seventh, in my presence, reiterated his charge of a conspiracy or
combination between the National Democrats and Republicans. What evidence
Judge Douglas has upon this subject I know not, inasmuch as he never
favors us with any. I have said upon a former occasion, and I do not
choose to suppress it now, that I have no objection to the division in
the Judge's party. He got it up himself. It was all his and their work.
He had, I think, a great deal more to do with the steps that led to the
Lecompton Constitution than Mr. Buchanan had; though at last, when they
reached it, they quarreled over it, and their friends divided upon it. I
am very free to confess to Judge Douglas that I have no objection to the
division; but I defy the Judge to show any evidence that I have in any way
promoted that division, unless he insists on being a witness himself in
merely saying so. I can give all fair friends of Judge Douglas here
to understand exactly the view that Republicans take in regard to that
division. Don't you remember how two years ago the opponents of the
Democratic party were divided between Fremont and Fillmore? I guess you
do. Any Democrat who remembers that division will remember also that he
was at the time very glad of it, and then he will be able to see all there
is between the National Democrats and the Republicans. What we now think
of the two divisions of Democrats, you then thought of the Fremont and
Fillmore divisions. That is all there is of it.
But if the Judge continues to put forward the declaration that there is
an unholy and unnatural alliance between the Republicans and the National
Democrats, I now want to enter my protest against receiving him as an
entirely competent witness upon that subject. I want to call to the
Judge's attention an attack he made upon me in the first one of these
debates, at Ottawa, on the 21st of August. In order to fix extreme
Abolitionism upon me, Judge Douglas read a set of resolutions which he
declared had been passed by a Republican State Convention, in October,
1854, at Springfield, Illinois, and he declared I had taken part in that
Convention. It turned out that although a few men calling themselves an
anti-Nebraska State Convention had sat at Springfield about that time, yet
neither did I take any part in it, nor did it pass the resolutions or any
such resolutions as Judge Douglas read. So apparent had it become that the
resolutions which he read had not been passed at Springfield at all,
nor by a State Convention in which I had taken part, that seven days
afterward, at Freeport, Judge Douglas declared that he had been misled by
Charles H. Lanphier, editor of the State Register, and Thomas L. Harris,
member of Congress in that district, and he promised in that speech that
when he went to Springfield he would investigate the matter. Since
then Judge Douglas has been to Springfield, and I presume has made the
investigation; but a month has passed since he has been there, and, so
far as I know, he has made no report of the result of his investigation.
I have waited as I think sufficient time for the report of that
investigation, and I have some curiosity to see and hear it. A fraud, an
absolute forgery was committed, and the perpetration of it was traced to
the three,--Lanphier, Harris, and Douglas. Whether it can be narrowed in
any way so as to exonerate any one of them, is what Judge Douglas's report
would probably show.
It is true that the set of resolutions read by Judge Douglas were
published in the Illinois State Register on the 16th of October, 1854, as
being the resolutions of an anti-Nebraska Convention which had sat in
that same month of October, at Springfield. But it is also true that the
publication in the Register was a forgery then, and the question is still
behind, which of the three, if not all of them, committed that forgery.
The idea that it was done by mistake is absurd. The article in the
Illinois State Register contains part of the real proceedings of that
Springfield Convention, showing that the writer of the article had
the real proceedings before him, and purposely threw out the genuine
resolutions passed by the Convention and fraudulently substituted the
others. Lanphier then, as now, was the editor of the Register, so that
there seems to be but little room for his escape. But then it is to
be borne in mind that Lanphier had less interest in the object of that
forgery than either of the other two. The main object of that forgery at
that time was to beat Yates and elect Harris to Congress, and that object
was known to be exceedingly dear to Judge Douglas at that time. Harris and
Douglas were both in Springfield when the Convention was in session,
and although they both left before the fraud appeared in the Register,
subsequent events show that they have both had their eyes fixed upon that
Convention.
The fraud having been apparently successful upon the occasion, both Harris
and Douglas have more than once since then been attempting to put it to
new uses. As the fisherman's wife, whose drowned husband was brought home
with his body full of eels, said when she was asked what was to be done
with him, "Take the eels out and set him again," so Harris and Douglas
have shown a disposition to take the eels out of that stale fraud by which
they gained Harris's election, and set the fraud again more than once. On
the 9th of July, 1856, Douglas attempted a repetition of it upon Trumbull
on the floor of the Senate of the United States, as will appear from the
appendix of the Congressional Globe of that date.
On the 9th of August, Harris attempted it again upon Norton in the House
of Representatives, as will appear by the same documents,--the appendix
to the Congressional Globe of that date. On the 21st of August last, all
three--Lanphier, Douglas, and Harris--reattempted it upon me at Ottawa.
It has been clung to and played out again and again as an exceedingly high
trump by this blessed trio. And now that it has been discovered publicly
to be a fraud we find that Judge Douglas manifests no surprise at it at
all. He makes no complaint of Lanphier, who must have known it to be a
fraud from the beginning. He, Lanphier, and Harris are just as cozy now
and just as active in the concoction of new schemes as they were before
the general discovery of this fraud. Now, all this is very natural if they
are all alike guilty in that fraud, and it is very unnatural if any one
of them is innocent. Lanphier perhaps insists that the rule of honor
among thieves does not quite require him to take all upon himself,
and consequently my friend Judge Douglas finds it difficult to make a
satisfactory report upon his investigation. But meanwhile the three are
agreed that each is "a most honorable man."
Judge Douglas requires an indorsement of his truth and honor by a
re-election to the United States Senate, and he makes and reports against
me and against Judge Trumbull, day after day, charges which we know to
be utterly untrue, without for a moment seeming to think that this one
unexplained fraud, which he promised to investigate, will be the least
drawback to his claim to belief. Harris ditto. He asks a re-election to
the lower House of Congress without seeming to remember at all that he is
involved in this dishonorable fraud! The Illinois State Register, edited
by Lanphier, then, as now, the central organ of both Harris and Douglas,
continues to din the public ear with this assertion, without seeming to
suspect that these assertions are at all lacking in title to belief.
After all, the question still recurs upon us, How did that fraud
originally get into the State Register? Lanphier then, as now, was the
editor of that paper. Lanphier knows. Lanphier cannot be ignorant of how
and by whom it was originally concocted. Can he be induced to tell, or,
if he has told, can Judge Douglas be induced to tell how it originally was
concocted? It may be true that Lanphier insists that the two men for whose
benefit it was originally devised shall at least bear their share of it!
How that is, I do not know, and while it remains unexplained I hope to be
pardoned if I insist that the mere fact of Judge Douglas making charges
against Trumbull and myself is not quite sufficient evidence to establish
them!
While we were at Freeport, in one of these joint discussions, I answered
certain interrogatories which Judge Douglas had propounded to me, and then
in turn propounded some to him, which he in a sort of way answered. The
third one of these interrogatories I have with me, and wish now to make
some comments upon it. It was in these words: "If the Supreme Court of
States cannot exclude slavery from their limits, are you in favor of
acquiescing in, adhering to, and following such decision as a rule of
political action?"
To this interrogatory Judge Douglas made no answer in any just sense of
the word. He contented himself with sneering at the thought that it was
possible for the Supreme Court ever to make such a decision. He sneered at
me for propounding the interrogatory. I had not propounded it without some
reflection, and I wish now to address to this audience some remarks upon
it.
In the second clause of the sixth article, I believe it is, of the
Constitution of the United States, we find the following language:
"This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made
in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land;
and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the
Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
The essence of the Dred Scott case is compressed into the sentence which I
will now read:
"Now, as we have already said in an earlier part of this opinion, upon
a different point, the right of property in a slave is distinctly and
expressly affirmed in the Constitution."
I repeat it, "The right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly
affirmed in the Constitution"! What is it to be "affirmed" in the
Constitution? Made firm in the Constitution, so made that it cannot be
separated from the Constitution without breaking the Constitution; durable
as the Constitution, and part of the Constitution. Now, remembering the
provision of the Constitution which I have read--affirming that that
instrument is the supreme law of the land; that the judges of every State
shall be bound by it, any law or constitution of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding; that the right of property in a slave is affirmed in
that Constitution, is made, formed into, and cannot be separated from
it without breaking it; durable as the instrument; part of the
instrument;--what follows as a short and even syllogistic argument from
it? I think it follows, and I submit to the consideration of men capable
of arguing whether, as I state it, in syllogistic form, the argument has
any fault in it:
Nothing in the Constitution or laws of any State can destroy a right
distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the United
States.
The right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in
the Constitution of the United States.
Therefore, nothing in the Constitution or laws of any State can destroy
the right of property in a slave.
I believe that no fault can be pointed out in that argument; assuming the
truth of the premises, the conclusion, so far as I have capacity at all to
understand it, follows inevitably. There is a fault in it as I think, but
the fault is not in the reasoning; but the falsehood in fact is a fault
of the premises. I believe that the right of property in a slave is not
distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution, and Judge Douglas
thinks it is. I believe that the Supreme Court and the advocates of that
decision may search in vain for the place in the Constitution where the
right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed I say,
therefore, that I think one of the premises is not true in fact. But it is
true with Judge Douglas. It is true with the Supreme Court who pronounced
it. They are estopped from denying it, and being estopped from denying it,
the conclusion follows that, the Constitution of the United States being
the supreme law, no constitution or law can interfere with it. It
being affirmed in the decision that the right of property in a slave is
distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution, the conclusion
inevitably follows that no State law or constitution can destroy that
right. I then say to Judge Douglas and to all others that I think it will
take a better answer than a sneer to show that those who have said that
the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in
the Constitution, are not prepared to show that no constitution or law
can destroy that right. I say I believe it will take a far better argument
than a mere sneer to show to the minds of intelligent men that whoever has
so said is not prepared, whenever public sentiment is so far advanced as
to justify it, to say the other. This is but an opinion, and the opinion
of one very humble man; but it is my opinion that the Dred Scott decision,
as it is, never would have been made in its present form if the party that
made it had not been sustained previously by the elections. My own opinion
is, that the new Dred Scott decision, deciding against the right of the
people of the States to exclude slavery, will never be made if that party
is not sustained by the elections. I believe, further, that it is just as
sure to be made as to-morrow is to come, if that party shall be sustained.
I have said, upon a former occasion, and I repeat it now, that the course
of arguement that Judge Douglas makes use of upon this subject (I charge
not his motives in this), is preparing the public mind for that new Dred
Scott decision. I have asked him again to point out to me the reasons for
his first adherence to the Dred Scott decision as it is. I have turned his
attention to the fact that General Jackson differed with him in regard
to the political obligation of a Supreme Court decision. I have asked his
attention to the fact that Jefferson differed with him in regard to the
political obligation of a Supreme Court decision. Jefferson said that
"Judges are as honest as other men, and not more so." And he said,
substantially, that whenever a free people should give up in absolute
submission to any department of government, retaining for themselves no
appeal from it, their liberties were gone. I have asked his attention
to the fact that the Cincinnati platform, upon which he says he stands,
disregards a time-honored decision of the Supreme Court, in denying the
power of Congress to establish a National Bank. I have asked his attention
to the fact that he himself was one of the most active instruments at one
time in breaking down the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois because
it had made a decision distasteful to him,--a struggle ending in the
remarkable circumstance of his sitting down as one of the new Judges who
were to overslaugh that decision; getting his title of Judge in that very
way.
So far in this controversy I can get no answer at all from Judge Douglas
upon these subjects. Not one can I get from him, except that he swells
himself up and says, "All of us who stand by the decision of the Supreme
Court are the friends of the Constitution; all you fellows that dare
question it in any way are the enemies of the Constitution." Now, in this
very devoted adherence to this decision, in opposition to all the great
political leaders whom he has recognized as leaders, in opposition to his
former self and history, there is something very marked. And the manner
in which he adheres to it,--not as being right upon the merits, as
he conceives (because he did not discuss that at all), but as being
absolutely obligatory upon every one simply because of the source from
whence it comes, as that which no man can gainsay, whatever it may
be,--this is another marked feature of his adherence to that decision.
It marks it in this respect, that it commits him to the next decision,
whenever it comes, as being as obligatory as this one, since he does not
investigate it, and won't inquire whether this opinion is right or wrong.
So he takes the next one without inquiring whether it is right or wrong.
He teaches men this doctrine, and in so doing prepares the public mind to
take the next decision when it comes, without any inquiry. In this I think
I argue fairly (without questioning motives at all) that Judge Douglas
is most ingeniously and powerfully preparing the public mind to take that
decision when it comes; and not only so, but he is doing it in various
other ways. In these general maxims about liberty, in his assertions that
he "don't care whether slavery is voted up or voted down,"; that "whoever
wants slavery has a right to have it"; that "upon principles of equality
it should be allowed to go everywhere"; that "there is no inconsistency
between free and slave institutions"--in this he is also preparing
(whether purposely or not) the way for making the institution of slavery
national! I repeat again, for I wish no misunderstanding, that I do not
charge that he means it so; but I call upon your minds to inquire, if you
were going to get the best instrument you could, and then set it to work
in the most ingenious way, to prepare the public mind for this movement,
operating in the free States, where there is now an abhorrence of the
institution of slavery, could you find an instrument so capable of doing
it as Judge Douglas, or one employed in so apt a way to do it?
I have said once before, and I will repeat it now, that Mr. Clay, when he
was once answering an objection to the Colonization Society, that it had a
tendency to the ultimate emancipation of the slaves, said that:
"Those who would repress all tendencies to liberty and ultimate
emancipation must do more than put down the benevolent efforts of the
Colonization Society: they must go back to the era of our liberty and
independence, and muzzle the cannon that thunders its annual joyous
return; they must blow out the moral lights around us; they must penetrate
the human soul, and eradicate the light of reason and the love of
liberty!"
And I do think--I repeat, though I said it on a former occasion--that
Judge Douglas and whoever, like him, teaches that the negro has no share,
humble though it may be, in the Declaration of Independence, is going back
to the era of our liberty and independence, and, so far as in him lies,
muzzling the cannon that thunders its annual joyous return; that he is
blowing out the moral lights around us, when he contends that whoever
wants slaves has a right to hold them; that he is penetrating, so far as
lies in his power, the human soul, and eradicating the light of reason and
the love of liberty, when he is in every possible way preparing the
public mind, by his vast influence, for making the institution of slavery
perpetual and national.
There is, my friends, only one other point to which I will call your
attention for the remaining time that I have left me, and perhaps I shall
not occupy the entire time that I have, as that one point may not take me
clear through it.
Among the interrogatories that Judge Douglas propounded to me at Freeport,
there was one in about this language:
"Are you opposed to the acquisition of any further territory to the United
States, unless slavery shall first be prohibited therein?"
I answered, as I thought, in this way: that I am not generally opposed
to the acquisition of additional territory, and that I would support a
proposition for the acquisition of additional territory according as my
supporting it was or was not calculated to aggravate this slavery question
amongst us. I then proposed to Judge Douglas another interrogatory,
which was correlative to that: "Are you in favor of acquiring additional
territory, in disregard of how it may affect us upon the slavery
question?" Judge Douglas answered,--that is, in his own way he answered
it. I believe that, although he took a good many words to answer it, it
was a little more fully answered than any other. The substance of his
answer was that this country would continue to expand; that it would
need additional territory; that it was as absurd to suppose that we could
continue upon our present territory, enlarging in population as we are, as
it would be to hoop a boy twelve years of age, and expect him to grow to
man's size without bursting the hoops. I believe it was something
like that. Consequently, he was in favor of the acquisition of further
territory as fast as we might need it, in disregard of how it might affect
the slavery question. I do not say this as giving his exact language,
but he said so substantially; and he would leave the question of slavery,
where the territory was acquired, to be settled by the people of the
acquired territory. ["That's the doctrine."] May be it is; let us consider
that for a while. This will probably, in the run of things, become one of
the concrete manifestations of this slavery question. If Judge Douglas's
policy upon this question succeeds, and gets fairly settled down, until
all opposition is crushed out, the next thing will be a grab for the
territory of poor Mexico, an invasion of the rich lands of South America,
then the adjoining islands will follow, each one of which promises
additional slave-fields. And this question is to be left to the people of
those countries for settlement. When we get Mexico, I don't know whether
the Judge will be in favor of the Mexican people that we get with it
settling that question for themselves and all others; because we know the
Judge has a great horror for mongrels, and I understand that the people of
Mexico are most decidedly a race of mongrels. I understand that there
is not more than one person there out of eight who is pure white, and I
suppose from the Judge's previous declaration that when we get Mexico, or
any considerable portion of it, that he will be in favor of these mongrels
settling the question, which would bring him somewhat into collision with
his horror of an inferior race.