from which he quotes, I really was not thinking of the things which he
ascribes to me at all. I had no thought in the world that I was doing
anything to bring about a war between the free and slave states. I had no
thought in the world that I was doing anything to bring about a political
and social equality of the black and white races. It never occurred to
me that I was doing anything or favoring anything to reduce to a dead
uniformity all the local institutions of the various States. But I must
say, in all fairness to him, if he thinks I am doing something which leads
to these bad results, it is none the better that I did not mean it. It
is just as fatal to the country, if I have any influence in producing
it, whether I intend it or not. But can it be true that placing this
institution upon the original basis--the basis upon which our fathers
placed it--can have any tendency to set the Northern and the Southern
States at war with one another, or that it can have any tendency to
make the people of Vermont raise sugar-cane, because they raise it in
Louisiana, or that it can compel the people of Illinois to cut pine logs
on the Grand Prairie, where they will not grow, because they cut pine
logs in Maine, where they do grow? The Judge says this is a new principle
started in regard to this question. Does the Judge claim that he is
working on the plan of the founders of government? I think he says in some
of his speeches indeed, I have one here now--that he saw evidence of a
policy to allow slavery to be south of a certain line, while north of
it it should be excluded, and he saw an indisposition on the part of the
country to stand upon that policy, and therefore he set about studying the
subject upon original principles, and upon original principles he got
up the Nebraska Bill! I am fighting it upon these "original principles,"
fighting it in the Jeffersonian, Washingtonian, and Madisonian fashion.
Now, my friends, I wish you to attend for a little while to one or two
other things in that Springfield speech. My main object was to show, so
far as my humble ability was capable of showing, to the people of this
country what I believed was the truth,--that there was a tendency, if not
a conspiracy, among those who have engineered this slavery question for
the last four or five years, to make slavery perpetual and universal in
this nation. Having made that speech principally for that object, after
arranging the evidences that I thought tended to prove my proposition, I
concluded with this bit of comment:
"We cannot absolutely know that these exact adaptations are the result of
preconcert; but when we see a lot of framed timbers, different portions of
which we know have been gotten out at different times and places, and by
different workmen--Stephen, Franklin, Roger, and James, for instance,--and
when we see these timbers joined together, and see they exactly make the
frame of a house or a mill, all the tenons and mortises exactly fitting,
and all the lengths and proportions of the different pieces exactly
adapted to their respective places, and not a piece too many or too
few,--not omitting even the scaffolding,--or if a single piece be lacking,
we see the place in the frame exactly fitted and prepared yet to bring
such piece in,--in such a case we feel it impossible not to believe that
Stephen and Franklin and Roger and James all understood one another from
the beginning, and all worked upon a common plan or draft drawn before the
first blow was struck."
When my friend Judge Douglas came to Chicago on the 9th of July, this
speech having been delivered on the 16th of June, he made an harangue
there, in which he took hold of this speech of mine, showing that he had
carefully read it; and while he paid no attention to this matter at all,
but complimented me as being a "kind, amiable, and intelligent gentleman,"
notwithstanding I had said this, he goes on and eliminates, or draws out,
from my speech this tendency of mine to set the States at war with one
another, to make all the institutions uniform, and set the niggers and
white people to marrying together. Then, as the Judge had complimented me
with these pleasant titles (I must confess to my weakness), I was a little
"taken," for it came from a great man. I was not very much accustomed to
flattery, and it came the sweeter to me. I was rather like the Hoosier,
with the gingerbread, when he said he reckoned he loved it better than any
other man, and got less of it. As the Judge had so flattered me, I could
not make up my mind that he meant to deal unfairly with me; so I went to
work to show him that he misunderstood the whole scope of my speech, and
that I really never intended to set the people at war with one another. As
an illustration, the next time I met him, which was at Springfield, I used
this expression, that I claimed no right under the Constitution, nor had
I any inclination, to enter into the slave States and interfere with the
institutions of slavery. He says upon that: Lincoln will not enter into
the slave States, but will go to the banks of the Ohio, on this side,
and shoot over! He runs on, step by step, in the horse-chestnut style of
argument, until in the Springfield speech he says: "Unless he shall
be successful in firing his batteries until he shall have extinguished
slavery in all the States the Union shall be dissolved." Now, I don't
think that was exactly the way to treat "a kind, amiable, intelligent
gentleman." I know if I had asked the Judge to show when or where it was
I had said that, if I didn't succeed in firing into the slave States until
slavery should be extinguished, the Union should be dissolved, he could
not have shown it. I understand what he would do. He would say: I don't
mean to quote from you, but this was the result of what you say. But I
have the right to ask, and I do ask now, Did you not put it in such a form
that an ordinary reader or listener would take it as an expression from
me?
In a speech at Springfield, on the night of the 17th, I thought I might as
well attend to my own business a little, and I recalled his attention as
well as I could to this charge of conspiracy to nationalize slavery. I
called his attention to the fact that he had acknowledged in my hearing
twice that he had carefully read the speech, and, in the language of the
lawyers, as he had twice read the speech, and still had put in no plea
or answer, I took a default on him. I insisted that I had a right then
to renew that charge of conspiracy. Ten days afterward I met the Judge
at Clinton,--that is to say, I was on the ground, but not in the
discussion,--and heard him make a speech. Then he comes in with his plea
to this charge, for the first time; and his plea when put in, as well as I
can recollect it, amounted to this: that he never had any talk with Judge
Taney or the President of the United States with regard to the Dred Scott
decision before it was made. I (Lincoln) ought to know that the man who
makes a charge without knowing it to be true falsifies as much as he who
knowingly tells a falsehood; and, lastly, that he would pronounce the
whole thing a falsehood; but, he would make no personal application of
the charge of falsehood, not because of any regard for the "kind, amiable,
intelligent gentleman," but because of his own personal self-respect! I
have understood since then (but [turning to Judge Douglas] will not hold
the Judge to it if he is not willing) that he has broken through the
"self-respect," and has got to saying the thing out. The Judge nods to me
that it is so. It is fortunate for me that I can keep as good-humored as I
do, when the Judge acknowledges that he has been trying to make a question
of veracity with me. I know the Judge is a great man, while I am only a
small man, but I feel that I have got him. I demur to that plea. I waive
all objections that it was not filed till after default was taken, and
demur to it upon the merits. What if Judge Douglas never did talk with
Chief Justice Taney and the President before the Dred Scott decision
was made, does it follow that he could not have had as perfect an
understanding without talking as with it? I am not disposed to stand upon
my legal advantage. I am disposed to take his denial as being like an
answer in chancery, that he neither had any knowledge, information, or
belief in the existence of such a conspiracy. I am disposed to take his
answer as being as broad as though he had put it in these words. And now,
I ask, even if he had done so, have not I a right to prove it on him, and
to offer the evidence of more than two witnesses, by whom to prove it; and
if the evidence proves the existence of the conspiracy, does his broader
answer denying all knowledge, information, or belief, disturb the fact?
It can only show that he was used by conspirators, and was not a leader of
them.
Now, in regard to his reminding me of the moral rule that persons who tell
what they do not know to be true falsify as much as those who knowingly
tell falsehoods. I remember the rule, and it must be borne in mind that
in what I have read to you, I do not say that I know such a conspiracy
to exist. To that I reply, I believe it. If the Judge says that I do not
believe it, then he says what he does not know, and falls within his
own rule, that he who asserts a thing which he does not know to be true,
falsifies as much as he who knowingly tells a falsehood. I want to call
your attention to a little discussion on that branch of the case, and the
evidence which brought my mind to the conclusion which I expressed as
my belief. If, in arraying that evidence I had stated anything which was
false or erroneous, it needed but that Judge Douglas should point it out,
and I would have taken it back, with all the kindness in the world. I do
not deal in that way. If I have brought forward anything not a fact, if he
will point it out, it will not even ruffle me to take it back. But if he
will not point out anything erroneous in the evidence, is it not rather
for him to show, by a comparison of the evidence, that I have reasoned
falsely, than to call the "kind, amiable, intelligent gentleman" a liar?
If I have reasoned to a false conclusion, it is the vocation of an
able debater to show by argument that I have wandered to an erroneous
conclusion. I want to ask your attention to a portion of the Nebraska
Bill, which Judge Douglas has quoted:
"It being the true intent and meaning of this Act, not to
legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it
therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and
regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the
Constitution of the United States."
Thereupon Judge Douglas and others began to argue in favor of "popular
sovereignty," the right of the people to have slaves if they wanted
them, and to exclude slavery if they did not want them. "But," said,
in substance, a Senator from Ohio (Mr. Chase, I believe), "we more than
suspect that you do not mean to allow the people to exclude slavery if
they wish to; and if you do mean it, accept an amendment which I propose,
expressly authorizing the people to exclude slavery."
I believe I have the amendment here before me, which was offered, and
under which the people of the Territory, through their representatives,
might, if they saw fit, prohibit the existence of slavery therein. And now
I state it as a fact, to be taken back if there is any mistake about it,
that Judge Douglas and those acting with him voted that amendment down. I
now think that those men who voted it down had a real reason for doing
so. They know what that reason was. It looks to us, since we have seen the
Dred Scott decision pronounced, holding that "under the Constitution" the
people cannot exclude slavery, I say it looks to outsiders, poor, simple,
"amiable, intelligent gentlemen," as though the niche was left as a place
to put that Dred Scott decision in,--a niche which would have been spoiled
by adopting the amendment. And now, I say again, if this was not the
reason, it will avail the Judge much more to calmly and good-humoredly
point out to these people what that other reason was for voting the
amendment down, than, swelling himself up, to vociferate that he may be
provoked to call somebody a liar.
Again: There is in that same quotation from the Nebraska Bill this clause:
"It being the true intent and meaning of this bill not to legislate
slavery into any Territory or State." I have always been puzzled to know
what business the word "State" had in that connection. Judge Douglas
knows. He put it there. He knows what he put it there for. We outsiders
cannot say what he put it there for. The law they were passing was not
about States, and was not making provisions for States. What was it placed
there for? After seeing the Dred Scott decision, which holds that the
people cannot exclude slavery from a Territory, if another Dred Scott
decision shall come, holding that they cannot exclude it from a State, we
shall discover that when the word was originally put there, it was in view
of something which was to come in due time, we shall see that it was the
other half of something. I now say again, if there is any different
reason for putting it there, Judge Douglas, in a good-humored way, without
calling anybody a liar, can tell what the reason was.
When the Judge spoke at Clinton, he came very near making a charge of
falsehood against me. He used, as I found it printed in a newspaper,
which, I remember, was very nearly like the real speech, the following
language:
"I did not answer the charge [of conspiracy] before, for the reason that
I did not suppose there was a man in America with a heart so corrupt as
to believe such a charge could be true. I have too much respect for Mr.
Lincoln to suppose he is serious in making the charge."
I confess this is rather a curious view, that out of respect for me he
should consider I was making what I deemed rather a grave charge in fun.
I confess it strikes me rather strangely. But I let it pass. As the Judge
did not for a moment believe that there was a man in America whose heart
was so "corrupt" as to make such a charge, and as he places me among the
"men in America" who have hearts base enough to make such a charge, I hope
he will excuse me if I hunt out another charge very like this; and if it
should turn out that in hunting I should find that other, and it
should turn out to be Judge Douglas himself who made it, I hope he will
reconsider this question of the deep corruption of heart he has thought
fit to ascribe to me. In Judge Douglas's speech of March 22, 1858, which I
hold in my hand, he says:
"In this connection there is another topic to which I desire to allude.
I seldom refer to the course of newspapers, or notice the articles which
they publish in regard to myself; but the course of the Washington Union
has been so extraordinary for the last two or three months, that I think
it well enough to make some allusion to it. It has read me out of the
Democratic party every other day, at least for two or three months, and
keeps reading me out, and, as if it had not succeeded, still continues to
read me out, using such terms as 'traitor,' 'renegade,' 'deserter,' and
other kind and polite epithets of that nature. Sir, I have no vindication
to make of my Democracy against the Washington Union, or any other
newspapers. I am willing to allow my history and action for the last
twenty years to speak for themselves as to my political principles and
my fidelity to political obligations. The Washington Union has a personal
grievance. When its editor was nominated for public printer, I declined
to vote for him, and stated that at some time I might give my reasons for
doing so. Since I declined to give that vote, this scurrilous abuse, these
vindictive and constant attacks have been repeated almost daily on me.
Will any friend from Michigan read the article to which I allude?"
This is a part of the speech. You must excuse me from reading the entire
article of the Washington Union, as Mr. Stuart read it for Mr. Douglas.
The Judge goes on and sums up, as I think, correctly:
"Mr. President, you here find several distinct propositions
advanced boldly by the Washington Union editorially, and apparently
authoritatively; and any man who questions any of them is denounced as an
Abolitionist, a Free-soiler, a fanatic. The propositions are, first, that
the primary object of all government at its original institution is the
protection of person and property; second, that the Constitution of the
United States declares that the citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States;
and that, therefore, thirdly, all State laws, whether organic or
otherwise, which prohibit the citizens of one State from settling in
another with their slave property, and especially declaring it forfeited,
are direct violations of the original intention of the government and
Constitution of the United States; and, fourth, that the emancipation of
the slaves of the Northern States was a gross outrage of the rights of
property, inasmuch as it was involuntarily done on the part of the owner.
"Remember that this article was published in the Union on the 17th of
November, and on the 18th appeared the first article giving the adhesion
of the Union, to the Lecompton Constitution. It was in these words:
"KANSAS AND HER CONSTITUTION.--The vexed question is settled. The problem
is saved. The dead point of danger is passed. All serious trouble to
Kansas affairs is over and gone..."
And a column nearly of the same sort. Then, when you come to look into
the Lecompton Constitution, you find the same doctrine incorporated in it
which was put forth editorially in the Union. What is it?
"ARTICLE 7, Section I. The right of property is before and higher than
any constitutional sanction; and the right of the owner of a slave to such
slave and its increase is the same and as inviolable as the right of the
owner of any property whatever."
Then in the schedule is a provision that the Constitution may be amended
after 1864 by a two-thirds vote:
"But no alteration shall be made to affect the right of property in the
ownership of slaves."
"It will be seen by these clauses in the Lecompton Constitution that they
are identical in spirit with the authoritative article in the Washington
Union of the day previous to its indorsement of this Constitution."
I pass over some portions of the speech, and I hope that any one who feels
interested in this matter will read the entire section of the speech, and
see whether I do the Judge injustice. He proceeds:
"When I saw that article in the Union of the 17th of November, followed by
the glorification of the Lecompton Constitution on the 10th of November,
and this clause in the Constitution asserting the doctrine that a State
has no right to prohibit slavery within its limits, I saw that there was a
fatal blow being struck at the sovereignty of the States of this Union."
I stop the quotation there, again requesting that it may all be read. I
have read all of the portion I desire to comment upon. What is this charge
that the Judge thinks I must have a very corrupt heart to make? It was a
purpose on the part of certain high functionaries to make it impossible
for the people of one State to prohibit the people of any other State from
entering it with their "property," so called, and making it a slave State.
In other words, it was a charge implying a design to make the institution
of slavery national. And now I ask your attention to what Judge Douglas
has himself done here. I know he made that part of the speech as a reason
why he had refused to vote for a certain man for public printer; but when
we get at it, the charge itself is the very one I made against him, that
he thinks I am so corrupt for uttering. Now, whom does he make that charge
against? Does he make it against that newspaper editor merely? No; he
says it is identical in spirit with the Lecompton Constitution, and so
the framers of that Constitution are brought in with the editor of
the newspaper in that "fatal blow being struck." He did not call it a
"conspiracy." In his language, it is a "fatal blow being struck." And if
the words carry the meaning better when changed from a "conspiracy" into a
"fatal blow being struck," I will change my expression, and call it "fatal
blow being struck." We see the charge made not merely against the editor
of the Union, but all the framers of the Lecompton Constitution; and not
only so, but the article was an authoritative article. By whose authority?
Is there any question but he means it was by the authority of the
President and his Cabinet,--the Administration?
Is there any sort of question but he means to make that charge? Then there
are the editors of the Union, the framers of the Lecompton Constitution,
the President of the United States and his Cabinet, and all the supporters
of the Lecompton Constitution, in Congress and out of Congress, who
are all involved in this "fatal blow being struck." I commend to Judge
Douglas's consideration the question of how corrupt a man's heart must be
to make such a charge!