Washington the Soldier
[Illustration:
WASHINGTON
From the St Memin Crayon in possession of J. Carson Brevoort Esq.
]
WASHINGTON
THE SOLDIER
BY
General Henry B. Carrington, LL.D.
AUTHOR OF
“Battles of the American Revolution,” “Battle Maps and Charts of the
Revolution,” “Indian Operations on the Plains,” “The Six Nations,”
“Beacon Lights of Patriotism,” etc.
WITH ILLUSTRATIONS, MAPS, CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX AND APPENDICES
“Th’ applause of list’ning senates to command;
The threats of pain and ruin to despise;
To scatter plenty o’er a smiling land,
And read _his history_ in a Nation’s eyes.”
New York
Charles Scribner’s Sons
1899
COPYRIGHT, 1898
BY
LAMSON, WOLFE AND COMPANY
_Copyright, 1899_
BY CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS
_All rights Reserved_
TYPOGRAPHY BY ROCKWELL AND CHURCHILL
PRESSWORK BY THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
DEDICATED
TO THE
Sons and Daughters of Liberty Everywhere
KNOWING
THAT ALL WHO ASPIRE AFTER INTELLIGENT FREEDOM SHALL FIND THE WATCHWORD
OF WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER—“FOR THE SAKE OF GOD AND COUNTRY”—THEIR
LOFTIEST INCENTIVE.
PREFACE
TO THE SECOND EDITION.
Since the first appearance of this volume, during the winter of 1898–9,
the author has considerately regarded all letters and literary comments
received by him, as well as other recent works upon the life and times
of Washington. His original purpose to treat his subject judicially,
regardless of unverified tradition, has been confirmed.
Washington’s sublime conception of America, noticed in Chapter XXXVI.,
foreshadowed “a stupendous fabric of freedom and empire, on the broad
basis of Independency,” through which the “poor and oppressed of all
races and religions” might find encouragement and solace.
The war with Spain has made both a moral and physical impress upon the
judgment and conscience of the entire world. Unqualified by a single
disaster on land or sea, and never diverted from humane and honorable
methods, it illustrates the intelligent patriotism and exhaustless
resources of our country, and a nearer realization of Washington’s
prayer for America.
Looking to the general trend of Washington’s military career, it is
emphasized, throughout the volume, that the moral, religious, and
patriotic motives that energized his life and shaped his character were
so absolutely interwoven with the fibre of his professional experiences,
that the soul of the Man magnified the greatness of the Soldier.
In connection with Washington’s relations to General Braddock, mentioned
in the First Chapter, it is worthy of permanent record that Virginia
would not sanction, nor would Washington accept assignment, except as
Chief of Staff. He was not a simple _Aid-de-Camp_, but of recognized and
responsible military merit.
HENRY B. CARRINGTON.
HYDE PARK, MASS.,
September 21, 1899.
PREFACE.
The text of this volume, completed in the spring of 1898 and not since
modified, requires a different Preface from that first prepared. The
events of another war introduce applications of military principles
which have special interest. This is the more significant because modern
appliances have been developed with startling rapidity, while general
legislation and the organization of troops, both regular and volunteer,
have been very similar to those of the times of Washington, and of later
American wars.
His letters, his orders, his trials, his experiences; the diversities of
judgment between civilians and military men; between military men of
natural aptitudes and those of merely professional or accidental
training, as well as the diversities of personal and local interest,
indicate the value of Washington’s example and the character of his
time. Hardly a single experience in his career has not been realized by
officers and men in these latter days.
A very decided impression, however, has obtained among educated men,
including those of the military profession, that Washington had neither
the troops, resources, and knowledge, nor the broad range of field
service which have characterized modern warfare, and therefore lacked
material elements which develop the typical soldier. But more recent
military operations upon an extensive scale, especially those of the
Franco-Prussian War, and the American Civil War of 1861–1865, have
supplied material for better appreciation of the principles that were
involved in the campaigns of the War for American Independence, as
compared with those of Napoleon, Wellington, Marlborough, Frederick,
Hannibal, and Cæsar.
With full allowance for changes in army and battle formation, tactical
action and armament, as well as greater facilities for the
transportation of troops and army supplies, it remains true that the
relative effect of all these changes upon success in war upon a grand
scale, has not been the modification of those principles of military
science which have shaped battle action and the general conduct of war,
from the earliest period of authentic military history. The formal
“Maxims of Napoleon” were largely derived from his careful study of the
campaigns of Frederick, Hannibal, and Cæsar; and these, with the
principles involved, had specific and sometimes literal illustration in
the eventful operations of the armies of the Hebrew Commonwealth. As a
matter of fact, those early Hebrew experiences were nearly as potential
in shaping the methods of modern generals, as their civil code became
the formative factor in all later civil codes, preëminently those of the
English Common Law. The very best civil, police, and criminal
regulations of modern enactment hold closely to Hebrew antecedents. And
in military lines, the organization of regiments by companies, and the
combinations of regiments as brigades, divisions and corps, still rest
largely upon the same decimal basis; and neither the Roman legion nor
the Grecian phalanx improved upon that basis. Even the Hebrew militia,
or reserves, had such well-established comprehension of the contingency
of the entire nation being called to the field, or subjected to draft,
that as late as the advent of Christ, when he ordered the multitudes to
be seated upon the grass for refreshment, “they seated themselves in
companies of hundreds and fifties.” The sanitary and police regulations
of their camps have never been surpassed, nor their provision for the
cleanliness, health, and comfort of the rank and file. From earliest
childhood they were instructed in their national history and its
glorious achievements, and the whole people rejoiced in the gallant
conduct of any.
Changes in arms, and especially in projectiles, only induced modified
tactical formation and corresponding movements. The division of armies
into a right, centre, and left, with a well-armed and well-trained
reserve, was illustrated in their earliest battle record. The latest
modern formation, which makes of the regiment, by its three battalion
formation, _a miniature brigade_, is chiefly designed to give greater
individual value to the soldier, and not subject compact masses to the
destructive sweep of modern missiles. It also makes the force more
mobile, as well as more comprehensive of territory within its range of
fire. All this, however, is matter of detail and not of substance, in
the scientific conduct of campaigns during a protracted and widely
extended series of operations in the field.
Military science itself is but the art of employing force to vindicate,
or execute, authority. To meet an emergency adequately, wisely, and
successfully, is the expressive logic of personal, municipal, and
military action. The brain power is banded to various shaftings, and the
mental processes may differ by virtue of different applications; but the
prime activities are the same. In military studies, as in all collegiate
or social preparation, the soldier, the lawyer, or the scientist, must
be in the man, and not the necessary product of a certificate or a
diploma. The simplest possible definition of a few terms in military use
will elucidate the narrative as its events develop the War for American
Independence, under the direction of Washington as Commander-in-Chief.
Six cardinal principles are thus stated:
I. STRATEGY.—To secure those combinations which will ensure the highest
possible advantage in the employment of military force.
NOTE.—The strategical principles which controlled the Revolutionary
campaigns, as defined in Chapter X. had their correspondence in
1861–1865, when the Federal right zone, or belt of war, was beyond the
Mississippi River, and the left zone between the Alleghany Mountains
and the Atlantic Ocean. The Confederate forces, with base at Richmond,
commanded an _interior line_ westward, so that the same troops could
be alternatively used against the Federal right, left, and centre,
while the latter must make a long détour to support its advance
southward from the Ohio River. Federal superiority on sea and river
largely contributed to success. American sea-control in 1898, so
suddenly and completely secured, was practically omnipotent in the war
with Spain. The navy, was a substantially equipped force at the start.
The army, had largely to be created, when instantly needed, to meet
the naval advance. Legislation also favored the navy by giving to the
commander-in-chief the services of eminent retired veterans as an
advisory board, while excluding military men of recent active duty
from similar advisory and administrative service.
II. GRAND TACTICS.—To handle that force in the field.
NOTE.—See Chapter XVII., where the Battle of Brandywine, through the
disorder of Sullivan’s Division, unaccustomed to act as a Division, or
as a part of a consolidated Grand Division or Corps, exactly fulfilled
the conditions which made the first Battle of Bull Run disastrous to
the American Federal Army in 1861. Subsequent _skeleton drills_ below
Arlington Heights, were designed to quicken the proficiency of fresh
troops, in the alignments, wheelings, and turns, so indispensable to
concert in action upon an extensive scale. In 1898 the fresh troops
were largely from militia organizations which had been trained in
regimental movements. School battalions and the military exercises of
many benevolent societies had also been conducive to readiness for
tactical instruction. The large Camps of Instruction were also
indispensably needed. Here again, time was an exacting master of the
situation.
III. LOGISTICS.—The practical art of bringing armies, fully equipped, to
the battlefield.
NOTE.—In America where the standing army has been of only nominal
strength, although well officered; and where militia are the main
reliance in time of war; and where varied State systems rival those of
Washington’s painful experience, the principle of Logistics, with its
departments of transportation and infinite varieties of supply, is
vital to wholesome and economic success. The war with Spain which
commenced April 21, 1898, illustrated this principle to an extent
never before realized in the world’s history. Familiarity with
details, on so vast a scale of physical and financial activity, was
impossible, even if every officer of the regular army had been
assigned to executive duty. The education and versatile capacity of
the American citizen had to be utilized. Their experience furnished
object lessons for all future time.
IV. ENGINEERING.—The application of mathematics and mechanics to the
maintenance or reduction of fortified places; the interposition or
removal of artificial obstructions to the passage of an army; and the
erection of suitable works for the defence of territory or troops.
NOTE.—The invention and development of machinery and the marvellous
range of mechanical art, through chemical, electrical, and other
superhuman agencies, afforded the American Government an immediate
opportunity to supplement its Engineer Corps in 1898, with skilled
auxiliaries. In fact, the structure of American society and the trend
of American thought and enterprise, invariably demand the best
results. What is mechanically necessary, will be invented, if not at
hand. That is good engineering.
V. MINOR TACTICS.—The instruction of the soldier, individually and _en
masse_, in the details of military drill, the use of his weapon, and the
perfection of discipline.
NOTE.—Washington never lost sight of the _set-up_ of the individual
soldier, as the best dependence in the hour of battle. Self-reliance,
obedience to orders, and confidence in success, were enjoined as the
conditions of success. His system of _competitive marksmanship_, of
_rifle ranges_, and _burden tests_, was initiated early in his career,
and was conspicuously enjoined before Brooklyn, and elsewhere, during
the war.
The American soldier of 1898 became invincible, _man for man_, because
of his intelligent response to individual discipline and drill.
Failure in either, whether of officer or soldier, shaped character and
result. As with the ancient Hebrew, citizenship meant knowledge of
organic law and obedience to its behests. Every individual, therefore,
when charged with the central electric force, became a _relay_
battery, to conserve, intensify, and distribute that force.
VI. STATESMANSHIP IN WAR.—This is illustrated by the suggestion of
Christ, that “a king going to war with another king would sit down first
and count the cost, whether he would be able with ten thousand to meet
him that cometh against him with twenty thousand.”
NOTE.—American statesmanship in 1898, exacted other appliances than
those of immediately available physical force. The costly and
insufferable relations of the Spanish West Indies to the United
States, had become pestilential. No self-respecting nation, elsewhere,
would have as long withheld the only remedy. Cuba was dying to be
free. Spain, unwilling, or unable, to grant an honorable and complete
autonomy to her despairing subjects, precipitated war with the United
States. _The momentum of a supreme moral force in behalf of humanity
at large, so energized the entire American people that every ordinary
unpreparedness failed to lessen the effectiveness of the stroke._
It was both statesmanship and strategy, to strike so suddenly that
neither climatic changes, indigenous diseases, nor tropical cyclones,
could gain opportunity to do their mischief. When these supposed
allies of Spain were brushed aside, as powerless to stay the advance
of American arms in behalf of starving thousands, and a fortunate
occasion was snatched, just in time for victory, it proved to be such
an achievement as Washington would have pronounced a direct
manifestation of Divine favor.
But the character of Washington as a soldier is not to be determined by
the numerical strength of the armies engaged in single battles, nor by
the resources and geographical conditions of later times. The same
general principles have ever obtained, and ever will control human
judgment. Transportation and intercommunication are relative; and the
slow mails and travel of Revolutionary times, alike affected both
armies, with no partial benefit or injury to either. The British had
better communication by water, but not by land; with the disadvantage of
campaigning through an unknown and intricate country, peopled by their
enemies, whenever not covered by the guns of their fleet. The American
expedition to Cuba in 1898 had not only the support of invincible
fleets, but the native population were to be the auxiliaries, as well as
the beneficiaries of the mighty movement.
Baron Jomini, in his elaborate history of the campaigns of Napoleon,
analyzes that general’s success over his more experienced opponents,
upon the basis of his observance or neglect of the military principles
already outlined. The dash and vigor of his first Italian campaign were
indeed characteristic of a young soldier impatient of the habitually
tardy deliberations of the _old-school_ movements. Napoleon discounted
time by action. He benumbed his adversary by the suddenness and ferocity
of his stroke. But never, even in that wonderful campaign, did Napoleon
strike more suddenly and effectively, than did Washington on Christmas
night, 1776, at Trenton. And Napoleon’s following up blow was not more
emphatic, in its results, than was Washington’s attack upon Princeton, a
week later, when the British army already regarded his capture as a
simple morning privilege. Such inspirations of military prescience
belong to every age; and often they shorten wars by their determining
value.
As a sound basis for a right estimate of Washington’s military career,
and to avoid tedious episodes respecting the acts and methods of many
generals who were associated with him at the commencement of the
Revolutionary War, a brief synopsis of the career of each will find
early notice. The _dramatis personæ_ of the Revolutionary drama are thus
made the group of which he is to be the centre; and his current orders,
correspondence, and criticisms of their conduct, will furnish his
valuation of the character and services of each. The single fact, that
no general officer of the first appointments actively shared in the
immediate siege of Yorktown, adds interest to this advance outline of
their personal history.
For the same purpose, and as a logical predicate for his early
comprehension of the real issues involved in a contest with Great
Britain, an outline of events which preceded hostilities is introduced,
embracing, however, only those Colonial antecedents which became
emotional factors in forming his character and energizing his life as a
soldier.
The maps, which illustrate only the immediate campaigns of Washington,
or related territory which required his supervision, are reduced from
those used in “Battle Maps and Charts of the American Revolution.” The
map entitled “Operations near New York,” was the first one drafted, at
Tarrytown, New York. In 1847, it was approved by Washington Irving, then
completing his Life of Washington, and his judgment determined the plan
of the future work. All of the maps, however, before engravure, had the
minute examination and approval of Benson J. Lossing. The present volume
owes its preparation to the personal request of the late Robert C.
Winthrop, of Massachusetts, made shortly before his decease, and is
completed, with ever-present appreciation of his aid and his friendship.
HENRY B. CARRINGTON.
HYDE PARK, MASS., Sept. 1, 1898.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER I.
PAGE
EARLY APTITUDES FOR SUCCESS 1
CHAPTER II.
THE FERMENT OF AMERICAN LIBERTY 10
CHAPTER III.
THE OUTBREAK OF REPRESSED LIBERTY 20
CHAPTER IV.
ARMED AMERICA NEEDS A SOLDIER 31
CHAPTER V.
WASHINGTON IN COMMAND 41
CHAPTER VI.
BRITISH CANADA ENTERS THE FIELD OF ACTION 50
CHAPTER VII.
HOWE SUCCEEDS GATES.—CLOSING SCENES OF 1775 58
CHAPTER VIII.
AMERICA AGAINST BRITAIN.—BOSTON TAKEN 68
CHAPTER IX.
SYSTEMATIC WAR WITH BRITAIN BEGUN 82
CHAPTER X.
BRITAIN AGAINST AMERICA.—HOWE INVADES NEW YORK 93
CHAPTER XI.
BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 101
CHAPTER XII.
WASHINGTON IN NEW YORK 114
CHAPTER XIII.
WASHINGTON TENDERS, AND HOWE DECLINES, BATTLE.—HARLEM HEIGHTS AND
WHITE PLAINS 125
CHAPTER XIV.
THE FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN.—TRENTON 134
CHAPTER XV.
THE FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN DEVELOPED.—PRINCETON 150
CHAPTER XVI.
THE AMERICAN BASE OF OPERATIONS ESTABLISHED.—THE SECOND NEW JERSEY
CAMPAIGN 160
CHAPTER XVII.
BRITISH INVASION FROM CANADA.—OPERATIONS ALONG THE HUDSON 171
CHAPTER XVIII.
PENNSYLVANIA INVADED.—BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE 181
CHAPTER XIX.
WASHINGTON RESUMES THE OFFENSIVE.—BATTLE OF GERMANTOWN 192
CHAPTER XX.
JEALOUSY AND GREED DEFEATED.—VALLEY FORGE 198
CHAPTER XXI.
PHILADELPHIA AND VALLEY FORGE IN WINTER, 1778 210
CHAPTER XXII.
FROM VALLEY FORGE TO WHITE PLAINS AGAIN.—BATTLE OF MONMOUTH 221
CHAPTER XXIII.
THE ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE TAKES EFFECT.—SIEGE OF NEWPORT 238
CHAPTER XXIV.
MINOR EVENTS AND GRAVE CONDITIONS, 1779 246
CHAPTER XXV.
MINOR OPERATIONS OF 1779 CONTINUED.—STONY POINT TAKEN.—NEW ENGLAND
RELIEVED 255
CHAPTER XXVI.
SHIFTING SCENES.—TEMPER OF THE PEOPLE.—SAVANNAH 263
CHAPTER XXVII.
THE EVENTFUL YEAR 1780.—NEW JERSEY ONCE MORE INVADED 269
CHAPTER XXVIII.
BATTLE OF SPRINGFIELD.—ROCHAMBEAU.—ARNOLD.—GATES 282
CHAPTER XXIX.
A BIRD’S-EYE VIEW OF THE THEATRE OF WAR 294
CHAPTER XXX.
THE SOLDIER TRIED.—AMERICAN MUTINY.—FOREIGN JUDGMENT.—ARNOLD’S
DEPREDATIONS 304
CHAPTER XXXI.
THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN, 1781, OUTLINED.—COWPENS.—GUILFORD
COURT-HOUSE.—EUTAW SPRINGS 312
CHAPTER XXXII.
LAFAYETTE IN PURSUIT OF ARNOLD.—THE END IN SIGHT.—ARNOLD IN THE
BRITISH ARMY 323
CHAPTER XXXIII.
NEW YORK AND YORKTOWN THREATENED.—CORNWALLIS INCLOSED BY LAFAYETTE 333
CHAPTER XXXIV.
BRITISH CAPTAINS OUTGENERALED.—WASHINGTON JOINS LAFAYETTE 344
CHAPTER XXXV.
THE ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE VINDICATED.—WASHINGTON’S MAGNANIMITY.—HIS
BENEDICTION 352
CHAPTER XXXVI.
WASHINGTON’S PREDICTION REALIZED.—THE ATTITUDE OF AMERICA
PRONOUNCED 366
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
APPENDIX A.—American Army, by States 377
APPENDIX B.—American Navy and its Career 378
APPENDIX C.—Comparisons with Later Wars 380
APPENDIX D.—British Army, at Various Dates 383
APPENDIX E.—Organization of Burgoyne’s Army 387
APPENDIX F.—Organization of Cornwallis’s Army 388
APPENDIX G.—Notes of Lee’s Court-martial 389
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
GLOSSARY OF MILITARY TERMS 393
CHRONOLOGICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL INDEX 397
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS.
ILLUSTRATIONS.
PAGE
WASHINGTON _Frontispiece._
[Hall’s engraving from the St. Memin crayon.]
WASHINGTON AT FOUR PERIODS OF HIS MILITARY CAREER 40
[From etching, after Hall’s Sons’ group.]
WASHINGTON AT BOSTON 80
[From Stuart’s painting, in Faneuil Hall, Boston.]
WASHINGTON BEFORE TRENTON 143
[From Dael’s painting.]
WASHINGTON IN HIS ROOM AT VALLEY FORGE 207
[From the painting by Scheuster.]
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
MAPS.
I. —OUTLINE OF THE ATLANTIC COAST 1
II. —BOSTON AND VICINITY 69
III. —BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 105
IV. —OPERATIONS NEAR NEW YORK 125
V. —CAPTURE OF FORT WASHINGTON 132
VI. —TRENTON AND VICINITY 144
VII. —BATTLE OF TRENTON: BATTLE OF PRINCETON 151
VIII. —OPERATIONS IN NEW JERSEY 161
IX. —ATTACK OF FORTS CLINTON AND MONTGOMERY 179
X. —BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE 186
XI. —BATTLE OF GERMANTOWN 196
XII. —OPERATIONS ON THE DELAWARE 202
XIII. —OPERATIONS NEAR PHILADELPHIA 204
XIV. —ENCAMPMENT AT VALLEY FORGE 211
XV. —BATTLE OF MONMOUTH 224
XVI. —OUTLINE MAP OF HUDSON RIVER 255
XVII. —BATTLE OF SPRINGFIELD: OPERATIONS FROM STATEN
ISLAND 283
XVIII. —LAFAYETTE IN VIRGINIA 339
XIX. —OPERATIONS IN CHESAPEAKE BAY 355
XX. —SIEGE OF YORKTOWN 357
[Illustration: Outline of Atlantic Coast]
WASHINGTON THE SOLDIER.
CHAPTER I.
EARLY APTITUDES FOR SUCCESS.
The boyhood and youth of George Washington were singularly in harmony
with those aptitudes and tastes that shaped his entire life. He was not
quite eight years of age when his elder brother, Lawrence, fourteen
years his senior, returned from England where he had been carefully
educated, and where he had developed military tastes that were
hereditary in the family. Lawrence secured a captain’s commission in a
freshly organized regiment, and engaged in service in the West Indies,
with distinguished credit. His letters, counsels, and example inspired
the younger brother with similar zeal. Irving says that “all his
amusements took a military turn. He made soldiers of his school-mates.
They had their mimic parades, reviews, and sham-fights. A boy named
William Bustle, was sometimes his competitor, but George was
commander-in-chief of the school.”
His business aptitudes were equally exact, methodical, and promising.
Besides fanciful caligraphy, which appeared in manuscript school-books,
wherein he executed profiles of his school-mates, with a flourish of the
pen, as well as nondescript birds, Irving states that “before he was
thirteen years of age, he had copied into a volume, forms of all kinds
of mercantile and legal papers: bills of exchange, notes of hand, deeds,
bonds, and the like.” “This self-tuition gave him throughout life a
lawyer’s skill in drafting documents, and a merchant’s exactness in
keeping accounts, so that all the concerns of his various estates, his
dealings with his domestic stewards and foreign agents, his accounts
with government, and all his financial transactions, are, to this day,
monuments of his method and unwearied accuracy.”
Even as a boy, his frame had been large and powerful, and he is
described by Captain Mercer “as straight as an Indian, measuring six
feet and two inches in his stockings, and weighing one hundred and
seventy-five pounds, when he took his seat in the Virginia House of
Burgesses in 1759. His head is well shaped though not large, but is
gracefully poised on a superb neck, with a large and straight rather
than a prominent nose; blue-gray penetrating eyes, which were widely
separated and overhung by heavy brows. A pleasing, benevolent, though a
commanding countenance, dark-brown hair, features regular and placid,
with all the muscles under perfect control, with a mouth large, and
generally firmly closed,” complete the picture. The bust by Houdon at
the Capitol of Virginia, and the famous St. Memin crayon, fully accord
with this description of Washington.
His training and surroundings alike ministered to his natural
conceptions of a useful and busy life. In the midst of abundant game, he
became proficient in its pursuit. Living where special pride was taken
in the cultivation of good stock, and where nearly all travel and
neighborly visitation was upon horseback, he learned the value of a good
horse, and was always well mounted. Competition in saddle exercise was,
therefore, one of the most pleasing and constant entertainments of
himself and companions, and in its enjoyment, and in many festive
tournaments that revived something of the olden-time chivalry of
knighthood, Washington was not only proficient, but foremost in
excellence of attainment.
Rustic recreations such as quoits, vaulting, wrestling, leaping, the
foot-race, hunting and fishing, were parts of his daily experience, and
thoroughly in the spirit of the Old Dominion home life of the well-bred
gentleman. The gallantry of the times and the social amenities of that
section of the country were specially adapted to his temperament, so
that in these, also, he took the palm of recognized merit. The lance and
the sword, and every accomplishment of mimic warfare in the scale of
heraldic observance, usual at that period, were parts of his panoply, to
be enjoyed with keenest relish, until his name became synonymous with
success in all for which he seriously struggled. Tradition does not
exaggerate the historic record of his proficiency in these manly sports.
Frank by nature, although self-contained and somewhat reticent in
expression; unsuspicious of others, but ever ready to help the deserving
needy, or the unfortunate competitor who vainly struggled for other
sympathy, he became the natural umpire, at the diverting recreations of
his times, and commanded a respectful confidence far beyond that of
others of similar age and position in society. With all this, a sense of
justice and a right appreciation of the merit of others, even of rivals,
were so conspicuous in daily intercourse with a large circle of familiar
acquaintances, whether of influential families or those of a more humble
sphere of life, that he ever bent gracefully to honor the deserving,
while never obsequious to gain the favor of any.
Living in the midst of slave labor, and himself a slaveholder, he was
humane, considerate, and impartial. Toward his superiors in age or in
position, he was uniformly courteous, without jealousy or envy, but
unconsciously carried himself with so much of benignity and grace, that
his most familiar mates paid him the deference which marked the demeanor
of all who, in later years, recognized his exalted preferment and his
natural sphere of command. The instincts of a perfect gentleman were so
radicated in his person and deportment, that he moved from stage to
stage, along life’s ascent, as naturally as the sun rises to its zenith
with ever increasing brightness and force.
All these characteristics, so happily blended, imparted to his choice of
a future career its natural direction and character. Living near the
coast and in frequent contact with representatives of the British navy,
he became impressed by the strong conviction that its service offered
the best avenue to the enjoyment of his natural tastes, as well as the
most promising field for their fruitful exercise. The berth of
midshipman, with its prospects of preferment and travel, fell within his
reach and acceptance. Every available opportunity was sought, through
books of history and travel and acquaintance with men of the naval
profession, to anticipate its duties and requirements. It was
Washington’s first disappointment in life of which there is record, that
his mother did not share his ardent devotion for the sea and maritime
adventure. At the age of eleven he lost his father, Augustine
Washington, but the estate was ample for all purposes of Virginia
hospitality and home comfort, and he felt that he could be spared as
well as his brother Lawrence. With all the intensity of his high
aspiration and all the vigor of his earnest and almost passionate will,
he sought to win his mother’s assent to his plans; and then, with filial
reverence and a full, gracious submission, he bent to her wishes and
surrendered his choice. That was Washington’s first victory; and similar
self-mastery, under obligation to country, became the secret of his
imperial success. Irving relates that his mother’s favorite volume was
Sir Matthew Hale’s Contemplations, moral and divine; and that “the
admirable maxims therein contained, sank deep into the mind of George,
and doubtless had a great influence in forming his character. That
volume, ever cherished, and bearing his mother’s name, Mary Washington,
may still be seen in the archives of Mount Vernon.”
But Washington’s tastes had become so settled, that he followed the
general trend of mathematical and military study, until he became so
well qualified as a civil engineer, that at the age of sixteen, one year
after abandoning the navy as his profession, he was intrusted with
important land surveys, by Lord Fairfax; and at the age of nineteen was
appointed Military Inspector, with the rank of Major. In 1752 he became
the Adjutant-General of Virginia. Having been born on the twenty-second
day of February (February 11th, Old Style) he was only twenty years of
age when this great responsibility was intrusted to his charge.
The period was one of grave concern to the people of Virginia,
especially as the encroachments of the French on the western frontier,
and the hostilities of several Indian tribes, had imperilled all border
settlements; while the British government was not prepared to furnish a
sufficient military force to meet impending emergencies. As soon as
Washington entered upon the duties of his office, he made a systematic
organization of the militia his first duty. A plan was formulated,
having special reference to frontier service. His journals and the old
Colonial records indicate the minuteness with which this undertaking was
carried into effect. His entire subsequent career is punctuated by
characteristics drawn from this experience. Rifle practice, feats of
horsemanship, signalling, restrictions of diet, adjustments for the
transportation of troops and supplies with the least possible
encumbrance; road and bridge building, the care of powder and the
casting of bullets, were parts of this system. These were accompanied by
regulations requiring an exact itinerary of every march, which were
filed for reference, in order to secure the quickest access to every
frontier post. The duties and responsibilities of scouts sent in advance
of troops, were carefully defined. The passage of rivers, the felling of
trees for breastworks, stockades, and block-houses, and methods of
crossing swamps, by corduroy adjustments, entered into the instruction
of the Virginia militia.
At this juncture it seemed advisable, in the opinion of Governor
Dinwiddie, to secure, if practicable, a better and an honorable
understanding with the French commanders who had established posts at
the west. The Indians were hostile to all advances of both British and
French settlement. There was an indication that the French were making
friendly overtures to the savages, with view to an alliance against the
English. In 1753 Washington was sent as Special Commissioner, for the
purpose indicated. The journey through a country infested with hostile
tribes was a remarkable episode in the life of the young soldier, and
was conducted amid hardships that seem, through his faithful diary, to
have been the incidents of some strangely thrilling fiction rather than
the literal narrative, modestly given, of personal experience. During
the journey, full of risks and rare deliverances from savage foes,
swollen streams, ice, snow, and tempest, his keen discernment was quick
to mark the forks of the Alleghany and Monongahela rivers as the proper
site for a permanent post, to control that region and the tributary
waters of the Ohio, which united there. He was courteously received by
St. Pierre, the French commandant, but failed to secure the recognition
of English rights along the Ohio. But Washington’s notes of the winter’s
expedition critically record the military features of the section
traversed by him, and forecast the peculiar skill with which he
accomplished so much in later years, with the small force at his
disposal.
In 1754 he was promoted as Colonel and placed in command of the entire
Virginia militia. Already, the Ohio Company had selected the forks of
the river for a trading-post and commenced a stockade fort for their
defence. The details of Washington’s march to support these pioneers,
the establishment and history of Fort Necessity, are matters of history.
Upon assuming command of the Virginia militia, Washington decided that a
more flexible system than that of the European government of troops, was
indispensable to success in fighting the combined French and Indian
forces, then assuming the aggressive against the border settlements.
Thrown into intimate association with General Braddock and assigned to
duty as his aid-de-camp and guide, he endeavored to explain to that
officer the unwisdom of his assertion that the very appearance of
British regulars in imposing array, would vanquish the wild warriors of
thicket and woods, without battle. The profitless campaign and needless
fate of Braddock are familiar; but Washington gained credit both at home
and abroad, youthful as he was, for that sagacity, practical wisdom,
knowledge of human nature, and courage, which ever characterized his
life.
During these marchings and inspections he caused all trees which were so
near to a post as to shelter an advancing enemy, to be felled. The
militia were scattered over an extensive range of wild country, in small
detachments, and he was charged with the defence of more than four
hundred miles of frontier, with an available force of only one thousand
men. He at once initiated a system of sharp-shooters for each post.
Ranges were established, so that fire would not be wasted upon
assailants before they came within effective distance. When he resumed
command, after returning from the Braddock campaign, he endeavored to
reorganize the militia upon a new basis. This reorganization drew from
his fertile brain some military maxims for camp and field service which
were in harmony with the writings of the best military authors of that
period, and his study of available military works was exact,
unremitting, and never forgotten. Even during the active life of the
Revolutionary period, he secured from New York various military and
other volumes for study, especially including Marshal Turenne’s Works,
which Greene had mastered before the war began.
Washington resigned his commission in 1756; married Mrs. Martha Custis,
Jan. 6, 1759; was elected member of the Virginia House of Burgesses the
same year, and was appointed Commissioner to settle military accounts in
1765. In the discharge of this trust he manifested that accuracy of
detail and that exactness of system in business concerns which have
their best illustration in the minute record of his expenses during the
Revolutionary War, in which every purchase made for the government or
the army, even to a few horse-shoe nails, is accurately stated.
Neither Cæsar’s Commentaries, nor the personal record of any other
historical character, more strikingly illustrate an ever-present sense
of responsibility to conscience and to country, for trusts reposed, than
does that of Washington, whether incurred in camp or in the whirl and
crash of battle. Baron Jomini says: “A great soldier must have a
_physical_ courage which takes no account of obstacles; and a high
_moral_ courage capable of great resolution.” There have been youth,
like Hannibal, whose earliest nourishment was a taste of vengeance
against his country’s foes, and others have imbibed, as did the ancient
Hebrew, abnormal strength to hate their enemies while doing battle; but
if the character of Washington be justly delineated, he was, through
every refined and lofty channel, prepared, by early aptitudes and
training, to honor his chosen profession, with no abatement of aught
that dignifies character, and rounds out in harmonious completeness the
qualities of a consummate statesman and a great soldier.