"genuine popular sovereignty," in the abstract, would be about this: That
each man shall do precisely as he pleases with himself, and with all
those things which exclusively concern him. Applied to government, this
principle would be, that a general government shall do all those things
which pertain to it, and all the local governments shall do precisely as
they please in respect to those matters which exclusively concern them. I
understand that this government of the United States, under which we live,
is based upon this principle; and I am misunderstood if it is supposed
that I have any war to make upon that principle.
Now, what is judge Douglas's popular sovereignty? It is, as a principle,
no other than that if one man chooses to make a slave of another man
neither that other man nor anybody else has a right to object. Applied in
government, as he seeks to apply it, it is this: If, in a new Territory
into which a few people are beginning to enter for the purpose of making
their homes, they choose to either exclude slavery from their limits or to
establish it there, however one or the other may affect the persons to be
enslaved, or the infinitely greater number of persons who are afterwards
to inhabit that Territory, or the other members of the families of
communities, of which they are but an incipient member, or the general
head of the family of States as parent of all, however their action may
affect one or the other of these, there is no power or right to interfere.
That is Douglas's popular sovereignty applied.
He has a good deal of trouble with popular sovereignty. His explanations
explanatory of explanations explained are interminable. The most lengthy,
and, as I suppose, the most maturely considered of this long series of
explanations is his great essay in Harper's Magazine. I will not attempt
to enter on any very thorough investigation of his argument as there made
and presented. I will nevertheless occupy a good portion of your time here
in drawing your attention to certain points in it. Such of you as may
have read this document will have perceived that the judge early in the
document quotes from two persons as belonging to the Republican party,
without naming them, but who can readily be recognized as being Governor
Seward of New York and myself. It is true that exactly fifteen months ago
this day, I believe, I for the first time expressed a sentiment upon this
subject, and in such a manner that it should get into print, that the
public might see it beyond the circle of my hearers; and my expression of
it at that time is the quotation that Judge Douglas makes. He has not made
the quotation with accuracy, but justice to him requires me to say that it
is sufficiently accurate not to change the sense.
The sense of that quotation condensed is this: that this slavery element
is a durable element of discord among us, and that we shall probably not
have perfect peace in this country with it until it either masters the
free principle in our government, or is so far mastered by the free
principle as for the public mind to rest in the belief that it is going to
its end. This sentiment, which I now express in this way, was, at no great
distance of time, perhaps in different language, and in connection with
some collateral ideas, expressed by Governor Seward. Judge Douglas has
been so much annoyed by the expression of that sentiment that he has
constantly, I believe, in almost all his speeches since it was uttered,
been referring to it. I find he alluded to it in his speech here, as well
as in the copyright essay. I do not now enter upon this for the purpose of
making an elaborate argument to show that we were right in the expression
of that sentiment. In other words, I shall not stop to say all that might
properly be said upon this point, but I only ask your attention to it for
the purpose of making one or two points upon it.
If you will read the copyright essay, you will discover that judge
Douglas himself says a controversy between the American Colonies and the
Government of Great Britain began on the slavery question in 1699, and
continued from that time until the Revolution; and, while he did not say
so, we all know that it has continued with more or less violence ever
since the Revolution.
Then we need not appeal to history, to the declarations of the framers of
the government, but we know from judge Douglas himself that slavery began
to be an element of discord among the white people of this country as far
back as 1699, or one hundred and sixty years ago, or five generations of
men,--counting thirty years to a generation. Now, it would seem to me that
it might have occurred to Judge Douglas, or anybody who had turned his
attention to these facts, that there was something in the nature of that
thing, slavery, somewhat durable for mischief and discord.
There is another point I desire to make in regard to this matter, before
I leave it. From the adoption of the Constitution down to 1820 is the
precise period of our history when we had comparative peace upon this
question,--the precise period of time when we came nearer to having peace
about it than any other time of that entire one hundred and sixty years
in which he says it began, or of the eighty years of our own Constitution.
Then it would be worth our while to stop and examine into the probable
reason of our coming nearer to having peace then than at any other time.
This was the precise period of time in which our fathers adopted, and
during which they followed, a policy restricting the spread of slavery,
and the whole Union was acquiescing in it. The whole country looked
forward to the ultimate extinction of the institution. It was when a
policy had been adopted, and was prevailing, which led all just and
right-minded men to suppose that slavery was gradually coming to an end,
and that they might be quiet about it, watching it as it expired. I think
Judge Douglas might have perceived that too; and whether he did or not, it
is worth the attention of fair-minded men, here and elsewhere, to consider
whether that is not the truth of the case. If he had looked at these two
facts,--that this matter has been an element of discord for one hundred
and sixty years among this people, and that the only comparative peace we
have had about it was when that policy prevailed in this government which
he now wars upon, he might then, perhaps, have been brought to a more just
appreciation of what I said fifteen months ago,--that "a house divided
against itself cannot stand. I believe that this government cannot endure
permanently, half slave and half free. I do not expect the house to fall,
I do not expect the Union to dissolve; but I do expect it will cease to
be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other. Either the
opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it
where the public mind will rest in the belief that it is in the course of
ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward until it shall
become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well
as South." That was my sentiment at that time. In connection with it, I
said: "We are now far into the fifth year since a policy was inaugurated
with the avowed object and confident promise of putting an end to slavery
agitation. Under the operation of the policy that agitation has not only
not ceased, but has constantly augmented." I now say to you here that we
are advanced still farther into the sixth year since that policy of
Judge Douglas--that popular sovereignty of his--for quieting the slavery
question was made the national policy. Fifteen months more have been
added since I uttered that sentiment; and I call upon you and all other
right-minded men to say whether that fifteen months have belied or
corroborated my words.
While I am here upon this subject, I cannot but express gratitude that
this true view of this element of discord among us--as I believe it is--is
attracting more and more attention. I do not believe that Governor Seward
uttered that sentiment because I had done so before, but because he
reflected upon this subject and saw the truth of it. Nor do I believe
because Governor Seward or I uttered it that Mr. Hickman of Pennsylvania,
in, different language, since that time, has declared his belief in
the utter antagonism which exists between the principles of liberty and
slavery. You see we are multiplying. Now, while I am speaking of Hickman,
let me say, I know but little about him. I have never seen him, and know
scarcely anything about the man; but I will say this much of him: Of all
the anti-Lecompton Democracy that have been brought to my notice, he
alone has the true, genuine ring of the metal. And now, without indorsing
anything else he has said, I will ask this audience to give three cheers
for Hickman. [The audience responded with three rousing cheers for
Hickman.]
Another point in the copyright essay to which I would ask your attention
is rather a feature to be extracted from the whole thing, than from any
express declaration of it at any point. It is a general feature of that
document, and, indeed, of all of Judge Douglas's discussions of this
question, that the Territories of the United States and the States of this
Union are exactly alike; that there is no difference between them at all;
that the Constitution applies to the Territories precisely as it does to
the States; and that the United States Government, under the Constitution,
may not do in a State what it may not do in a Territory, and what it must
do in a State it must do in a Territory. Gentlemen, is that a true view of
the case? It is necessary for this squatter sovereignty, but is it true?
Let us consider. What does it depend upon? It depends altogether upon the
proposition that the States must, without the interference of the
General Government, do all those things that pertain exclusively to
themselves,--that are local in their nature, that have no connection
with the General Government. After Judge Douglas has established this
proposition, which nobody disputes or ever has disputed, he proceeds
to assume, without proving it, that slavery is one of those little,
unimportant, trivial matters which are of just about as much consequence
as the question would be to me whether my neighbor should raise horned
cattle or plant tobacco; that there is no moral question about it, but
that it is altogether a matter of dollars and cents; that when a new
Territory is opened for settlement, the first man who goes into it may
plant there a thing which, like the Canada thistle or some other of those
pests of the soil, cannot be dug out by the millions of men who will come
thereafter; that it is one of those little things that is so trivial in
its nature that it has nor effect upon anybody save the few men who first
plant upon the soil; that it is not a thing which in any way affects the
family of communities composing these States, nor any way endangers the
General Government. Judge Douglas ignores altogether the very well known
fact that we have never had a serious menace to our political existence,
except it sprang from this thing, which he chooses to regard as only upon
a par with onions and potatoes.
Turn it, and contemplate it in another view. He says that, according
to his popular sovereignty, the General Government may give to the
Territories governors, judges, marshals, secretaries, and all the other
chief men to govern them, but they, must not touch upon this other
question. Why? The question of who shall be governor of a Territory for a
year or two, and pass away, without his track being left upon the soil, or
an act which he did for good or for evil being left behind, is a question
of vast national magnitude; it is so much opposed in its nature to
locality that the nation itself must decide it: while this other matter
of planting slavery upon a soil,--a thing which, once planted, cannot be
eradicated by the succeeding millions who have as much right there as the
first comers, or, if eradicated, not without infinite difficulty and
a long struggle, he considers the power to prohibit it as one of these
little local, trivial things that the nation ought not to say a word
about; that it affects nobody save the few men who are there.
Take these two things and consider them together, present the question of
planting a State with the institution of slavery by the side of a question
who shall be Governor of Kansas for a year or two, and is there a man
here, is there a man on earth, who would not say the governor question
is the little one, and the slavery question is the great one? I ask any
honest Democrat if the small, the local, and the trivial and temporary
question is not, Who shall be governor? while the durable, the important,
and the mischievous one is, Shall this soil be planted with slavery?
This is an idea, I suppose, which has arisen in Judge Douglas's mind from
his peculiar structure. I suppose the institution of slavery really looks
small to him. He is so put up by nature that a lash upon his back would
hurt him, but a lash upon anybody else's back does not hurt him. That is
the build of the man, and consequently he looks upon the matter of slavery
in this unimportant light.
Judge Douglas ought to remember, when he is endeavoring to force this
policy upon the American people, that while he is put up in that way,
a good many are not. He ought to remember that there was once in
this country a man by the name of Thomas Jefferson, supposed to be a
Democrat,--a man whose principles and policy are not very prevalent
amongst Democrats to-day, it is true; but that man did not take exactly
this view of the insignificance of the element of slavery which our friend
judge Douglas does. In contemplation of this thing, we all know he was led
to exclaim, "I tremble for my country when I remember that God is just!"
We know how he looked upon it when he thus expressed himself. There was
danger to this country,--danger of the avenging justice of God, in that
little unimportant popular sovereignty question of judge Douglas. He
supposed there was a question of God's eternal justice wrapped up in the
enslaving of any race of men, or any man, and that those who did so braved
the arm of Jehovah; that when a nation thus dared the Almighty, every
friend of that nation had cause to dread his wrath. Choose ye between
Jefferson and Douglas as to what is the true view of this element among
us.
There is another little difficulty about this matter of treating the
Territories and States alike in all things, to which I ask your attention,
and I shall leave this branch of the case. If there is no difference
between them, why not make the Territories States at once? What is
the reason that Kansas was not fit to come into the Union when it was
organized into a Territory, in Judge Douglas's view? Can any of you tell
any reason why it should not have come into the Union at once? They are
fit, as he thinks, to decide upon the slavery question,--the largest and
most important with which they could possibly deal: what could they do by
coming into the Union that they are not fit to do, according to his view,
by staying out of it? Oh, they are not fit to sit in Congress and decide
upon the rates of postage, or questions of ad valorem or specific duties
on foreign goods, or live-oak timber contracts, they are not fit to decide
these vastly important matters, which are national in their import, but
they are fit, "from the jump," to decide this little negro question. But,
gentlemen, the case is too plain; I occupy too much time on this head, and
I pass on.
Near the close of the copyright essay, the judge, I think, comes very near
kicking his own fat into the fire. I did not think, when I commenced these
remarks, that I would read that article, but I now believe I will:
"This exposition of the history of these measures shows conclusively that
the authors of the Compromise measures of 1850 and of the Kansas-Nebraska
Act of 1854, as well as the members of the Continental Congress of 1774.,
and the founders of our system of government subsequent to the Revolution,
regarded the people of the Territories and Colonies as political
communities which were entitled to a free and exclusive power of
legislation in their provisional legislatures, where their representation
could alone be preserved, in all cases of taxation and internal polity."
When the judge saw that putting in the word "slavery" would contradict
his own history, he put in what he knew would pass synonymous with it,
"internal polity." Whenever we find that in one of his speeches, the
substitute is used in this manner; and I can tell you the reason. It would
be too bald a contradiction to say slavery; but "internal polity" is a
general phrase, which would pass in some quarters, and which he hopes will
pass with the reading community for the same thing.
"This right pertains to the people collectively, as a law-abiding and
peaceful community, and not in the isolated individuals who may wander
upon the public domain in violation of the law. It can only be exercised
where there are inhabitants sufficient to constitute a government, and
capable of performing its various functions and duties,--a fact to be
ascertained and determined by" who do you think? Judge Douglas says "by
Congress!" "Whether the number shall be fixed at ten, fifteen or twenty
thousand inhabitants, does not affect the principle."
Now, I have only a few comments to make. Popular sovereignty, by his own
words, does not pertain to the few persons who wander upon the public
domain in violation of law. We have his words for that. When it does
pertain to them, is when they are sufficient to be formed into an
organized political community, and he fixes the minimum for that at ten
thousand, and the maximum at twenty thousand. Now, I would like to know
what is to be done with the nine thousand? Are they all to be treated,
until they are large enough to be organized into a political community, as
wanderers upon the public land, in violation of law? And if so treated
and driven out, at what point of time would there ever be ten thousand?
If they were not driven out, but remained there as trespassers upon the
public land in violation of the law, can they establish slavery there? No;
the judge says popular sovereignty don't pertain to them then. Can they
exclude it then? No; popular sovereignty don't pertain to them then. I
would like to know, in the case covered by the essay, what condition
the people of the Territory are in before they reach the number of ten
thousand?
But the main point I wish to ask attention to is, that the question as
to when they shall have reached a sufficient number to be formed into a
regular organized community is to be decided "by Congress." Judge Douglas
says so. Well, gentlemen, that is about all we want. No, that is all the
Southerners want. That is what all those who are for slavery want. They
do not want Congress to prohibit slavery from coming into the new
Territories, and they do not want popular sovereignty to hinder it; and as
Congress is to say when they are ready to be organized, all that the South
has to do is to get Congress to hold off. Let Congress hold off until they
are ready to be admitted as a State, and the South has all it wants in
taking slavery into and planting it in all the Territories that we now
have or hereafter may have. In a word, the whole thing, at a dash of the
pen, is at last put in the power of Congress; for if they do not have this
popular sovereignty until Congress organizes them, I ask if it at last
does not come from Congress? If, at last, it amounts to anything at all,
Congress gives it to them. I submit this rather for your reflection
than for comment. After all that is said, at last, by a dash of the pen,
everything that has gone before is undone, and he puts the whole question
under the control of Congress. After fighting through more than three
hours, if you undertake to read it, he at last places the whole matter
under the control of that power which he has been contending against, and
arrives at a result directly contrary to what he had been laboring to do.
He at last leaves the whole matter to the control of Congress.
There are two main objects, as I understand it, of this Harper's Magazine
essay. One was to show, if possible, that the men of our Revolutionary
times were in favor of his popular sovereignty, and the other was to show
that the Dred Scott decision had not entirely squelched out this popular
sovereignty. I do not propose, in regard to this argument drawn from
the history of former times, to enter into a detailed examination of the
historical statements he has made. I have the impression that they are
inaccurate in a great many instances,--sometimes in positive statement,
but very much more inaccurate by the suppression of statements that really
belong to the history. But I do not propose to affirm that this is so to
any very great extent, or to enter into a very minute examination of his
historical statements. I avoid doing so upon this principle,--that if it
were important for me to pass out of this lot in the least period of time
possible, and I came to that fence, and saw by a calculation of my known
strength and agility that I could clear it at a bound, it would be folly
for me to stop and consider whether I could or not crawl through a crack.
So I say of the whole history contained in his essay where he endeavored
to link the men of the Revolution to popular sovereignty. It only requires
an effort to leap out of it, a single bound to be entirely successful.
If you read it over, you will find that he quotes here and there from
documents of the Revolutionary times, tending to show that the people of
the colonies were desirous of regulating their own concerns in their own
way, that the British Government should not interfere; that at one time
they struggled with the British Government to be permitted to exclude
the African slave trade,--if not directly, to be permitted to exclude
it indirectly, by taxation sufficient to discourage and destroy it. From
these and many things of this sort, judge Douglas argues that they were
in favor of the people of our own Territories excluding slavery if they
wanted to, or planting it there if they wanted to, doing just as they
pleased from the time they settled upon the Territory. Now, however his
history may apply and whatever of his argument there may be that is sound
and accurate or unsound and inaccurate, if we can find out what these men
did themselves do upon this very question of slavery in the Territories,
does it not end the whole thing? If, after all this labor and effort
to show that the men of the Revolution were in favor of his popular
sovereignty and his mode of dealing with slavery in the Territories, we
can show that these very men took hold of that subject, and dealt with
it, we can see for ourselves how they dealt with it. It is not a matter of
argument or inference, but we know what they thought about it.
It is precisely upon that part of the history of the country that one
important omission is made by Judge Douglas. He selects parts of the
history of the United States upon the subject of slavery, and treats it as
the whole, omitting from his historical sketch the legislation of Congress
in regard to the admission of Missouri, by which the Missouri Compromise
was established and slavery excluded from a country half as large as the
present United States. All this is left out of his history, and in nowise
alluded to by him, so far as I can remember, save once, when he makes
a remark, that upon his principle the Supreme Court were authorized to
pronounce a decision that the act called the Missouri Compromise was
unconstitutional. All that history has been left out. But this part of the
history of the country was not made by the men of the Revolution.