BRITISH CANADA ENTERS THE FIELD OF ACTION.
The Continental Army about Boston was largely composed of New England
troops. This was inevitable until the action of Congress could be
realized by reënforcements from other Colonies. The experience of nearly
all veteran soldiers in the Cambridge camps had been gained by service
in Canada or upon its borders. British garrisons at Halifax, Quebec, and
Montreal, as well as at Ticonderoga, Crown Point, and St. John’s,
offered an opportunity for British aggression from the north. The
seizure of the nearer posts, last named, temporarily checked such
aggressions, but seemed to require adequate garrisons, and a watchful
armed outlook across the border.
There had been very early urged upon the Massachusetts Committee of
Safety more extensive operations into Canada, especially as the
“Canadian Acts of Parliament” had become nearly as offensive to
Canadians as other Acts which had alienated the American Colonies from
respect for the common “Mother Country.” The Canadian Acts, however, had
not been pressed to armed resistance; and differences of race, language,
and religious forms were not conducive to those neighborly relations
which would admit of combined action, even in emergencies common to both
sections. But the initiative of a general movement into Canada had been
taken, and Congress precipitated the first advance, before Washington
became Commander-in-Chief. In order to appreciate the action of
Washington when he became more directly responsible for the success of
these detachments from his army, for service in Canada, they must be
noticed.
The adventurous spirit of Arnold prompted the suggestion that the
conquest of Canada would bring disaster to Great Britain and fend off
attacks upon the other Colonies. He once traded with its people, was
familiar with Quebec, and after his adventure at Crown Point, in June,
had written from that place to the Continental Congress that Gen. Sir
Guy Carleton’s force in Canada was less than six hundred men, promising
to guarantee the conquest of Canada if he were granted the command of
two thousand men for that purpose. On the second day of June, Ethan
Allen, who had anticipated Arnold in the capture of Ticonderoga, had
made a similar proposition to the Provincial Congress of New York. Both
Allen and Seth Warner had visited Congress, and requested authority to
raise new regiments. Authority was not given, but a recommendation was
forwarded to the New York Provincial Congress, that the “Green Mountain
Boys” should be recognized as regular forces, and be granted the
privilege of electing their own officers.
It is of interest in this connection to notice the fact that when
Arnold, in his first dash up Lake Champlain, found that Warner had
anticipated his projected capture of Crown Point, as Allen had that of
Ticonderoga, he was greatly offended, usurped command of that post and
of a few vessels which he styled his “Navy,” and upon finding that his
assumption of authority was neither sanctioned by Massachusetts nor
Connecticut, discharged his force and returned to Cambridge in anger.
This same navy, however, chiefly constructed under his skilful and
energetic direction, won several brilliant successes and certainly
postponed movements from Canada southward, for many months.
Eventually a formal expedition was authorized against Montreal, and
Generals Schuyler and Montgomery were assigned to its command. This
force, consisting of three thousand men, was ordered to rendezvous
during the month of August at Ticonderoga, where Allen and Warner also
joined it.
During the same month a committee from Congress visited Washington at
Cambridge, and persuaded him to send a second army to Canada, via the
Kennebec river, to capture Quebec. Existing conditions seemed to warrant
these demonstrations which, under other circumstances, might have proved
fatal to success at Boston. The theory upon which Washington concurred
in the action of Congress is worthy of notice, in estimating his
character as a soldier. He understood that the suddenness of the
resistance at Lexington, and the comparatively “drawn game” between the
patriots and British regulars at Breed’s Hill, would involve on the part
of the British government much time and great outlay of money, in order
to send to America an adequate force for aggressive action upon any
extended scale; and that the control of New York and the southern coast
cities must be of vastly more importance than to harass the scattered
settlements adjoining Canada. Inasmuch, however, as New York and New
England seemed to stake the safety of their northern frontier upon
operations northward, while Quebec and Montreal were almost destitute of
regular troops, and the season of the year would prevent British
reënforcements by sea, it might prove to be the best opportunity to test
the sentiment of the Canadian people themselves as to their readiness to
make common cause against the Crown. If reported professions could be
realized, the north would be permanently protected.
Taking into account that General Carleton would never anticipate an
advance upon Quebec, but concentrate his small force at Montreal, with
view to the ultimate recapture of St. John’s, Crown Point, and
Ticonderoga, and estimating, from advices received, that Carleton’s
forces numbered not to exceed eight hundred regulars and as many
Provincials, he regarded the detail of three thousand men as sufficient
for the capture of Montreal. This estimate was a correct one. Its
occupation was also deemed practicable and wise, because it was so near
the mouth of Sorel River and Lake Champlain as to be readily supported,
so long as the British army was not substantially reënforced along the
Atlantic coast.
There was one additional consideration that practically decided the
action of Washington. The mere capture of Montreal, on the north bank of
the St. Lawrence river, and so easily approached by water from Quebec,
would be of no permanent value so long as Quebec retained its place as
the almost impregnable rendezvous of British troops and fleets. This
view of the recommendation of Congress was deemed conclusive; provided,
that the movement against Quebec could be immediate, sudden, by
surprise, and involve _no siege_. Under the assumption that Congress had
been rightly advised of the British forces in Canada, and of the
sentiments of the Canadians themselves, the expedition had promise of
success.
There was a variance of religious form and religious faith which did not
attract all the New England soldiers in behalf of Canadian independence.
This was sufficiently observed by Washington’s keen insight into human
nature to call forth the following order, which placed the Canadian
expeditions upon a very lofty basis. The extract is as follows: “As the
Commander-in-Chief has been apprised of a design formed for the
observance of that ridiculous and childish custom of burning the effigy
of the Pope, he cannot help expressing his surprise that there should be
officers and soldiers in this army so void of common-sense as not to see
the impropriety of such a step at this juncture, at a time when we are
soliciting, and have really obtained the friendship and alliance of
Canada, whom we ought to consider as brethren embarked in the same
cause—the defence of the general liberty of America.... At such a
juncture, and in such circumstances, to be insulting their religion is
so monstrous as not to be suffered or excused; indeed, instead of
offering the most remote insult, it is our duty to address public thanks
to those our brethren, as to them we are so much indebted for every late
happy success over the common enemy in Canada.”
Washington, however, hinged his chief objection to these distant
enterprises, which he habitually opposed throughout the war, upon the
pressing demand for the immediate capture of Boston, and an immediate
transfer of the Headquarters of the Army to New York, where, and where
only, the Colonies could be brought into close relation for the
organization and distribution of an army adequate to carry on war,
generally, wherever along the Atlantic coast the British might land
troops.
As early as June, Congress had disclaimed any purpose to operate against
Canada, and Bancroft says that the invasion was not determined upon
until the Proclamation of Martial Law by the British Governor, his
denunciation of the American borderers, and the incitement of savages to
raids against New York and New England had made the invasion an act of
self-defence. But there had been no such combination of hostile acts
when these expeditions were planned, and Mr. Bancroft must have
associated those events with the employment of Indian allies during the
subsequent Burgoyne campaign of 1777.
The details of the two contemporary expeditions to Canada are only
sufficiently outlined to develop the relations of the Commander-in-Chief
to their prosecution, and to introduce to the reader certain officers
who subsequently came more directly under Washington’s personal command.
The substantial failure of each, except that it developed some of the
best officers of the war, is accepted as history. But it is no less true
that when Great Britain made Canada the base of Burgoyne’s invasion, his
feeble support by the Canadians themselves proved a material factor in
his ultimate disaster. He was practically _starved to surrender_ for
want of adequate support in men and provisions, from his only natural
base of supply.
It is sufficient, at present, to notice the departure of the two
expeditions, that of Schuyler and Montgomery, assembling at Ticonderoga,
August 20, and that of Arnold, consisting of eleven hundred men, without
artillery, which left Cambridge on the seventeenth day of September and
landed at Gardiner, Me., on the twentieth. Several companies of riflemen
from Pennsylvania and Virginia which had reported for duty were assigned
to Arnold’s command. Among the officers were Daniel Morgan and
Christopher Greene. Aaron Burr, then but nineteen years of age,
accompanied this expedition.
As the summer of 1775 drew near its close, and the temporary excitement
of Arnold’s departure restored the routine of camp life and the passive
watching of a beleaguered city, the large number of “Six Months” men,
whose term of enlistment was soon to expire, became listless and
indifferent to duty. Washington, without official rebuke of this growing
negligence, forestalled its further development by redoubling his
efforts to place the works about Boston in a complete condition of
defence. None were exempt from the scope of his orders. Ploughed Hill
and Cobble Hill were fortified, and the works at Lechmere Point were
strengthened. (See map, “Boston and Vicinity.”) Demonstrations were made
daily in order to entice the garrison to sorties upon the investing
lines. But the British troops made no hostile demonstrations, and in a
very short time the American redoubts were sufficiently established to
resist the attack of the entire British army.
A Council of War was summoned to meet at Washington’s headquarters to
consider his proposition that an assault be made upon the city, and that
it be burned, if that seemed to be a military necessity. Lee opposed the
movement, as impossible of execution, in view of the character of the
British troops whom the militia would be compelled to meet in close
battle. The Council of War concurred in his motion to postpone the
proposition of the Commander-in-Chief. Lee’s want of confidence in the
American troops, then for the first time officially stated, had its
temporary influence; but, ever after, through his entire career until
its ignominious close, he opposed every opportunity for battle, on the
same pretence. The only exception was his encouragement to the
resistance of Moultrie at Charleston, against the British fleet, during
June, 1776, although he was not a participant in that battle.
Meanwhile, the citizens of the sea-coast towns of New England began to
be anxious as to their own safety. A British armed transport cannonaded
Stonington, and other vessels threatened New London and Norwich. All of
these towns implored Washington to send them troops. Governor Jonathan
Trumbull, of Connecticut (the original “Brother Jonathan”), whose
extraordinary comprehension of the military as well as the civil issues
of the times made him then, and ever, a reliable and constant friend of
Washington, consulted the Commander-in-Chief as to these depredations,
and acquiesced in his judgment as final.
Washington wrote thus: “The most important operations of the campaign
cannot be made to depend upon the piratical expeditions of two or three
men-of-war privateers.” This significant rejoinder illustrated the
proposition to burn Boston, and was characteristic of Washington’s
policy respecting other local raids and endangered cities. It is in
harmony with the purpose of this narrative to emphasize this incident.
Napoleon in his victorious campaign against Austria refused to occupy
Vienna with his army, and counted the acquisition of towns and cities as
demoralizing to troops, besides enforcing detachments from his fighting
force simply to hold dead property. Washington ignored the safety of
Philadelphia, the Colonial capital, repeatedly, claiming that to hold
his army compactly together, ready for the field, was the one chief
essential to ultimate victory. Even the later invasions of Virginia and
Connecticut, and the erratic excursions of Simcoe and other royalist
leaders into Westchester County, New York, and the country about
Philadelphia, did not bend his deliberate purpose to cast upon local
communities a fair share of their own defence. In more than one instance
he announced to the people that these local incursions only brought
reproach upon the perpetrators, and embittered the Colonists more
intensely against the invader.