offensive to Judge Douglas. He has warred upon them as Satan wars upon the
Bible. His perversions upon it are endless. Here now are my views upon it
in brief:
I said we were now far into the fifth year since a policy was initiated
with the avowed object and confident promise of putting an end to the
slavery agitation. Is it not so? When that Nebraska Bill was brought
forward four years ago last January, was it not for the "avowed object" of
putting an end to the slavery agitation? We were to have no more agitation
in Congress; it was all to be banished to the Territories. By the way, I
will remark here that, as Judge Douglas is very fond of complimenting Mr.
Crittenden in these days, Mr. Crittenden has said there was a falsehood
in that whole business, for there was no slavery agitation at that time to
allay. We were for a little while quiet on the troublesome thing, and that
very allaying plaster of Judge Douglas's stirred it up again. But was it
not understood or intimated with the "confident promise" of putting an end
to the slavery agitation? Surely it was. In every speech you heard Judge
Douglas make, until he got into this "imbroglio," as they call it, with
the Administration about the Lecompton Constitution, every speech on that
Nebraska Bill was full of his felicitations that we were just at the
end of the slavery agitation. The last tip of the last joint of the old
serpent's tail was just drawing out of view. But has it proved so? I have
asserted that under that policy that agitation "has not only not ceased,
but has constantly augmented." When was there ever a greater agitation in
Congress than last winter? When was it as great in the country as to-day?
There was a collateral object in the introduction of that Nebraska policy,
which was to clothe the people of the Territories with a superior degree
of self-government, beyond what they had ever had before. The first
object and the main one of conferring upon the people a higher degree of
"self-government" is a question of fact to be determined by you in answer
to a single question. Have you ever heard or known of a people anywhere
on earth who had as little to do as, in the first instance of its use, the
people of Kansas had with this same right of "self-government "? In
its main policy and in its collateral object, it has been nothing but a
living, creeping lie from the time of its introduction till to-day.
I have intimated that I thought the agitation would not cease until a
crisis should have been reached and passed. I have stated in what way I
thought it would be reached and passed. I have said that it might go one
way or the other. We might, by arresting the further spread of it, and
placing it where the fathers originally placed it, put it where the public
mind should rest in the belief that it was in the course of ultimate
extinction. Thus the agitation may cease. It may be pushed forward until
it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North
as well as South. I have said, and I repeat, my wish is that the further
spread of it may be arrested, and that it may be where the public
mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate
extinction--I have expressed that as my wish I entertain the opinion, upon
evidence sufficient to my mind, that the fathers of this government placed
that institution where the public mind did rest in the belief that it was
in the course of ultimate extinction. Let me ask why they made provision
that the source of slavery--the African slave-trade--should be cut off at
the end of twenty years? Why did they make provision that in all the new
territory we owned at that time slavery should be forever inhibited? Why
stop its spread in one direction, and cut off its source in another,
if they did not look to its being placed in the course of its ultimate
extinction?
Again: the institution of slavery is only mentioned in the Constitution of
the United States two or three times, and in neither of these cases does
the word "slavery" or "negro race" occur; but covert language is used
each time, and for a purpose full of significance. What is the language
in regard to the prohibition of the African slave-trade? It runs in about
this way:
"The migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now
existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the
Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight."
The next allusion in the Constitution to the question of slavery and the
black race is on the subject of the basis of representation, and there the
language used is:
"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union, according to their
respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term
of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other
persons."
It says "persons," not slaves, not negroes; but this "three-fifths" can be
applied to no other class among us than the negroes.
Lastly, in the provision for the reclamation of fugitive slaves, it is
said:
"No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof,
escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation
therein be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered
up, on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."
There again there is no mention of the word "negro" or of slavery. In
all three of these places, being the only allusions to slavery in the
instrument, covert language is used. Language is used not suggesting that
slavery existed or that the black race were among us. And I understand the
contemporaneous history of those times to be that covert language was used
with a purpose, and that purpose was that in our Constitution, which it
was hoped and is still hoped will endure forever,--when it should be read
by intelligent and patriotic men, after the institution of slavery had
passed from among us,--there should be nothing on the face of the great
charter of liberty suggesting that such a thing as negro slavery had ever
existed among us. This is part of the evidence that the fathers of the
government expected and intended the institution of slavery to come to
an end. They expected and intended that it should be in the course of
ultimate extinction. And when I say that I desire to see the further
spread of it arrested, I only say I desire to see that done which the
fathers have first done. When I say I desire to see it placed where the
public mind will rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate
extinction, I only say I desire to see it placed where they placed it.
It is not true that our fathers, as Judge Douglas assumes, made this
government part slave and part free. Understand the sense in which he
puts it. He assumes that slavery is a rightful thing within itself,--was
introduced by the framers of the Constitution. The exact truth is, that
they found the institution existing among us, and they left it as they
found it. But in making the government they left this institution with
many clear marks of disapprobation upon it. They found slavery among
them, and they left it among them because of the difficulty--the absolute
impossibility--of its immediate removal. And when Judge Douglas asks me
why we cannot let it remain part slave and part free, as the fathers of
the government made it, he asks a question based upon an assumption which
is itself a falsehood; and I turn upon him and ask him the question, when
the policy that the fathers of the government had adopted in relation
to this element among us was the best policy in the world, the only wise
policy, the only policy that we can ever safely continue upon that will
ever give us peace, unless this dangerous element masters us all and
becomes a national institution,--I turn upon him and ask him why he could
not leave it alone. I turn and ask him why he was driven to the necessity
of introducing a new policy in regard to it. He has himself said he
introduced a new policy. He said so in his speech on the 22d of March of
the present year, 1858. I ask him why he could not let it remain where
our fathers placed it. I ask, too, of Judge Douglas and his friends why we
shall not again place this institution upon the basis on which the fathers
left it. I ask you, when he infers that I am in favor of setting the free
and slave States at war, when the institution was placed in that attitude
by those who made the Constitution, did they make any war? If we had no
war out of it when thus placed, wherein is the ground of belief that we
shall have war out of it if we return to that policy? Have we had any
peace upon this matter springing from any other basis? I maintain that we
have not. I have proposed nothing more than a return to the policy of the
fathers.
I confess, when I propose a certain measure of policy, it is not enough
for me that I do not intend anything evil in the result, but it is
incumbent on me to show that it has not a tendency to that result. I
have met Judge Douglas in that point of view. I have not only made the
declaration that I do not mean to produce a conflict between the States,
but I have tried to show by fair reasoning, and I think I have shown to
the minds of fair men, that I propose nothing but what has a most peaceful
tendency. The quotation that I happened to make in that Springfield
Speech, that "a house divided against itself cannot stand," and which has
proved so offensive to the judge, was part and parcel of the same thing.
He tries to show that variety in the democratic institutions of the
different States is necessary and indispensable. I do not dispute it. I
have no controversy with Judge Douglas about that. I shall very readily
agree with him that it would be foolish for us to insist upon having a
cranberry law here in Illinois, where we have no cranberries, because they
have a cranberry law in Indiana, where they have cranberries. I should
insist that it would be exceedingly wrong in us to deny to Virginia the
right to enact oyster laws, where they have oysters, because we want no
such laws here. I understand, I hope, quite as well as Judge Douglas or
anybody else, that the variety in the soil and climate and face of the
country, and consequent variety in the industrial pursuits and productions
of a country, require systems of law conforming to this variety in the
natural features of the country. I understand quite as well as Judge
Douglas that if we here raise a barrel of flour more than we want, and the
Louisianians raise a barrel of sugar more than they want, it is of mutual
advantage to exchange. That produces commerce, brings us together, and
makes us better friends. We like one another the more for it. And I
understand as well as Judge Douglas, or anybody else, that these mutual
accommodations are the cements which bind together the different parts
of this Union; that instead of being a thing to "divide the
house,"--figuratively expressing the Union,--they tend to sustain it; they
are the props of the house, tending always to hold it up.
But when I have admitted all this, I ask if there is any parallel between
these things and this institution of slavery? I do not see that there
is any parallel at all between them. Consider it. When have we had any
difficulty or quarrel amongst ourselves about the cranberry laws of
Indiana, or the oyster laws of Virginia, or the pine-lumber laws of Maine,
or the fact that Louisiana produces sugar, and Illinois flour? When have
we had any quarrels over these things? When have we had perfect peace in
regard to this thing which I say is an element of discord in this Union?
We have sometimes had peace, but when was it? It was when the institution
of slavery remained quiet where it was. We have had difficulty and turmoil
whenever it has made a struggle to spread itself where it was not. I ask,
then, if experience does not speak in thunder-tones telling us that the
policy which has given peace to the country heretofore, being returned to,
gives the greatest promise of peace again. You may say, and Judge Douglas
has intimated the same thing, that all this difficulty in regard to
the institution of slavery is the mere agitation of office-seekers and
ambitious Northern politicians. He thinks we want to get "his place," I
suppose. I agree that there are office-seekers amongst us. The Bible
says somewhere that we are desperately selfish. I think we would have
discovered that fact without the Bible. I do not claim that I am any less
so than the average of men, but I do claim that I am not more selfish than
Judge Douglas.
But is it true that all the difficulty and agitation we have in regard
to this institution of slavery spring from office-seeking, from the mere
ambition of politicians? Is that the truth? How many times have we had
danger from this question? Go back to the day of the Missouri Compromise.
Go back to the nullification question, at the bottom of which lay this
same slavery question. Go back to the time of the annexation of Texas.
Go back to the troubles that led to the Compromise of 1850. You will find
that every time, with the single exception of the Nullification question,
they sprung from an endeavor to spread this institution. There never was a
party in the history of this country, and there probably never will be, of
sufficient strength to disturb the general peace of the country. Parties
themselves may be divided and quarrel on minor questions, yet it extends
not beyond the parties themselves. But does not this question make a
disturbance outside of political circles? Does it not enter into the
churches and rend them asunder? What divided the great Methodist Church
into two parts, North and South? What has raised this constant disturbance
in every Presbyterian General Assembly that meets? What disturbed the
Unitarian Church in this very city two years ago? What has jarred and
shaken the great American Tract Society recently, not yet splitting it,
but sure to divide it in the end? Is it not this same mighty, deep-seated
power that somehow operates on the minds of men, exciting and stirring
them up in every avenue of society,--in politics, in religion, in
literature, in morals, in all the manifold relations of life? Is this the
work of politicians? Is that irresistible power, which for fifty years has
shaken the government and agitated the people, to be stifled and subdued
by pretending that it is an exceedingly simple thing, and we ought not to
talk about it? If you will get everybody else to stop talking about it,
I assure you I will quit before they have half done so. But where is
the philosophy or statesmanship which assumes that you can quiet that
disturbing element in our society which has disturbed us for more than
half a century, which has been the only serious danger that has threatened
our institutions,--I say, where is the philosophy or the statesmanship
based on the assumption that we are to quit talking about it, and that the
public mind is all at once to cease being agitated by it? Yet this is the
policy here in the North that Douglas is advocating, that we are to care
nothing about it! I ask you if it is not a false philosophy. Is it not a
false statesmanship that undertakes to build up a system of policy upon
the basis of caring nothing about the very thing that everybody does care
the most about--a thing which all experience has shown we care a very
great deal about?
The Judge alludes very often in the course of his remarks to the exclusive
right which the States have to decide the whole thing for themselves. I
agree with him very readily that the different States have that right.
He is but fighting a man of straw when he assumes that I am contending
against the right of the States to do as they please about it. Our
controversy with him is in regard to the new Territories. We agree that
when the States come in as States they have the right and the power to do
as they please. We have no power as citizens of the free-States, or in
our Federal capacity as members of the Federal Union through the General
Government, to disturb slavery in the States where it exists. We profess
constantly that we have no more inclination than belief in the power
of the government to disturb it; yet we are driven constantly to defend
ourselves from the assumption that we are warring upon the rights of the
Sates. What I insist upon is, that the new Territories shall be kept free
from it while in the Territorial condition. Judge Douglas assumes that we
have no interest in them,--that we have no right whatever to interfere. I
think we have some interest. I think that as white men we have. Do we not
wish for an outlet for our surplus population, if I may so express
myself? Do we not feel an interest in getting to that outlet with such
institutions as we would like to have prevail there? If you go to the
Territory opposed to slavery, and another man comes upon the same ground
with his slave, upon the assumption that the things are equal, it turns
out that he has the equal right all his way, and you have no part of it
your way. If he goes in and makes it a slave Territory, and by consequence
a slave State, is it not time that those who desire to have it a free
State were on equal ground? Let me suggest it in a different way. How many
Democrats are there about here ["A thousand"] who have left slave States
and come into the free State of Illinois to get rid of the institution
of slavery? [Another voice: "A thousand and one."] I reckon there are a
thousand and one. I will ask you, if the policy you are now advocating had
prevailed when this country was in a Territorial condition, where would
you have gone to get rid of it? Where would you have found your free State
or Territory to go to? And when hereafter, for any cause, the people in
this place shall desire to find new homes, if they wish to be rid of the
institution, where will they find the place to go to?
Now, irrespective of the moral aspect of this question as to whether there
is a right or wrong in enslaving a negro, I am still in favor of our new
Territories being in such a condition that white men may find a home,--may
find some spot where they can better their condition; where they can
settle upon new soil and better their condition in life. I am in favor
of this, not merely (I must say it here as I have elsewhere) for our own
people who are born amongst us, but as an outlet for free white people
everywhere the world over--in which Hans, and Baptiste, and Patrick, and
all other men from all the world, may find new homes and better their
conditions in life.
I have stated upon former occasions, and I may as well state again, what I
understand to be the real issue in this controversy between Judge Douglas
and myself. On the point of my wanting to make war between the free and
the slave States, there has been no issue between us. So, too, when he
assumes that I am in favor of producing a perfect social and political
equality between the white and black races. These are false issues,
upon which Judge Douglas has tried to force the controversy. There is
no foundation in truth for the charge that I maintain either of these
propositions. The real issue in this controversy--the one pressing upon
every mind--is the sentiment on the part of one class that looks upon the
institution of slavery as a wrong, and of another class that does not look
upon it as a wrong. The sentiment that contemplates the institution of
slavery in this country as a wrong is the sentiment of the Republican
party. It is the sentiment around which all their actions, all their
arguments, circle, from which all their propositions radiate. They look
upon it as being a moral, social, and political wrong; and while they
contemplate it as such, they nevertheless have due regard for its actual
existence among us, and the difficulties of getting rid of it in any
satisfactory way, and to all the constitutional obligations thrown about
it. Yet, having a due regard for these, they desire a policy in regard
to it that looks to its not creating any more danger. They insist that it
should, as far as may be, be treated as a wrong; and one of the methods of
treating it as a wrong is to make provision that it shall grow no larger.
They also desire a policy that looks to a peaceful end of slavery at some
time. These are the views they entertain in regard to it as I understand
them; and all their sentiments, all their arguments and propositions,
are brought within this range. I have said, and I repeat it here, that
if there be a man amongst us who does not think that the institution of
slavery is wrong in any one of the aspects of which I have spoken, he is
misplaced, and ought not to be with us. And if there be a man amongst us
who is so impatient of it as a wrong as to disregard its actual
presence among us and the difficulty of getting rid of it suddenly in a
satisfactory way, and to disregard the constitutional obligations thrown
about it, that man is misplaced if he is on our platform. We disclaim
sympathy with him in practical action. He is not placed properly with us.
On this subject of treating it as a wrong, and limiting its spread, let me
say a word. Has anything ever threatened the existence of this Union save
and except this very institution of slavery? What is it that we hold most
dear amongst us? Our own liberty and prosperity. What has ever threatened
our liberty and prosperity, save and except this institution of slavery?
If this is true, how do you propose to improve the condition of things by
enlarging slavery, by spreading it out and making it bigger? You may have
a wen or cancer upon your person, and not be able to cut it out, lest
you bleed to death; but surely it is no way to cure it, to engraft it and
spread it over your whole body. That is no proper way of treating what you
regard a wrong. You see this peaceful way of dealing with it as a wrong,
restricting the spread of it, and not allowing it to go into new
countries where it has not already existed. That is the peaceful way,
the old-fashioned way, the way in which the fathers themselves set us the
example.