as it was, secured. That was the second point gained. The indorsement,
however, fell short of a clear popular majority by nearly four hundred
thousand votes,(approximately 10% of the vote) and so, perhaps, was not
overwhelmingly reliable and satisfactory. The outgoing President, in his
last annual message, as impressively as possible echoed back upon the
people the weight and authority of the indorsement. The Supreme Court
met again, did not announce their decision, but ordered a reargument. The
Presidential inauguration came, and still no decision of the court; but
the incoming President, in his inaugural address, fervently exhorted the
people to abide by the forth-coming decision, whatever it might be. Then,
in a few days, came the decision.
The reputed author of the Nebraska Bill finds an early occasion to make a
speech at this capital indorsing the Dred Scott decision, and vehemently
denouncing all opposition to it. The new President, too, seizes the early
occasion of the Silliman letter to indorse and strongly construe that
decision, and to express his astonishment that any different view had ever
been entertained!
At length a squabble springs up between the President and the author of
the Nebraska Bill, on the mere question of fact, whether the Lecompton
Constitution was or was not in any just sense made by the people of
Kansas; and in that quarrel the latter declares that all he wants is a
fair vote for the people, and that he cares not whether slavery be voted
down or voted up. I do not understand his declaration, that he cares not
whether slavery be voted down or voted up, to be intended by him other
than as an apt definition of the policy he would impress upon the public
mind,--the principle for which he declares he has suffered so much, and is
ready to suffer to the end. And well may he cling to that principle! If he
has any parental feeling, well may he cling to it. That principle is the
only shred left of his original Nebraska doctrine. Under the Dred Scott
decision "squatter sovereignty" squatted out of existence, tumbled down
like temporary scaffolding; like the mould at the foundry, served through
one blast, and fell back into loose sand; helped to carry an election,
and then was kicked to the winds. His late joint struggle with the
Republicans, against the Lecompton Constitution, involves nothing of the
original Nebraska doctrine. That struggle was made on a point--the
right of a people to make their own constitution--upon which he and the
Republicans have never differed.
The several points of the Dred Scott decision, in connection with Senator
Douglas's "care not" policy, constitute the piece of machinery, in its
present state of advancement. This was the third point gained. The working
points of that machinery are:
Firstly, That no negro slave, imported as such from Africa, and no
descendant of such slave, can ever be a citizen of any State, in the sense
of that term as used in the Constitution of the United States. This point
is made in order to deprive the negro, in every possible event, of the
benefit of that provision of the United States Constitution which declares
that "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States."
Secondly, That, "subject to the Constitution of the United States,"
neither Congress nor a Territorial Legislature can exclude slavery from
any United States Territory. This point is made in order that individual
men may fill up the Territories with slaves, without danger of losing
them as property, and thus to enhance the chances of permanency to the
institution through all the future.
Thirdly, That whether the holding a negro in actual slavery in a free
State makes him free, as against the holder, the United States courts will
not decide, but will leave to be decided by the courts of any slave State
the negro may be forced into by the master. This point is made, not to
be pressed immediately; but, if acquiesced in for a while, and apparently
indorsed by the people at an election, then to sustain the logical
conclusion that what Dred Scott's master might lawfully do with Dred
Scott, in the free State of Illinois, every other master may lawfully do
with any other one, or one thousand slaves, in Illinois, or in any other
free State.
Auxiliary to all this, and working hand in hand with it, the Nebraska
doctrine, or what is left of it, is to educate and mould public opinion,
at least Northern public opinion, not to care whether slavery is voted
down or voted up. This shows exactly where we now are; and partially,
also, wither we are tending.
It will throw additional light on the latter, to go back and run the mind
over the string of historical facts already stated. Several things
will now appear less dark and mysterious than they did when they were
transpiring. The people were to be left "perfectly free," "subject only
to the Constitution." What the Constitution had to do with it, outsiders
could not then see. Plainly enough now,--it was an exactly fitted niche,
for the Dred Scott decision to afterward come in, and declare the perfect
freedom of the people to be just no freedom at all. Why was the amendment,
expressly declaring the right of the people, voted down? Plainly enough
now,--the adoption of it would have spoiled the niche for the Dred
Scott decision. Why was the court decision held up? Why even a Senator's
individual opinion withheld, till after the Presidential election? Plainly
enough now,--the speaking out then would have damaged the "perfectly
free" argument upon which the election was to be carried. Why the
outgoing President's felicitation on the indorsement? Why the delay of a
reargument? Why the incoming President's advance exhortation in favor of
the decision? These things look like the cautious patting and petting of a
spirited horse preparatory to mounting him, when it is dreaded that he may
give the rider a fall. And why the hasty after-indorsement of the decision
by the President and others?
We cannot absolutely know that all these exact adaptations are the result
of preconcert. But when we see a lot of framed timbers, different portions
of which we know have been gotten out at different times and places and by
different workmen, Stephen, Franklin, Roger, and James, for instance, and
when we see these timbers joined together, and see they exactly make the
frame of a house or a mill, all the tenons and mortises exactly fitting,
and all the lengths and proportions of the different pieces exactly
adapted to their respective places, and not a piece too many or too
few,--not omitting even scaffolding,--or, if a single piece be lacking, we
see the place in the frame exactly fitted and prepared yet to bring such
piece in,--in such a case, we find it impossible not to believe that
Stephen and Franklin and Roger and James all understood one another from
the beginning, and all worked upon a common plan or draft drawn up before
the first blow was struck.
It should not be overlooked that by the Nebraska Bill the people of a
State as well as Territory were to be left "perfectly free," "subject
only to the Constitution." Why mention a State? They were legislating for
Territories, and not for or about States. Certainly the people of a State
are and ought to be subject to the Constitution of the United States; but
why is mention of this lugged into this merely Territorial law? Why
are the people of a Territory and the people of a State therein lumped
together, and their relation to the Constitution therefore treated as
being precisely the same? While the opinion of the court, by Chief Justice
Taney, in the Dred Scott case, and the separate opinions of all the
concurring Judges, expressly declare that the Constitution of the United
States neither permits Congress nor a Territorial Legislature to exclude
slavery from any United States Territory, they all omit to declare whether
or not the same Constitution permits a State, or the people of a State, to
exclude it. Possibly, this is a mere omission; but who can be quite sure,
if McLean or Curtis had sought to get into the opinion a declaration of
unlimited power in the people of a State to exclude slavery from their
limits, just as Chase and Mace sought to get such declaration, in behalf
of the people of a Territory, into the Nebraska Bill,--I ask, who can be
quite sure that it would not have been voted down in the one case as it
had been in the other? The nearest approach to the point of declaring the
power of a State over slavery is made by Judge Nelson. He approaches it
more than once, Using the precise idea, and almost the language, too, of
the Nebraska Act. On one occasion, his exact language is, "Except in cases
where the power is restrained by the Constitution of the United States,
the law of the State is supreme over the subject of slavery within its
jurisdiction." In what cases the power of the States is so restrained by
the United States Constitution, is left an open question, precisely as the
same question, as to the restraint on the power of the Territories, was
left open in the Nebraska Act. Put this and that together, and we have
another nice little niche, which we may, ere long, see filled with another
Supreme Court decision, declaring that the Constitution of the United
States does not permit a State to exclude slavery from its limits. And
this may especially be expected if the doctrine of "care not whether
slavery be voted down or voted up" shall gain upon the public mind
sufficiently to give promise that such a decision can be maintained when
made.
Such a decision is all that slavery now lacks of being alike lawful in all
the States. Welcome or unwelcome, such decision is probably coming, and
will soon be upon us, unless the power of the present political dynasty
shall be met and overthrown. We shall lie down pleasantly dreaming that
the people of Missouri are on the verge of making their State free, and
we shall awake to the reality instead that the Supreme Court has made
Illinois a slave State. To meet and overthrow the power of that dynasty is
the work now before all those who would prevent that consummation. That is
what we have to do. How can we best do it?
There are those who denounce us openly to their friends, and yet whisper
to us softly that Senator Douglas is the aptest instrument there is with
which to effect that object. They wish us to infer all, from the fact that
he now has a little quarrel with the present head of the dynasty, and that
he has regularly voted with us on a single point, upon which he and we
have never differed. They remind us that he is a great man, and that the
largest of us are very small ones. Let this be granted. But "a living dog
is better than a dead lion." Judge Douglas, if not a dead lion, for this
work is at least a caged and toothless one. How can he oppose the advances
of slavery? He don't care anything about it. His avowed mission is
impressing the "public heart" to care nothing about it. A leading Douglas
Democratic newspaper thinks Douglas's superior talent will be needed to
resist the revival of the African slave trade. Does Douglas believe an
effort to revive that trade is approaching? He has not said so. Does he
really think so? But if it is, how can he resist it? For years he has
labored to prove it a sacred right of white men to take negro slaves into
the new Territories. Can he possibly show that it is less a sacred right
to buy them where they can be bought cheapest? And unquestionably they can
be bought cheaper in Africa than in Virginia. He has done all in his
power to reduce the whole question of slavery to one of a mere right of
property; and, as such, how can he oppose the foreign slave trade, how can
he refuse that trade in that "property" shall be "perfectly free,"--unless
he does it as a protection to the home production? And as the home
producers will probably not ask the protection, he will be wholly without
a ground of opposition.
Senator Douglas holds, we know, that a man may rightfully be wiser to-day
than he was yesterday; that he may rightfully change when he finds himself
wrong. But can we, for that reason, run ahead, and infer that he will make
any particular change, of which he himself has given no intimation? Can we
safely base our action upon any such vague inference? Now, as ever, I wish
not to misrepresent Judge Douglas's position, question his motives, or do
aught that can be personally offensive to him. Whenever, if ever, he and
we can come together on principle so that our cause may have assistance
from his great ability, I hope to have interposed no adventitious
obstacles. But clearly he is not now with us; he does not pretend to
be,--he does not promise ever to be.
Our cause, then, must be intrusted to, and conducted by, its own undoubted
friends,--those whose hands are free, whose hearts are in the work, who do
care for the result. Two years ago the Republicans of the nation mustered
over thirteen hundred thousand strong. We did this under the single
impulse of resistance to a common danger, with every external circumstance
against us. Of strange, discordant, and even hostile elements we gathered
from the four winds, and formed and fought the battle through, under the
constant hot fire of a disciplined, proud, and pampered enemy. Did we
brave all then to falter now,--now, when that same enemy is wavering,
dissevered, and belligerent? The result is not doubtful. We shall not
fail; if we stand firm, we shall not fail. Wise counsels may accelerate,
or mistakes delay it, but, sooner or later, the victory is sure to come.
SPEECH AT CHICAGO, JULY 10, 1858.
IN REPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS
DELIVERED AT CHICAGO, SATURDAY EVENING, JULY 10, 1858.
(Mr. DOUGLAS WAS NOT PRESENT.)
[Mr. LINCOLN was introduced by C. L. Wilson, Esq., and as he made his
appearance he was greeted with a perfect storm of applause. For some
moments the enthusiasm continued unabated. At last, when by a wave of his
hand partial silence was restored, Mr. LINCOLN said,]
MY FELLOW-CITIZENS:--On yesterday evening, upon the occasion of the
reception given to Senator Douglas, I was furnished with a seat very
convenient for hearing him, and was otherwise very courteously treated by
him and his friends, and for which I thank him and them. During the course
of his remarks my name was mentioned in such a way as, I suppose, renders
it at least not improper that I should make some sort of reply to him. I
shall not attempt to follow him in the precise order in which he addressed
the assembled multitude upon that occasion, though I shall perhaps do so
in the main.
There was one question to which he asked the attention of the crowd, which
I deem of somewhat less importance--at least of propriety--for me to dwell
upon than the others, which he brought in near the close of his speech,
and which I think it would not be entirely proper for me to omit attending
to, and yet if I were not to give some attention to it now, I should
probably forget it altogether. While I am upon this subject, allow me to
say that I do not intend to indulge in that inconvenient mode sometimes
adopted in public speaking, of reading from documents; but I shall depart
from that rule so far as to read a little scrap from his speech, which
notices this first topic of which I shall speak,--that is, provided I can
find it in the paper:
"I have made up my mind to appeal to the people against the combination
that has been made against me; the Republican leaders having formed an
alliance, an unholy and unnatural alliance, with a portion of unscrupulous
Federal office-holders. I intend to fight that allied army wherever I meet
them. I know they deny the alliance; but yet these men who are trying
to divide the Democratic party for the purpose of electing a Republican
Senator in my place are just as much the agents and tools of the
supporters of Mr. Lincoln. Hence I shall deal with this allied army
just as the Russians dealt with the Allies at Sebastopol,--that is, the
Russians did not stop to inquire, when they fired a broadside, whether it
hit an Englishman, a Frenchman, or a Turk. Nor will I stop to inquire,
nor shall I hesitate, whether my blows shall hit the Republican leaders
or their allies, who are holding the Federal offices, and yet acting in
concert with them."
Well, now, gentlemen, is not that very alarming? Just to think of it!
right at the outset of his canvass, I, a poor, kind, amiable, intelligent
gentleman,--I am to be slain in this way! Why, my friend the Judge is not
only, as it turns out, not a dead lion, nor even a living one,--he is the
rugged Russian Bear!
But if they will have it--for he says that we deny it--that there is any
such alliance, as he says there is,--and I don't propose hanging very much
upon this question of veracity,--but if he will have it that there is such
an alliance, that the Administration men and we are allied, and we stand
in the attitude of English, French, and Turk, he occupying the position
of the Russian, in that case I beg that he will indulge us while we barely
suggest to him that these allies took Sebastopol.
Gentlemen, only a few more words as to this alliance. For my part, I have
to say that whether there be such an alliance depends, so far as I know,
upon what may be a right definition of the term alliance. If for the
Republican party to see the other great party to which they are opposed
divided among themselves, and not try to stop the division, and rather be
glad of it,--if that is an alliance, I confess I am in; but if it is meant
to be said that the Republicans had formed an alliance going beyond that,
by which there is contribution of money or sacrifice of principle on the
one side or the other, so far as the Republican party is concerned,--if
there be any such thing, I protest that I neither know anything of it,
nor do I believe it. I will, however, say,--as I think this branch of the
argument is lugged in,--I would before I leave it state, for the benefit
of those concerned, that one of those same Buchanan men did once tell me
of an argument that he made for his opposition to Judge Douglas. He said
that a friend of our Senator Douglas had been talking to him, and had,
among other things, said to him:
"...why, you don't want to beat Douglas?" "Yes," said he, "I do want to
beat him, and I will tell you why. I believe his original Nebraska Bill
was right in the abstract, but it was wrong in the time that it was
brought forward. It was wrong in the application to a Territory in regard
to which the question had been settled; it was brought forward at a time
when nobody asked him; it was tendered to the South when the South had not
asked for it, but when they could not well refuse it; and for this same
reason he forced that question upon our party. It has sunk the best men
all over the nation, everywhere; and now, when our President, struggling
with the difficulties of this man's getting up, has reached the very
hardest point to turn in the case, he deserts him and I am for putting him
where he will trouble us no more."
Now, gentlemen, that is not my argument; that is not my argument at all.
I have only been stating to you the argument of a Buchanan man. You will
judge if there is any force in it.
Popular sovereignty! Everlasting popular sovereignty! Let us for a moment
inquire into this vast matter of popular sovereignty. What is popular
sovereignty? We recollect that at an early period in the history of
this struggle there was another name for the same thing,--"squatter
sovereignty." It was not exactly popular sovereignty, but squatter
sovereignty. What do those terms mean? What do those terms mean when used
now? And vast credit is taken by our friend the Judge in regard to his
support of it, when he declares the last years of his life have been,
and all the future years of his life shall be, devoted to this matter of
popular sovereignty. What is it? Why, it is the sovereignty of the people!
What was squatter sovereignty? I suppose, if it had any significance at
all, it was the right of the people to govern themselves, to be sovereign
in their own affairs while they were squatted down in a country not their
own, while they had squatted on a Territory that did not belong to them,
in the sense that a State belongs to the people who inhabit it, when
it belonged to the nation; such right to govern themselves was called
"squatter sovereignty."
Now, I wish you to mark: What has become of that squatter sovereignty?
what has become of it? Can you get anybody to tell you now that the people
of a Territory have any authority to govern themselves, in regard to this
mooted question of slavery, before they form a State constitution? No such
thing at all; although there is a general running fire, and although there
has been a hurrah made in every speech on that side, assuming that policy
had given the people of a Territory the right to govern themselves upon
this question, yet the point is dodged. To-day it has been decided--no
more than a year ago it was decided--by the Supreme Court of the United
States, and is insisted upon to-day that the people of a Territory have no
right to exclude slavery from a Territory; that if any one man chooses to
take slaves into a Territory, all the rest of the people have no right
to keep them out. This being so, and this decision being made one of the
points that the Judge approved, and one in the approval of which he says
he means to keep me down,--put me down I should not say, for I have never
been up,--he says he is in favor of it, and sticks to it, and expects to
win his battle on that decision, which says that there is no such thing
as squatter sovereignty, but that any one man may take slaves into a
Territory, and all the other men in the Territory may be opposed to it,
and yet by reason of the Constitution they cannot prohibit it. When that
is so, how much is left of this vast matter of squatter sovereignty, I
should like to know?
When we get back, we get to the point of the right of the people to make a
constitution. Kansas was settled, for example, in 1854. It was a Territory
yet, without having formed a constitution, in a very regular way, for
three years. All this time negro slavery could be taken in by any few
individuals, and by that decision of the Supreme Court, which the Judge
approves, all the rest of the people cannot keep it out; but when they
come to make a constitution, they may say they will not have slavery. But
it is there; they are obliged to tolerate it some way, and all experience
shows it will be so, for they will not take the negro slaves and
absolutely deprive the owners of them. All experience shows this to be so.
All that space of time that runs from the beginning of the settlement
of the Territory until there is sufficiency of people to make a State
constitution,--all that portion of time popular sovereignty is given up.
The seal is absolutely put down upon it by the court decision, and Judge
Douglas puts his own upon the top of that; yet he is appealing to the
people to give him vast credit for his devotion to popular sovereignty.
Again, when we get to the question of the right of the people to form
a State constitution as they please, to form it with slavery or without
slavery, if that is anything new, I confess I don't know it. Has there
ever been a time when anybody said that any other than the people of a
Territory itself should form a constitution? What is now in it that Judge
Douglas should have fought several years of his life, and pledge himself
to fight all the remaining years of his life for? Can Judge Douglas find
anybody on earth that said that anybody else should form a constitution
for a people? [A voice, "Yes."] Well, I should like you to name him; I
should like to know who he was. [Same voice, "John Calhoun."]