THE ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE TAKES EFFECT.—SIEGE OF NEWPORT.
Upon the return of General Clinton to New York as the successor to
General Howe in command of “all the Atlantic Colonies from Nova Scotia
to West Indies, inclusive,” his outlook over the territories which fell
under his guardianship must have been that of faith rather than of
sight. With the exception of Staten Island and the British supply depot,
practically a part of New York, only one other post in the Northern
Department, that of Newport, R.I., retained a British garrison. It is
very certain that Clinton did not regard his exodus from Philadelphia
and his collision with Washington’s army at Monmouth with as much
enthusiasm as did Charles Lee, who, shortly after that battle, when
demanding a speedy court-martial, informed Washington that “this
campaign would close the war.” At any rate, Clinton was hardly settled
in his quarters, before tidings reached him that, on the eighth, a
formidable French fleet of twelve line-of-battle ships and four frigates
had made the Delaware Capes; and that one of them, the _Chinier_, had
conveyed to the American capital Monsieur Conrad A. Gerard, the first
French Ambassador to the United States of America. Silas Deane, one of
the American Commissioners at Paris, accompanied Monsieur Gerard.
Clinton had reason to rejoice in this tardy arrival. The fleet sailed
from Toulon, April thirteenth; but on account of contrary winds did not
pass Gibraltar until the fifteenth day of May. A voyage of ordinary
passage would have imperiled both Howe and Clinton; as four thousand
troops accompanied the squadron, and its naval force was, just at that
time, superior to that of Great Britain in American waters.
In order rightly to appreciate the campaign which almost immediately
opened, it is interesting to observe how the operations of both America
and Britain were controlled by incidents over which neither had control.
They also illustrate the contingencies which shape all military and
naval operations over a broad theatre of war. A superior British
squadron, under Admiral Byron, sailed from Portsmouth, England, as soon
as it was known that France would actively support the United States.
This was on the twentieth day of May. Upon receipt of news, supposed to
be trustworthy, that the French fleet had been ordered to the West
Indies only, the order was suspended in time for his return. Admiral
Byron, who had been ordered to relieve Admiral Howe, returned to
Plymouth. He did not actually sail with his fine fleet of twenty-two
ships until the fifth of June. Even then, the ships were scattered by
storms; and four of them, reaching New York separately, narrowly escaped
capture by the French just after Count d’Estaing left that port for
Newport.
The French fleet, when advised of the evacuation of Philadelphia,
immediately sailed for New York. Its arrival produced intense
excitement. The Annual Register (British) of that period reflects the
sentiment very fully. The British ships, then in port, were inferior in
number and weight of metal to those of France. Every available vessel of
sufficient capacity to carry heavy guns was immediately subsidized for
defence. The entire city was exposed to attack as when occupied by the
American army after its retreat from Long Island. It was a strange
change in the relations of the British and American forces in that
vicinity.
Washington, fully satisfied that Clinton could have no possible
inducement again to enter New Jersey, hoped, that through the presence
of the French ships and the accompanying troops he might wrest Newport
from British control, and planned accordingly. He did not, however,
overlook the possibility of even striking New York. He had been advised
by the French Ambassador of the very perilous relations of France in the
West Indies; and that the fleet which accompanied him to Philadelphia,
with the expectation of a decisive action there, must soon be released
for service elsewhere. Its change of destination to the port of New York
involved an unexpected delay upon the American coast, and contingencies
of a very serious character. American critics constantly complained that
the French fleet did not at once bombard New York City. Even some
military men of that period, and some historical speculators since that
time, would denounce the statement of the French Admiral, that the depth
of water was insufficient for his ships to approach the city, as a mere
excuse for not doing so. Washington sent Colonels Laurens and Hamilton,
confidential members of his staff, to learn the facts; and the most
experienced pilots were offered fifty thousand dollars if they would
agree to conduct the ships to the city. Hamilton’s Report read as
follows:
“These experienced persons unanimously declared, that it was impossible
to carry us in. All refused; and the particular soundings which I caused
to be made myself, too well demonstrated that they were right.”
Washington immediately turned his attention to Newport; and the French
fleet sailed at once to Rhode Island. Count d’Estaing cast anchor off
Point Judith, only five miles from Newport, on the twenty-ninth day of
July. As an indication of the condition of affairs at New York after his
departure, the following despatch of General Clinton to Lord Germaine,
bearing the same date, July twenty-ninth, is of interest, declaring: “I
may yet be compelled to evacuate the city and return to Halifax.”
The reader will involuntarily recall the events of July and August,
1776, only two years prior to the date of this despondent letter. Then
General Howe and Admiral Howe superciliously addressed communications to
“George Washington, Esqr.” Now, General Howe was homeward bound,
relieved from further service in America, because the same Washington
had outgeneraled him as a Soldier. And his brother, Admiral Howe, had
been granted his request to be transferred to some other sphere of naval
service.
As soon as the French squadron of Count d’Estaing sailed from New York,
Washington instructed General Sullivan, then in command at Providence,
R.I., to summon the New England militia to his aid for a combined attack
upon Newport; assigned Generals Greene and Lafayette to the command of
divisions; and ordered the brigades of Varnum and Glover to report to
Lafayette. These officers had served with Greene before Boston, and
Varnum was a member of Greene’s old company, the Kentish Guards, which
marched with him to Boston at the outbreak of war. The proposed
coöperation of French troops also made the assignment of General
Lafayette equally judicious.
The British garrison consisted of six thousand troops under
Major-General Pigot. On the fifth of August two French frigates entered
the harbor, and the British burned seven of their own frigates with
which they had controlled the waters, to avoid their capture. Details of
the siege of Newport, except as Washington bore relations to its
progress and its ultimate failure, are not within the purpose of this
narrative. It was unfortunate that General Sullivan so long detained the
French troops on shipboard; where, as one of their officers wrote, they
had been “cooped up” for more than five months. Their prompt landing
would certainly have averted the subsequent disaster; as storms of
unprecedented fury soon after swept the coast, with almost equal
distress to the land forces and those on the sea. In General
Washington’s letter, advising of the departure of Admiral Howe from New
York for Newport, he thus forecast the future: “Unless the fleet have
advices of reenforcements off the coast, it can only be accounted for on
the principle of desperation, stimulated by a hope of finding you
divided in your operations against Rhode Island.”
The American force was about ten thousand men. The tenth of the month
had been specifically designated for a joint movement; but General
Sullivan, without notifying the Count d’Estaing, anticipated it by a
day, and failed. Count d’Estaing was a lieutenant-general in the French
army; but agreed to waive his rank, and serve under Lafayette. The
report was current at that time, that ill-feeling arose between General
Sullivan and Count d’Estaing because of the precipitate action of
General Sullivan on this occasion. On the contrary, Count d’Estaing
understood that but two thousand troops were in the movement. He
promptly called upon General Sullivan to consult as to further
operations; and in a Report to Congress used this language, alike
creditable to his judgment and his candor: “Knowing that there are
moments which must be eagerly seized upon in war, I was cautious of
blaming any overthrow of plans, which nevertheless astonished me, and
which, in fact, merits in my opinion only praise; although accumulated
circumstances might have rendered the consequences very unfortunate.”
When he made his visit to General Sullivan, he left orders for the
troops that were to join in the land expedition to follow. He had no
knowledge, at that time, that Admiral Howe had received reënforcements,
and had left New York to attack the French fleet then at Newport. A
large number of the French seamen were upon Connanicut Island, on
account of scurvy, and the fleet was scattered, without apprehension of
an attack from the sea. A fog prevailed on the morning of the visit.
D’Estaing returned to his flag-ship, and as the fog lifted, there
appeared in the offing a British fleet of thirty-six sail. Admiral Howe
had been reënforced by a portion of Admiral Byron’s fleet, which arrived
in advance of its commander; and this force was superior to that of his
adversary. D’Estaing was alert. Quickly gathering his ships, in spite of
a rising gale, he succeeded in gaining and holding the “weather-gauge”
of Howe, who did not dare press toward the land against such an
advantage in D’Estaing’s favor. Both fleets were dispersed by the
tempest over fifty miles of ocean, repeatedly meeting with collisions,
and after several of his ships had been dismasted, Howe ran the gauntlet
of a part of the French squadron, and returned to New York.
On the twentieth, Count d’Estaing returned to Newport; and on the
twenty-second sailed for Boston to refit. A protest, signed by General
Sullivan and others, including John Hancock, who took an active part in
the operations of the siege, did not change his purpose. He had no
alternative. It is true that much bad feeling, soon proven to have been
absolutely unjustifiable, existed among Americans at the date of his
departure. Sullivan himself issued an intemperate order, which he
speedily modified, but not until it had gone to the public; in which he
used these words: “The general yet hopes the event will prove America
able to procure that by her own arms, which her allies refuse to assist
in obtaining.”
Just at this time, a courier from Washington reached Sullivan’s
headquarters with the information that General Clinton had sailed from
New York with four thousand troops to reënforce the garrison of Newport;
and strongly intimated “the importance of securing a timely retreat from
the Island.” The suggestion was heeded. On the twenty-sixth, the heavy
baggage was removed. On the twenty-eighth, a council of officers decided
to withdraw to the north end of the island, until a messenger could be
sent to Boston to urge the return of the French fleet. Lafayette was the
messenger, and made the round trip in a few hours. Count d’Estaing very
properly held, that to put in peril the entire fleet of France, in
support of land operations so far from home and upon a strange coast,
was a practical disobedience of his orders, and unjust to his sovereign;
but, while he _would not return with his fleet_, he informed Lafayette,
that he “_was willing to lead the French troops, in person, to
Newport_,” and place himself “_under General Sullivan’s orders_.” In a
manly explanation of his course, and notwithstanding General Sullivan’s
proclamation, of which he was advised, he used this language: “_I was
anxious to demonstrate that my countrymen could not be offended by a
sudden expression of feeling; and that he who commanded them in America,
was, and would be, at all times, one of the most devoted and zealous
servants of the United States._”
By three o’clock of the twenty-ninth, the Americans occupied Quaker Hill
and Turkey Hill. These localities are still remembered for the gallantry
of their defenders during subsequent British assaults. At eleven
o’clock, Lafayette returned from Boston, and before twelve—as reported
by Sullivan—“the main army had crossed to the mainland with stores and
baggage.” As at Brandywine, Barren Hill and Monmouth, Lafayette remained
with the rear-guard, and brought away the last of the pickets in good
order, “not a man nor an article of baggage having been left behind.”
On the morning of the thirtieth, one hundred and five sail of British
vessels were in sight, bringing Clinton’s army to the rescue of the
garrison. Howe returned immediately to New York, although Gray made an
expedition from Newport which committed depredations at Bedford,
Fairhaven, Martha’s Vineyard, and all places from which American
privateers were fitted out for assaults upon British commerce. Admiral
Howe afterwards sailed for Boston, but being unable to entice Count
d’Estaing to so unequal a contest, returned again to New York. On the
first of November, Admiral Byron appeared off Boston with a large naval
force, but was driven to sea by a storm which so disabled his fleet that
he was compelled to go to Newport and refit. On his voyage from England
he had been compelled to stop at Halifax, and it has been well said of
this officer, that he chiefly “fought the ocean, during the year 1778.”
Count d’Estaing sailed for the West Indies on the third of November. The
first coöperation of the French navy in support of the United States had
resulted in no victories, on land or sea; but it had precipitated the
evacuation of Philadelphia, restricted the garrison of New York to
operations within the reach of the British navy, and was a practical
pledge of thorough sympathy with America in her struggle for complete
independence of Great Britain, and of the emphatic determination of
France to maintain, as well as acknowledge, that independence.