to buy one and take him to the
Territory as the other does.
A voice: I want to ask a question. Don't foreign nations interfere with
the slave trade?
Mr. LINCOLN: Well! I understand it to be a principle of Democracy to whip
foreign nations whenever, they interfere with us.
Voice: I only asked for information. I am a Republican myself.
Mr. LINCOLN: You and I will be on the best terms in the world, but I do
not wish to be diverted from the point I was trying to press.
I say that Douglas's popular sovereignty, establishing his sacred right
in the people, if you please, if carried to its logical conclusion gives
equally the sacred right to the people of the States or the Territories
themselves to buy slaves wherever they can buy them cheapest; and if any
man can show a distinction, I should like to hear him try it. If any man
can show how the people of Kansas have a better right to slaves, because
they want them, than the people of Georgia have to buy them in Africa,
I want him to do it. I think it cannot be done. If it is "popular
sovereignty" for the people to have slaves because they want them, it is
popular sovereignty for them to buy them in Africa because they desire to
do so.
I know that Douglas has recently made a little effort, not seeming to
notice that he had a different theory, has made an effort to get rid
of that. He has written a letter, addressed to somebody, I believe, who
resides in Iowa, declaring his opposition to the repeal of the laws that
prohibit the Africa slave trade. He bases his opposition to such repeal
upon the ground that these laws are themselves one of the compromises of
the Constitution of the United States. Now, it would be very interesting
to see Judge Douglas or any of his friends turn, to the Constitution of
the United States and point out that compromise, to show where there is
any compromise in the Constitution, or provision in the Constitution;
express or implied, by which the administrators of that Constitution are
under any obligation to repeal the African slave trade. I know, or at
least I think I know, that the framers of that Constitution did expect
the African slave trade would be abolished at the end of twenty years, to
which time their prohibition against its being abolished extended there
is abundant contemporaneous history to show that the framers of the
Constitution expected it to be abolished. But while they so expected,
they gave nothing for that expectation, and they put no provision in
the Constitution requiring it should be so abolished. The migration or
importation of such persons as the States shall see fit to admit shall not
be prohibited, but a certain tax might be levied upon such importation.
But what was to be done after that time? The Constitution is as silent
about that as it is silent, personally, about myself. There is absolutely
nothing in it about that subject; there is only the expectation of the
framers of the Constitution that the slave trade would be abolished at the
end of that time; and they expected it would be abolished, owing to public
sentiment, before that time; and the put that provision in, in order that
it should not be abolished before that time, for reasons which I suppose
they thought to be sound ones, but which I will not now try to enumerate
before you.
But while, they expected the slave trade would be abolished at that time,
they expected that the spread of slavery into the new Territories should
also be restricted. It is as easy to prove that the framers of the
Constitution of the United States expected that slavery should be
prohibited from extending into the new Territories, as it is to prove
that it was expected that the slave trade should be abolished. Both these
things were expected. One was no more expected than the other, and one was
no more a compromise of the Constitution than the other. There was nothing
said in the Constitution in regard to the spread of slavery into the
Territory. I grant that; but there was something very important said about
it by the same generation of men in the adoption of the old Ordinance of
'87, through the influence of which you here in Ohio, our neighbors in
Indiana, we in Illinois, our neighbors in Michigan and Wisconsin, are
happy, prosperous, teeming millions of free men. That generation of men,
though not to the full extent members of the convention that framed the
Constitution, were to some extent members of that convention, holding
seats at the same time in one body and the other, so that if there was any
compromise on either of these subjects, the strong evidence is that
that compromise was in favor of the restriction of slavery from the new
Territories.
But Douglas says that he is unalterably opposed to the repeal of those
laws because, in his view, it is a compromise of the Constitution. You
Kentuckians, no doubt, are somewhat offended with that. You ought not to
be! You ought to be patient! You ought to know that if he said less than
that, he would lose the power of "lugging" the Northern States to your
support. Really, what you would push him to do would take from him
his entire power to serve you. And you ought to remember how long, by
precedent, Judge Douglas holds himself obliged to stick by compromises.
You ought to remember that by the time you yourselves think you are ready
to inaugurate measures for the revival of the African slave trade, that
sufficient time will have arrived, by precedent, for Judge Douglas to
break through, that compromise. He says now nothing more strong than
he said in 1849 when he declared in favor of Missouri Compromise,--and
precisely four years and a quarter after he declared that Compromise to
be a sacred thing, which "no ruthless hand would ever daze to touch," he
himself brought forward the measure ruthlessly to destroy it. By a mere
calculation of time it will only be four years more until he is ready to
take back his profession about the sacredness of the Compromise abolishing
the slave trade. Precisely as soon as you are ready to have his services
in that direction, by fair calculation, you may be sure of having them.
But you remember and set down to Judge Douglas's debt, or discredit, that
he, last year, said the people of Territories can, in spite of the Dred
Scott decision, exclude your slaves from those Territories; that he
declared, by "unfriendly legislation" the extension of your property into
the new Territories may be cut off, in the teeth of the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States.
He assumed that position at Freeport on the 27th of August, 1858. He said
that the people of the Territories can exclude slavery, in so many words:
You ought, however, to bear in mind that he has never said it since. You
may hunt in every speech that he has since made, and he has never used
that expression once. He has never seemed to notice that he is stating his
views differently from what he did then; but by some sort of accident, he
has always really stated it differently. He has always since then declared
that "the Constitution does not carry slavery into the Territories of the
United States beyond the power of the people legally to control it, as
other property." Now, there is a difference in the language used upon
that former occasion and in this latter day. There may or may not be a
difference in the meaning, but it is worth while considering whether there
is not also a difference in meaning.
What is it to exclude? Why, it is to drive it out. It is in some way to
put it out of the Territory. It is to force it across the line, or change
its character so that, as property, it is out of existence. But what is
the controlling of it "as other property"? Is controlling it as other
property the same thing as destroying it, or driving it away? I should
think not. I should think the controlling of it as other property would be
just about what you in Kentucky should want. I understand the controlling
of property means the controlling of it for the benefit of the owner of
it. While I have no doubt the Supreme Court of the United States would
say "God speed" to any of the Territorial Legislatures that should thus
control slave property, they would sing quite a different tune if, by
the pretence of controlling it, they were to undertake to pass laws which
virtually excluded it,--and that upon a very well known principle to
all lawyers, that what a Legislature cannot directly do, it cannot do by
indirection; that as the Legislature has not the power to drive slaves
out, they have no power, by indirection, by tax, or by imposing burdens in
any way on that property, to effect the same end, and that any attempt to
do so would be held by the Dred Scott court unconstitutional.
Douglas is not willing to stand by his first proposition that they can
exclude it, because we have seen that that proposition amounts to nothing
more nor less than the naked absurdity that you may lawfully drive out
that which has a lawful right to remain. He admitted at first that the
slave might be lawfully taken into the Territories under the Constitution
of the United States, and yet asserted that he might be lawfully driven
out. That being the proposition, it is the absurdity I have stated. He
is not willing to stand in the face of that direct, naked, and impudent
absurdity; he has, therefore, modified his language into that of being
"controlled as other property."
The Kentuckians don't like this in Douglas! I will tell you where it will
go. He now swears by the court. He was once a leading man in Illinois to
break down a court, because it had made a decision he did not like. But
he now not only swears by the court, the courts having got to working
for you, but he denounces all men that do not swear by the courts,
as unpatriotic, as bad citizens. When one of these acts of unfriendly
legislation shall impose such heavy burdens as to, in effect, destroy
property in slaves in a Territory, and show plainly enough that there
can be no mistake in the purpose of the Legislature to make them
so burdensome, this same Supreme Court will decide that law to be
unconstitutional, and he will be ready to say for your benefit "I swear by
the court; I give it up"; and while that is going on he has been getting
all his men to swear by the courts, and to give it up with him. In this
again he serves you faithfully, and, as I say, more wisely than you serve
yourselves.
Again: I have alluded in the beginning of these remarks to the fact that
Judge Douglas has made great complaint of my having expressed the opinion
that this government "cannot endure permanently, half slave and half
free." He has complained of Seward for using different language, and
declaring that there is an "irrepressible conflict" between the principles
of free and slave labor. [A voice: "He says it is not original with
Seward. That it is original with Lincoln."] I will attend to that
immediately, sir. Since that time, Hickman of Pennsylvania expressed the
same sentiment. He has never denounced Mr. Hickman: why? There is a little
chance, notwithstanding that opinion in the mouth of Hickman, that he may
yet be a Douglas man. That is the difference! It is not unpatriotic to
hold that opinion if a man is a Douglas man.
But neither I, nor Seward, nor Hickman is entitled to the enviable or
unenviable distinction of having first expressed that idea. That same idea
was expressed by the Richmond Enquirer, in Virginia, in 1856,--quite two
years before it was expressed by the first of us. And while Douglas was
pluming himself that in his conflict with my humble self, last year, he
had "squelched out" that fatal heresy, as he delighted to call it, and
had suggested that if he only had had a chance to be in New York and meet
Seward he would have "squelched" it there also, it never occurred to him
to breathe a word against Pryor. I don't think that you can discover that
Douglas ever talked of going to Virginia to "squelch" out that idea there.
No. More than that. That same Roger A. Pryor was brought to Washington
City and made the editor of the par excellence Douglas paper, after making
use of that expression, which, in us, is so unpatriotic and heretical.
From all this, my Kentucky friends may see that this opinion is heretical
in his view only when it is expressed by men suspected of a desire that
the country shall all become free, and not when expressed by those fairly
known to entertain the desire that the whole country shall become slave.
When expressed by that class of men, it is in nowise offensive to him. In
this again, my friends of Kentucky, you have Judge Douglas with you.
There is another reason why you Southern people ought to nominate Douglas
at your convention at Charleston. That reason is the wonderful capacity of
the man,--the power he has of doing what would seem to be impossible. Let
me call your attention to one of these apparently impossible things:
Douglas had three or four very distinguished men of the most extreme
anti-slavery views of any men in the Republican party expressing their
desire for his re-election to the Senate last year. That would, of itself,
have seemed to be a little wonderful; but that wonder is heightened when
we see that Wise of Virginia, a man exactly opposed to them, a man who
believes in the divine right of slavery, was also expressing his desire
that Douglas should be reelected; that another man that may be said to
be kindred to Wise, Mr. Breckinridge, the Vice-President, and of your
own State, was also agreeing with the anti-slavery men in the North that
Douglas ought to be re-elected. Still to heighten the wonder, a senator
from Kentucky, whom I have always loved with an affection as tender
and endearing as I have ever loved any man, who was opposed to the
anti-slavery men for reasons which seemed sufficient to him, and equally
opposed to Wise and Breckinridge, was writing letters into Illinois to
secure the reelection of Douglas. Now, that all these conflicting elements
should be brought, while at daggers' points with one another, to support
him, is a feat that is worthy for you to note and consider. It is quite
probable that each of these classes of men thought, by the re-election of
Douglas, their peculiar views would gain something: it is probable that
the anti-slavery men thought their views would gain something; that Wise
and Breckinridge thought so too, as regards their opinions; that Mr.
Crittenden thought that his views would gain something, although he was
opposed to both these other men. It is probable that each and all of them
thought that they were using Douglas; and it is yet an unsolved problem
whether he was not using them all. If he was, then it is for you to
consider whether that power to perform wonders is one for you lightly to
throw away.
There is one other thing that I will say to you, in this relation. It is
but my opinion, I give it to you without a fee. It is my opinion that it
is for you to take him or be defeated; and that if you do take him you
may be beaten. You will surely be beaten if you do not take him. We, the
Republicans and others forming the opposition of the country, intend to
"stand by our guns," to be patient and firm, and in the long run to beat
you, whether you take him or not. We know that before we fairly beat
you we have to beat you both together. We know that you are "all of a
feather," and that we have to beat you all together, and we expect to
do it. We don't intend to be very impatient about it. We mean to be as
deliberate and calm about it as it is possible to be, but as firm and
resolved as it is possible for men to be. When we do as we say,--beat
you,--you perhaps want to know what we will do with you.
I will tell you, so far as I am authorized to speak for the opposition,
what we mean to do with you. We mean to treat you, as near as we possibly
can, as Washington, Jefferson, and Madison treated you. We mean to leave
you alone, and in no way interfere with your institution; to abide by all
and every compromise of the Constitution, and, in a word, coming back to
the original proposition, to treat you, so far as degenerated men (if we
have degenerated) may, according to the examples of those noble fathers,
Washington, Jefferson, and Madison. We mean to remember that you are
as good as we; that there is no difference between us other than the
difference of circumstances. We mean to recognize and bear in mind always
that you have as good hearts in your bosoms as other people, or as we
claim to have, and treat you accordingly. We mean to marry your girls when
we have a chance, the white ones I mean; and I have the honor to inform
you that I once did have a chance in that way.
I have told you what we mean to do. I want to know, now, when that thing
takes place, what do you mean to do? I often hear it intimated that you
mean to divide the Union whenever a Republican, or anything like it, is
elected President of the United States. [A voice: "That is so."] "That is
so," one of them says; I wonder if he is a Kentuckian? [A voice: "He is
a Douglas man."] Well, then, I want to know what you are going to do with
your half of it? Are you going to split the Ohio down through, and push
your half off a piece? Or are you going to keep it right alongside of us
outrageous fellows? Or are you going to build up a wall some way between
your country and ours, by which that movable property of yours can't come
over here any more, to the danger of your losing it? Do you think you can
better yourselves, on that subject, by leaving us here under no obligation
whatever to return those specimens of your movable property that come
hither? You have divided the Union because we would not do right with you,
as you think, upon that subject; when we cease to be under obligations to
do anything for you, how much better off do you think you will be? Will
you make war upon us and kill us all? Why, gentlemen, I think you are as
gallant and as brave men as live; that you can fight as bravely in a
good cause, man for man, as any other people living; that you have shown
yourselves capable of this upon various occasions: but, man for man, you
are not better than we are, and there are not so many of you as there are
of us. You will never make much of a hand at whipping us. If we were fewer
in numbers than you, I think that you could whip us; if we were equal, it
would likely be a drawn battle; but being inferior in numbers, you will
make nothing by attempting to master us.
But perhaps I have addressed myself as long, or longer, to the Kentuckians
than I ought to have done, inasmuch as I have said that whatever course
you take we intend in the end to beat you. I propose to address a few
remarks to our friends, by way of discussing with them the best means of
keeping that promise that I have in good faith made.
It may appear a little episodical for me to mention the topic of which
I will speak now. It is a favorite position of Douglas's that the
interference of the General Government, through the Ordinance of '87, or
through any other act of the General Government never has made or ever can
make a free State; the Ordinance of '87 did not make free States of
Ohio, Indiana, or Illinois; that these States are free upon his "great
principle" of popular sovereignty, because the people of those several
States have chosen to make them so. At Columbus, and probably here, he
undertook to compliment the people that they themselves have made the
State of Ohio free, and that the Ordinance of '87 was not entitled in any
degree to divide the honor with them. I have no doubt that the people
of the State of Ohio did make her free according to their own will and
judgment, but let the facts be remembered.
In 1802, I believe, it was you who made your first constitution, with
the clause prohibiting slavery, and you did it, I suppose, very nearly
unanimously; but you should bear in mind that you--speaking of you as
one people--that you did so unembarrassed by the actual presence of
the institution amongst you; that you made it a free State not with the
embarrassment upon you of already having among you many slaves, which if
they had been here, and you had sought to make a free State, you would
not know what to do with. If they had been among you, embarrassing
difficulties, most probably, would have induced you to tolerate a slave
constitution instead of a free one, as indeed these very difficulties have
constrained every people on this continent who have adopted slavery.
Pray what was it that made you free? What kept you free? Did you not
find your country free when you came to decide that Ohio should be a free
State? It is important to inquire by what reason you found it so. Let us
take an illustration between the States of Ohio and Kentucky. Kentucky is
separated by this River Ohio, not a mile wide. A portion of Kentucky, by
reason of the course of the Ohio, is farther north than this portion of
Ohio, in which we now stand. Kentucky is entirely covered with slavery;
Ohio is entirely free from it: What made that difference? Was it climate?
No. A portion of Kentucky was farther north than this portion of Ohio.
Was it soil? No. There is nothing in the soil of the one more favorable
to slave than the other. It was not climate or soil that mused one side of
the line to be entirely covered with slavery, and the other side free of
it. What was it? Study over it. Tell us, if you can, in all the range
of conjecture, if there be anything you can conceive of that made that
difference, other than that there was no law of any sort keeping it out of
Kentucky, while the Ordinance of '87 kept it out of Ohio. If there is any
other reason than this, I confess that it is wholly beyond my power to
conceive of it. This, then, I offer to combat the idea that that Ordinance
has never made any State free.